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Abstract
This thesis focuses on the importance of the concepts of political power, structure and agency in 
the study of International Relations. It argues that mainstream IR theory has yet to incorporate the 
main findings of critical theories, such as post-modernism and feminism, into its analytical 
toolbox. It will offer the author’s own theory of world power, which combines a Foucaultian with a 
structurationist approach to argue for the existence of four-faced power relationships across twelve 
interdependent sites of material and cognitive power: i) the site of time; ii) the site of space; iii) the 
site of knowledge and aesthetics; iv) the site of morality and emotion; v) the site of identities; vi) 
the site of the body; vii) the site of welfare; viii) the site of culture/cultural life; ix) the site of civic 
associations; x) the site of the economy; xi) the site of the organisation of violence and coercive 
relations; and xii) the site of regulatory and legal institutions. These power relations operate at 
multiple levels of agency across world society, from the individual through to world polities, as 
well as across the twelve sites of power interdependently. The case of HIV/AIDS is then used to 
illustrate the necessity of broadening mainstream conceptions of power in International Relations.
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Chapter One: Introduction -  The Importance of the Concept of 
Power for the Study of World Politics
“Reports that say that something hasn't happened are always interesting to me, because as we 
know, there are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known 
unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also 
unknown unknowns - the ones we don't know we don't know. ”I
Playground Politics
The above quotation by the U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has received 
much global coverage since he initially made the statement, even winning a so- 
called ‘Foot in Mouth’ award for its perceived bizarreness and thus hilarity.2 The 
simplicity of Rumsfeld’s statement is however part of its geniality -  there are 
‘known knowns’, which are known and can be identified, there are ‘known 
unknowns’, which are not known but could possibly be identified if access to this 
knowledge was available, and there are ‘unknown unknowns’, which might 
possibly never be known since we do not know we need to look for them. As this 
thesis hopes to make clear, the remark is illustrative of the main problems facing 
anyone wishing to construct a theory of world relations, since such a theory will 
always be limited by the existence of ‘unknown unknowns’ -  events or 
circumstances that the theorist has very little if any knowledge about. That is not 
to say that it is a futile enterprise however -  on the contrary, some theories can 
help to understand the complex realities of the world a little better, while others 
can distort these realities to the point of obscurity.
Imagine the case of George, a 12-year-old boy, who attends The United Kids 
School in Country A. Bom of wealthy parents and with a self-confidence to match 
his ‘superior’ social standing, George dominates the school playground with his 
fists. He has security in his ‘hegemonic’ or ‘imperial’ position3, in the form of an 
assured alliance, or posse, that always backs him up when the going gets tough.
1 U.S. Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, cited on the BBC, Tuesday 2nd December 2003.
2 Ibid.
3 It should be noted that I do not take the concepts of ‘hegemony’ and ‘empire’ to be interchangeable. 
However, as shall be argued in the introduction to this thesis, I do perceive an urgent need for a more 
comprehensive debate on the underlying concept of power in much of the current debates on each of 
the two concepts.
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The income of the group is maintained by coercing the other children to give them 
their lunch money -  initial verbal threats are followed up by violence if needs be. 
It is usually the newer children who fall victim to the group -  the children who 
have been there longer either avoid the playground when they can or have 
developed a routine to deal with the situation -  either by giving George the money 
up front, no questions asked, or by offering him other services -  such as helping 
him with homework etc. One group of children, mostly female, try to avoid the 
playground at all costs -  since George and his friends do not (yet) like girls -  and 
keep themselves busy by practising in the school orchestra and theatre group at 
lunchtimes. There is also a school football team that practices at lunchtime -  
George is not good enough to be a member of the team but he occasionally lets a 
couple of his comrades take part, when they are not required in “other matters”. 
There is also a school tuck shop, run by a couple of George’s classmates, which he 
and his comrades regularly frequent with their stolen earnings. And, finally, at the 
other side of the playground, there is another group of children who George and 
his friends usually leave alone, since they rarely have any money to spare and do 
not interest him.
The question is -  is George truly the ‘hegemonic’ or ‘imperial’ power of the 
playground? He does admittedly have the ultimate say over which children are 
able to walk home without a black eye. Even when his group is fully assembled 
however, he cannot pick more than one battle at once. Nonetheless, he knows how 
to subordinate the other children, even when he is alone -  name-calling and 
taunting are frequent tactics to remind the others of his superiority. “Sticks and 
stones may hurt their bones but words may also harm them” is one of his father’s 
favourite paraphrases. Indeed, it seems that George has not only inherited his 
social position from his father and older brothers (who were also quite active in 
playground politics), but they have also taught him all of the necessary tricks of 
the trade -  such as accepting responsibility for fights where he was not even 
present, just to maintain the image of ‘supreme’ power. And while he knows that 
there are ‘rules’, of sorts, to playground politics -  simply to maintain the order of 
things -  he is also aware that these are only to be adhered to when it suits his own 
interests. And, of course, he knows how to behave in class and to deny everything 
if asked by any of the teachers.
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So, George certainly knows how to behave as the ‘hegemonic’ or ‘imperial’ 
power, but is he really the most powerful? The children who take his stolen 
earnings in the tuck shop and go on to become successful business leaders might 
disagree. In fact, George also has to share his earnings with his comrades -  indeed 
he has to pay for their support in many ways, including backing them up in fights 
of their own and helping them out with their homework -  all to maintain their 
allegiance. The football field is also an arena where George has little power -  the 
team has won many matches and recognition -  indeed, one of the players in later 
life gains world acclaim. And while the girls in the orchestra and theatre group 
may be restricted access to the playground because of George and his antics, they 
too succeed in their ambitions when they leave school. As for the children who are 
left alone on the other side of the playground, they are, at least for now, equal to 
George in access to territory, if not to economic resources.
“Ok”, you might ask, “apart from a couple of ‘clever’ names and an over-stretched 
plot in its attempts to mirror current world events, what does this story really have 
to do with the study of International Relations (IR)?” Well, the point is that all I 
have done so far is to paint a very stereotypical, essentialist picture of ‘playground 
politics’. The reader will probably recognise many of the sub-plots, since I have 
intentionally included some of the ‘storylines’ that would suit many neo-/realist, 
world-system, constructivist or even some feminist analyses of current world 
events, if translated to the ‘international’ level. But the reader will also probably 
agree that, as far as storylines go, these sub-plots are all pretty general and tell us 
very little about the politics of this particular playground, or any other playground 
for that matter, in any greater detail. Indeed, there are so many possible dynamics 
going on even here, that this playground alone could consume an entire academic 
thesis!
For George might actually be a fairly lonely boy, with few ‘real’ friends to help 
him when he really needs them, and little to show for his conquests other than a 
few bruised noses and a couple of crumpled notes. And while he enjoys 
‘hegemonic’ power in the playground, at home he struggles to maintain any form 
of autonomy, other than when he escapes to his room. In fact, he wishes he could
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be on the other side of the playground with the quiet children, where all is ‘peace’ 
and ‘harmony’. Those children, however, are actually terrified of George and wish 
for nothing more than to gain access to his group -  with internal rivalries within 
the ‘quiet’ group thus in abundance. The girls in the school orchestra are likewise 
pretty fed up with the situation and would much rather earn their share of the 
takings -  either in the tuck shop or through the playground’s clandestine deals. In 
another ‘playground’ altogether, however, it is the gymnastics team that is doing 
well instead of the football team and George is in fact Georgina, who lives in the 
local council estates opposite the school. And in yet another ‘playground’ again, it 
is the neighbouring ‘playground’ that provides for all the excitement, as their 
bullies wait outside the gates after school has finished for the day...
... I could of course go on! The varieties of this story are as numerous as they are 
diverse and I am fully aware that, even with such a ‘simple’ case, I have not yet 
deconstructed it enough. Which is exactly my point. For it is difficult to tell which 
power relations are operating even on a ‘local’ level, with the simple analogy of a 
‘playground’. I have yet, for example, to examine more closely the most basic 
neo-/realist claim about power, namely that the most effective or dominant form of 
power is ‘military’ -  or, as I will call it, ‘existential power’ -  i.e. the power over 
life and death. If George/-ina walks into the playground with a loaded gun one 
day, for example, he or she will certainly have ‘existential’ power over the other 
children, especially if he or she actually uses it. However, as I will come to argue 
later in this thesis, this simplification of analysis ignores the fact that ‘existential’ 
power comes in many different forms -  many of which are not governed by the 
use of direct physical violence but rather by subtler, less obvious means.
More on this and the different forms of power later in the thesis however. The 
main point that I wish to make here, with the example of the playground, is that it 
is difficult enough to define who the main players are, as well as where they are 
actually located, even in such a ‘simple’ case study. For although the initial 
reaction might be that George/-ina is the ‘hegemonic’ or ‘imperial’ power, a closer 
inspection will probably reveal that there are numerous other actors involved who 
could also contend for that position (if it even exists), depending on which form of 
power one gives precedence. It is also unclear exactly where the ‘boundaries’ of
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this power are located, since these can be geographical, sociological, cultural, 
economic or even psychological, dividing the children into ‘rich’/ ’poor’, 
‘male’/ ’female’, ‘majority’/minority’ etc. -  and not as simple dichotomies but 
rather as diffuse, overlapping identities that will matter in some cases and not in 
others. And each child will have their own individual psychological boundaries, 
both between each other and within themselves, which will also be multiple and 
diffuse, mattering in varying degrees depending on the context of the situation. 
The combination of all of these boundaries together -  which not only overlap but 
also change in content and form over time and space -  will result in multiple 
relations of power between the children that cannot adequately be summarised 
with the simple statement “George/-ina is a (hegemonic/imperial) bully”.
By now, the reader may think that I have dwelt on the case of the school bully for 
rather too long, given that this is supposed to be a discussion of world relations of 
power. What I am talking about is commonly perceived to constitute little more 
than ‘interhuman society’ or ‘first-order society’ in standard IR terminology.4 
And yet all of the above scenarios -  as well as many more besides -  could be said 
to hold true even in world relations. It is just as difficult (if not more, due to the 
sheer vastness of scale) to determine the boundaries of interaction between the 
different actors on an ‘international’ level. And it is the aim of this thesis to reveal 
why this must be so.
Although the story of George/-ina reveals that there are many possible accounts of 
power in the playground, this thesis argues that traditional theories of power 
typically fall into one of three categories: i) behaviouralist; ii) structuralist; and iii) 
post-modernist. This on its own is not so surprising perhaps -  after all, together all 
of these three schools of thought have dominated the social sciences for most of 
the 20th Century and beyond, contributing greatly to their development. What is a 
problem however is that none of these three approaches on their own is sufficient 
to encapsulate the full complexities of relations of power. Rather, they prioritise 
one of power’s many dimensions over the others -  i) behaviouralism typically 
focuses on the power of social actors to change or maintain the relations of power
4 Buzan, Barry. (2004), pxvii.
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in which they find themselves; ii) structuralism typically views power as a social 
structure that constrains or facilitates all actors in their capacities to change these 
power relations; iii) while post-modernism rejects the notion of theorising about 
power altogether, maintaining that the very discourse of power itself constitutes a 
relation of power that benefits some actors at the cost of others. It is the contention 
here however that, although each of these approaches highlights important aspects 
of power, none of them can be used on their own if one wishes to fully 
comprehend the complexities of power. Instead, all three approaches need to be 
combined, using theories of structuration and relational power, if the concept is to 
be fully understood. This thesis will examine this argument in detail, not only 
arguing why this must be so but also examining the consequences that this has for 
the theorisation of world politics in general.
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World Politics -  U.S. ‘Hegemony* or ‘Empire*?
“[M y] belief that the end o f U.S. hegemony has already begun does not follow from  the 
vulnerability that became apparent to all on September 11, 2001. In fact, the United States has 
been fading as a global power since the 1970s, and the U.S. response to the terrorist attacks has 
merely accelerated this decline [ ...]  U.S. decline in the world-system is structural, and is not the 
result o f merely errors in policy committed by previous U.S. governments. It cannot be reversed. 
To be sure, it can be managed intelligently, but that is precisely what is not happening now. ”5
(Immanuel Wallerstein, 2003)
“Not since Rome has one nation loomed so large above the others [ ...]  The United States is 
undoubtedly the world's number one power, but how long can this situation last, and what should 
we do with it? [ ...]  Declinism tends to produce overtly cautious behavior that could undercut our 
influence; triumphalism could beget a potentially dangerous absence o f restraint, as well as an 
arrogance that would also squander our influence [ ...]  Simply put, power is the ability to effect the 
outcomes you want, and if necessary, to change the behavior of others to make this happen. ”6
(Joseph Nye, 2002)
“The notion of the American superpower is a myth, as Joseph Nye has argued with different 
words. True, there is no match fo r  American military power. But this does not make it possible for  
America to bomb all the important countries or areas: Europe, Russia, China, Japan, India, 
Pakistan, and the like. So, yes, it is possible to bomb Afghanistan or Iraq or, eventually, Colombia. 
But this does not add substantial power [ ...]  the USA is a superpower o f the industrial age that is 
only now starting to build up defenses against the netwars of the information age. For these 
netwars, the USA cannot proceed with its current unilateralism. It needs cooperation, information, 
cultural and political ability to penetrate the networks. ”7 
(Manuel Castells, 2003)
The above ‘soundbites’ -  chosen not only for their independent strength of 
conviction and, more notably, disagreement, but also since they originate from 
some of today’s main ‘spokesmen’ within the Western social sciences on the 
current state of U.S. power -  illustrate the fact that contemporary debates on world 
power are, quite simply put, all over the place. What forms this power actually 
takes, whether it constitutes ‘empire’, ‘hegemony’ or neither of these, and whether 
the extent of the said ‘state’s’ power is on the rise or in decline, are all hotly 
disputed points of contention. This is not surprising perhaps, since the case of the
5 Wallerstein, Immanuel. (2003), p l3  & 306.
6 Nye, Joseph S. (2002), p i & 4.
7 Castells, Manuel and Ince, Martin. (2003), p i 14-115.
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playground has made clear that there are always many sides to any story. To come 
up with a definitive theory of world power is thus not only impossible but also 
unadvisable, as it is difficult to envisage a theory that manages to encapsulate 
every single story that could be told about the relations of power that affect world 
politics.
There is however a need to understand power more fully than is currently the case 
in many analyses of world relations. It is argued here that this can be done by 
bringing together the main arguments of the behaviouralists, structuralists and 
post-modernists, since these three schools of thought span the spectrum of the 
many possible stories it is possible to tell about world power relations. There have 
of course been uncountable attempts throughout history and across the academic 
disciplines to define this ‘thing called power’ -  from the Ancient Greeks and 
Machiavelli to more contemporary approaches, such as behaviouralism and 
structuralism, as well as post-modernist calls to abandon the cause altogether -  but 
none of these ideas have been synthesised into one area of study, as has been the 
case with other major social concepts such as democracy, culture or nationalism. 
This means that a study on the power of the U.S. does not face the same 
methodological ‘stringency’ as one on, say, U.S. democracy, culture or 
nationalism would do. On the contrary, the underlying theoretical concept of 
power used in many contemporary studies of ‘hegemony’ or ‘empire’ is rarely 
questioned, debated or (re-)defined. Rather the definition of what is actually meant 
by U.S. power is often taken as a given, and comments on its prevalence 
frequently thrown around haphazardly, without regard for other theoretical 
approaches to the subject.
To demonstrate the importance of defining one’s underlying perception of power, 
let us look again at the above three quotations. In their defence, it should be noted 
that another reason for their selection is precisely because, unlike much current 
discourse on the state of U.S. power, they are surprisingly open about their 
underlying theoretical definitions of power. To begin with Immanuel Wallerstein, 
it is obvious (indeed, it is stated) that his is a structural definition. In his view, U.S. 
power is not taken by the ‘state’ itself but is rather granted to it by the very nature 
of what he calls the ‘world system’. Although he still allows for some notion of
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agency, by stating that the U.S. government can deal with the rise or (in his view) 
decline of such power with varying degrees of ‘intelligence’, he does not believe 
that the process itself can be halted. It is quite simply the inevitable structural 
changes in the world system that do and will dictate the extent of U.S. power from 
one day to the next.
Joseph S. Nye, in turn, offers a stark contrast to this argument and is quite 
obviously behavioural in his approach. He argues that the future of U.S. power lies 
firmly in the government’s own hands, stating quite openly that power is the 
ability of one actor to change not only outcomes, but also the behaviour of other 
actors. This can be done either by using ‘hard’ (military or economic) or ‘soft’ 
power (culture), but the underlying assumption is that the U.S. government 
ultimately decides over its own fate in the world, since power, in his view, is 
fundamentally agency-based.
And finally, Manuel Castells argues that the capabilities of the U.S. are severely 
limited by its positioning in world ‘networks’ -  specifically those relating to 
information technology. The notion of networks indicates a more ‘structurated’ 
approach than the other two, as it retains the concept of agency (in contrast to 
Wallerstein), but instead of confining it to one ‘state’ actor (as Nye does), Castells 
‘spreads’ it out to include other social actors (networks) than ‘states’ alone. More 
on structurationist approaches to power later however.
Suffice to say at this point that contemporary debates on the eventual rise or 
decline of U.S. power thus appear to be in complete disarray. Many theorists seem 
unable even to agree upon what it is they are actually talking about -  i.e. what is 
U.S. power? -  nevermind on whether or not the U.S. ‘has’ more or less of this 
‘thing’ than before. That theorists disagree over this is obviously partly due to the 
problem that behind every concept of power lies the theorist’s own normative 
view of society8, and it is clear that, for instance, Wallerstein, Nye and Castells all 
have very different normative views both of what world society is and what it 
should be -  indeed, further reading of their respective works makes this point very
8 Hay, Colin. (1997), p45.
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clear. In the social sciences in general, however, disagreements on the extent of 
U.S. power also seem to stem from a common and rather unrefined usage of the 
concept of power itself. And this part of the problem will not and cannot be 
resolved until a more thorough theoretical debate on the concept of world power is 
(re-)opened. In sum, then, this thesis sets out to open up for debate exactly what it 
is that the U.S. may ‘have’, or alternatively is ‘granted’, more or less than 
everyone else of -  and more specifically, who the ‘U.S.’ and ‘everyone else’ is.
It is argued here that, by categorising theories of power as being either 
behaviouralist, structuralist or post-modernist, a more coherent overall analysis of 
the concept of power can be achieved. Of course, a theory may never be purely 
behaviouralist, structuralist or post-modernist -  indeed, some more structurationist 
theories of power already cross this methodological divide, as shall be examined 
later in the thesis. It is also possible that the theorists in question may themselves 
reject the label attributed to their theory. It is however necessary to try to ascertain 
the main dividing lines that separate one theory of power from another and it is the 
argument here that this is most easily done using these three categories as a 
reference point. It should not be taken as a definitive categorisation of theories of 
power however -  it is certainly possible that there are theories of power which do 
not fall into any of the three categories, although it is difficult to conceive which 
these might be. Nonetheless, it is the argument here that these are the three schools 
of thought that most typically represent not only the main dividing lines that 
currently prevail in the social sciences but also those which best summarise the 
main differences between different conceptions of power.
When it comes to theorising world politics in general, the same division can be 
said to apply. Mainstream IR theory can also be divided into those who prioritise 
either a behavioural or structural analysis, as well as those who favour a post­
modernist approach. Dating back to Kenneth Waltz’ and Immanuel Wallerstein’s 
respective reification of structures (the former denoting a system of states, the 
latter a capitalist system), to Hans Morgenthau’s reification of human nature and 
individualism, IR theories can be seen to have prioritised either agency or 
structure in their accounts of world power. Globalisation theories, similarly, often 
favour a structural approach, prioritising the structural properties of the capitalist
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system over behavioural analyses of human agency. Indeed, the complex world of 
global politics is frequently ordered into neat little boxes or theories, in the hope 
that this will make the world an easier place to understand. It is the argument here 
however that it does not -  on the contrary, all such simplifications lead to a 
weakened understanding of the world as a ‘whole’.
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Traditional Definitions of Power in International Relations and Globalisation 
Theories
“The disciplinary tendency to associate power with realism and to work primarily with the realist 
conceptualization partly owes to the fact that rivals to realism typically distance themselves from  
‘pow er’ considerations [ ...]  A consequence of this failure to develop alternative conceptualizations 
o f power has been to reinforce the discipline’s gravitation toward the default conception as defined
by realism. ”9
As the above quotation makes clear, IR has historically been closely associated 
with the realist concept of power, meaning that it is thus often seen as state- and 
agency-bound. Indeed, until very recently, there was such consensus about this 
that it was difficult to find detailed debate about the concept within realist and 
indeed IR literature in general. One had to delve deep into adjacent debates on 
hegemony, empire or structure/agency to disentangle theorists’ implicit views on 
power. The dominant realist lens views a hegemonic power, for example, simply 
as that state which is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing 
international relations, is willing to do so and, in addition, can revoke existing 
rules, prevent the adoption of new rules that it opposes, or play the dominant role 
in constructing new rules.10 This is clearly a behaviouralist perspective, as it 
focuses merely on the capacity of an actor (a state) to behave in certain ways and 
set the agenda in international politics. Indeed, it is dangerous to fall for the 
common claim that realism (and indeed IR in general) constitutes a highly 
‘structural’ perspective. The fact that its main assumption is that states are the 
most important actors in world politics, who rationally seek power in an anarchic 
system, makes it highly behavioural. As Barry Buzan et al point out:
“The Waltzian [neorealist] notion o f structure is, as has often been pointed out, derived from the 
units. It is not, as in some o f the more metaphysical versions of structuralism in linguistics, a 
preexisting force that generates units and interactions. Rather it is generated by the interaction
and arrangement o f the units. ”n
9 Barnett, Michael and Duvall, Raymond. (2005a), p40-41.
10 Keohane, Robert O. and Nye, Joseph S. (1977), p44.
11 Buzan, Barry et al. (1993), p i 1.
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The units are of course the states and power is thus reduced to nothing more than a 
product of state interaction. A classical example of this in IR literature -  made all 
the more noteworthy for its unique attempt at a definition of international power, 
albeit with considerable reluctance and marked frustration -  is that offered by 
Robert Gilpin in War and Change in International Politics:
“The concept o f power is one of the most troublesome in the field  o f international relations and, 
more generally, political science [ ...]  In this book, power refers simply to the military, economic, 
and technological capabilities o f states. This definition obviously leaves out important and 
intangible elements that affect the outcomes of political actions, such as public morale, qualities of
leadership, and situational factors [ . . . ] ”12
The fact that Gilpin admits only to having left out other ‘outcomes of political 
actions’ and not to the absence of a structural dimension, reveals the implicit 
acceptance of behaviouralism in mainstream IR theory. For although some might 
argue that a state’s capabilities differ from its actions -  in that capabilities could 
be said to constitute the state’s structural positioning in the international system -  
the focus is in my view still far too concentrated on the potentiality to action. Like 
Gilpin, Nye also (perhaps unwittingly) proves this point when he admits that 
references to the resources or capabilities of a state, far from denoting structural 
power, are simply “shorthand” for what, ultimately, amounts to little more than a 
behavioural definition (note: I have put emphasis on all of his references to 
action):
“Simply put, power is the ability to effect the outcomes you want, and if  necessary, to change the 
behavior o f others to make this happen [ ...]  The ability to obtain the outcomes one wants is often 
associated with the possession of certain resources, and so we commonly use shorthand and define 
power as possession of relatively large amounts of such elements as population, territory, natural 
resources, economic strength, military force, and political stability. Power in this sense means 
holding the high cards in the international poker game. If you show high cards, others are likely to 
fold their hands. O f course, if  you play poorly or fall victim to bluff and deception, you can still 
lose, or at least fail to get the outcome you want. ”13
12 Gilpin, Robert. (1981), pl3-14.
13 Nye Jr., Joseph S. (2002), p4-5.
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Much has been made of Nye’s definition of ‘power as being broader and more 
multi-dimensional than mainstream IR theory, but the above quotation proves that 
he too falls into the realist trap of behaviouralism. For although he includes ‘soft’ 
power in his definition of the concept, this turns out to be just another term for 
what in earlier debates has been called the third face of power (a theory by Steven 
Lukes, which shall be examined in more detail later in this thesis), as Nye defines 
‘soft power’ as “the ability to set the political agenda in a way that shapes the 
preferences of others.”14 Although this is an important and frequently forgotten 
aspect of behavioural power, it is nonetheless just that -  a behavioural definition. 
Add to this the fact that Nye is still preoccupied solely with the power of states 
and one is left with yet another near-perfect example of a realist definition of 
power.
“Gramsci took over from Machiavelli the image o f power as a centaur: half-man, half-beast, a 
necessary combination o f consent and coercion. To the extent that the consensual aspect o f power 
is in the forefront, hegemony prevails. Coercion is always latent but is only applied in marginal, 
deviant cases [... This] connection frees the concept o f power (and o f hegemony as one form of  
power) from a tie to historically specific social classes and gives it a wider applicability to [ ...]  
relations o f world order. It does not, however, sever power relations from their social basis (i.e., in 
the case o f world-order relations by making them into relations among states narrowly conceived), 
but directs attention towards deepening an awareness o f this social basis. ”15
As with all hegemonic discourse, there is always resistance. And, as in most of the 
social sciences, it is structuralism, with its roots in Marxist theory, which has been 
the main opponent to the mainstream behavioural approach of IR theory, in the 
form of much ‘globalisation’ theory. Here, the definition of power is not implicit 
but is instead more freely discussed, being one of the central normative concerns 
of Marxist ideology. The problem, however, is that the definitions offered are 
almost exclusively structural. Attempts by theorists such as Robert Hunter Wade 
to talk of ‘The Invisible Hand of the American Empire’16, although refreshing in 
the otherwise stagnant world of behavioural IR, (and despite all the agency 
implied in the title), still focus solely on the structural (and then solely economic)
14 Ibid, p9.
15 Cox, Robert W. (1983), pl27.
16 Hunter Wade, Robert. (2003)
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aspects of international power, paying little or no regard to other structural or 
behavioural dimensions.
It is still worth accounting for the history of structural theory of world politics, 
however, since it helps to open up the ‘blackbox’ that is structural power. Despite 
rarely having discussed global politics per se, focusing instead on theories of 
national power and hegemony, it is the work of Antonio Gramsci that has 
provided much of the inspiration for much globalisation theory. Perhaps this is 
because his international influence has penetrated beyond mainstream left-wing 
political thought. As Eric Hobsbawm writes in his introduction to Gramsci’s 
prison notebooks:
“[Gramsci] has demonstrated his independence o f the fluctuations of ideological fashion. Who 
now expects another vogue for Althusser, any more than for Spengler? He has survived the 
enclosure in academic ghettos which looks like being the fate o f so many other thinkers o f ‘western 
marxism’. He has even avoided becoming an ‘ism’. ”17
It is Gramsci’s use of the term ‘historic bloc’ (blocco storied), (which he 
developed from the ideas of Georges Sorel), that has had the most resonance in 
critical IR theory. Such ‘historic blocs’ are formed by structures and 
superstructures he states, noting that “the complex, contradictory and discordant 
ensemble of the superstructures is the reflection of the ensemble of the social
1Rrelations of production.” Indeed, it is production that is the main focus of 
Gramscian IR theory, albeit a broader definition of production than is normally to 
be found in traditional Marxist thought -  “[it] includes the production of ideas, of 
intersubjective meanings, of norms, of institutions and social practices [...] 
Looking at production is simply a way of thinking about collective life, not a 
reference to the ‘economic’ sectors of human activity”.19
And so although, at first glance, one could be forgiven for interpreting Gramsci’s 
distinction between consent and coercion as being somewhat behaviouralist, it 
becomes apparent on closer reflection that nothing could be further from his mind.
17 Hobsbawm, E J (1999), p l3.
18 Gramsci, Antonio, quoted in Forgacs, David (ed.) (1999), pl92.
19 Sinclair, Timothy J. (1996), p9.
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By equating consensual power with hegemony, he wishes to point to manipulative 
power (similarly to Lukes, as shall be examined later in the thesis) but avoids 
entangling himself in a behaviouralist discussion of such manipulation, focusing 
instead on the consensual power that is manifest but latent in structures and 
superstructures. The rare marginal, deviant cases of coercion (read behavioural 
power) are instead the hegemonic power’s rare need to reign in its subjects from 
trying to escape, through acts of counter-hegemony, this all-encompassing, 
consensual structure.
One of the principle IR theorists to use Gramsci’s concept of power and hegemony 
is Robert W. Cox. He advocates a critical approach to a theory of world order that 
includes:
“an awareness that action is never absolutely free but takes place within a framework fo r  action 
which constitutes its problematic [ .. .]  The framework fo r action changes over time [...and] has the 
form o f a historical structure [ .. .]  These structures do not determine people’s actions in any 
mechanical sense but constitute the context o f habits, pressures, expectations, and constraints
within which action takes place. ”20
Cox prioritises history and change, observing that the major driving forces of 
world order change over time, however slowly. The hitherto major actor of this 
world order, the state, has thus already undergone change under pressure from 
forces from above (world order) and from below (civil society).21 He criticises 
neorealism for reducing: i) states to material actors; and ii) world order and the 
balance of power to a configuration of material forces. Such an approach
99disregards the normative and institutional values of world order. Instead there 
are, according to Cox, three categories of forces that interact in a structure, namely 
material capabilities, ideas and institutions.23 One particular quote neatly 
summarises his view on international power mechanisms:
“The imperial system is at once more than and less than the state. It is more than the state in that it 
is a transnational structure with a dominant core and dependent periphery [ ...]  The unity o f the
20 Cox, Robert W (1981), p97.
21 Sinclair, Timothy J. (1996), p3.
22 Cox, Robert W. (1981), p l02.
23 Ibid, p98.
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state, posited by neorealism, is fragmented in this image, and the struggle fo r and against the 
imperial system may go on within the state structures at both core and periphery as well as among 
social forces ranged in support and opposition to the system. ”24
What is more, Cox shares Gramsci’s notion of consensual hegemony, making the 
classical comment: “Hegemony is like a pillow: it absorbs blows and sooner or 
later the would-be assailant will find it comfortable to rest upon.”25 Indeed, to 
compensate for the fact that Gramsci never offered a theory of world order and 
power, Cox does it for him, stating:
“Hegemony at the international level is thus not merely an order among states [...It] can be 
described as a social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure; and it cannot be 
simply one o f these things but must be all three.1,26
24 Ibid, p 106-107.
25 Cox, Robert W. (1983), pl39.
26 Ibid, pl37.
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The Post-Modernist Critique o f Mainstream Theories of World Politics
“The concept o f [international] power [ ...]  must include cultural and ideological factors as 
resources of power. Furthermore, the concept of power must include both relational and structural 
mechanisms of power. The former denotes power in relation to other parties. The latter refers to 
that power which can be gained via a dominating position in the international system or through
some of its institutions. ”27
Mainstream theories of world politics have not only tended to rely too heavily on 
either behavioural or structural definitions of power however, but also in the range 
of political issues (ie. actors and structures) that are taken to be relevant. There is a 
continued dominance of ‘state-centrism’ in the field that has much to do with the 
historical and normative origins of IR in particular -  namely to secure world peace 
through diplomacy and negotiation on an ‘interstate’ level. As Jacinta O’Hagan 
points out, “[t]he discipline of International Relations was bom from a desire to 
understand and prevent war between states and all the key paradigms, to a greater 
or lesser extent, continue to acknowledge the centrality of the state.”28 As shall be 
examined in this thesis, even those theorists who have managed to avoid ‘state- 
centrism’ have typically found themselves focusing solely on one issue, whether 
that is the power of the economy, history or culture.
Those theorists who do take other actors and structures than ‘states’ into account 
are mainly to be found in the critical sub-disciplines of constructivism, 
scientific/critical realism, gender and post-colonial studies. These critical schools 
of thought have tended to focus on producing critiques of mainstream approaches, 
thus implicitly (however unintentionally) acknowledging and helping to maintain 
the ‘state-centric’ stronghold of the discipline. As of yet, there have been very few 
attempts made to incorporate these critical approaches into mainstream theories of 
IR -  those few brave souls who have tried to ‘rewrite’ IR theory will be accounted 
for later in the thesis. Indeed, it seems that, while there has been a plethora of 
highly admirable attempts to deconstruct mainstream concepts of world relations, 
there have been very few attempts made to reconstruct new ones that take, for 
example, gender and post-colonial critiques into account.
27 (My translation) Hveem, Helge. (1996), p l7.
28 O’Hagan, Jacinta. (2002), p21-22.
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I am aware that not all IR feminists or post-colonialists would agree with me on 
this point. In a recent publication of International Affairs, Gillian Youngs claims 
that feminist IR theorists have dealt with tasks that have been “both deconstructive 
and reconstructive.” She does however acknowledge that there is a “gulf that 
continues to exist between what might be called mainstream (‘malestream’ is a 
term frequently used in feminist critiques) International Relations and feminist 
International Relations”, the latter of which, while ‘flourishing’ as a sub-field, has 
failed to make “much impact on the field as a whole.”29 This is contrary to the 
aims and ambitions of feminism however, for as Youngs points out “[f]eminism 
requires an ontological revisionism: a recognition that it is necessary to go behind 
the appearance and examine how differentiated and gendered power constructs the 
social relations that form that reality.”30 Hers is a call for feminism to be fully 
integrated into mainstream theory -  a task that has yet to be accomplished.
Some feminists have resisted the notion of incorporating their discourses into 
mainstream approaches altogether however. Jill Steans for example, warns that 
those feminists who have been incorporated into mainstream IR have tended to be 
“those scholars who seemingly work with stable and unproblematic gender 
categories. In turn, in embracing what appears to be a settled and essentialist 
conception of gender, mainstream scholars have effectively attempted to reduce 
gender to the status of one of many ‘variables’ that might be used to inform our 
theories on causality or to quantify impacts in international politics.”31 This is not 
the approach I am advocating however. As I shall argue below, it is not my 
intention to just add gender into a theory of world power as one of many variables, 
but rather as one that permeates any analysis of world relations, as a social reality 
that still today affects world politics.
This thesis intends to incorporate those issues of power that have been raised by 
feminists and post-colonialists into a theory of world power without reifying the 
concepts of gender or ethnicity per se, in the hope that a theory that includes all of
29 Youngs, Gillian. (2004), p75.
30 Ibid, p77.
31 Steans, Jill. (2003), p430.
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these issues of power does away with the need to separate feminist, post-colonial 
and mainstream theories. This does not mean that I am advocating that IR ‘does 
away’ with feminist or post-colonial discourses altogether however. On the 
contrary, as this thesis shall show, inequalities based on differences of gender or 
colonial experiences are as real and as violent in today’s world as they ever have 
been -  thus, as specialist subjects that are able to highlight many of the dimensions 
of these inequalities (in much greater detail than is possible in a general theory of 
world politics) both schools of thought are unfortunately still of the utmost 
relevance to IR. Indeed, it is since both schools of thought are of such importance 
to the discipline, that it is the argument here that it is high time both were 
incorporated into ‘mainstream’ conceptions of world power and society. 
Mainstream IR theories need to give as full a description of world politics as 
possible -  issues of gender or post-colonialism can no longer be side-lined as 
issues of secondary importance.
It is thus the argument here that mainstream IR’s continued ‘state-/economic- 
centricity’ leaves the discipline unable to examine other, very real causes of 
conflict that operate on ‘non-state’ levels. These are conflicts that are not only 
military in nature but can also be socio-economic -  using Johan Galtung’s 
definition of structural violence. Indeed, it is one of the main contentions of this 
thesis that conflict can -  at least partly -  be explained by unequal distributions of 
all forms of social power across the globe. For such inequalities can lead to the 
struggle between different actors (including both ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ actors, as 
well as other, less organised forms of human organisation, such as those built upon 
divisions of gender) to gain access to *resources’ (material and non-material) on 
a global and/or local level. However, to date, most mainstream IR theories have 
failed to fully account for relations of inequality and thus power. This leaves the 
discipline unable to adequately explain fundamental structures of power in world 
relations, such as those that have resulted in the predominance of HIV/AIDS 
amongst women in the ‘developing’ world. For, as shall be seen later in this thesis, 
such phenomena cannot be explained by ‘state-/economic-centric’ theories alone -  
indeed, they demand instead that mainstream IR learns from feminist and post-
32 Galtung, J. (1969)
26
colonial discourses and incorporates their methodologies into its theoretical 
frameworks.
"In particular, theories of power must explain the immersion of human beings in nets o f power 
relations that constrain their possibilities while simultaneously uncovering the means by which 
human beings have the ability to resist and challenge those relations. ”33
This thesis will argue that, at the very essence of power, lies the ability o f human 
agents to maintain, create or challenge existing power structures, at the same time 
as they are themselves being maintained, created or challenged by prevailing 
power structures. These two processes lie at the very heart of human existence and 
society, and neither process can exist without the other. Individual agents (be they 
individual humans, states or other human aggregates) both affect and are affected 
by societal constraints. They may be influenced by their cultural upbringing, for 
example, and may live their whole lives never questioning its roots, but they can 
also change that cultural heritage to mean something quite different in a fairly 
short period of time -  the relative successes of feminism in Western societies over 
the past hundred or so years being a fair case in point.
In a recent publication entitled A New Weave o f Power, People and Politics..., 
Lisa VeneKlasen and Valerie Miller make a useful distinction between the 
different realms of power that are relevant to its conception:
i) the public realm o f power -  refers to the visible face of power as it affects
women and men in their jobs, employment, public life, legal rights, etc.
ii) the private realm o f power -  refers to relationships and roles in families,
among friends, sexual partnerships, marriage, etc.
iii) the intimate realm o f power -  has to do with one’s sense of self, personal
confidence, psychology and relationship to body and health.34
One of the main reasons for choosing HIV/AIDS as the empirical focus of this 
thesis is that it highlights the highly political nature, not only of the public realms
33 Wartenberg, Thomas E. (1992), pxix.
34 VeneKlasen, Lisa -  Miller, Valerie (2007), p51.
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of power, but also of the private and intimate realms of power -  all of which, it is 
argued here, affect and are affected by world society. Indeed, as VeneKlasen and 
Miller point out, “[t]he challenge of AIDS prevention further illustrates some of 
the contradictions that occur with regard to relations of power in the intimate 
realm. Many seemingly educated, empowered women and men around the world 
fail to take measures to protect themselves against the disease despite the 
knowledge and resources to do so.”35 It is the argument here however that the 
intimate realm of power is not only dependent on agency but also constitutes a 
structure of power. It is thus the hope that this thesis will reveal how all three of 
these realms play a significant role in shaping world relations.
For there is simply no part of human existence, or agency, which is free from 
societal conditioning and thus independent from networks of power. But these 
networks of power cannot exist freely of human agency either, since they need 
human (in-)action to be maintained, created or challenged -  that is, to exist -  in 
the first place. As shall become apparent, however, the inclusion of everything in a 
concept of power is a somewhat controversial point, even to those who advocate 
similarly ‘structurated’ approaches. For even those IR theorists who accept the 
need to combine agency with structure when defining political power, have so far 
done so without then following what in my view is the inherent logic of that power 
-  that it is (only) as extensive in its reach as is human society and existence itself.
35 Ibid, p52.
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Conclusion -  Overview o f the Thesis
Part One of this thesis will explore the theoretical implications of restricting an 
analysis of power to one of the three schools of thought -  behaviouralism, 
structuralism and post-modernism -  and suggest a way of combining the insights 
of all three, using structurationism to tie them all together. Chapter Two will begin 
to do this by looking at the three schools’ conceptions of power in detail, 
accounting for the main debates on power that have taken place within the social 
sciences over the past century or so. The main strengths and flaws of each school 
of thought will be examined, leading to the conclusion that, while each school 
certainly has something to offer a definition of power, none is capable of grasping 
the full complexities of power relations on their own. Chapter Three will then 
examine theories of structurationism as a means of tying together these three 
schools of thought. The ontological existence of power, agency and structure will 
be defended, using the scientific realist argument for the study of unobservables 
(namely the known unknowns -  the unknown unknowns can, as already stated, not 
even be theorised), with the limitation that, while power might be ontological in its 
existence, any definition of it will always be epistemological and thus always up 
for dispute. A theory of power can thus never be verified to be certainly true or 
false, but it can be judged according to how much more certainly true or false it is 
compared to other theories. The final chapter of Part One, Chapter Four, then 
presents the theory of power that is offered in this thesis, as a combination of 
behaviouralist, structuralist and post-modernist theories of power, using 
structurationism as the glue which holds them together.
Part Two then sets out to exemplify why a structurationist definition of power is 
preferable to any of the three schools of thought on their own, using the case of 
global HIV/AIDS to illustrate both the theoretical and practical dangers and 
limitations of using a more narrow analysis. Chapter Five begins by giving a brief 
overview of what is known about the disease and why it has been chosen as an 
example of world power relations. Chapter Six will then show that most research 
on the social causes and implications of HIV/AIDS can also be categorised 
according to the three schools of thought (behaviouralism, structuralism and post­
modernism), with a brief overview of both the theoretical and the practical
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implications of each analysis. Chapters Seven, Eight and Nine will then conclude 
the thesis by examining the case of HIV/AIDS using the structurated definition of 
power that is offered in this thesis, arguing that it is only by combining all three 
approaches that world relations of power (exemplified here by HIV/AIDS) can be 
understood in their full complexity.
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Chapter Two: Political Debates on Power -  Behavioural, 
Structural and Post-Modernist Definitions of Power
Introduction -  Reining in the Concept of Power
“Power has always been the most fundamental concept in the study of politics. [...I]n the 
history of political theory and political science since their origins in ancient Greece, 
power has constantly stood out as the single most important defining conceptual issue. ”36
/
“That political scientists remain divided by the common language of power is perhaps 
testament to the centrality o f the concept to political analysis. Quite simply, power is
politics, politics is power. ”37 
/
“It is said that it is easy to recognise an elephant -  but much harder to define one. The
same with power. ”38
Despite being one of the most fundamental concepts -  or as Henri Goverde et al 
(in the first quotation above) would have it, the most important concept -  of 
political theory, power is a notoriously difficult, if not impossible concept to rein 
in, its definition depending on the context of the analysis and the normative stance 
of the theorist. As a concept which has captured the attention of political 
philosophers since ancient times, one recent estimate by Dennis H. Wrong is that 
there are now “hundreds, perhaps thousands, of more recent definitions of social
<3Q
power”. This is because power is what Ludwig Wittgenstein termed a ‘family 
resemblance’ concept40 -  it cannot be captured by a single definition. As Goverde 
et al point out however -  “[t]his does not entail that all usages of the word ‘power’ 
are unrelated. They are related, but not by any single characteristic. Rather, their 
relationship is formed from a criss-crossing set of commonalities that interweave 
into a complex tapestry of related meanings.”41 As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, it is argued here that theories of power can be divided into three main
36 Goverde, Henri et al. (2000), p i.
37 Hay, Colin. (1997), p45.
38 Strange, Susan. (1996), pl7.
39 Wrong, Dennis H. (1993), p9.
40 Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1968), p36.
41 Goverde, Henri et al. (2000), p i8.
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categories, namely those which are behaviouralist (viewing power as the capacity 
of one actor to maintain or change a relation of power over another actor), those 
which are structuralist (viewing power as a structure that either constrains or 
enables all actors in relation to one another), and those which are post-modernist 
(viewing power as something which cannot and should not be defined).
Regardless of the commonalities between these many definitions of power 
however, there is often very little unity to be found in the opinions of their makers 
-  namely the theorists of power themselves. As Colin Hay points out in the second 
quotation above, political scientists ‘remain divided by the common language of 
power’ for the simple reason that ‘power is politics, politics is power’. For, 
underlying each theorist’s definition of power is their normative conception of the 
world which, when brought into conflict with someone else’s, can naturally be 
conceptually very divisive. According to Goverde et al, the debates on power that 
have taken place in the social sciences and normative political theory have done so 
“in relative conceptual isolation from one another. When debates do cross, it 
becomes obvious that the concepts of power at the center of these debates refer to 
different social phenomena. Over time, many strategies have been developed for 
coping with this, including: (a) insisting that ‘your’ concept of power is the ‘right 
one’; (b) arguing that what others are analyzing constitutes a trivial aspect of 
power; or (c) ignoring what others are doing.” Goverde et al maintain however 
that there are four theoretical issues that have been central to these strategies and 
debates, namely: “1. power as a contested, family resemblance concept; 2. the 
problematic of structure and agency in power analysis; 3. the evolving debate on 
globalization and structuration, or the restructuring of power in a globalizing 
world; and 4. the relationship between power and democratic decision-making.”42 
The next three chapters will focus on the first, second and third theoretical issues 
listed by Goverde et al, albeit not in that particular order 43
42 Ibid, pl7.
43 The fourth issue, that of the relationship between power and democratic decision-making, will be left 
already at this early stage of the thesis, as that issue seeks to answer the question what power ought to 
be rather than what it is -  the latter of which is the main focus of this thesis. That the two issues are 
connected, by the very fact that they both involve normative judgements on the state of the world -  as 
it is and as it ought to be -  is of course accepted. Nonetheless, the main focus of this thesis is on where 
to find power rather than what to do with it.
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Steven Lukes (whose own theory of power shall be examined in more detail later 
in this chapter) makes the useful distinction between ‘potentia’ and ‘potestas’ 
(citing Spinoza’s definition of the two Latin terms) -  the former relating to the 
power of things in nature (including persons) ‘to exist and act’, the latter meaning 
the state of being in the power of another.44 Although the rest of Lukes’ work 
focuses on potestas -  power in the form of domination -  it is clear that the analysis 
of power also includes the notion of potentia. For if power is defined as the 
capacity to act in society, then it is the argument here that this action is not only 
dependent on the actions of others (potestas) but also of the structural potential or 
placing of the relevant actors in the first place (potentia). In other words, it is 
argued here that it is necessary to include both potentia and potestas in a 
definition o f power. This is similar to the typical distinction that is made between 
‘power over’ and ‘power to’. And similarly, it is the argument here that, in order 
to be able to study a social actor’s  ‘power to ’, one must necessarily include 
‘power over’, since it is the placing of this actor in relation to others that dictates 
his or her power to do anything at all. In other words, any definition of power 
must necessarily include both its behavioural (potestas) and structural (potentia) 
aspects, since the power that people have over each other is highly dependent on 
their capacities to act in society at all.
Structure and agency alone cannot ‘solve’ the problematic of defining power 
however. Indeed, as already mentioned, post-modernism has long criticised any 
attempts to define power in the first place. As shall be examined in more detail in 
this chapter, one of the main proponents of this approach, Michel Foucault, 
dedicated his life’s work to showing the underlying discourses of power and long 
fought against the idea that there is any one definition of power that suits all power 
relations. Instead, he argued that knowledge itself is power -  thus, any definition 
of power can be used as a means with which to sustain current power relations. 
The post-modernist approach must therefore also be taken into consideration in 
any attempt to define the concept, since it not only highlights the problems with 
settling with any one definition, but also reveals the interrelationship between the 
discourse of power and power itself. Furthermore, post-modernism highlights the
44 Lukes, Steven. (2005), p73.
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importance of contextually specific definitions -  prioritising the empirical over the 
theoretical if you will -  arguing that power is always case-specific to the particular 
power relations in question. Thus power theorised can never fully comprehend 
power empiricised -  it is always dependent on the particular power relations in a 
certain relationship.
Structurationism can help to bring together these three approaches however. As 
shall be examined in the next chapter, structurationism highlights the relationship 
between structure and agency -  arguing that they are interrelated and cannot be 
separated from one another. It highlights the processes that relate structure 
(society) and agency (people), which in turn affect people’s knowledge of the 
structures in which they live. These processes are mutually dependent -  agency 
can change structure and vice versa. Thus, structurationism can also be used as a 
link between post-modernism and theory -  highlighting the interdependence 
between theory and society. For just as theory can affect empirical realities, so too 
can they affect theory -  our place in the world is to some extent governed by our 
knowledge of it, but so too is our knowledge of the world affected by our place in 
it.
To this end, the aim in this thesis is to focus on the problematic of structure and 
agency in power analysis and to try to resolve this with contextually specific 
structurated theories of power that accept that power means many different things 
to many different people around the world. For it is only when conceptual 
divisions of power are understood as being fundamentally normative divisions that 
a common ground can even be hoped to be found in the form of a contextual, 
relational and structurated approach to the concept. Thus, the aim here is not only 
to link behavioural and structural theories of power, but also to problematise these 
more general definitions by adding the post-modernist critique. Before revealing 
in the next chapter how structurationism can help to link all three approaches 
however, this chapter sets out to uncover the main strengths and weaknesses of 
each approach.
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Behavioural Power as Agency -  The ‘Faces of Power’ Dehate.
Max Weber defined power as “the probability that one actor within a social 
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, 
regardless of the basis on which this probability rests.”45 This idea -  that power is 
the exertion of influence of one (or more) social actors over other social actors -  is 
one that, according to Gerhard Goehler, is still widespread throughout the social 
sciences and which also, in his view, corresponds to our everyday understanding 
of power.46 For although it is a definition of power that is most closely associated 
with the pluralists and the behaviouralist school of the 1940’s and 50’s, such 
definitions of power still abound in the discourse of power today. Popularly 
known as the ‘faces of power’ debate, these definitions focus on the ‘faces’ or 
agents of power, rather than on its structural constraints. Four ‘faces’ of power 
have so far been defined in this debate - all of which will be discussed below.
The first ‘face’ of power (although not entitled as such until later in the debate) 
was introduced by Robert Dahl in 1957:
“My intuitive idea of power, then, is something like this: A has power over B to the extent 
that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do. ”47
There are two important conditions on which Dahl’s theory rests -  relevant since 
they provoked the rest of the ‘faces of power’ debate. Firstly, the theory assumes 
that there is a conflict o f interests between the actors A and B, and secondly, that 
A can only be said to have power over B if A ‘wins’ a process of conflict that is 
overt, and in which A and B participate consciously and actively. Thus, as Hay 
points out, “by virtue of A’s power, B not only modifies her behaviour, but does 
so in full knowledge that her modified behaviour is contrary to her own genuine 
interests.”49 This raises the thorny question of whether it is theoretically possible 
or even indeed normatively desirable to locate an actor’s ‘genuine’ or ‘real
45 Weber, Max. (1993), p37.
46 Goehler, Gerhard. (2000), p41.
47 Dahl, Robert. (1957), p202-203.
48 (My emphasis and translation) Hveem, Helge, (1997), p25.
49 Hay, Colin. (2002), pl72.
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interests’. For not only is it highly questionable whether a theory of power can, 
should or indeed needs to subscribe interests onto actors in order to be able to state 
that relations of power exist, but it is also possible that the actors involved in the 
actual power relationship themselves may not always fully comprehend what is in 
their ‘real’ interests in the first place. This will be discussed in further detail 
below, since it is of most relevance to Steven Lukes’ ‘radical’ third ‘face’ of 
power. Suffice to say at this stage that it is an issue that has plagued the ‘faces of 
power’ debate since the very beginning. For the main problem with the notion of 
interests offered by Dahl here is, as Hay states, that “[a]ctors are assumed to be 
blessed with perfect information and hence to know their real interests.”50 As shall 
be examined in greater detail below however, access to ‘perfect information’ 
cannot always be taken for granted in the decision-making process, nor can actors 
always be assumed to be acting in their real interests, however these are defined.
Dahl was only interested in observable conflicts of power however, where each 
actor’s interests are clearly set out and stated. Indeed, the support of empirical 
evidence was crucial to his idea of power -  he claimed in a subsequent article that 
“a theory that cannot even in principle be controverted by empirical evidence is 
not a scientific theory.”51 That there may be problems finding the data to calculate 
power relations, as he suggested doing and indeed attempted, was no deterrent to 
Dahl: “The observations may be exceedingly difficult but they are not inherently 
impossible: they don’t defy the laws of nature as we understand them” he 
concluded.52 In his 1957 paper and subsequent publications, he set out to establish 
algebraic equations on the probability that B will do as A wishes, and on the 
amount of power that A can be said to hold. These empirical investigations were 
limited to observations of the formal and thus overt proceedings of political 
institutions, such as the local politics of New Haven or the United States Senate, 
thus ignoring other relationships of power that might exist either covertly within 
the institution itself or across institutions and society.53
50 Ibid.
51 Dahl, Robert. (1958), p463.
52 Dahl, Robert. (1957), p214.
53 Ibid, p209-214.
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Indeed, Dahl’s is a state-centric view of the world, as he assumed that power is 
solely to be found in the hands of the political decision-makers of the state and 
that this power is always overt and observable. This was in response to proponents 
of the so-called ruling elite model, which he criticised for its potential of being “a 
type of quasi-metaphysical theory made up of what might be called an infinite 
regress of explanations. [...] If the overt leaders of a community do not appear to 
constitute a ruling elite, then the theory can be saved by arguing that behind the 
overt leaders there is a set of covert leaders who do. If subsequent evidence shows 
that this covert group does not make a ruling elite, then the theory can be saved by 
arguing that behind the first covert group there is another, and so on.”54 On his 
subsequent ‘proposed test’ of the model, he stated “I do not want to pretend either 
that the research necessary to such a test is at all easy to carry out or that 
community life lends itself conveniently to strict interpretation according to the 
requirements of the text. But I  do not see how anyone can suppose that he has 
established the dominance o f a specific group in a community or a nation without 
basing his analysis on the careful examination o f a series o f concrete decisions.”55 
Thus, the idea of power as overt, observable behaviour in the form of concrete 
decisions was vital to Dahl -  for without evidence of its existence, there was in his 
view simply no point in theorising about it. As Hay points out however, such an 
approach could actually help to maintain existing power structures by allowing 
them to go unquestioned:
“It is all very well to consider the exercise o f power within the decision-making chamber, 
but if this is merely a talking shop from which consideration o f all contentious issues has 
already been excluded, then the wood is being missed for the foliage on the trees. Indeed, 
such a narrow concern with decision-making is tantamount to an endorsement of 
systematic and deep-seated power relations. It is, in short, a normative legitimation of the 
political elite masquerading as a neutral and dispassionate science o f the political. ”56
Linked to the serious normative implications of ignoring other mechanisms of 
power than those found in the official decision-making process, are the equally 
grave theoretical limitations to Dahl’s definition of power as it stands. Indeed, the
54 Dahl, Robert. (1958), p463.
55 (Emphasis in original). Ibid, p466.
56 (Emphasis in original). Hay, Colin. (2002), p i75.
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very reason that Dahl’s theoretical definition of power is called one-dimensional is 
because of “its narrow focus on power as decision-making”57, as it thus leaves out 
the multitudes of other ways in which actors can have power over each other. As 
shall be examined in more detail below, there are numerous other ‘faces’ or 
dimensions to agentic power that Dahl’s definition fails to capture. Common to all 
of the ‘faces of power’ definitions however is the problem that they are all also 
actor-centred -  neither Dahl nor any of the other ‘faces of power’ theorists have so 
far been able to satisfactorily account for structural constraints on agency. Indeed, 
Clarissa Rile Hayward (who advocates ‘defacing’ the concept of power altogether, 
as shall be examined in more detail towards the end of this chapter) criticises all of 
the ‘faces of power’ definitions for retaining Dahl’s original formulation of the 
problem, which focuses solely on the power that actor A has over actor B. Her 
main criticism is that, throughout the discourse on power’s various ‘faces’ or 
dimensions, “Dahl’s statement of the question [...] remained unchallenged.”58
Another serious limitation with Dahl’s definition of power is that he sees it as a 
zero-sum phenomenon -  a view which, as Hay points out, maintains that “some 
gain [power] only to the extent that others lose out. If Anna has power, Ben does 
not; the extent of Anna’s power is the extent of Ben’s lack of power.”59 As shall 
be examined later in this chapter, power relationships are rarely if ever this simple 
-  both actors will, except in extreme cases of total domination, always have the 
power to change the power relationship. Thus A’s power cannot be said to cancel 
out or replace B’s power to act in the relationship. It is for this reason that power 
cannot be satisfactorily explained as simply constituting a commodity that passes 
from one actor to another, as Dahl’s theory seems to suggest.
“[A] fresh study of power is called for, an approach based upon a recognition of the two 
faces of power. Under this approach the researcher would begin [...] by investigating the
particular ‘mobilization o f bias. ”60
57 Ibid, pl73.
58 Hayward, Clarissa Rile. (2000), p i8.
59 Hay, Colin. (2002), pl73.
60 Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton S. (1969a), p99.
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It was Peter Bachrach and Morton S. Baratz who launched the debate into the 
concept of different dimensions, or ‘faces’ of power. They criticised Dahl and 
other pluralists for claiming that power could only be analysed after careful 
examination of a series of concrete decisions. For this ignored the fact that power 
can also be exercised “by confining the scope of decision-making to relatively 
‘safe’ issues”. In other words, they wished to include the “nondecision-making 
process” into the concept.61 This is not to say that they rejected Dahl’s definition, 
however. On the contrary, they accepted that “of course power is exercised when 
A participates in the making of decisions that affect B.”62 And they agreed that 
power is relational between actors.63 They simply wished to add a second 
dimension, where A could be said to “devote his energies” to limiting the scope of 
the political process so that only issues that were of benefit to A were brought to 
the agenda.64 Three additional prerequisites were included: i) that there be a 
conflict of interests or values between two or more persons or groups; ii) that B 
actually bows to A’s wishes; and iii) that one of the parties can threaten to invoke 
sanctions.65
The main contribution of Bachrach and Baratz’s definition of power, as Hay so 
succinctly puts it, was that it “extended the sphere of political analysis from the 
parliament or formal decision-making arena to include the corridors of power, the 
boardroom, the masonic lodge, the golf course and the clubs and pubs in which 
agenda-setting occurs behind the scenes.” However, as Hay also makes clear, this 
“did not come without a price. [...T]he analysis of power was set to become an 
altogether more complex, exacting and, arguably, subjective task. This led a 
number of pluralist critiques to conclude that non-decision-making was simply 
unresearchable”.66 This was however a criticism that Bachrach and Baratz had 
“reject[ed] in advance [...] In reacting against the subjective aspects of the 
sociological model of power, the pluralists have, we believe, made the mistake of 
discarding ‘unmeasurable elements’ as unreal. It is ironical that, by so doing, they 
have exposed themselves to the same fundamental criticism they have so
61 Ibid, p95 -96.
62 Ibid, p95.
63 Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton S. (1969b), plOl.
64 Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton S. (1969a), p95.
65 Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton S. (1969b), pl01-102.
66 Hay, Colin. (2002), p 176.
39
forcefully levelled against the elitists: their approach to and assumptions about 
power predetermine their findings and conclusions.”
Even though Bachrach and Baratz’s definition of power was a significant 
improvement on Dahl’s, in that it allowed for the (albeit difficult) analysis of 
agenda-setting, it also and somewhat paradoxically retained the limitation of only 
looking for power in processes of decision-making -  the very limitation that it 
critiqued. For even non-decisions are decisions -  in this case, decisions to ignore 
or sideline an issue. Indeed, if a non-decision is, as Bachrach and Baratz claimed, 
“a decision that results in the suppression or thwarting of a latent or manifest
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challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker” , then it is clear that 
this too is a conscious decision not to make a decision. As Alan Bradshaw has 
pointed out, a non-decision cannot exist per definition: “We cannot legitimately 
conceive of an actor [A] who possesses relevant information, or who is in a 
position to acquire that information (and aware of that), ever making a 
nondecision which is a wo-decision, i.e. simply failing to make a decision” he 
claimed. Rather, A has in that case “made a decision to neglect”.69
Moreover, not only did Bachrach and Baratz’s definition of power limit its scope 
of analysis to non-/decision-making but it thus also focused solely on the power of 
agency, meaning that it faced the same problem as Dahl’s definition in that it too 
ignored structural constraints on this agency. One theorist who tried to resolve this 
problem -  albeit unsuccessfully -  was Steven Lukes:
“The trouble seems to be that both Bachrach and Baratz and the pluralists suppose that 
because power, as they conceptualise it, only shows up in cases o f actual conflict, it 
follows that actual conflict is necessary to power. But this is to ignore the crucial point 
that the most effective and insidious use of power is to prevent such conflict from arising
in the first place. ”70
67 Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton S. (1969a), p99.
68 Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton S. (1970), p44.
69 (Emphasis in original.) Bradshaw, Alan. (1976), p i24.
70 Lukes, Steven. (1974), p23.
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It was in a thin volume entitled Power: A Radical View (PRV) that Lukes first 
offered his ‘radical view’ on the concept of power. He too accepted Dahl’s first 
dimension, as well as Bachrach and Baratz’s second -  his contribution was to add 
a complementary third.71 Now, thirty years on from its first publication, Lukes has 
reissued a second edition of the same work, where the original version (which 
remains largely untouched) constitutes the first chapter and is followed by two 
chapters that further elaborate as well as delimit his original theory. Before 
reviewing this and the critics of his revised theory, it is worth considering the 
work as it first came out, as this not only highlights many of the problems with it 
but also enables a more detailed analysis of the revised version, enabling an 
assessment as to whether or not Lukes has managed to resolve the issues with the 
concept of a third ‘face’ of power. For while it is a concept that will be used later 
in this thesis, it is the argument here that there are still amendments to be made to 
the Lukes version of it.
Lukes’ ‘radical’ conception of power meant adding the notions of manipulation 
and socialisation to the other two dimensions of decision- and nondecision­
making. Bachrach and Baratz had explicitly excluded manipulation from the 
concept of power, claiming that it was instead “an aspect of force”.72 In Lukes’ 
words, however, he maintained that “the bias of the system is not sustained simply 
by a series of individually chosen acts, but also, most importantly, by the socially 
structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups, and practices of 
institutions, which may indeed be manifested by individuals’ inaction.” Quite 
simply, he criticised Bachrach and Baratz for having followed the pluralists by 
adopting “too methodologically individualist a view of power.”73 In this third 
dimension, A could also exercise power over B “fry influencing, shaping or 
determining his very wants”74. This cemented the concept of ‘real interests’ into 
the power debate. Controversially, Lukes argued that B could only know of these 
interests if he or she was under the conditions of ‘relative autonomy’. He also 
stated that until B had realised his or her ‘real interests’, it was defendable for A to 
continue to exercise ‘short-term power’ over B -  a relation that would ‘self-
71 Ibid, p25.
72 Bachrach, Peter and Baratz, Morton S. (1969b), pl03.
73 Lukes, Steven. (1974), p21-22.
74 (My emphasis) Ibid, p23.
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annihilate’ once B had discovered these interests.75 As shall be seen below, it is on 
the notion of ‘real interests’ that Lukes has been most heavily criticised and to 
which he has subsequently most strongly responded in the second edition, since it 
opened him up to the charge of paternalism. As Hay neatly puts it:
“The problem with such a formulation is the deeply condescending conception of the 
social subject as an ideological dupe that it conjures. Not only is this wretched individual 
incapable o f perceiving her/his true interests, pacified as s/he is by the hallucinogenic 
effects o f bourgeois (or other) indoctrination. But, to confound matters, rising above the 
ideological mists which tame the masses is the enlightened academic who from a high 
perch in the ivory tower may look down to discern the genuine interests of those not
similarly privileged. ”76
It is clear that Lukes’ theory was initially inspired by Marxist thought on ‘false 
consciousness’, as well as Gramsci’s concept of hegemony, and that he wanted to 
include structural power into the debate -  indeed, he now clearly states this in the 
introduction to the second edition.77 It is not clear however, even initially, exactly 
how the third ‘face’ was supposed to include these aspects of power. For having 
read numerous articles criticising the theory, as well as later work by Lukes 
himself where he withdrew from much of its initial content, it is apparent that a lot 
of what he earlier set out to prove has been omitted from subsequent accounts of 
the third dimension. This is most neatly summarised by the rather long 
‘disclaimer’ he writes in the second edition of PRV, where he sets out the 
limitations of the theory:
“PRV [...] focuses on the exercise of power, thereby committing the ‘exercise fallacy ’ :  
power is a dispositional concept, identifying an ability or capacity, which may or may not 
be exercised. Secondly, it focuses entirely on the exercise o f ‘power over’ -  the power o f 
some A over some B andB’s condition of dependence on A. Thirdly, it equates such 
dependence-inducing power with domination, assuming that ‘A affects B in a manner 
contrary to B ’s interests’, thereby neglecting what we have seen to be the manifold ways 
in which power over others can be productive, transformative, authoritative and
75 Ibid, p33.
76 Hay, Colin. (2002), pl79.
77 Lukes, Steven. (2005), p7-9.
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compatible with dignity. Fourthly, assuming that power, thus defined, affects the interests 
of those subject to it adversely, it offers no more than the most perfunctory and 
questionable account of what such interests are and, moreover, it treats an actor's 
interests as unitary, failing to consider differences, interactions and conflicts among one ’s 
interests. And, finally, it operates (like much of the literature on power) with a reductive 
and simplistic picture o f binary power relations, an unending array of permutating
relations between A and B ”18
Indeed, the idea of covert manipulation as a form of behavioural domination 
neatly sums up Lukes’ overall contribution to the ‘faces of power’ debate. As 
already mentioned, however, it originally also contained the concept of structural 
power. He had claimed that “the power to control the agenda of politics and 
exclude potential issues cannot be adequately analysed unless it is seen as a
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function of collective forces and social arrangements.” And yet, although there 
are still other researchers who build their analyses on his first, more ‘radical’ 
conception of power80, Lukes seemed in later years to retreat back into the 
behaviouralist school.
The reason that structural power fell out of the theory is that it simply did not fit 
into a behavioural analysis. Lukes seems to have recognised this very early on, as 
he returned to a restricted, behavioural definition of power in an essay entitled 
‘Power and Structure’, that was published only three years after the first 
publication of PRV. Here he did not even mention the third ‘face’, using the word 
‘power’ only to refer to individual (presumably conscious and intentional) 
action.81 For although he stated that “the agents operate within structurally 
determined limits”, he added “they none the less have a certain relative autonomy 
and could have acted differently.” Most striking was his comment that “the notion 
of a power structure becomes a self-contradiction, since power operates within 
structures.”82 This is a turnaround from his original argument, for as Margaret 
Groarke points out, he now “defines the social forces acting upon the agent as 
structure, not power.” And yet, she continues, ’’the [whole] point of his original
78 Ibid, p i 09.
79 Lukes, Steven. (1974), p22.
on
See Samson, Colin (1994) and Vogler, Carolyn (1998) for unabridged usage of Lukes’ initial theory.
81 Groarke, Margaret. (1993), p37.
82 Lukes, Steven. (1977), p6-7 & 9.
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theory was to show that structures and institutional arrangements were not 
neutral.”83 Regardless of this critique however, Lukes continues to echo similar 
sentiments in the second edition of PRV when he states that “social life can only 
be properly understood as an interplay of power and structure, a web of 
possibilities for agents, whose nature is both active and structured, to make 
choices and pursue strategies within given limits, which in consequence expand 
and contract over time.”84 In a critique of the revised edition, Peter Morriss neatly 
summarises the continued problem that Lukes seems to be having separating 
agency from structure:
“the difficulties Lukes has with the interrelationship between power (as agency) and 
structure only arise because he continues to work with a concept o f ‘power-over'. The 
problem is that talk o f ‘structural power' would seem to be either oxymoronic, or require 
structures to be held responsible for exercising or having power over people. But the 
problem simply disappears when we focus on ‘power-to', and have a context of social 
evaluation that does not involve responsibility; for there is no difficulty in saying that 
structures limit the ends that people can obtain (and should, for that reason, be
altered). ”85
Already after the first publication however, Groarke neatly summed up the 
dissatisfaction felt by many of Lukes’ critics: “his ‘radical’ alternative ultimately 
disappoints. Lukes offers a useful critique of those who have come before him in 
the power debate [...] but he only sketches his alternative [...] Despite his
provocative statements to the contrary, Lukes’ concept of power [...] never
86transcends the limits of the agency-based concepts of power he criticizes.” 
Somewhat remarkably perhaps, Lukes seems to echo Groarke’s ‘disappointment’ 
himself in the second edition of the book, when he admits that it is purely a
87behavioural definition and thus “entirely unsatisfactory in several respects”. 
Although he concedes that “[p]ower can be at work, inducing compliance by
oo
influencing desires and beliefs, without being ‘intelligent and intentional’” , it is
83 Groarke, Margaret. (1993), p38 & 41.
84 Lukes, Steven. (2005), p69.
85 Morriss, Peter. (2006), p i30.
86 Groarke, Margaret. (1993), p31-32.
87 Lukes, Steven, (2005), pl09.
88 Lukes, Steven. (2005), p i36.
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clear that there is little room for a structural argument in his now otherwise purely 
behavioural account of power as domination.
Nonetheless, Lukes’ ‘radical view’ can be considered to be both a theoretical 
milestone and thus also a success in the power debate, since it opened up a large 
can of worms, as critics attacked both the methodological and moral sustainability 
of his argument. Bradshaw was one of the first, questioning the logical soundness 
of a state of ‘relative autonomy’, where B is independent of all influence. For even 
if B were to become independent of A’s influence, there would be no guarantee 
that other actors, (C, D or E), would not continue to exercise their power over B. 
His second objection was that such ‘relative autonomy’ was thus a purely 
theoretical construct, falsifiable only in the impossible event of one being able to 
manipulate society as a huge laboratory. “We cannot envisage a scenario in which 
any actor is somehow liberated from all structural conditions, and hence able to 
correctly identify what his real interests would be in the best of all possible 
worlds”89 he stated.
Bradshaw (who, as already mentioned, had argued for the term ‘decision to 
neglect’, rather than Bachrach and Baratz’s preferred term ‘nondecision-making’) 
also pointed out that the notion of an unconscious ‘nondecision’ by A is 
contradictory to Lukes’ subsequent normative claim that A is responsible and to 
blame for his or her power over B. Contrary to Lukes, Bradshaw wholly rejected 
the notion of responsibility, saying that it is not difficult to imagine a circumstance 
where two independent, individually harmless actions by two actors, A and C, 
could combine to produce harmful effects to B.90 Indeed, he summarised his 
critique by stating that Lukes seemed confused as to what to include in his theory 
-  unconsciousness or responsibility -  “a confusion [...] marked out as two 
discordant notions of the nature of power combined, or rather juxtaposed, within a 
single essay.” He concluded: “Unfortunately, Lukes’ Power: A Radical View is a 
work divided against itself.”91
89 Bradshaw, Alan. (1976), pl21-123
90 (Emphasis in original) Ibid, p i24.
91 (Emphasis in original) Ibid, p i26.
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Bradshaw’s critique hit home. He was offered a reply from Lukes in the same 
journal where he denied that he had anywhere spoken of absolute autonomy -  not 
seeming to accept that the logical implication of his claim (that B should and 
could only decide his or her ‘real interests’ when free from the influences of 
power) was in fact just that, an implication of absolute autonomy. He defended the 
second dimension’s concept of nondecisions, saying that the exercise of power 
could very well be unconsidered, routine or in ignorance of alternatives. And then, 
ultimately, he proceeded to agree with the rest of Bradshaw’s critique. He 
consented that harmless action by two actors could harm B and that the third
92dimension needed elaboration to include “more complex cases such as these.”
Bradshaw was by no means the last to criticise Lukes, for the debate on the actual 
contours of the third dimension was only just beginning. Like Bradshaw, T. 
Benton criticised the concept of ‘real interests’ for implying that B could ever be 
absolutely autonomous from power -  “how do we know when enough of [A’s] 
power has been withdrawn [...]?”, he asked. He also argued that B could very 
well, even after experiencing the results of a multiplicity of policy options, choose 
to do something that was not in his or her best interest. Lukes’ argument could 
only be made to work, he said, if a notion of ‘objective’ interests were to replace 
‘real’ ones. These would instead be ascribed on the basis of principles and
Q<5
standards of general applicability. Here we can trace a normative ambition in 
Benton’s argument to counter Lukes’ radicalism with a liberal universalism, where 
both can thus be criticised for involving moral judgements of B’s interests. That 
Benton’s main concern with Lukes’ theory seems to have been political and not 
theoretical is supported by the fact that he at one point states that “the problem is 
rooted in the radical intellectual’s despair of the working class.”94 For although 
there may be some truth in the comment, Benton’s solution is not any less 
subjective. For who is to decide whether or not B has ‘objective interests’?
It was when David West entered the debate in 1987 that a viable alternative to 
Lukes’ ‘radical’ third dimension presented itself. West expressed the need for a
92 Lukes, Steven. (1976), pl29-131.
93 Benton, T. (1981), pl67-169.
94 Ibid, p i 73.
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theory that “is able to recognize manipulations of people’s values or desires as 
instances of power”, and still resist paternalism. His argument was that there is no 
need to identify people's interests, (‘real’, ‘objective’ or otherwise), in order to be 
able to recognise processes o f manipulation and thus relationships o f domination 
or power. He gave the example of advertising as a case in point.95 This meant that 
“futile arguments about real or true interests can be avoided, because interests [...] 
cannot be anticipated or revealed in a purely intellectual discussion [...and] are 
not necessarily subject to any useful generalisations. People start from different 
cultural and social origins.” Even those who come from similar backgrounds, he 
stated, may end up with different constellations of interests.96
Take the example of female education for example. Like any other relationship of 
power, this will be determined both by the behaviour of the actors concerned (that 
of the educational authorities (global, national and local), as well as the teachers, 
parents and students) as well as by the structural constraints that either facilitate or 
constrain action for all concerned. If the educational system is geared towards 
domesticating the female students for a life in the home, then this can be said to be 
a process of manipulation, regardless of whether or not the female students agree 
with the idea or not. Likewise, if their education instead gears them towards a 
career in business, then this too can be said to be a process of manipulation -  
indeed most, if not all education by its very definition is geared towards forming 
its subjects in one way or another. One might therefore argue that, interpreted this 
broadly, power as manipulation becomes a useless concept -  indeed, this is where 
Lukes et al would argue that the notion of interests is crucial in determining when 
the third ‘face’ of power can be said to operate. This argument is however based 
on the idea of power as always being negative and repressive and misses the 
fundamental point that manipulation, just as all of the other faces of power, can 
just as easily work in B’s interests as in A’s. To continue with the case of female 
education for example -  if it is clear that an education system is solely geared 
towards the interests of its male students, ignoring those of female students, then it 
is clear that an inequality of power exists. The same would be true in the reverse 
however. And if no separation is made between the two groups and all of the
95 (My emphasis) West, David, (1987), pl41-142.
96 Ibid, pl52.
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actors interests are taken into account, the education system can still be said to be 
manipulative, but in a positive and productive way. All of these examples 
constitute relations of power and each of them will be normatively more attractive 
and desirable to some than others. The point is that each case needs to be reviewed 
separately and empirically, trying to ascertain from all of the actors involved what 
their interests in the case are. Trying to subscribe interests onto them theoretically 
in advance however -  before exploring the particularities of a case -  will always 
be paternalistic, no matter how strongly it is defended.
The importance of West’s contribution cannot in my view be overestimated, as it 
rescued the third ‘face’ of power from potential theoretical ruin. It allows for an 
analysis of the process of manipulation by A (or B), without implicitly making 
assumptions about the outcome, namely the effects it has on the interests of B (or 
A). It is therefore surprising that Lukes does not address West’s contribution in the 
second edition of PRV. For although he is mentioned as a reference in the 
bibliography, there is no mention of him (or the subject of advertising as a case in 
point) either in the index or the actual body of the text itself.
“These difficulties become less serious if one simply takes what count as ‘real interests’ 
to be a function of one’s explanatory purpose, framework and methods, which in turn 
have to be justified. There is no reason to believe that there exists a canonical set o f such 
interests that will constitute ‘the last word on the matter’ -  that will resolve moral 
conflicts and set the seal on proffered explanations, confirming them as true. [...] Or 
‘real interests’ can be understood as a way o f identifying ‘basic’ or ‘central’ capabilities 
which existing arrangements preclude. ”91
Indeed, Lukes continues to defend the use of ‘real interests’ in the second edition 
of PRV, as well as strongly resist the charge of paternalism: “the very idea o f 
power’s third dimension requires an external standpoint. Power as domination 
[...] invokes the idea of constraint upon interests, and to speak of the third 
dimension of such power is to speak of interests imputed to and unrecognized by 
the actors.”98 On ‘false consciousness’ he states that “to recognize its very
97 Lukes, Steven. (2005), pl48.
98 (My emphasis) Ibid, p i46.
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possibility is not [...] to be loftily condescending.”99 It is not the point here to 
deny that ‘false consciousness’ can exist -  indeed, it is likely that all actors at 
some point in their lives will act in ways which are not always in their own 
interest and may not be aware of this. What Lukes seems to have missed however 
is the fact that it is still possible to analyse the third ‘face’ of power -  through its 
processes -  without making pre-made judgements about people’s interests. If 
processes of manipulation can be traced back to an actor or actors A, which are 
meant to have the desired effect of changing actor or actors B’s interests, then the 
third ‘face’ of power can be said to exist. One need not make assumptions about 
the possible results and thus a priori subscribe interests onto either A or B, 
‘objective’, ‘real’ or otherwise.
“Who is Steven Lukes to criticise the values of others? I think the answer is 
straightforward: Lukes, just like anyone else, can analyse and evaluate the situation of 
others. To suggest that people are always the best judge o f their own interests and have 
privileged moral status over their own preferences is to deny any sort o f normative social 
analysis. Nevertheless, the charge is one to be taken seriously and Lukes examines it
carefully. ”100
PRV  is clearly a work of ‘normative social analysis’, as Keith Dowding states in 
the above quotation. Hay agrees: “[o]nce it is recognised for what it is then -  an 
invitation to an ethical critique of power relations as distinct from an analytical 
technique for the identification of power relations -  Lukes’ schema is not in itself 
contradictory.”101 This is not extraordinary for any theory of power -  for, as 
already stated, it is impossible to conceive of any definition of power that is free 
from normative bias. However, if one is interested in trying to find an analytical 
technique for the identification of power relations, as opposed to an ethical 
critique of them, then Lukes’ account of the third ‘face’ of power must be 
modified. It is the argument here that -  as a purely behavioural account of 
processes of manipulation -  the third ‘face’ of power qualifies as an analytical 
concept. It is when structure and ‘real interests’ are imposed on it that it moves 
from an attempt at an analytical technique to a purely ethical critique. As already
99 Ibid, pl49.
100 Dowding, Keith. (2006), p i37.
101 Hay, Colin. (2002), p i83.
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argued, interests can never be assumed a priori in a purely analytical account. Nor 
can structure be squeezed into agency -  as shall be seen in the next chapter, these 
two concepts need to be kept ontologically separate in order to be able to both 
distinguish and analyse the interdependency of the two. Before moving onto 
structure however, there is one more ‘face’ of power to be taken into account -  
namely Peter Digeser’s interpretation of Foucault’s concept of power as 
constituting its fourth ‘face’, or as Digeser calls it, power*
“[T]he model for the modem form of power4 is the panopticon: [...tjhe perpetual 
possibility of surveillance forges a self-disciplined prisoner even when the jailor is not in 
the watchtower. [...] We become our own jailors and perpetuate disciplinary practices 
through our own actions. It is unlike the other conceptions of power in which power is 
exercised by something outside the subject. ”102
The above quotation by Digeser encapsulates his interpretation of Foucault’s 
contribution to the ‘faces of power’ debate (despite the fact that Foucault never 
actively participated in it). He neatly summarises the four faces of power thus: 
“Under the first face of power the central question is, “Who, if anyone, is 
exercising power?” Under the second face, “What issues have been mobilized off 
the agenda and by whom?” Under the radical conception, “Whose objective 
interests are being harmed?” Under the fourth face of power the critical issue is, 
“What kind of subject is being produced?””103
The fourth ‘face’ of power is thus the power of both subjects -  both A’s and B’s -  
to ‘become [their] own jailors’ and constitute themselves as both producers and 
subjects of power. This interpretation rests on Foucault’s observations regarding 
Jeremy Bentham’s ‘panoptican’ design for prisons -  where, as Digeser puts it, the 
‘perpetual possibility of surveillance’ means that all subjects (both A and B) self­
police themselves to comply with prevailing relations of power. As Foucault 
himself put it: “the system of surveillance [...] involves very little expense. There 
is no need for arms, physical violence, material constraints. Just a gaze. An 
inspecting gaze, a gaze which each individual under its weight will end by
102 Digeser, Peter. (1992), p994.
103 Ibid, p980.
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interiorising to the point that he is his own overseer, each individual thus 
exercising this surveillance over, and against, himself. A superb formula: power 
exercised continuously and for what turns out to be a minimal cost.”104
Digeser’s interpretation of Foucault thus hinges on one of Foucault’s main 
arguments, namely that power operates through the very formation of the subject. 
“[The subject] is not a substance” Foucault once stated. “It is a form, and this form 
is not primarily or always identical to itself. You do not have the same type of 
relationship to yourself when you constitute yourself as a political subject who 
goes to vote or speaks at a meeting and when you are seeking to fulfil your desires 
in a sexual relationship. Undoubtedly there are relationships and interferences 
between these different forms of the subject; but we are not dealing with the same 
type of subject. In each case, one plays, one establishes a different type of 
relationship to oneself.”105
In the language of the ‘faces of power’ debate, this means that both A and B are at 
the same time both the subjects and the producers of power -  both forming and 
being formed by prevailing power relations. In order to properly examine 
Digeser’s interpretation of Foucault however, an introduction to the work of the 
latter is first necessary. For, although Digeser interprets Foucault as having made a 
contribution to the ‘faces of power’ debate, his definition of power can also be 
taken as a structural account, as shall be examined below. Indeed, as shall be 
explored further in the next chapter, Foucault’s work, along with that of 
structurationism, can also be seen to function as a bridge over the structure/agency 
divide. Perhaps most importantly, however, Foucault’s writings highlight the 
contested nature of power and the importance of an empirical, rather than a 
theoretical study of its existence, in order to cater for its many different 
interpretations across time and space.
104 Foucault, Michel. (1980a), pl55.
105 Foucault, Michel. (1996), p440.
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Michel Foucault and the (Politically) Contested Nature o f Power
Foucault is commonly recognised as having been one of the most influential 
theorists of power in the 20th century. His earlier works focused on the disciplinary 
measures that were historically taken in Western societies against perceived 
societal deviancies, such as criminality, madness and sexuality106. Although these 
works contain the seeds of his later conceptions of power, he later admitted that 
they were quite specifically written with these particular institutional practices in
1 07mind. Over time, however, he expanded his scope of vision to constituting a 
general critique of society and its overarching power structures. In an attempt to 
summarise this overall critique, it is therefore perhaps most useful to focus on two 
publications -  Power/Knowledge, (edited by Colin Gordon and published in 1980) 
and Foucault Live: Collected Interviews, 1961-1984 (edited by Sylvere Lotringer 
and first published posthumously in 1989) -  both of which constitute seminal 
anthologies of selected interviews with and writings by Foucault on the subject 
towards the end of his life.
“Nothing is fundamental. That is what is interesting in the analysis o f society. That is why 
nothing irritates me as much as these inquiries — which are by definition metaphysical -  
on the foundations o f power in a society or the self-institution o f a society, etc. These are 
not fundamental phenomena. There are only reciprocal relations, and the perpetual gaps 
between intentions in relation to one another. ”108
Even with a narrower focus on his later works, however, it is still not the easiest 
task to summarise Foucault’s overall contribution to the power debate, for the very 
reason that his views on the matter varied over relatively short periods of time 
(sometimes even within the course of an interview itself109) -  indeed, it is almost 
impossible to pin him down on the subject. As he himself stated, “I am not at all 
the sort of philosopher who conducts or wants to conduct a discourse of truth on 
some science or other. Wanting to lay down the law for each and every science is
106 e.g. Foucault, Michel. The Birth o f the Clinic. /  Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. /  The 
Will to Knowledge: The History of Sexuality: Volume One.
107 Foucault, Michel. (1980b), p65.
108 Foucault, Michel. (1996), p341.
109 Foucault, Michel. (1980b), p77.
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the project of positivism.”110 Foucault’s idea of a theory of power was that it 
should instead be based on a specific and historical analysis. “The notion of theory 
as a toolkit means: (i) The theory to be constructed is not a system but an 
instrument, a logic of the specificity of power relations and the struggles around 
them; (ii) That this investigation can only be carried out step by step on the basis 
of reflection (which will necessarily be historical in some of its aspects) on given 
situations.”111
Integral to Foucault’s notion of power was the importance of knowledge or truth 
claims about its existence. “Knowledge and power are integrated with one another, 
and there is no point in dreaming of a time when knowledge will cease to depend 
on power” he stated. “It is not possible for power to be exercised without 
knowledge, it is impossible for knowledge not to engender power.”112 This mutual 
dependency between power and knowledge hinges on the idea of the construction 
of ‘truths’ in each society -  a construction which is necessary to maintain power 
relations as they are. In Foucault’s own words: “[t]ruth is a thing of this world: it 
is produced only by multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects of 
power. Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth [...] It’s 
not a matter of emancipating truth from every system of power (which would be a 
chimera, for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of truth from the 
forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the 
present time. / The political question, to sum up, is not error, illusion, alienated
1 1 o
consciousness or ideology; it is truth itself. Hence the importance of Nietzsche.”
As shall be seen below, Foucault’s frequent references to Nietzsche have made his 
view of power normatively unpalatable to some, especially those who advocate 
liberating subjects of power from ‘false consciousness’ to discover their ‘real 
interests’. The idea of power defining and being defined by knowledge is however 
a crucial aspect of his contribution to the power debate. For it ties Foucault closely 
to the notion of power being a contested, family resemblance concept, which has 
different meanings to different people in different contexts. Indeed, one of the
110 Ibid, p64-5.
111 Foucault, Michel. (1980c), p l45.
112 Foucault, Michel. (1980d), p52.
113 Foucault, Michel. (1980e), p i 19.
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most important legacies of Foucaultian analysis is the prioritisation of empirical 
over theoretical research, which might seem to suggest that all theoretical research 
is thus made redundant. I would argue here however that this does not necessarily 
need to be the case. For, whatever his claims to the contrary, Foucault was indeed 
a philosopher of power, with his own notion of the concept which, it turns out, is 
very useful in bridging the divide between agentic and structural accounts of 
power.
For, in general, Foucault’s was a relational concept of power -  indeed, he once 
stated: “I scarcely use the word ‘power’, and if I use it on occasion it is simply as 
short-hand for the expression I generally use: ‘relations of power’.”114 He insisted 
that power is everywhere and must be analysed as something which circulates. It 
is never located anywhere, never in anybody’s hands and is never owned, either as 
a commodity or as a piece of wealth. In his own words, “[p]ower is employed and 
exercised through a net-like organisation.”115 Relations of power are interwoven 
with other kinds of relations, and hence do not take the sole form of prohibition 
and punishment.116 He stated that he found it impossible “to say that one thing is 
of the order of ‘liberation’ and another of the order of ‘oppression’”. He admitted 
that a concentration camp perhaps constitutes an exception, as it cannot really be 
defined as an instrument of liberation. Neither, he consented, can torture or 
execution be included as they do not offer any opportunities to resistance. (To 
prevent having to list these examples each time I refer to them in the thesis 
however, I have chosen hereon to categorise them as cases of ‘total domination’, 
to signify that there is no possibility of resistance.) However, he held fast to the 
view, (which he recognised is not generally accepted), that, except in cases of total 
domination, there is otherwise always an opportunity to resistance, disobedience 
and oppositional groupings.117
Indeed, Foucault strongly resisted simply defining power negatively as repression. 
“What makes power hold good” he claimed, “what makes it accepted, is simply 
the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses
114 Foucault, Michel. (1996), p441.
115 Foucault, Michel. (1980f), p98.
116 Foucault, Michel. (1980c), pl42.
117 Foucault, Michel. (1996), p339.
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and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It 
needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole 
social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is 
repression.”118
“Let us not, therefore, ask why certain people want to dominate, what they seek, what is 
their overall strategy. Let us ask, instead, how things work at the level of on-going 
subjugation, at the level of those continuous and un-interrupted processes which subject 
our bodies, govern our gestures, dictate our behaviours etc. In other words, rather than 
ask ourselves how the sovereign appears to us in his lofty isolation, we should try to 
discover how it is that subjects are gradually, progressively, really and materially 
constituted through a multiplicity of organisms, forces, energies, materials, desires, 
thoughts etc. We should try to grasp subjection in its material instance as a constitution o f
subjects. ”119
The above quotation by Foucault brings to mind Digeser’s interpretation of his 
work, namely that power operates through the very constitution of subjects 
themselves. It is not clear, however, that Foucault meant this as a purely agentic 
conception of power. On the contrary, the above quotation highlights the fact that 
Foucault asked for a turn away from traditional behavioural accounts of power 
towards more relational accounts of the concept. Indeed, the above quotation 
continues to criticise what Foucault perceived as being political theory’s obsession 
with the power of the sovereign, as symbolised by Thomas Hobbes’ figure of 
Leviathan -  a subject to which he also devoted a whole series of lectures, 
published posthumously in Society Must Be Defended120. It was not that he did not 
see the state as an important institution of power, however, as he himself admitted. 
It was simply that “relations of power, and hence the analysis that must be made
191of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the State.” And central to 
Foucault’s concept of this power was the idea of the subject as socially constituted 
through these relations:
118 Foucault, Michel. (1980e), p i 19.
119 Foucault, Michel, (1980f), p97.
120 Foucault, Michel. (2004)
121 Foucault, Michel. (1980e), pl23.
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“The individual is not to be conceived as a sort o f elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a 
multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens 
to strike, and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one o f the 
prime effects o f power that certain bodies, certain gestures, certain discourses, certain 
desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, is not 
the vis-a-vis o f power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects. The individual is an effect o f 
power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the 
element o f its articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same time
its vehicle. ”122
For all the stress he put on the relational aspects of power, however, Foucault has 
come under fire from some critics for being structurally deterministic. In the 
second edition of PRV, Lukes cites “widespread critical discussion and 
accusations” of Foucault’s idea of the constitution of the subject as “a structuralist 
commitment to determinism. What scope”, he asks, “does this picture leave for the 
agency of the subject?”123 However, as Digeser has already made clear, Foucault 
can also be interpreted as offering an agentic definition of power (providing the 
means with which to study its fourth ‘face’) and so it is not possible to maintain 
that his is a purely structural conception of power -  nowhere does he state that just 
because power is everywhere, that it affects everyone in the same way. Indeed, 
Foucault can also be interpreted as having stressed the importance of agency in 
maintaining power relations. And, as the next chapter will show, his work proves a 
useful bridge between both structure and agency.
Indeed, it is clear that Foucault’s notion of power and domination is very different 
from that of more traditional accounts, such as those offered by Lukes et al in the 
‘faces of power’ debate (a point which Lukes also makes clear in his revised 
version of PRV124). In Foucault’s own words: “in speaking of domination I do not 
have in mind that solid and global kind of domination that one person exercises 
over others, or one group over another, but the manifold forms of domination that 
can be exercised within society.” This is very different from Lukes’ concept of
122 Foucault, Michel. (1980f), p98.
123 Lukes, Steven. (2005), p95.
124 Ibid, p88-107.
125 Foucault, Michel. (1980f), p96.
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domination which, he claims, “concerns power over another or others [...] PRV 
focuses on this and asks: how do the powerful secure the compliance of those they 
dominate -  and, more specifically, how do they secure their willing compliance?” 
However, on the very same page as the above quotation, Lukes also states that 
“power as domination, is only one species of power”. Thus it is clear that Lukes 
accepts that power is much more than just the behavioural domination of one 
group over others. It is merely that the ‘faces of power’ debate limits the scope of 
its analysis to this aspect of power.
There appears to be more to Lukes’ criticism of Foucault than simply a difference 
in opinion as to the definition of domination however -  and, not surprisingly, it is 
political. “The trouble is” he states, “that, for most of his life, Foucault never 
ceased to clothe this idea in Nietzschean rhetoric, within which power excluded 
both freedom and truth. [...] According to this rhetoric, there can be no liberation 
from power, either within a given context or across contexts; and there is no way
i 97of judging between ways of life, since each imposes its own ‘regime of truth’.”
It should also be noted that, despite dedicating 8 pages of the second edition of 
PRV to Foucault, Lukes does not critically engage with how Foucault’s concept of 
power relates to his own other than to complain about the latter’s Nietzschean 
tendencies, as well as to make the claim -  also made here -  that Foucault’s 
relational concept of power very closely resembles sociology’s (and thus
1 98structurationism’s) assertion that “[individuals are socialized”. Were Foucault 
alive today, he would probably have responded to Lukes’ rather hollow and 
polemic criticisms exactly as he once did in an interview: “Nietzsche is the 
philosopher of power, a philosopher who managed to think of power without 
having to confine himself within a political theory in order to do so. [...] The only 
valid tribute to thought such as Nietzsche’s is precisely to use it, to deform it, to 
make it groan and protest. And if commentators then say that I am being faithful
129or unfaithful to Nietzsche, that is of absolutely no interest.”
126 (Emphasis in original). Lukes, Steven. (2005), pl2.
127 Ibid, p91.
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129 Foucault, Michel. (1980d), p53-4.
57
As already mentioned, Lukes’ work shows a commitment to a ‘truth’ of some kind 
-  as an ethical critique of existing power relations. It is not clear however that this 
is a preferable approach to studying power. For if power can only be studied from 
above, by people who share a certain normative standpoint, then their concepts of 
‘freedom’ and ‘truth’ must also surely be brought into question. In this regard, 
Foucault’s notion of power is in some ways more ‘true’ than Lukes’, as it allows 
for any definition of the concept, according to empirical realities, rather than some 
higher ideal. For by denying an overall theoretical truth about power, Foucault 
helped to open up the debate to include cases of positive power, as well as the 
negative cases that have so far pre-occupied most theorists of power. Moreover, 
Foucault’s concept of power allows B as well as A the possibility to act in any 
power relationship, except in cases of total domination. This added complexity 
avoids making pre-made theorietical assumptions that dichotomise power 
relationships as being between the ‘oppressors’ or ‘victims’ and the ‘oppressed’ or 
‘victimisers’. For such simplified dichotomies, although empirically certainly 
perfectly possible, cannot constitute the sole theoretical premise for relationships 
of power, as reality is often much more complicated than that.
It is not that Foucault viewed the formation of the subject or the location of power 
as politically neutral however. Indeed, this is where Digeser’s interpretation of his 
work is useful, since it recognises the political agency that Foucault saw operating 
in relations of power. In ‘The Eye of Power’, for example, Foucault accounts for 
the historical processes that lead to the establishment of a surveillance society, in 
which he accounts for the agency of the bourgeoisie in much the same way as a 
Marxist analysis would do: “The bourgeoisie is perfectly well aware that a new 
constitution or legislature will not suffice to assure its hegemony; it realises that it 
has to invent a new technology ensuring the irrigation by effects of power of the 
whole social body down to its smallest particles. And it was by such means that 
the bourgeoisie not only made a revolution but succeeded in establishing a social 
hegemony which it has never relinquished.” 130
130 Foucault, Michel. (1980a), pl56.
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Neither Foucualt’s nor the ‘faces of power’ approach need necessarily cancel out 
the other however. For while power can certainly be exercised by some 
individuals over others -  through the four ‘faces’ of power -  it is also true that all 
actors are both constrained and facilitated by relationships of power from the very 
moment they enter into social relations, in other words, from their very conception 
as human beings. There is quite simply no escape from power. As Digeser so 
succinctly puts it:
“Within the radical and liberal conceptions of power there is always the possibility for 
human relationships not to be mediated by power. [...] Unlike the other conceptions, 
power4  is not defined in opposition to freedom. Liberation, if understood as an act that 
escapes power4  assumes that we could jump outside our social skin to some unsituated
arena wherepower4had no play. ”131
131 Digeser, Peter. (1992), p981.
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Power as Structure -  Should It Be Defaced Altogether?
While Foucault’s contribution to the power debate enables an understanding of the 
inescapability of relations of power, of its positive as well as of its negative 
dimensions, as well of its links with knowledge, it does not define what these 
relations of power are as such. Indeed, to do so would be to go against Foucault’s 
most fundamental belief -  that to define power is to participate in its very 
constitution. Although there is much to be said for this approach, it does not leave 
those who wish to find structural relations of power with much to go on. However, 
as has already been discussed, Foucault need not be taken quite so literally. The 
main point of his argument was that relations of power -  if they are to be defined 
at all -  should be viewed specifically and historically, in a given context and at a 
certain point in time.
Structural accounts of power fetch their inspiration mainly from the historical 
materialism of Marxist and Gramscian thought. Each of these two theorists 
engaged in similar projects to Foucault, in that they attempted to historically 
account for structures of power that shaped society at the specific time of their 
writing. Put very generally, while Marx focused mainly on the role of capital and 
labour in economic production and the subsequent division of society into 
different classes, Gramsci centred his work on the role of hegemony in 
maintaining power relations as they were in Italian society at the time. Modern- 
day proponents of each approach often broaden their respective views on power to 
also include social relations of race, identity and/or gender -  indeed, Marxist 
thought nowadays constitutes somewhat of a discipline in itself. As such, it is 
impossible within the constraints of a single chapter of a thesis to review all of the 
possible interpretations and usages of his view on power -  there are quite simply 
too many of them.
Generally put, however, it can be said that structural power is seen as the power of 
society to shape and influence not only the actions but also the very wants and 
needs of the people within it. According to Hay, “[structuralism is the explanation 
of political effects, outcomes and events exclusively in terms of structural or 
contextual factors. By such a definition, few if any pure forms of structuralism
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persist. Nonetheless, the term is widely deployed to point to the marginalisation of 
actors and agency in social and political analysis.” Hay continues to state that, 
defined as such, “structuralism is little more than a term of abuse” -  not many 
people “would claim that their own thinking was structuralist”. Nonetheless, even 
though many structuralists would not define themselves as such, Hay claims that 
“structuralism lives on in various forms of systems theory. Such approaches seek 
to account for regularities in observed patterns of political behaviour (for example, 
the behaviour of states within an international system) by appeal to the operation 
of systemic logics (logics operating at the level of the system as a whole). In so far 
as these logics are seen to operate in some sense independently of -  and over the 
heads of -  the actors themselves, recourse is being made to a structuralist mode of 
argument.” 132
All too often this approach can therefore lead to the problem of structural 
determinism, which reifies the structures of society (such as race or capitalism) as 
somehow existing outside of human agency. Although it is possible to interpret 
both Marx and Gramsci as resisting such structural determinism, since both of 
them also accounted for the processes by which people could unite to change these 
structures, these accounts were mainly prescriptive (revolutionary) and focused on 
the capacities of specific actors (e.g. the working or middle classes) to change 
specific power structures. Thus, while some Marxist and Gramscian theorists 
manage to maintain a relational view of power, all too often these analyses fall 
into the traps of structural determinism, that reify certain structures of power 
(whether these be those of capitalism, race or gender) and ignore the possibility 
for agency, except for certain specific and again reified groups.
It is interesting to note however that the concept of structure in historical 
materialism has many links with the interpretation of structure in linguistics and 
thus Foucault’s interpretation of power as discourse. For although they are quite 
distinct discourses themselves, they do overlap, most predominantly regarding the 
argument that our knowledge of the structures that affect us in turn affects the very 
shape of these structures themselves. According to Terence Hawkes, structures
132 Hay, Colin" (2002), pl02.
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cannot be perceived neutrally for “every perceiver’s method of perceiving can be 
shown to contain an inherent bias which affects what is perceived to a significant 
degree. A wholly objective perception of individual entities is therefore not 
possible: any observer is bound to create something of what he observes.” 133
Thus, although structuration theory grew out of a dissatisfaction with sociological 
theories of structuralism, while Foucault’s work was more a frustration with 
linguistic structuralism, the two critiques do in my view meet half-way, to end up 
discussing the same thing -  namely relations of power. It seems simply to be the 
case of two different vocabularies or discourses pursuing a similar cause, namely 
that of uncovering the mutually constitutive relationships between the individual 
and society, most easily recorded in relationships of power. Indeed, if one 
deliberately reads ‘relationships’ where structurationists write ‘structures’, and 
‘structures’ where Foucaultians talk about ‘relationships’, one can soon see that 
this is a mere linguistic division, even if the more devout followers of each school 
would probably contest the idea. The concept of power is central to both 
approaches, and both schools of thought define power as the capacity of human 
agents (as socially constituted rather than sovereign individuals) to re-/act in all 
(or most) social relations, by drawing upon a number of issues and resources (both 
material and non-material). Most importantly, both schools regard these structures 
or relationships of power as always reciprocal and that there is always the 
potential for resistance and change, except in extreme cases of total domination 
(e.g. a concentration camp).
Central to both the historical materialist and the linguistic definitions of structure, 
therefore, is the idea that knowledge of these structures is key to the power that 
they hold over us. Marxist thought often focuses on the idea of ‘false 
consciousness’ -  that if only the less fortunate members of society were made 
aware of their situation, they would be able to change their predicament, which in 
some regards resembles Foucault’s argument that power is knowledge. There are 
however, as already mentioned in the discussion of Lukes above, some real 
problems with the idea of ‘false consciousness’, as it risks ascribing interests onto
133 (Emphasis in original) Hawkes, Terence. (1977), pl7.
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actors regardless of their actual interests -  which may never be known to anyone 
but themselves. Furthermore, it is not clear that simply acquiring a knowledge of 
structures is enough to change one’s position in society, however much one might 
wish to. Marx and Gramsci argued here for collective agency -  that by uniting the 
proletariat or the middle classes, social change would be possible. Although this 
may certainly be the case in some instances, it cannot be taken to be so in all 
situations, many actors in less fortunate positions in society are surely aware of 
their social standing and many may wish to do something about it, but they may 
be limited in their capacities to do anything about it due to the very structural 
constraints under which they are living. Indeed, this is where a structural 
definition of power is useful, since it highlights the limitations of social agency.
Thus, it is clear that a structural definition of power has much to offer an analysis 
of the concept, since it highlights the structural constraints on agency. People 
cannot simply do as they wish, nor can states simply invade or conquer whomever 
they choose, since they are not only constrained by their social standing but also 
by their knowledge of it. Taking this argument too far however means risking 
structural determinism, taking all agency away from the actors concerned. Society 
does not simply happen while people look on -  social structures would have no 
meaning, indeed they would not exist at all, without human interaction.
One modern-day structural theorist of power who tries to avoid the trap of 
structural determinism is Clarissa Rile Hayward. For although her recent and 
influential work advocates ‘de-facing power’ from its three (or, if one includes 
Foucault, four) dimensional past altogether, she does allow some room for agency. 
Her main criticism is of the origin of the ‘faces’ theory. As has already been 
mentioned above, one of her main criticisms of the ‘faces of power’ debate is that 
it has retained Dahl’s original formulation of the problem.134 For although 
contemporary theorists have challenged almost every aspect of Dahl’s answer, 
they did not question his definition of the problem itself, namely “What do we 
mean when we say that A has power over B?” 135 According to Hayward, all of the 
contributors to the debate “embraced [Dahl’s] more basic premise that power
134 Hayward, Clarissa Rile, 2000, p i8.
135 Ibid, p i 1.
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necessarily wears some face, that it is an instrument powerful agents use or direct 
in order to alter the free action of the powerless.” The definitions of ‘power-with- 
a-face’ thus alternated solely between a notion of free action and action shaped by 
the action of others. 136
These arguments drew attention away from “the politically significant ways power 
shapes freedom for all social actors,” says Hayward. Her proposal is that we 
instead “de-fac[e] power by reconceptualizing it as the network of social 
boundaries that delimits, for all, fields of possible action.” 137 This means replacing 
the behaviouralists’ concept of free action with social action, as the mechanisms of 
power are not instruments, but boundaries that define all fields of possible action. 
Such boundaries can both facilitate and constrain action, and consist of, for 
example, laws, rules, symbols, norms, customs, social identities, and standards.138 
To simply see the powerful individual (A) as evil or bad, she continues, is to 
ignore A’s own boundaries, rendering them unchangeable. In reality, A’s limits 
are often institutionalised and codified, for example in socially constructed racial 
and gender identities. Nor are they always understood by or of benefit to A, she 
says. For focusing solely on the evil nature of A means that other non-evil A’s are 
made invisible, as they just do not fit the bill.139
It is also apparent that, by her own admission, Hayward is influenced by Foucault, 
as she claims that power is a continuum with an end-point, namely domination. 
She emphasises that the other end of the continuum is not political freedom itself, 
but rather relations that promote participants’ political freedom.140 Nonetheless, 
there are few power relations that realise a state of domination, she concludes, for 
this only occurs when the boundaries to action are widely accepted as extra­
political -  i.e. divinely ordained, biologically given or sociologically necessary.141
In summary, Hayward argues that attention should be redirected from agents to the 
political mechanisms that comprise relevant practices, as well as the institutions
136 Ibid, pl4-15.
137 Ibid, p27.
138 Ibid, p30.
139 Ibid, p33-34.
140 Ibid, pl66.
141 Ibid, p i 74.
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that sustain and govern these practices.142 By advocating the use of the concept of 
social action instead of free action, she goes some way towards defining a 
relational concept of power that allows for action, as long as it is socially 
structured and not ‘rational’ or ‘free’. Indeed, as shall be seen in the next chapter, 
the concept of ‘social action’ is crucial to any understanding of power, as it 
immediately places it in its social -  and thus structural -  context. It is however 
questionable whether one should advocate defacing power altogether, since by so 
doing, one also altogether removes from the concept the idea of political agency 
and thus responsibility. Although this is not Hayward’s intention, one result of her 
call to ‘deface’ power could be a return to structural determinism, where structures 
are somehow deemed to operate by themselves. The risk of such an analysis is that 
one misses one of Foucault’s main points, which was that, except in cases of total 
domination, there is always the potential for change. Indeed, how else does this 
change come about if not by human action? For what is a culture without people to 
maintain it? What is a ‘state’ without people to support it? What is an economy 
without consumers and producers? Even in the case of total domination, where it 
can seem that these relations or structures are ‘permanently’ embedded in human 
consciousness and thus existence, one must still accept the prerequisite of human 
agency to maintain these relations. Hayward makes an important point when she 
states that ‘dominators’ do not necessarily have one face -  in the case of culture or 
patriarchy, the dominators can equally be the dominated, in that both those who 
benefit from and those who are disadvantaged by relations of power can be 
equally as responsible in maintaining them -  but by suggesting that power be ‘de­
faced’ altogether, she runs the risk of being interpreted by some as missing the 
fundamental notion that these power relations ultimately need the continuation of 
human agency to survive.
Another contemporary theorist who has attempted to define structural power is 
David Held, in his account of ‘nautonomic structures’. ‘Nautonomy’, according to 
this theory, “refers to the asymmetrical production and distribution of life-chances 
which limit and erode the possibilities of political participation” -  in other words, 
a reversed concept of autonomy, or freedom. Nautonomic structures, states Held,
142 Ibid, p38.
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are shaped by the availability of a diverse range of socially patterned resources, 
from the material, through the coercive to the cultural -  all of which can 
undermine or corrode the principle of autonomy. Thus, a theory of power which 
can disclose nautonomic structures and processes is “potentially a theory which 
can highlight obstacles to the empowerment of persons as equally free agents in a 
community”. 143 In order to disclose these nautonomic structures, Held claims that 
we must analyse seven ‘sites of power’:
1) The Body: how physical and emotional wellbeing are organised
2) Welfare: organisation o f the domain o f goods and services that aids the 
transition o f the citizen from private person to full membership o f the community
3) Site o f Culture/Cultural Life: those realms o f social activity where matters o f 
public interest and identity can be discussed, where differences o f opinion can be 
explored and where local custom and dogma can be examined
4) The Sphere o f Civic Associations', the array o f institutions and organisations in 
and through which individuals or groups can pursue their own projects 
independently o f the direct organisation o f the state or o f economic collectivities 
such as corporations or trade unions
5) The Economy: the collective organisation o f the production, distribution, 
exchange and consumption o f goods and services
6) The Organisation o f Violence and Coercive Relations: concentrated physical 
force for/against the community
7) The Sphere o f Regulatory and Legal Institutions: the state as an independent 
corporation, made up o f an ensemble o f organisations144
These sites of power constitute an interaction context or institutional milieu in and 
through which power operates to shape the capacities of people -  “that is, to 
mould and circumscribe their life-chances, effective participation and share in 
. public decision-making.” Each site may operate independently, or shape and 
delimit other sites.145 Nautonomy (and thus the extent of political agency) in a site 
of power can be detected by three indicators: i) whether and to what extent people
143 (Emphasis in original) Held, David. (1995), pl70-172.
144 Ibid, pl76-185.
145 (My emphasis) Ibid, pl73.
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have access to that site; ii) whether opportunities within the site are open or closed 
and iii) whether outcomes (e.g. education levels, jobs, range of cultural activities) 
are biased in favour of certain groups or interests.146
Held’s definition is one of the most elaborate theories of structural power to date, 
since it includes most of the structures of power that play a part in shaping 
people’s lives and thus human agency. Indeed, it is the definition of structural 
power that will be used in this thesis, albeit in a somewhat modified and extended 
form. For although it lists many prevalent structures of power, it is the argument 
here that it still misses out some important ones and that there are some problems 
with Held’s overall argument. To begin with, although Held’s seven ‘sites of 
power’ certainly offer a more detailed view of the number of resources over which 
humanity competes, there are still in my view a few sites missing, namely: i) the 
site of time; ii) the site of space; iii) the site of knowledge and aesthetics; iv) the 
site of morality and emotion; and v) the site of identities. These shall be argued for 
later -  suffice to say at this stage that the first two denote the importance of time 
and space to social change, as advocated by structurationism, while the latter three 
refer to the importance of cognitive power, as advocated by Foucault.
The idea that structures are ‘nautonomic’ also restricts Held’s definition to simply 
encompassing negative power -  however, structures can also be positively 
enabling, helping people to live their lives. Foucault’s notion of power as being 
both positive and negative means that Held’s seven sites of power can be 
interpreted as being both autonomic and nautonomic -  they may enable agency in 
some instances and constrain it in others. It is also interesting to note that Held, 
although initially entitling them as ‘sites of power’, then interchanges between the 
words ‘sphere’ (sites 4 and 7) and ‘site’ (site 3). There is no apparent reason for 
this interchange of terminology and so -  in my modification of his theory - 1 have 
opted for the word ‘site’ throughout, as it in my view better denotes the idea of a 
node of human interaction and thus agency. Moreover, Held’s seems to be more a 
structural definition of power than a behavioural one (although he does allow for 
some agency by the very fact that he states that these sites ‘mould and
146 Ibid, p!76.
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circumscribe [people’s] life-chances, effective participation and share in public 
decision-making’) -  it is the argument in this thesis however that an account of the 
sites of structural power alone is not sufficient. Behavioural power must be given 
equal attention and it is the aim of the next chapter to reveal how this can be done.
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Conclusion
Power is a multifaceted concept that has many different ‘faces’ as well as 
structures, dependent on the empirical context that is under study. It is the 
argument here however that theories of power can most usefully be divided into 
three main categories: i) behaviouralist; ii) structuralist; and ii) post-modernist. 
The distinctions made between potentia (‘power to’) and potestas (‘power over’) 
in the beginning of this chapter can help to make the distinction between the first 
two categories, namely behavioural and structural power. Structural theorists 
typically focus on the resources that are deemed necessary to act in society 
(potentia/’power to’), while behaviouralists have typically focused on the power of 
one actor over another (potestas/’power over’). The interrelationship between 
potentia and potestas, or ‘power over’ and ‘power to’, disables both the 
behaviouralist and the structuralist notions of power however, since neither can 
adequately explain power on their own. Post-modernism -  most notably the 
contribution of Foucault -  makes clear the need to also see the processes of power 
production within society that connect agency with structure, as well as the need 
for contextually specific definitions of power. Power thus envisaged is never 
solely negative, nor positive, but rather a continual process of social interaction 
within certain social parameters.
The idea of free action for example, on which the ‘faces of power’ debate (bar 
perhaps the fourth ‘face’) has been so wholly dependent should rather, as Hayward 
advocates, be defined as social action that is dependent on the social constraints 
relevant to the actors in question. Power defined as the capacity for social action 
necessarily includes the agentic concepts of authority, domination, influence and 
manipulation (to name but a few of the commonly cited sub-categories), since all 
of these actions can delimit the social action of others in one way or another, but it 
is necessary to remember that all of these actions are also delimited by social 
constraints. For an actor’s ability to dominate or influence another actor (through 
action) depends on their relationship to this actor in the first place (ie. social 
positioning). Structural power, thus defined, helps to reveal the societal constraints 
that are placed on agency. There is however also a risk with structural definitions
69
of power, namely that they become structurally deterministic, leaving agency out 
of the equation altogether.
The next chapter will thus make the case for a relational and structurated analysis 
of power, which combines structure with agency, as this is the only way to 
overcome the logical dilemma faced by Lukes et al, when trying to squeeze a 
structural account of power into a behavioural definition, or by purely structural 
accounts that do not allow for any concept of agency at all. Indeed, one of the 
main points of this thesis is that one cannot equate agency and structure as 
denoting the same thing -  they necessarily require the existence of each other and 
are interdependent, but they are also distinct and so must be kept ontologically 
separate. The next chapter shall reveal in more detail why this must be so.
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Chapter Three: Agency, Structure and Structuration -  Bringing 
Behaviouralists, Structuralists and ‘Foucaultians9 Together
Introduction -  The Ontological Status of Structure, Agency and Power: 
Scientific Realism and the Study of Unobservables
“[I]n structuration theory there are no ‘socialfacts’ sui seneris. Social agents, through their 
praxis, make ‘social fa c ts’, albeit they make them in circumstances they inherit from the past. 
Fifteen years ago this insight seemed incidental to the concerns o f many social theorists. ”147
It is apparent then that there are three main approaches to viewing the concept of 
political power. Whereas behaviouralists speak of the various ‘faces’ of power, 
regarding it as a relationship that exists solely between agents, structuralists see it 
as a structural phenomenon that influences all agents alike. Post-modernists, 
following Foucault, resist the notion of conceptualising power at all, arguing that 
power is everywhere and as such cannot be conceptualised. The question remains 
however, which theory should be used? Is it not possible that they all have their 
appeal because each one has something important to say? And is it not therefore 
viable to try to combine these three approaches so that one can analyse the full 
complexities of political power? I maintain that it is possible and will argue the 
reasons why this is so in this and the following chapter. For even post-modernists 
have a concept of power, even if they might resist the fact that that is the case. As 
Colin Wight points out, “[e]ven contemporary postmodern sceptics wish us to take 
their pronouncements as ‘real’. [...W]hen faced by a sceptic who wishes to state 
their scepticism, we need only ask them to repeat or clarify the meaning of their 
initial statement. To do so they must regard their initial statement, or its content, as 
a socially real entity that is external to them.” 148 In other words, all those who state 
that there can be no theory of power are themselves guilty of stating a theoretical 
‘truth’ about power, namely that it can never be theorised and thus understood.
The question remains how to combine these three seemingly fundamentally 
opposed approaches? The solution is not as complicated as it may at first appear.
147 Parker, John. (2000), p287.
148 Wight, Colin. (2006), p27.
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Indeed, as shall be shown below, if one strips each approach down to its 
fundamental ontological premise, it becomes apparent that each approach is 
already engaged with the others. The main point of this chapter is to show that the 
relational aspects of power highlighted by Foucault can be further analysed using 
structuration theory -  a theory that is regarded by some as being one of the most 
influential contributions to the question of structure and agency.149 Many 
‘Foucaultians’ might argue that this is to misuse Foucault’s concept of power. As 
already shown in the previous chapter however, Foucault argued for the existence 
of power as reciprocal relationships between individuals and society. As such, not 
only did he grant power ontological status -  as a concept that can be said to exist 
in its own right -  but his definition of it was in fact very similar to a 
structurationist account. Indeed, it shall be argued here that power, if it is defined 
as the capacity to act in society, should be granted the same ontological status as 
structure and agency. For power is the very glue that ties structure and agency 
together. Just as with structure and agency however, exactly how power does this 
(relates structure to agency) and how it is to be further defined is up to 
epistemological dispute and thus debate. For granting power the same ontological 
status as structure and agency still leaves open the debate regarding its various 
definitions. The definition of power that is offered in the next chapter of this thesis 
is thus necessarily an epistemological account and should not be misinterpreted as 
an attempt to reify the concept of power. To do so would be to ignore the 
importance of the post-modernist contribution to the discourse on power. Indeed, 
although this chapter deals mainly with structurationism -  and as such, the links 
between the first two schools of thought (behaviouralism and structuralism) -  it 
should be borne in mind throughout that this is also a defence of Foucault’s 
argument that power is forever a process. Thus, the ensuing analysis, although 
constrained to the terminology of structurationism, is precisely an attempt to 
theorise the relationships between agency (people) and structure (society) that 
Foucault envisaged. As shall become clear, this is not an easy task and involves 
many theoretical pitfalls, that often lead to a theory falling on one side of the 
structurationist fence or the other, either prioritising agency at the expense of 
structure, or vice versa. The main point in this chapter however is that the three -
149 Hay, Colin. (1995), pl97.
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structure, agency and power -  are ontologically inextricably intertwined (a point 
that Foucault would find it hard to deny) and that structuration theory can help to 
disentangle how they are linked.
Traditionally associated with the works of Anthony Giddens and Pierre Bourdieu, 
‘structuration’ theory grew out of a dissatisfaction within the discipline of 
sociology with theories of structuralism. The main criticism of structuralism on 
which all structurationists agree is that it always manages to subsume agency into 
structure to such an extent that it is made irrelevant. Structuration theory is 
therefore a call to bring agency back into the equation and for focus to be put 
instead on the processes that link structure to agency. As shall be seen below 
however, structurationists are divided as to whether structure or agency is the 
more important -  for although the theory seems to suggest a neutral stance akin to 
‘sitting on the fence’, most structurationists tend to fall down on one side or the 
other of this ‘fence’ if pushed. Indeed, as shall become clear below, there are 
several points of contention between structurationists themselves, which 
ultimately boil down to the question of how much attention to give structure and 
agency respectively. These disputes will be examined in more detail later in this 
chapter but can be summarised as relating to the following: i) the degree of 
autonomy (and/or knowledgeability) granted to the actor; ii) the degree of 
autonomy granted to structure; iii) the distinction between structure and system; 
iv) the number of structuration processes involved (duality or ‘tripality’); v) the 
role of time and space in these processes; vi) the different resources of power 
available to individuals; and vii) the potential for social change/power of 
resistance.
Before approaching these questions however, it is first necessary to deal with the 
overarching problem of how to study potentially unobservable mechanisms such 
as power, structure and agency. For, as has already been mentioned in the previous 
chapter, the most fundamental point of contention with any theory of power is 
how to define its unobservable elements, such as unconscious decisions and 
‘invisible’ structures of power. Behaviouralists struggle over the unobservable 
elements of the decision-making process, while structuralists have difficulties 
proving that a structure of power exists. Post-modernists face a greater dilemma
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still, namely how to prove that power is everywhere at once, or does not exist at 
all as a common denominator in social relations, if left with no tools with which to 
theorise it.
The question of unobservables has also troubled the structurationist debate, as the 
main problem with defining both structure and agency is precisely that they are 
often unobservable. The main task for any structurationist is therefore to prove 
that these unobservable processes do exist, regardless of their empirical 
observation. This may at first glance seem to be a hopeless task. Empirical realists, 
for example, tend to argue that, without empirical observation, social facts cannot 
be said to exist, while post-modemists/post-structuralists tend to question the 
possibility of any social observation at all, claiming that it is always subjective. 
There is however a school of thought that strongly makes the case for the study of 
unobservables, namely that of scientific realism. Indeed, scientific realism can be 
seen to offer a solution to the divide between empirical realists and post- 
modemists/post-structuralists, since its main claim is to open up the social 
sciences to allow for as many epistemological accounts of fundamental 
ontological phenomena (such as structure, agency and power) as possible, while 
still maintaining a focus on empirical research.
For although scientific realists are divided on some issues, they are generally 
agreed on the main claims of the approach, namely that there are certain social 
realities which exist independently of social scientific knowledge of them. The 
disagreements mainly concern defining which of these social realities are 
independent of such knowledge and which are conversely constructed, maintained 
or transformed through knowledge of them. In this section, I shall therefore offer 
my own argument for the independent, ontological existence of structure, agency 
and power, with the claim that how these are then defined will always be up to 
epistemological dispute.
“[A]t the heart of the [scientific realist] SR account of science” claims Wight, “is 
the view that the entities postulated by mature scientific theories [...] are believed
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by scientists to be real.” 150 The approach draws on the work of Roy Bhaskar, who 
argued that “/ sjociety, as an object of inquiry, is necessarily ‘theoretical’, in the 
sense that, like a magnetic field, it is necessarily unperceivable. As such it cannot 
be empirically identified independently o f its effects; so that it can only be known, 
not shown, to exist. [...Sjocial systems are not spontaneously, and cannot be 
experimentally, closed.” 151 The fact that social systems are necessarily open and 
can never be revealed in their entirety in any form of social ‘laboratory’ does not 
mean that they do not exist however. On the contrary, most scientific realists argue 
that social realities exist independently of their observation and thus a social 
scientist’s knowledge of them. In a defence of scientific realism in a recent forum 
on the subject in Millennium, Jonathan Joseph writes:
“[SJcientific realism focuses on the independently existing reality that knowledge tries to 
comprehend./ [PJerhaps the answer to the question of the ontological status o f objects, ideas, 
relations and structures is to say that they are all real. Both the material and the ideational should 
be conceived in the context o f real entities that exist independently o f our conceptualisation and 
have real powers, liabilities and causal effects. Thus ideational things as much as material things 
can be said to have a real existence independent o f particular conceptions and understandings we
may have o f them. ”152
This reality is the stuff of ontology -  the status that objects, ideas, relations and 
structures have regardless of epistemological or methodological debates about 
them. As shall be seen below, ensuing definitions of ontology, (namely which 
objects, ideas etc. are ontological) remains up to dispute. What most scientific 
realists do agree upon however is the importance of ontology to social scientific 
research. For, as Wight states, “the ontological question of whether [something] 
exists is independent of the epistemological claims.” 153 Simply put, scientific 
realists argue that social realities exist independently of the social scientist’s 
knowledge of them and although academic theory certainly can influence social 
practice, this does not necessarily have to be the case. As Wight points out later in 
the same article, “[n]o matter how deluded academics might be about their own 
self-importance, there are no sound philosophical arguments that suggest that if
150 Wight, Colin. (2007), p382.
151 (My emphasis) Bhaskar, Roy. (1998), p45.
152 Joseph, Jonathan. (2007), p346 & 354.
153 Wight, Colin. (2007), p384.
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the social sciences were to disappear tomorrow then so would the social world. 
The fact that something is socially constructed and dependent on concepts, beliefs, 
language use, and so on, does not mean it is not real.” 154
The reality of the social does not mean that scientific realists advocate one single 
‘truth’ or description of its existence however. On the contrary, its main purpose is 
to defend the necessary variation of epistemological and methodological 
approaches that this interdependence of knowledge and reality entails. Theories 
should therefore try to embrace all of these social realities. Indeed, this is where 
scientific realism can appease post-structuralist/-modemist critiques that realism 
necessarily involves endorsing hegemonic discourses. Instead, scientific realism 
means opening up the social sciences to allow for as many epistemological 
accounts of fundamental ontological concepts -  such as structure, agency and 
power -  as possible. Thus, a scientific realist approach is also a Foucaultian 
approach, as it allows for as many possible accounts of these concepts as is 
empirically necessary. However, scientific realism should not be interpreted as 
defending the position that ‘anything goes’ -  a common criticism made by 
empirical realists. On the contrary, this would be to deny the realist claims of the 
approach -  the whole point is that “the object the theory is attempting to grasp 
exists independent of the theory.” 155
“Fallibilism can be embraced without endorsing a debilitating epistemological nihilism. Nor do 
we need to know that a particular viewpoint is ‘true’, since the choice we face is very rarely, if  
ever, that o f a single account o f  a given phenomenon. On the contrary, theories are refuted or 
accepted by virtue of their explanatory power vis-a-vis both the object they seek to explain and 
their ability to go beyond competing accounts. ”156
As Wight argues in the above citation, ‘theories are refuted or accepted by virtue 
of their explanatory power’. At another point he states: “[scientific realism is 
epistemologically relativist, that is, relativist about the transitive object, not 
ontologically relativist. And because it is knowledge of an intransitive object, 
some knowledge claims may be better than others. [...] In fact, there may be, and
154 Ibid, p389.
155 Ibid, p384.
156 Wight, Colin. (2006), p45.
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often are, good grounds for preferring one theory or account of some aspect of the
1 S7world to another.” “Rejecting the idea that knowledge is an all-or-nothing 
affair”, Wight suggests conceiving of an epistemic hierarchy, (based on an 
approach by Roderick Chisholm), that spans from knowledge claims which are 
certain, through knowledge claims which are counterbalanced, to knowledge 
claims which are certainly false.158 In his conclusions, Wight writes “I am not 
suggesting that there are no epistemological or methodological standards to guide 
research. So I am not advocating an ‘anything goes’ approach to research practice. 
I am however suggesting that as a discipline we should be much more relaxed 
about epistemological and methodological matters and more rigorous about 
questions of ontology.” 159
Wight’s seminal and lengthy exposition on the implications of scientific realism 
for the study of IR -  Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as 
Ontology -  sets out some basic ontological premises which he argues theories of 
world politics need to take into account. Taking the concepts of agency and 
structure as ontologically given, Wight’s defence against “the question of how one 
knows anything at all” and therefore whether even structures and agents can be 
proven to exist is simple -  “[wjithout taking some things as given, no research 
would ever get off the ground. [...] Indeed, it would be hard to find a social 
theorist who denied that [actors and their interpretations] were the stuff of the 
social world, although there may well be substantial disagreement about whether 
or not they were exhaustive of it, and of the specific role they should play in 
explanations.” 160 As shall be discussed in the next chapter, Wight himself argues 
for a ‘structural relational account’ of ‘global social relations’161 (preferring the 
latter term to that of ‘international relations’), basing this argument on 
structurationist theories.
I shall return to Wight’s use and interpretation of structurationism later in this 
chapter. What matters here is the import that scientific realism has for the
157 Ibid, p39-40.
158 Ibid, p241.
159 Ibid, p291.
160 Ibid, p249-250.
161 Ibid, p299.
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possibilities of social research. For although it focuses mainly on the philosophical 
questions surrounding the possibilities for a social science, scientific realism is 
inextricably bound up with the question of structure and agency -  indeed, as shall 
be noted in the next section, the founder of scientific realism himself (Bhaskar) 
has offered his own contribution to the structurationist debate. Based on his work 
therefore, scientific realists argue that structure and agency both exist 
ontologically and that they cannot be confused with one another, nor kept 
separate, since they are interdependent. Furthermore, scientific realism questions 
the extent to which knowledge is linked to the processes that link the two. For 
scientific realism cuts straight into the very core of the structure/agency debate, 
since it deals with the question of how knowledge of the social and thus agency 
affects and is affected by the social itself, again linking Foucault to the concepts of 
structure and agency.
There are other theorists who argue that agency and structure are not ontologically 
given however, favouring instead an ontological view of the world that prioritises 
the relationships between agency and structure, rather than agency and structure 
themselves. Diana Coole, for example, argues instead for a phenomenological 
approach that prioritises the transpersonal, finding the terms structure and agency 
too dichotomous. Her main concern with structurationism is that, by retaining the 
terms structure and agency, it reifies the concepts and maintains their separateness, 
instead of focusing on the transpersonal relationships between the two. Rosanne 
Lynn Doty similarly argues that the ontology of agents and structures should be 
replaced by an ontology of practices that are radically indeterminate.
The problem with both of these approaches, however, is that they grant the 
relationships or practices that connect structure and agency ontological status, 
without allowing for the ontological existence of structure and agency themselves. 
As shall be shown in the next section however, these relationships -  whether they 
are labelled as transpersonal, practices or otherwise -  cannot exist at all without 
their constituent parts. And there is enough evidence to support the ontological 
premises that: i) structure and agency exist; and ii) agency does not constitute
162 Coole, Diana. (2005)
163 Doty, Roxanne Lynn. (1997)
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structure, nor structure agency. That they are inextricably linked is not in dispute, 
but the problem with Coole and Doty’s respective solutions is that they reify these 
relationships without explaining what they are made up of. For a relationship 
cannot be said to exist between two things that do not in turn exist. Indeed, giving 
the relationship between agency and structure ontological status, whilst denying 
the ontological status of agency and structure themselves, seems to make no 
logical sense at all. Granting agency and structure ontological status however does 
away with this problem, as long as this status is seen as being co-dependent -  i.e. 
acknowledging that agency cannot exist without structure and vice versa.
It is argued here that power -  as the processes or relationships that bind structure 
to agency -  is the ontological ‘stuff that ties the two together. Any definition of 
this power (or relationships) however, will always be epistemological -  for there 
are no given ontological relations of power between humans that always have and 
always will exist for all time. Gender relations, for example, may have existed for 
a very long time but this does not mean that they will always continue to exist or 
that they have always looked the same. On the contrary, there are countless 
examples of varying gender relations across time and space and so granting the 
relations themselves, or gender as a social construct, ontological existence simply 
reifies the epistemological assumption that gender should matter. It is not 
ontologically given that it should -  it is simply the case that many societies have 
organised social relations around the biological differences between men and 
women. The fact that this has been the case however does not mean that it always 
will be, nor that it is an ontological given. It is also perfectly conceivable to 
imagine a society where gender plays no role at all.
If adequately defined, the concepts of structure and agency can fully incorporate 
the aspects of those transpersonal relationships or practices that both Coole and 
Doty wish to highlight, without reifying either concept, something which neither 
avoid, since they instead reify the processes as somehow existing independently of 
structure and agency. For as Wight rightly points out with regard to Doty’s 
proposal in particular: “[t]his position replaces the determinism of conventional 
structural accounts with a new ‘indeterminate determinism’ of poststructuralism.
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Equally, Doty does not explain what she means by practices, hence it is difficult to 
see the methodological implications of this new ontology.” 164
At the root of all of these disputes -  both internally between scientific realists 
themselves and externally with other approaches -  lie differing concepts of 
ontology. I am fully aware, for example, that the understanding of ontology and 
epistemology that is offered in this thesis may not concur with that of other 
scientific realists. According to Wight, epistemology is concerned with “the 
definition of knowledge and related concepts; the sources and criteria of 
knowledge; the kinds of knowledge possible and the degree to which each is 
certain; and the exact relation between the one who knows and the object 
known.” 165 Ontology on the other hand constitutes theories “of what the world is 
like.” 166 “Politics is about the terrain of competing ontologies” he claims. “Politics 
is about competing visions of how the world is and how it should be.” 167 In this 
thesis however, I use Hay’s definition, namely that ontology asks the question 
“what exists to be known?”, while epistemology asks the question “what can we 
(hope to) know about it?” 168 I thus take epistemology to denote ‘what we know’ 
about ‘what actually exists’ ontologically. Politics in this thesis is therefore taken 
to be about the terrain of competing epistemologies (as knowledge-claims) about 
ontological facts. These ontological facts however are few and far between -  for 
the only ontological facts that remain constant across time and space are agency 
and structure -  namely the existence of human beings and their organisation in 
social relations. How they go about organising themselves however will always be 
up for epistemological dispute.
I do not therefore agree with Wight when he argues, for example, that the 
divisions within IR are ontological and not epistemological or methodological,169 
although he concedes that the widespread view is that they are epistemological170. 
For while I agree with him that they are fundamentally located at the level of
164 Wight, Colin. (2006), p82.
165 Ibid, p231.
166 Ibid, p26.
167 Ibid, p2.
168 Hay, Colin. (2002), p62-4.
m  Wight, Colin. (2006), p2.
170 Ibid, p227.
80
ontology -  that depend on how much weight each theorist attributes to structure or 
agency respectively -  this does not mean that they are not epistemological. On the 
contrary, any proposed ‘solution’ to the agency-structure dilemma will always be 
epistemological. For as Wight himself has pointed out, there is no ontological 
solution to the agency-structure dilemma171 -  any proposed solution will always 
be political, weighing down more heavily on one side of the structurationist 
‘fence’ or the other. Relationships between agents and structures can only ever be 
understood on a case-by-case, empirical level and never a theoretical one -  
something which Wight himself argues. Logically, however, this means that all 
differences of opinion on the subject will always be epistemological. For although 
Wight is correct when he states that “[t]he only comprehensive way to address an 
ontological problem is at the level of ontology”172, the problem here is that there is 
no way to address the agency-structure problem ontologically -  it will always be a 
question of different epistemological approaches to a fundamentally unsolvable 
ontological dilemma.
Divisions within any academic discipline can therefore never be ontological -  they 
are not based on different realities but rather on different perceptions or 
knowledge of those realities. That there is a relationship between epistemology 
and ontology goes without saying -  what humans know about what exists in 
society has an effect on these social phenomena and vice versa. This means that 
what exists is always subject to epistemological influence -  social realities today 
are not the same as social realities a couple of millennia ago for example. The 
basic ontological components of human society however -  namely structure, 
agency and power -  never change -  “no people, no society” as Margaret Archer 
has put it.173 These are the only fundamental ontological phenomena that exist in 
society -  the ‘stuff that exists regardless of epistemological debate. Everything 
else however -  namely how these structures and agents are defined and seen to be 
arranged -  is always epistemological. This is especially the case with structures, 
since they are to some extent more difficult to observe than agents of power who, 
even if they remain hidden for considerable lengths of time, are usually exposed at
1/1 Ibid, p63.
172 Ibid, p4.
173 Archer, Margaret Scotford (1995), p!41.
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some point in history. For although structures can certainly be proven to exist 
ontologically -  both as material and non-material realities that exist regardless of a 
social scientist’s knowledge of them -  any definition of them will always be 
epistemological, only ever capturing a part of that reality.
Indeed, it is the interaction between epistemology and ontology that makes the 
relationships between structure and agency not ontological but rather 
epistemological, since they are always subject to being reproduced or changed 
through human knowledge of their existence. For, as shall be argued in the next 
chapter, concepts such as the ‘state’, the ‘economy’ and ‘gender’ are not taken 
here to denote ontological realities but rather social constructs and, as such, 
necessarily epistemological. Their existence is always contextual, subject to 
human knowledge of them and thus also subject to being reproduced or changed 
according to this knowledge. This does not mean that epistemological concepts 
such as the ‘state’ and ‘gender’ do not exist at all as social realities however. On 
the contrary, these concepts denote very real structurated relationships that have a 
very real impact on societies across time and space. They can also be empirically 
studied in given contexts, but this does not make them timeless ontological 
realities that exist across time and space. This is exactly why politics is about 
competing epistemologies (not ontologies), since it concerns the different 
narratives or knowledge-claims that are made about what actually exists.
“[T]he agent-structure problem has highlighted the way in which there is simply no theoretical 
substitute fo r  empirical research. Man, [according] to Marx, makes history, but not under 
conditions o f his own choosing, and it is the interplay of these elements that requires integration 
into our theories, not the a priori epistemological, or methodological, privileging of one over the
other. ”174
Above all, scientific realism highlights the importance of empirical research over 
theoretical hypothesising. As Wight argues in the above quotation, ‘there is simply 
no theoretical substitute for empirical research’. Indeed, even those who remain 
sceptical about the value of scientific (and critical) realism to the study of IR
174 Wight, Colin. (2006), p294.
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support the importance it places on historical analysis. In the aforementioned 
forum in Millennium, Chris Brown states:
"If critical realism is going to lead to a revival o f historical materialism, then it gets my vote. [ ...]  
Though not a Marxist myself, I would like to see more o f this kind of Marxism around, and insofar 
as critical realism provides a foundation fo r  this work, I ’m all fo r  it. If, on the other hand, the 
effect o f critical realism is to revitalise debates over epistemology and ontology it will do the
discourse no service. ”175
It is the argument here however that the distinction that scientific (and critical) 
realism makes between epistemological and ontological debates is, contrary to 
Brown’s view, of the utmost importance to the study of IR. Indeed, it means that 
the unfortunate labelling of discourses as being either Marxist or non-Marxist, for 
example, becomes superfluous. This is not to deny that Marxist discourses exist -  
as already mentioned in the previous chapter, they constitute a significant share of 
structuralist theory. The point here is that it is what lies at the core of each 
discourse that is of interest -  namely the importance that each attaches to structure 
and agency. For it is only once the ontological premises on which each theory is 
built are uncovered that its epistemological claims can be revealed.
This thesis thus follows the basic scientific realist argument that agents and 
structures are the fundamental ontological ‘stuff of social relations and adds the 
concept of power as the ‘stuff which links the two. For if power is defined as the 
capacity to act in social relations, it is also the glue which ties structures and 
agents together in relationships of social action and is thus also an ontological 
concept in its purest form. All further elaborations on the definition of the concept, 
however, will always be up for epistemological dispute. Indeed, as shall be seen in 
the next chapter, the relevant agents and structures of power in a particular context 
can never be ontologically defined as set or given -  they will always vary across 
time and space and according to both subjective interpretation and empirical 
context. What is offered in the next chapter of this thesis therefore is one particular 
epistemological interpretation of the relevant structures and agents of 
contemporary world power -  there will, of course, be many other possible
175 Brown, Chris. (2007), p416.
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accounts. Those theories that will be deemed to best account for current 
relationships of world power will therefore be those on which most theorists can 
agree. No ontological claims of ‘absolute truth’ can be made on the matter -  other 
than the claim that is made here that it is power which binds structures and agents 
together, albeit in many different ways, in many different contexts. For, as the next 
section shall show, structure, agency and power are ontologically inextricably 
intertwined and structuration theory can help to reveal why this must be so.
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Traditional Structuration Theory -  Giddens (the Behaviouralist 
Structurationist) and Bourdieu (the Structural Structurationist)
“So to the extent that sociology’s raison d'etre has always been the explanation of a certain sort of 
structure, structuration is nothing other than its central problem. Since sociology’s task is to 
account fo r  the reproduction and transformation of phenomena, which being social are necessarily 
relational and therefore structured, then the sociological imagination must have the concept o f
structuration at its core. ”176
As already noted, although Bhaskar is rarely mentioned in mainstream 
structurationist literature, the founder of scientific realism himself has offered his 
own theory of structuration -  namely the transformational model o f social activity 
-  which he bases on the works of Aristotle and Marx. The model’s “central 
features are the definition of human intentional agency as criterial for the social, as 
distinct from the purely natural sphere; and the characterisation of the onto-logical 
structure of human activity or praxis as essentially transformative or poietic, as 
consisting in the transformation of pre-given material (natural and social) causes 
by efficient (intentional) human agency.” Social causes “exist and persist only in 
virtue of human agency” he writes -  “society is itself a social product. [...It] is at 
once the ever-present condition and the continually reproduced outcome of 
agency: this is the duality of structure.” Important to note is Bhaskar’s insistence 
that, although society and agents are “existentially interdependent”, they are also 
“essentially distinct”. Structure and agency are thus ontologically distinct -  “they 
cannot be reduced to or reconstructed from one another.” 177 As already noted 
however, Bhaskar’s main concern was on the relationships between social activity 
and knowledge. For a more detailed account of how structure and agency are 
related, one must turn to traditional structuration theory.
Until the 1960s, the structuralist view of society made barely any reference at all 
to agency, focusing instead on structures. Typically, Marxist theories of revolution 
sought to understand the mechanisms of the capitalist system; humanist Marxism 
focused on the power of ideology; while French structuralism concentrated on the
176 Parker, John. (2000), pl4-15.
177 (Emphasis in original) Bhaskar, Roy. (1986), p i22-4.
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178meaning-producing mechanisms of culture -  and no matter how detailed their 
work on structures, they all seemed to forget about agency. Even Talcott Parsons, 
who (alongside Jean Piaget) is accredited with having been one of the most 
influential structural theorists of the time,179 has been criticised for reducing the 
autonomy of actors “to the point where they merely provide the energy required to 
satisfy the expectations of social roles” .180 (Similarly, his contribution to the 
debate on power, although giving a useful account of some of the structural 
properties of power, was also just that -  a purely structural account.181) Indeed, 
structuralism tended to give structures a natural, reified existence completely out 
of the control of human agency. On the other side of the methodological divide, 
non-structuralists (behaviouralists) focused solely on agency, either suggesting 
that people could take the reins and produce new and better structures for 
themselves,182 or, in most cases, ignoring structuralism altogether.
In 1964 however, David Lockwood’s accounts of ‘social’ and ‘system integration’ 
-  which focused on the “orderly or conflictual relationships” between the actors or 
the parts of a social system respectively183 -  provided the inspiration needed for a 
change in the methodology of sociology. Structures (as rule-resource sets184) are 
marked by an absence of the subject, out of time and space, while systems (as the 
patterning of social relations185) are the situated activities of human agents, 
reproduced across time and space. It should be noted that Lockwood was not 
actually advocating ‘structuration’ in any way, using instead Alvin Gouldner’s
1 8 f \notion of the “functional autonomy” of parts of a social system, to keep 
structure and agency still separate.187 Nonetheless, the theoretical path had been 
cleared for the analysis of the relationships between these parts of the social 
system, and Giddens stepped forward with a proposal on how to do just that.
178 Parker, John. (2000), plO.
179 Haugaard, Mark. (2002), p67.
180 Parker, John. (2000), p l7.
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183 (My emphasis) Lockwood, David. (1964), p245.
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“[I]n social theory, the notions o f action and structure presuppose one another; but that 
recognition of this dependence, which is a dialectical relation, necessitates a reworking both o f a 
series o f concepts linked to each of these terms, and of the terms themselves. ”188
Giddens’ self-entitled ‘structuration theory’ is widely regarded as being one of the
1RQmost influential contributions to the question of structure and agency. Although, 
as shall be shown below, he is certainly not the only theorist to have since written 
on the subject, it was he who first introduced the social sciences to the term, in a 
discussion on the processes of class formation in 1973.190 It is difficult within the 
confines of a section of a single chapter to summarise Giddens’ extensive writing 
on the theory of structuration, since it encompassed several publications on the 
subject. The Constitution o f Society: Outline o f the Theory o f Structuration, 
published in 1984, was the end-result of several publications by Giddens on the 
matter and is that which most adequately summarises the arguments made in his 
other writings on the subject. It was here that he presented his own ‘reworkings’ of 
key concepts (just as he had advocated doing five years previously in his book 
Central Problems in Social Theory: action, structure and contradiction -  see 
above quotation) including, most importantly, refined definitions of structure and 
agency that he claimed preserved their interdependency. What is cited below 
therefore is mostly taken from The Constitution o f Society..., since it was here that 
he summarised most of his main arguments, as well as provided a useful glossary 
at the end of the publication defining the main concepts of the theory.
“Recognition o f the nature and significance of structural constraint does not mean succumbing to 
the attractions of structural sociology, but neither, as I try to make clear, do I accept a viewpoint
close to methodological individualism. ”m
The above quotation summarises Giddens’ overall view of the split between 
structuralists and behaviouralists. His ‘structuration theory’ attempted to bridge 
this gap, using a concept of structure that differed from its usual usage in the 
social sciences.192 There is no dualism between agents and structures, Giddens
188 (Emphasis in original) Giddens, Anthony. (1979), p53.
189 Hay, Colin. (1995), pl97.
190 Giddens, Anthony. (1973)
191 Giddens, Anthony. (1984), pxxvii.
192 Ibid.
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claimed, only duality. “The constitution of agents and structures are not two 
independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality”, he 
wrote. “According to the notion of the duality of structure, the structural properties 
of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively 
organize.”193 Thus, structure and agency are -  in Colin Hay’s interpretation of 
Giddens -  “two sides of the same coin”.194
Building on Lockwood’s distinction, Giddens defined structures, systems and 
structuration as follows:
“Structure: Rules and resources, recursively implicated in the reproduction of 
social systems. Structure exists only as memory traces, the organic basis of human 
knowledgeability, and as instantiated in action.
Structures: Rule-resource sets, implicated in the institutional articulation of social 
systems. To study structures, including structural principles, is to study major 
aspects of the transformation/mediation relations which influence social and 
system integration.
System: The patterning of social relations across time-space, understood as 
reproduced practices. Social systems should be regarded as widely variable in 
terms of the degree of ‘systemness’ they display and rarely have the sort of 
internal unity which may be found in physical and biological systems.
Structuration: The structuring of social relations across time and space, in virtue 
of the duality of structure.”195
Structuration, according to Giddens, therefore consists of the conditions governing 
the continuity or transmutation of structures and thus the reproduction of social 
systems. These systems are ‘intersocietal’ and are distributed along ‘time-space 
edges’ (boundaries) between societies. That is to say, each society is constituted
193 Ibid, p25.
194 Hay, Colin. (1995), p i97.
195 Giddens, Anthony. (1984), p376-7.
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by the intersection of multiple social systems, across time and space.196 ‘Time- 
space distanciation’, therefore, is “the stretching of social systems across time- 
space, on the basis of mechanisms of social and system integration.”197
“In general (although certainly not universally) it is true that the greater the time-space 
distanciation o f social systems -  the more their institutions bite into time and space -  the more 
resistant they are to manipulation or change by any individual agent [ ...]  Time-space distanciation 
closes off some possibilities o f human experience at the same time as it opens up others. ”198
Social change, in Giddens’ view, is therefore inextricably tied up with the concept 
of time-space distanciation. He argued against the predominance of theories of 
evolutionary change, advocating instead that social change is dependent on 
structuration processes. These processes are further characterised by the concepts 
of ‘episodic characterisation’ and ‘world time’ (the latter of which he took from 
Wolfram Eberhard199). “All social life is episodic” he stated -  an episode 
consisting of “a number of acts or events that have a specifiable beginning and 
end, thus involving a particular sequence”200. World time consists therefore of 
“conjunctures of history that influence the nature of episodes” as well as “the 
effects of the understanding of historical precedents upon episodic 
characterisations”201.
Giddens used the notion of episodes to make a problematic distinction between 
three ‘major’ types of society that he claimed can be distinguished in human 
history: tribal cultures; class-divided societies; and modem nation-states 
associated with the rise of industrial capitalism202 - problematic since it not only 
universalises the ‘Western’ experience, but also because it does after all seem to 
reflect a notion of evolutionary change, something he had intended to avoid. He 
also identified four interrelated institutional bases of social order and social 
change: i) symbolic orders/modes of discourse; ii) political institutions; iii)
196 Ibid, pl64.
197 Ibid, p377.
198 Ibid, pl71.
199 Eberhard, Wolfram. (1965)
200 Giddens, Anthony. (1984), p244.
201 Ibid, p377.
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economic institutions; and iv) legal institutions.203 As shall be seen below, 
Giddens was not alone in dividing the social world into four categories. There is 
no apparent reason why theorists of structuration settle for a taxonomy consisting 
of only four components, but as shall be argued below, such four-faceted 
taxonomies tend to be very rudimentary and generalised, missing out on many 
other types of social order that are relevant to the analysis of political power.
“Power cannot be tacked on, as it were, after the more basic concepts o f social science have been 
formulated. There is no more elemental concept than that o f power. However, this does not mean 
that the concept of power is more essential than any other, as is supposed in those versions of 
social science which have come under a Nietzchean influence. Power is one o f several primary 
concepts o f social science, all clustered around the relations of action and structure. ”204
Giddens was very aware of the importance of power to social order. As the above 
quotation makes clear, Giddens regarded power as one of several primary social 
concepts clustered around the relations of structure and agency. He criticised 
prevalent conceptions of power for “faithfully” reflecting the structure/agency 
dualism of the social sciences in general -  defining power either exclusively in 
terms of will and intent, or as a property of society or the social community. “The 
point is not to eliminate one of these types of conception at the expense of the 
other, but to express their relation as a feature of the duality of structure” he stated. 
He attempted to do this himself by stating that resources -  as structured properties 
of social systems -  are “drawn upon and reproduced by knowledgeable agents in 
the course of interaction.” Power thus constitutes all forms o f action, and is not a 
resource in itself. Instead, resources are “media through which power is 
exercised'205 and are either ‘allocative’ or ‘authoritative’.
According to Giddens, allocative resources constitute i) material features of the 
environment, ii) the means of material production/reproduction and iii) produced 
goods; while authoritative resources refer to i) the organisation of social time- 
space, ii) production/reproduction of the body and iii) the organisation of life 
chances. None of these resources are fixed -  “they form the media of the
203 Ibid, p33.
204 Ibid, p283.
205 (My emphasis) Ibid, p i5-16.
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expandable character of power in different types of society.”206 Put more simply, 
allocative resources refer to material objects, such as raw material or land, while 
authoritative resources refer to non-material resources, such as status or 
hierarchical positions.207 And they can be drawn upon either by those who are 
superior or (occasionally) by those who are subordinate. This duality of agency he 
entitled the “dialectic of control in social systems”208 -  and allows for the notion 
of the power of resistance, as advocated by Foucault.
Importantly, Giddens stated that structural constraints do not operate 
independently of the motives and reasons that agents have for what they do. “They 
cannot be compared with the effect of, say, an earthquake which destroys a town 
and its inhabitants without their in any way being able to do anything about it.”209 
And yet the social sciences have often treated agents as much less knowledgeable 
than they really are, Giddens complained.210 If agents lose the capacity to 
influence, then they cease to be agents. “[Ajction depends upon the capability of 
the individual to ‘make a difference’ to a pre-existing state of affairs, or course of 
events.” In other words, social constraint need not be equated with the dissolution 
of action as such. “To ‘have no choice’ does not mean that action has been 
replaced by reaction,” he stated.211 A view which he neatly sums up in an 
interview with Christopher Pierson:
“agency [is] essentially the capability to have done otherwise, the whole of social life rests upon it. 
Even someone who is threatened by a bullet from a gun remains an agent in a philosophical sense. 
Many social scientists have failed to acknowledge what is obvious to any lay person -  that we are
conscious, intentional beings”212
Indeed, ‘in a philosophical sense’, Giddens is by no means alone in attributing the 
notion of choice to agency, for it is a concept that has been much debated within 
philosophy itself. Alan Gewirth, for example, claims that all action has “a 
‘normative structure’, in that evaluative and deontic judgments on the part of
206 Ibid, p258.
207 Wight, Colin. (2006), pl42.
208 Giddens, Anthony. (1984), p i6.
209 Ibid, pl81.
210 Ibid, pxxx.
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agents are logically implicit in all action [...] Any agent, simply by virtue of being 
an agent, must admit, on pain of self-contradiction, that he ought to act in certain 
determinate ways.”213 What agency actually is however, and who constitutes an 
agent or actor (for not all theorists agree with Giddens that the two terms should 
be treated synonymously214, although they will continue to used as such in this 
thesis, for the simple reason that there is no apparent reason to prefer one above 
the other) remains heavily disputed among structurationists, as shall be seen in the 
next section of this chapter.
“Human social activities [ ...]  are not brought into being by social actors but continually recreated 
by them via the very means whereby they express themselves as actors. [ .. .]  To be a human being 
is to be a purposive agent, who both has reasons fo r  his or her activities and is able, if  asked, to 
elaborate discursively upon those reasons (including lying about them). But terms such as 
‘purpose’ or ‘intention’, ‘reason’, ‘motive’ and so on have to be treated with caution [ .. .]  because 
they extricate human action from the contextuality o f time-space. Human action occurs as a duree. 
a continuous flow  o f conduct, as does cognition. ”215
This quotation most neatly sums up what form of actor it was that Giddens wished 
to put back into structure. It is a knowledgeable agent, who motivates, rationalises 
and reflects over its actions. He conceded that motivation can also be unconscious, 
but advocated that the social sciences guard against a reductive theory of 
consciousness “which, wanting to show how much of social life is governed by 
dark currents outside the scope of actors’ awareness, cannot adequately grasp the 
level of control which agents are characteristically able to sustain reflexivity over 
their conduct.” Giddens spoke of the ‘rationalization of action’, where actors 
“routinely and for the most part without fuss [...] maintain a continuing 
‘theoretical understanding’ of the grounds of their activity.”216 “What agents know 
about what they do, and why they do it -  their knowledgeability as agents -  is 
largely carried in practical consciousness. Practical consciousness consists of all 
the things which actors know tacitly about how to ‘go on’ in the contexts of social
9 1 7life without being able to give them direct discursive expression.” Not
213 Gewirth, Alan. (1978), p26.
214 Giddens, Anthony. (1984), pxxii. /  Wight, Colin. (2006), pl89-190.
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surprisingly perhaps, it is regarding this knowledgeability of the actor -  indeed 
regarding his concept of agency in general -  that Giddens has deservedly received 
the most severe criticism, as shall be seen in the next section of this chapter. 
Indeed, I have chosen to call him the ‘behaviouralist structurationist’, as his 
account of structurationism tends to fall on the agency side of the structure/agency 
fence.
The theory of structuration subsequently spread rapidly through the social 
sciences,218 albeit restricted mainly to methodological discussions. (The few 
attempts that have been made to use it in the study of international power 
structures are listed in the next chapter.) Giddens himself, however, intended it to 
be put to practical use, believing that “[s]ocial theory has the task of providing 
conceptions of the nature of human social activity and of the human agent which 
can be placed in the service of empirical work.”219 Criticising theorists such as 
Parsons for granting the social sciences the same logical framework as natural 
science,220 Giddens instead demanded that social scientists “be alive to 
philosophical problems”. This did not mean that they should turn to speculative 
research, as opposed to empirical -  on the contrary, empirical research could, and 
already had disproved some of the more fundamental philosophical assumptions 
of social science theory.221 And, of course, this was most apparent regarding the 
concepts of agency and structure.
Before accounting for many of the problems that critics have found with Giddens’ 
‘structuration theory’ as it stands, it is also worth noting the work of a theorist I 
have chosen to call the ‘structuralist structurationist’. Bourdieu, like Giddens, was 
namely also interested in the processes that link structure and agency. Although he 
preferred to describe his work as ‘genetic structuralism’ rather than ‘structuration 
theory’,222 he is widely accepted as having dealt with the same fundamental 
problems of social theory as Giddens. In Parker’s words: “Despite his hostility to 
Giddens’ mode of producing theory (which he dubs ‘theoretical theory’ or
218 Parker, John. (2000), p3.
219 Giddens, Anthony. (1984), pxvii.
220 Ibid, pxiv.
221 Ibid, pxxvii-xviii.
222 Bourdieu, Pierre. (1990), p i4.
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‘scholastic’), he cannot easily avoid being associated with Giddens’ ideas.”223 I 
will deal much more briefly with Bourdieu than Giddens however, since his 
terminology does not easily lend itself to a discussion of structure and agency per 
se and may therefore end up just confusing matters. However it should be noted 
that, although the analysis in the rest of this thesis will deal mainly with the 
terminology provided by Giddens, it is assumed here that both Giddens and 
Bourdieu were arguing more or less the same case, albeit with different 
terminology. Moreover, while Giddens’ theory of structuration can be criticised 
for giving too much weight to agency, Bourdieu’s theory of the ‘habitus’ can 
likewise be criticised for giving too much weight to structure, thus revealing how 
easy it is for a structurationist to fall down on one side of the fence or the other.
Bourdieu’s alternative to structurationism, ‘genetic structuralism’, focused on the 
concept of ‘experience’ and its relevance to knowledge. He was mostly interested 
in the knowledge that underpins the formulation of rules and, more specifically, 
what comes before that knowledge -  namely practice. In his own words: “the 
theory of practice puts objectivist knowledge back on its feet by posing the 
question of the (theoretical and also social) conditions which make such 
knowledge possible.”224 Indeed, Bourdieu’s wide-ranging empirical studies all 
showed that the individual and the social are not mutually exclusive categories -  
humans do not simply interpret their experience of the world, but rather actively 
produce it. Individuals must therefore be seen as collective beings, meaning that 
social theory must focus on the patterning of individuals and their consequent
27Sactions.
Fundamental to Bourdieu’s concept of agency was the mediaeval concept of 
‘habitus' -  an interpretation of the Aristotelian term ‘hexis’. Bourdieu defined 
the habitus as:
“ precisely this imminent law, lex insita, laid down in each agent by his earliest upbringing, which 
is the precondition not only fo r  the co-ordination o f practices but also fo r practices ofco-
223 Parker, John. (2000), p39.
224 Bourdieu, Pierre. (1977), pl64.
225 Parker, John. (2000), p41.
226 Bourdieu, Pierre. (1985), pl2-13.
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ordination, since the corrections and adjustments the agents themselves consciously carry out 
presuppose their mastery of a common code and since undertakings of collective mobilization 
cannot succeed without a minimum of concordance between the habitus o f the mobilizing agents 
(e.g. prophet, party leader, etc.) and the dispositions of those whose aspirations and world-view
they express. ”221
Habitus is thus the practice of individuals who, having been formed into typical 
examples of their group or class -  in other words, having been given a social role 
or identity -  can reproduce these structures without giving it a second thought. To 
describe this more simply, in Parker’s words: “Ours is not merely embodied being, 
but doing. [...] It is the creative use of a history in the practice of agents which 
keeps it ‘alive’ and moving on into the future.” It is this habitus, or knowledge, 
that makes agents reproduce historical structures. For even if agents can afford the 
luxury of reflective and rational thought on their practice, they vary in their 
capacities to exercise power -  thus it is that structures are maintained that tend to 
favour certain groups and classes.228
“The structures constitutive of a particular type of environment (e.g. the material conditions o f  
existence characteristic o f a class condition) produce habitus. systems of durable, transposable 
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as 
principles o f the generation and structuring of practices and representations which can be 
objectively ‘regulated’ and ‘regular’ without in any way being the product o f obedience to rules, 
objectively adapted to their goals without presupposing a conscious aiming at ends or an express 
mastery of the operations necessary to attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated 
without being the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor. ”229
Bourdieu’s notion of structuration then (if he had conceded to the term) is 
therefore one of structure conferring agency onto actors by distributing power to 
them. He distinguishesd between four types of power, or ‘capital’, namely: i) 
economic; ii) political; iii) social; and iv) cultural (symbolic). This taxonomy 
bears a strikingly close resemblance to Giddens’ aforementioned four-faceted 
account of social order, the only difference being that here ‘social’ power replaces 
Giddens’ ‘legal’. Thus it is clear that, for Bourdieu also, a study of society 
inevitably means a study of power, and vice versa. It was however his view that
227 (Emphasis in original) Bourdieu, Pierre. (1977), p81.
228 Parker, John. (2000), p40-46.
229 (Emphasis in original) Bourdieu, Pierre (1977), p72.
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the historical struggle for dominance in these fields is not between individuals but 
rather between collective agents.230
There is however a very serious problem with Bourdieu’s account of structuration, 
in that, like Coole and Doty, the concept of ‘habitus’ seems to be granted 
ontological autonomy -  as something that exists freely of structure and agency. 
This is a grave problem since, as Anthony King states, “the habitus formally rules 
out any external intervention which has always been a key motor for social 
transformation [... and so] [i]n order to circumvent the formal immutability of the
9*3 ihabitus, Bourdieu has to construct a theory of social change for the habitus”. 
Quite simply put, the habitus is granted an existence of its own, instead of 
denoting the interrelated processes that connect structure to agency. This attempt 
to theorise about the habitus reaches almost ridiculous levels of abstraction at 
times, exemplified when Bourdieu states: “the habitus, which at every moment 
structures in terms of the structuring experiences which produced it the structuring 
experiences which affect its structure, brings about a unique integration, 
dominated by the earliest experiences, of the experiences statistically common to 
the members of the same class.”232 In this quote it is the habitus -  as a process -  
that is doing the structuring, not the structures or agents. By granting the habitus 
ontological status -  as a ‘thing’ which structures structures and agents -  Bourdieu 
loses most of the analytical usefulness of the concept. Processes or relationships 
can never be ontologically given but are rather always in a state of flux, changing 
according to the relevant structures and agents that affect them, according to the 
given context at a particular time and space.
Nor should the habitus be seen as constituting the only possible structuration 
process. For while Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus is a very enlightening 
account of one of the many structuration processes that exist in the social world -  
namely that of the structural conditioning of individuals to act without giving it a 
‘second thought’ -  it is simply that, an account of one of many processes. As 
mentioned above, crucial to his argument for the habitus was the role of power in
230 Parker, John. (2000), p48.
231 King, Anthony. (2000), p427.
232 Bourdieu, Pierre. (1977), p86-7.
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affecting people’s abilities to transform structures -  only those in certain positions 
can do so. While this may very well be the case some, or even most, of the time, it 
centres on a negative definition of power that ignores the many ways that the 
‘subordinate’ also affect relationships of power and thus structures. Although 
Bourdieu described the habitus as a two-way process, he seems to have focused 
mainly on the question of how structures are reproduced through agency, not on 
how they might be transformed. As is stands therefore, the habitus seems to 
denote a one-way process rather than a dualistic one, as it seems to focus mostly 
on the effects of structure on agency, without leaving any room for agency to have 
very much effect on structure, other than to reproduce it.
There are numerous problems with this approach. To begin with, individuals 
frequently do reconsider their ‘second natures’ and upbringings to break free from 
social conditioning. Even when they do not, their actions are never pure 
repetitions of what came before, but will always affect the relevant structures in 
different ways over time and space. For although it is plausibly the case that no 
single individual ever manages to fully escape their social conditioning -  in that 
one’s upbringing will always, at least partly, condition ones actions -  this 
conditioning cannot be made to be the only reason for human action. This not only 
denounces the possibilities of social change en masse, but it also gives each 
individual pre-determined attributes that he/she cannot then escape. A child may 
very well “imitate[...] other people’s actions”, as Bourdieu put it, but social actors 
-  individuals as well as collective -  are not ‘children’ all their lives. Indeed, for all 
their social conditioning, they can and frequently do act in ways not in line with 
their institutional ‘make-up’ or upbringing. Thus Bourdieu can be said to be the 
‘structuralist structurationist’, since his is a definition that prioritises structure over 
agency.
It is thus the argument here that Giddens’ theory of structuration is much better 
equipped to deal with the many processes of interaction between structure and 
agency, not only because it does not grant these processes ontological status in 
their own right but also because it allows for a multifaceted account of the many 
processes involved, instead of focusing solely on the effects of structure on 
agency. There are however many short-comings with Giddens’ account of
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structuration as it stands. It is to these criticisms that this chapter will now turn, in 
order to find a definition of structuration that allows both structure and agency 
equal weight.
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A Critique of Traditional Structuration Theory
“All sociologists are interested in accounting fo r social structures and almost all accept the 
interdependence o f structure and agency. But it is wrong to say that because this is so ‘we are all 
"structurationists" now’ because not everyone accepts Giddens's way o f relating the two. The 
debate is no longer about whether structure and agency are related, but about the nature of that
relation [ . . . ] ”233
Although structuration theory helps to understand the links between structure and 
agency, there are, as already mentioned, quite a few problems with it as it stands. 
For, despite its strengths, structuration theory is, after all, nothing more than that, a 
theory -  a way of looking at agency and structure -  and even those who agree with 
Giddens’ premise that there is an ontological duality between the two, dispute 
some of the assumptions he has made about the nature of this relationship. It is 
impossible within the confines of this thesis to deal with all of the critique that has 
been written on Giddens’ work however, since it constitutes a vast amount of 
writing over the past 20-30 years. Nonetheless, that so much attention has been 
paid to the theory does reveal the significance of his contribution to the social 
sciences -  indeed many critics have endorsed its main aims, offering instead 
alternative ways of viewing one or other aspect of the theory. As Ira J. Cohen 
points out, Giddens gave no indication that the concepts he set out in the theory of 
structuration are complete as they stand. There is still much to be said about many 
issues in the theory, while yet more remain to be addressed at all.234 This, in 
Cohen’s view, can be seen as “a sign of the fertility of structuration theory”, 
stating that “the most significant contributions to social theory always leave as 
many unsettled issues as those which they explicitly confront”.235
What follows below is therefore necessarily a summary of the main points of 
contention with the theory, namely: i) the degree of autonomy (and/or 
knowledgeability) granted to the actor; ii) the degree of autonomy granted to 
structure; iii) the distinction between structure and system; iv) the number of 
structuration processes involved (duality or ‘tripality’); v) the role of time and
233 (Emphasis in original) Parker, John. (2000), p9-10.
234 Cohen, Ira J. (1989), p279.
235 Ibid, p287.
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space in these processes; vi) the different resources of power available to 
individuals; and vii) the potential for social change/power of resistance. Each of 
these points will be dealt with in the critique that follows and each will also be 
confronted, in order to operationalise a theory of structuration that can be put to 
use in the analysis of world power.
i) the degree o f autonomy (and/or knowledgeability) granted to the actor; vii) the 
potential for social change/power o f resistance.
The degree of autonomy (and/or knowledgeability) granted to the actor in any 
structurationist account directly affects the potential that the theorist allows for 
social change and for the power of resistance -  hence the decision here to include 
both of these problems under one sub-heading. One of the main concerns with 
Giddens’ account of structuration is that, by making transformative capacity a 
logical property of all agents (that is thus not determined by social positioning), 
agency is given indeterminate scope. This does not fit in with stark realities where 
resources are scarce -  in such cases, agency is not logical, but rather dependent on 
the distributional position of the actor in question.236 For although Giddens does 
recognise the existence of both allocative and authoritative resources -  thus 
implying a notion of distributional variation -  this does not then fit in with his 
logic of agency.
What is under question here therefore is Giddens’ overemphasis of the 
transformative capacity of agents. For if Bourdieu can be criticised for being too 
structural by attributing too little importance to agency -  if the habitus is taken 
simply to mean the tendency to reproduce social structures -  then Giddens can be 
criticised being too behavioural by attributing too much importance to the ability 
of agents to transform social structures. This is a rather Foucaultian tendency -  
indeed, by claiming that every participant in a power relationship has the capacity 
to transform or resist that relationship, Foucault too can be criticised for failing to 
see the stark realities of structural power. Not all actors are capable of 
transforming all of the structures of which they are a part. Indeed, this is one of the
236 Parker, John. (2000), p62.
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key questions where structurationists tend to fall on one side of the fence or the 
other. Ideally however, a structurationist account of the relationships that exist 
between structure and agency should be able to take into account both the 
behavioural and the structural aspects of these relationships -  namely the 
structural potential of agency to reproduce, as well as the behavioural potential of 
agency to transform structures, both of which are dependent on structural 
positioning.
Already in 1987, J.M. Barbalet complained that Giddens tends “to conceptualize 
social structure as a secondary aspect of agency”237 -  “he ties the enablement of 
power through structural resources too tightly to the reproduction of social 
structure through action or agency.”238 Indeed, the central problem here is 
Giddens’ definition of power itself. According to Parker, “he shifts from 
theorizing power as a general transformative capacity of agents (who are never 
power-/esj) to seeing it as a variable of social relations of domination and 
distributional hierarchies. [...R]ecognizing that power is differentially distributed, 
and is of various kinds (military, economic, ideological etc.), entails attributing 
relatively autonomous causality to properties of social systems.” This, says Parker, 
“contradict[s] the mere randomness implied by ‘structuration’ theory’s 
methodological argument that social system change is no more than the contingent 
and unintended outcome of agency”.239 I shall deal with the issue of Giddens’ 
restricted concept of the different kinds of power in part vi) of this section, where I 
shall introduce the much extended (epistemological) taxonomy of the resources of 
power that shall be used in this thesis.
Other critics of Giddens’ structuration theory, such as N. Mouzelis, have been 
much more sympathetic to its ideas, arguing instead that Giddens does not attach 
enough importance to the capacities of agency to transform structures. Mouzelis 
developed his own alternative, by rescuing what he considers to be its more 
positive elements.240 He accepted Giddens’ notion that agents can act 
knowledgeably and routinely, in a taken-for granted fashion, and that structure can
237 Barbalet, J.M. (1987), p i2.
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indeed be the outcome of agency, but he insisted that agents can also 
(dualistically) distance themselves from the rules. Humans are equally (and 
sometimes collectively) critics as well as followers of routines. He thus 
differentiated between ‘paradigmitic’ dimensions of structure (that he found in 
Giddens) -  which refer to rules and resources in system integration -  and 
‘syntagmatic’ dimensions of structure -  relating to games that actors play in social 
integration.241 Central to his theory is the concept of the ‘hierarchization’ of actors 
in macro, meso and micro levels, which determine the degrees of agency and 
constraint on these actors.242 In Parker’s words: “[Mouzelis] wants to enable 
[Giddens’] ‘structuration’ theory to recognize the variability of social constraint
243and powers of agency, characteristic of positions in hierarchies”. And, most 
importantly, Mouzelis wished to retain notions of both dualism and duality -  
although, in Parker’s view, he rather overcomplicated the matter, since he talks of 
‘dualism’ and ‘duality’ in both the paradigmatic and syntagmatic dimensions. 
Instead, says Parker, “I f  there is to be a place for duality, it is only at the 
paradigmatic level which Giddens originally proposed.”244
Now while I agree with Mouzelis that it is important to open up the concept of 
agency to the potential for resistance to rules, his seems to be a very confused way 
of going about it. For the power to resist dominant social structures is not so much 
a question of hierarchical social placement as a matter of social organisation. If 
individuals at any level of society organise themselves to resist a prevailing power 
structure there is always the potential for social change -  a potential that cannot 
therefore be ignored in an account of social change. I also disagree with Parker’s 
further complication of the matter when he states that the duality of structure and 
agency can only be found on Mouzelis’ ‘paradigmatic’ level. Both ‘levels’, 
whether relating to structure or agency, ultimately boil down to agent/structure 
duality. Indeed, the two cannot be held separate, since they are both interrelated. 
For while structure can both be changed by and change the nature of human 
agency, so too can agency change and be changed by prevalent structures. And, as 
shall be explained in the next section, the debate is further confused by dividing
241 Ibid, p94-95.
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structures into the sub-categories of structure and system integration, since this 
implies that structure is something other than the result of human interaction.
The problem is not only with the level of autonomy Giddens grants each agent 
however but also with the level of knowledgeability he gives them. Wight argues 
that “in construing structure as ‘rules and resources’ Giddens ends up with 
precisely the voluntaristic account of social inquiry he was so keen to reject. 
[He...] seems guilty of reducing the totality of social being to 
phenomenological/psychological phenomena.”245 For “[r]ules take primacy in the 
‘rules and resources’ account of structure. Rules are the master principle through 
which all explanation will be provided.”246 Cohen pinpoints one of these 
psychological phenomena, namely Giddens’ acceptance of ‘unacknowledged’ 
interests. Although he concedes that Giddens is well aware of the pitfalls implied 
in such a concept, Cohen complains that little is then offered by way of ground- 
rules for attributing such interests to agents.247 This is a typical and very important 
criticism of many agency-based theories, a problem that, as already mentioned, 
Giddens shares with Lukes’ concept of ‘real interests’ in the ‘third face of power’.
In his seminal exposition of structuration theory, Wight in my view rescues the 
heavily disputed structurated concept of agency from internal combustion. Indeed, 
it is his concept of agency that shall be used in this thesis. Wight bases his 
interpretation of structuration on Bhaskar’s transformational model of social 
activity which, according to Joseph who does the same, “challenges the reified 
view of structuralist and functionalist accounts of social action, while resisting the 
voluntarism of alternative approaches that give free reign to human praxis.”248 As 
already mentioned, Bhaskar’s main contribution was to show the link between 
structuration and the study of the social sciences, advocating a scientific realist 
approach. There is little scope here to enter into the more detailed philosophical 
arguments that Bhaskar makes for this other than those already given above, since 
that would require a thesis in its own right. However, since Wight not only 
expands upon Bhaskar’s model, but also modifies its terminology to integrate it
245 Wight, Colin. (2006), pl44.
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into the rest of the structurationist debate, it is more useful to immediately 
consider Wight’s conceptualisation of structuration with all of these modifications 
already onboard.
Similarly to Hayward, Wight distinguishes between individual action -  which, 
although perhaps intentional, need not involve any other humans than the one 
performing the act (e.g. taking a walk, drinking a glass of wine or taking a shower) 
-  and social action -  which denotes all “human actions involving, or orientated 
towards, other humans and performed in accordance with social forms such as 
conventions, social norms, rules, institutions, social groups and organisations.” 
Individual action is improbable claims Wight, since most, if not all, human action 
requires “a wide range of socially constructed resources [...] to be in place. So 
walking on a road requires roads, the drinking of wine requires wine and the 
taking of a shower requires showers.” The concept of social action on the other 
hand, argues Wight, requires distinguishing between social groups, institutions 
and organisations. Social groups are defined by “particular individuals standing in 
certain relations”, which can either be formally or informally structured. 
Organisations have “an embodied formal structure” where “specific individuals 
occupy the roles” but where the “identity of the particular agents [...] is not 
constitutive of the organisation, whereas for social groups it clearly may be.” 
Organisations are therefore “identified in terms of the structure they embody” 
which, once embodied, can also have a normative dimension and a moral 
character. “An institution is a wider concept” writes Wight, and encompasses “a 
custom, practice, relationship or behavioural pattern of importance in social life”, 
such as the institutions of marriage and the family, or the economic institution of 
capitalism.249
The problem with many accounts of social agency is that they fail to distinguish 
between these three types, according to Wight. “The conflation of social groups 
and organisations underpins many of the attempts to ascribe agency, and 
responsibility, to organisations, and even at times to institutions.” Instead, states 
Wight, “we must view the locus of intention as residing in the individuals or social
249 Wight, Colin. (2006), p200-203.
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group, not the organisation. [...I]t would be wrong to conclude that role 
incumbants can be understood as simply playing out their allotted roles. For to 
accept this would be to accept a rampant and deterministic structuralism. [...] It 
seems that human agency refuses to be written out of any coherent story.”250
Refusing the definition of an agent as someone who has the ‘capacity to do’, 
Wight instead uses the term to describe “the status of an entity as an ‘agent of 
something’ [.. .since this] allows us to link the account of agency [...] to the power 
agents accumulate by virtue of their positioning in a social context.” “Agency [...] 
appears as layered and differentiated and inextricably linked to social contexts 
through the relations in which it is embedded” he writes. He then goes on to 
distinguish between three levels of agency. Agencyi refers to the ‘freedom of 
subjectivity’ and is always employed in the singular. Agency2 “refers to the way in 
which agencyi becomes an agent of something and this something refers to the 
socio-cultural system into which persons are bom and develop. In a sense agency2 
precedes agencyi.” However, “[agency2] is not to be interpreted as a static 
category”, warns Wight, “since individuals move between and through such 
groups or collectives throughout their lifespan. Hence, they reproduce and/or 
transform their individual and collective identities as part of maintaining or 
transforming the socio-cultural structures they inherited at birth.” Wight rectifies 
here the implication in Giddens’ account that all agents are equally placed -  this is 
not the case, he argues, but rather “agentS2 are embedded in structures and are 
always differentially placed.” Agency3 “refers to those ‘positioned-practice places’ 
which agentsi inhabit.” It refers to social actors such as diplomats, prime 
ministers, soldiers, generals etc. In this way, “agency3 refers to those ‘roles’ that 
agentsi play for agency2.” None of the three levels of agency can be understood 
without reference to the others, claims Wight. “Equally, these distinctions do not 
refer to different people, but are ontologically different aspects of the same 
person.”251
The importance that Wight’s redefinition of agency has for the study of 
structurated agency cannot in my view be overestimated. The next chapter will
250 Ibid, p200-203.
251 Ibid, p212-215.
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examine the implications it has for the study of world politics. Indeed, it is when 
structuration theory has to contend with organisational and institutional agency 
that Giddens’ rather simplified version of agency faces the most severe 
difficulties. For not all agents are equally placed, nor can they all be held equally 
intentionally and thus morally responsible for their actions. Wight’s concept of 
agency rightly problematises the typically behaviouralist oversimplifications of 
intentions and responsibility, to encompass the necessarily more complex accounts 
of agency that also includes collective agents. For although he admits that it is the 
individuals within these organisations who ultimately bear responsibility for their 
actions, it does widen the scope from focusing solely on individual agency.
Similarly to Wight, Giddens also denied that human aggregates could ever 
constitute individual agents, claiming that to make such a claim is simply 
metaphorical. “[T]he only true agents in history are human individuals” he has 
argued, for even if institutions may be regarded by the law as agents, they are 
ultimately the product of structuration and thus reducible to individual human 
agency.252 The problem is that Giddens’ account of agency is too individualistic, 
causing problems if one wishes to apply his theory to IR, since the discipline most 
often appropriates agency to collective agents, such as states. This, along with his 
tendency to collapse structure into agency, is neatly summarised in the following 
statement:
“All social life is agent-controlled in the sense that to be a human being is to monitor one’s 
behaviour constantly in relation to that o f others -  there is no time out from this process, which is 
simply chronic. On the other hand, vast areas o f social life aren’t agent-controlled, if that means 
consciously directed by anyone. [ .. .]  Markets aren’t simply the ‘outcome’ o f millions o f individuals 
taking individual decisions to buy, sell, save and so forth. They have highly structured properties 
which -  as structuration theory underlines -  are simultaneously the consequence and the means o f
actions individuals carry out. ”253
ii) the degree o f autonomy granted to structure; iii) the distinction between 
structure and system; iv) the number o f structuration processes involved (duality 
or ‘tripality’)
252 Giddens, Anthony -  Pierson, Christopher. (1998), p87-8.
253 Ibid, p85-6.
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As already mentioned, Giddens’ concept of structure collapses into agency, thus 
granting it very little autonomy at all. He problematically defines structure as 
consisting of ‘rules and resources’ -  problematic because, according to Wight, it 
constitutes “an ontological reduction of structure to agential understandings and 
instantiations of such structures: in effect, the individualism Giddens wishes to 
avoid.”254 Giddens also problematically differentiates between structure and 
system -  a distinction that shall be abandoned altogether in this thesis. Indeed, the 
reason for examining parts ii), iii) and iv) together here is that the root of all three 
problems is that Giddens overcomplicates structure by adding an unnecessary 
dimension into the structuration process -  namely system. The ‘logical’ 
implication of this becomes a ‘tripality’ between systems, structures and agency, 
rather than a duality between structure and agency. The reasons for this lie in his 
individualistic interpretation of agency, as well as his conception of structuration 
over time and space -  the latter of which will be dealt with in the next section. 
What is under focus here is the definition that Giddens gives structures in the first 
place. For, as rule-resource sets that are implicated in the institutional articulation 
of social systems, these include the collective aspects of agency (namely 
organisational and institutional agency) highlighted above. This denies structure 
its usual meaning, as those organisational features of society that place all agency 
in its context -  something that Giddens has to rely on system to do instead.
The main problem here is that, although he modifies them, Giddens maintains 
Lockwood’s claim that there is an ontological distinction between structure and 
system. Even worse, as Barbalet has pointed out, he borrows Lockwood’s 
concepts of system and structure without then explaining why he has modified 
them, which implicitly translates as a rejection of them as they stand. Defending 
Lockwood’s original distinction, Barbalet insists that power “has to be understood 
in terms of two separate and distinct phases, parallel to social and system 
integration, which are subject to independent variation.”256 Indeed, it is clear that it 
is the concept of power which is crucial to any defence of Lockwood’s distinction
254 Wight, Colin. (2006), pl54.
255 Barbalet, J.M. (1987), p l3 .
256 Ibid, p i 8.
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between structure and system -  Barbalet, for example, argues that “power must be 
seen as having two aspects or phases, one relating to its fundamental basis in 
social structural resources and another pertaining to its exercise in social 
relationships”.257 It is the argument here however that this distinction can be more 
sensibly maintained with the concepts of structure and agency, while still 
maintaining the duality between the two. Ontologically, there is nothing more ‘out 
there’ than people and social structures -  structures which, no matter how old or 
embedded, can either be reproduced or transformed into something else. The 
notion of system reeks of structural determinism, as a form of structure that 
somehow becomes locked into time and space as reified and unchangeable. This is 
not to deny the power of structures however -  indeed, this would be to fall off the 
structurationist ‘fence’ into an agentic definition similar to that of Giddens. For his 
is not a structurally deterministic account of structure -  bar the reference to 
systems -  but rather one that collapses into agency.
Once again, this thesis will rely instead on Wight’s definition, since it ties in with 
his definition of agency given above. He writes that “many of the important causal 
factors that arise from the organisational features of society are neglected, hidden 
or denied if structure is interpreted as ‘rules and resources’.”258 “The practical 
difference between structure as ‘rules and resources’” he continues, “and structure 
as ‘relations between social objects’ is one of the causal significance of objective, 
and perhaps unknown to social agents, social relations.”259 Preferring instead the 
concept of structure as denoting social relations, Wight states that these relations 
“not only co-exist and articulate but endure. The most durable social structures are 
those that lock their occupants into situations that they cannot unilaterally change. 
[...] We need to see agents as socially positioned in networks of social relations 
that provide interests, identities, motivations and materials that enable and 
constrain social agency.”260 We need, he concludes, “to concentrate our attention 
on the important structure (relations) between the material and ideational aspects 
of social life. Hence, brute material facts, the distribution of capabilities, for 
example, are not a structure but one element in a social field of activity that is
257 Ibid, p21.
258 Wight, Colin. (2006), pl41.
259 Ibid, pl53-4.
260 Ibid, pl73.
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structured. As structured it stands in a relation to the ideas held by agents about 
such a distribution as well as the relationship between the agents engaging in the 
activity.”261
Structural power -  those resources that are available to an agent -  necessarily 
affects the power exercised by that agent. Likewise, the power exercised by agents 
helps to either reproduce or transform the structural organisation of social life. To 
divide the concept of structure into the separate ontological realms of structure and 
system is a case of adding one too many concepts into the ontological melting pot 
-  structure and agency will suffice. For, as already mentioned, resources need not 
only be material but can also be non-material, so structure can also encompass all 
of the ideational or cognitive resources necessary for human agency. Put simply, 
an agent draws on many resources in social action -  from the power of ideas to the 
power of material wealth. The definition of resources offered in this thesis will be 
expanded upon in section vi), but suffice to say here that the distinction between 
structure and system is not only unnecessary but also ontologically incorrect.
v) the role o f time and space in these processes
Linked to Giddens’ problematic notion of systems is another serious flaw in his 
account of structuration, namely “the extent to which [his] account of [time-space] 
distanciation finds [him] acknowledging the durability, autonomous temporality 
and causality of social systems, which his ‘structuration’ programme was intended 
to deny.” Critics argue that he has replaced the dualism of stmcture and agency 
with a dualism between structure/agency on the one hand, and time-space on the 
other. What is more, he then leaves us “with only ad hoc means for theorizing the 
relations between them, since the ‘duality of stmcture’ has been exhausted.” 
This is perhaps the most serious criticism of Giddens’ version of ‘structuration’ 
theory.
261 Ibid, pl75.
262 Parker, John. (2000), p63.
263 (Emphasis in original) Ibid.
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For it is Giddens’ interpretation of the role of time and space in structuration 
processes that is fundamental to his distinction between structures and system. He 
defines social integration as a reciprocity between actors in contexts of co­
presence, while system integration is a reciprocity between actors or collectivities 
across extended time-space. In his own words, “[s]ocial integration then means 
systemness on the level of face-to-face interaction. System integration refers to 
connections with those who are physically absent in time or space.”264 As already 
mentioned, however, Giddens’ notion of social integration can be incorporated in 
Wight’s multi-layered concept of agency -  for what is face-to-face interaction if 
not agency? This does not mean however that agency is ever completely 
‘physically absent’ from structure, in either time or space -  indeed, such a 
definition once again risks structural determinism. It seems that, despite his 
intention to break free from structuralism, Giddens still manages to get ensnared in 
Lockwood’s rather unfortunate distinction between system and structure, the 
former of which -  being absent of the subject and out of time and space -  all but 
replicates the reified concept of structure that Giddens had hoped to replace. As 
mentioned above, the duality between structure and agency becomes now instead 
a ‘tripality’, where agents are both affected by as well as affect structures, which 
are then affected by and affect systems, which are somehow out of time and space.
M.S.Archer has written extensively on structuration theory and has called for 
strengthening the ontological defence of the existence of social systems. While 
she does not wish to reify them, she argues that they should be conceptualised as 
distinct and different from individuals. She defines systems as: i) relatively 
autonomous; ii) pre-existing agents; and iii) causally efficacious -  and that these 
claims do not entail reification.266 ‘Action’ and ‘system’ should therefore in her 
view be replaced with a strong concept of social system that is both dependent on 
and independent from action. It is important to note that, while she thus advocates 
‘analytical dualism’, she rejects ‘philosophical dualism’. She accepts that a notion
264 Giddens, Anthony. (1984), p28.
265 Ibid, p70; Archer, M.S. (1996), p680.
266 Parker, John. (2000), p71.
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of individuals presumes a notion of society and vice versa -  “no people, no 
society” as she puts it.267
Archer offers instead her own definition of the processes that operate between 
structure and agency, based again on Lockwood’s awkward distinction, which she 
redefines as being the difference between the ‘parts’ and the ‘people’ respectively. 
She develops this idea to state that the ‘emergence’ of new forms, relations and 
powers between these two basic categories consists of three kinds, namely the 
structural and the cultural (both of which relate to the parts) and the agential 
(which relates to the people). The natural necessity of the internal relations in each 
is what gives them their relative autonomy to contribute to the process of 
structuration. All three have the properties of pre-existence, autonomy, durability 
and causal efficacy.268 The problem with this categorisation however is that, like 
Lockwood’s distinction, it cements structure as being somehow independent of 
human agency.
Archer does however make a very useful objection to Giddens’ account of 
structuration theory, by criticising it for failing to address the varying relations that 
may exist between agency and structure over time. She refers to her methodology 
as one of ‘morphogenesis’ that allows for variable relations. For it is notably the 
concept of time which, in Archer’s view, determines which relations predominate 
between agency and systems -  systems can only be conceptualised as real, without 
reification, by relating them to the agentic powers of individuals over time. Her 
main criticism of individualism is thus that, if agents are considered to be the only 
mediums of constraint, then there can be no explanation of systems of power that, 
although perhaps produced by individuals, remain relevant even after the death of 
those individuals.270 I would argue however that, while the remnants (or, as I shall 
call them, ghosts) of agency-past cannot be said to verify the existence of 
autonomic structures, they do reveal the importance of the concepts of time and 
space to the variability of relations. Archer’s notion of morphogenesis is thus a 
much more fruitful concept of the third dimensions of time and space, since it
267 Archer, Margaret Scotford. (1995), pl41.
268 Parker, John. (2000), p79-80.
269 Ibid, p74.
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allows for both the temporal and spatial variance in the relations between structure 
and agency. For, despite her reification of structures, Archer’s most important 
contribution to the structurationist debate lies in the comment: “[s]tructuration 
itself is ever a process and never a product”,271 thus rejecting Giddens’ more 
utopian ideals for the theory.
However, while I agree that structuration must include the third dimensions of 
time and space -  as the past, present and future multilayered loci of social 
interaction, from micro to macro, through which structuration processes operate -  
these dimensions surely only reflect the relationships between agency and 
structure and nothing else (systems or otherwise) over time and space, i.e. 
structuration all over again. For although history may seem to cement certain 
processes to such an extent that it does not seem as if they will ever change, all 
social enterprises, no matter how persistent their perceived longevity, are only 
ever maintained or tom apart by human agency itself -  in the present. This does 
not mean that past agency is irrelevant however -  indeed, the reproduction of 
structures (reflected in Bourdieu’s concept of habitus) relies heavily on past 
agency. I call this the ‘ghost of agency’ and shall return to it in the next chapter. 
Giddens however only seems able to include agency in the present -  using time 
and space to differentiate between and cement structures (‘systems’) past, present 
and future. This is perhaps how he arrives at the aforementioned problematic 
distinction between ‘tribal cultures’, ‘class-divided societies’ and ‘modem nation­
states’.
vi) the different resources o f power available to individuals
As already mentioned, Giddens distinguished between allocative and authoritative 
resources and identified four interrelated institutional bases of social order and 
social change: i) symbolic orders/modes of discourse; ii) political institutions; iii) 
economic institutions; and iv) legal institutions. The problem with this definition 
as it stands however is that it is not a very nuanced account of structural power. 
Bourdieu also distinguished between only four types of social ‘capital’, namely: i)
271 Archer, M.S. (1990), p75.
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economic; ii) political; iii) social; and iv) cultural (symbolic) -  the only difference 
between the two being Giddens’ inclusion of legal institutions as opposed to 
Bourdieu’s social capital. As shall be shown in the next chapter, Michael Mann 
offers a similar four-faceted taxonomy of society, claiming that ‘societies’ should 
be seen as overlapping interrelations of ‘the four sources of social power’ -  i) 
ideological; ii) economic; iii) military; and iv) political -  the IEMP relationships. 
272 There is no apparent reason why these theorists have settled for taxonomies of 
social order, capital or power that consist of only four components, but it is clear 
that all three of these four-faceted taxonomies are quite rudimentary and 
generalised, missing out on many of the other structures or resources of power that 
people may draw upon in human agency. As already mentioned, this thesis 
chooses instead to use Held’s account of seven sites of power, expanding it to 
include another five sites that shall be argued for in the next chapter.
However, it should be clear that all of the aforementioned theorists -  from 
Giddens, Bourdieu and Mann through to Held -  are essentially talking about the 
same thing -  namely human freedoms. For regardless of whether one chooses to 
call these freedoms ‘structures’, ‘resources’, ‘issues’ or ‘sites of power’, they all 
fundamentally denote the same concept -  namely the social organisation (through 
relationships) of resources on which humans can draw upon in order to be able to 
act freely.
272 Mann, Michael. (1986), pl-2.
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Conclusion
It is clear then that, regardless of whether one opts for Giddens or Bourdieu, or 
any one of the number of modifications that have built on their theories of 
‘structuration’ and ‘practice’, there are still many issues which remain unresolved. 
As already mentioned, these can be summarised as involving: i) the degree of 
autonomy (and/or knowledgeability) granted to the actor; ii) the degree of 
autonomy granted to structure; iii) the distinction between structure and system; 
iv) the number of structuration processes involved (duality or ‘tripality’); v) the 
role of time and space in these processes; vi) the different resources of power 
available to individuals; and vii) the potential for social change/power of 
resistance. The important contribution that structuration theory has made however 
is to highlight these problems in the first place, since they are problems that 
confront any theory of society.
To use structuration theory, therefore, is not to take the works of either Giddens or 
Bourdieu as ready and set frameworks that can be cited and applied word-for- 
word and concept-for-concept, but it is rather a question of trying to use the 
discourse of structuration as the foundations for theory-building. By this I mean 
that any theory of society -  be that ‘international’ or ‘local’ -  must ask itself to 
what extent it addresses these problems. Are the actors granted unprecedented 
autonomy or knowledge, free from structure, or do the structures themselves seem 
to predetermine every act, and every event that that theory sets out to prove? Are 
the processes of structuration themselves granted a ‘natural’ deterministic status 
that somehow exist freely from structure and agency? Is time and space granted 
ontological independence or woven into structuration as the third dimension that, 
ultimately determines the variability of the stmctures and the actors within them? 
What are the resources of power available to individuals in that society? And what 
is the potential for social change or resistance? It is on all of these questions that 
the rest of this thesis will now focus, as I account for my own epistemological 
account of world power.
For, as shall be seen in the next chapter, the debate on structurated international 
power is still in its infancy. I therefore offer my own contribution to this debate,
114
by following up on the aforementioned structurationist debate in the social 
sciences in general. For, as has been made clear, structuration theory itself is still a 
relatively new concept, on which much yet remains to be said. The question of 
how to depict the relationships between structure and agency remains a heavily 
contested one and, thus far, all attempts (including Giddens) have tended, 
unwittingly or no, to prioritise either structure or agency above the other. I will 
therefore attempt to show how a structurated approach that can deal with these 
problems is beneficial to the study of world power. For it is my contention that the 
rather ironic problem with structuration theory, as it stands, is that it does not grant 
enough attention to behavioural and structural power respectively. It seems that, 
by combining the two approaches, a little is lost from each -  not enough attention 
is paid to those accounts of structural or behavioural power that preceded 
Giddens’ call for structuration. I argue that, however methodologically blinkered 
these ‘old school’ theories may have been to each other, they do still illustrate the 
complexities involved in each in much greater detail than any structurated account 
has done thus far. And, more importantly, it is only by examining these 
complexities that we can begin to see how the relationships between structure and 
agency actually operate. Indeed, a structurated account of world power not only 
bridges the ontological divide -  it can also help us answer the more fundamental 
questions of structure and agency in world politics. For, as has already been stated, 
definitions of power and society are inextricably linked, since they not only raise 
the question of who is considered to be an agent or a player, so to speak, but also 
which structures or games they are actually playing.
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Chapter Four: Setting the Stage For An Analysis of World Power 
-  Structurated Power in World Society
Introduction: The *Real World o f Politics’
’’The real world o f politics has always been one o f layered, overlapping, and interacting polities. 
Our task as theorists is to explain that most defining characteristic o f politics: the manner in which 
individuals come together (or are brought together) to behave collectively. We need to understand 
the sources and consequences of political change -  the processes by which polities emerge, evolve,
expire, and are sometimes resurrected. ”273
As Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach make clear in the above 
quotation, the ‘real world of politics’ is a complex one -  of this there is no doubt. 
John Burton made a similar point when he stated that “[s]ocial and political 
interactions are beyond comprehension on a world scale. [...] At best we can have 
a concept of the whole.” According to Burton, most humans build their 
conceptions of this ‘whole’ by moving from their knowledge of the local to a 
wider knowledge, “from discovery of parts to wholes”.274 Despite the inherent 
difficulties in doing so however, all of these theorists have subsequently offered 
their own conceptions of ‘world society’, all of which shall be examined in further 
detail in this chapter, along with the conception of world society and power that 
shall be used in this thesis.
As already mentioned, there are certain criteria that any theory, including all 
theories of world relations, can be asked to fulfil. A theory can be judged against 
other theories according to how well it depicts the social realities that are ‘out 
there’, realities that exist independently of any of the theories that may be written 
about them. Furthermore, all theories can also be fairly accurately judged 
according to a scale of how certain or certainly false they may be. A theory may 
be correct for example in stating that, in current day politics, the U.S. president is 
a powerful agent, but it would slip further down this scale if it claimed that he or 
she was the most powerful agent or ruler of the world, who could do anything that 
he or she wanted. Equally, a theory that states that capitalism is a powerful
273 Ferguson, Yale H. -  Mansbach, Richard W. (1996a), p42-43.
274 Burton, John. (1987), p23-25.
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structure that has power over most human agency today would be higher up on the 
scale than a theory that stated that capitalism is the only or even the most 
important structure of power that is relevant to world politics. It is thus the 
argument here that -  for a theory of contemporary world society to be as high up 
on the scale as possible -  it must take into account as many of the relevant 
structures and agents that have an effect on current world politics as possible.
For, as Foucault held, power is everywhere275 and, as Hay puts it, ‘power is 
politics, politics is power’276 -  arguments that many feminists have used to fight 
the distinction that is often (still) made between public and private politics. It is 
thus the assumed concept of ‘political’ power which lies at the core of most 
mainstream theories of world politics that I wish to contest, since they all too often 
make the assumption that all other forms of power are apolitical. Following the 
assumption that everything is power and thus political, this thesis assumes that all 
of the ‘sites’ of power that are listed here are just as political as traditional 
definitions of ‘political’ power. Do not misunderstand me here -  there is a clear 
difference between economic and cultural power, for example, and they will be 
dealt with separately throughout this thesis (albeit with the argument that each 
‘site’ of power affects and is affected by the others). All of the networks or ‘sites’ 
of power studied in this thesis are however taken to be forms of ‘political’ power, 
in that they affect and are affected by the abilities of human agents to change 
outcomes and thus live their lives. Traditional notions of ‘political’ power -  
relating to matters concerned with the ‘citizen’ and the ‘state’ politic -  are instead 
categorised in this thesis as just that, as relating to the state, and are to be found in 
the sites of structural power in which the state plays a dominant role in either 
maintaining or being maintained by the structural properties of that site.
More on this later in this chapter however. Suffice to say here that I take all social 
(human) power to be political, meaning both that power which is maintained, 
created or challenged by human agency, as well as that power which exists in 
networks of (human) society to maintain, create or challenge human agency. The 
inclusion of the word ‘human’ may seem somewhat overstated at this point, but as
275 Foucault, Michel. (1980f), p98.
276 Hay, Colin. (1997), p45.
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I will later come to discuss the social and thus political power of the natural 
environment, as well as of tiime and space respectively, I wish to make it clear 
already here that these are omly considered to be forms of political power in the 
contexts in which they are useed by human agents. For human society consists of a 
rich variety of ingredients that can each be made more or less politically relevant 
over time. It is finding the rellevant set of ingredients that are relevant at a certain 
point in human history that cconstitutes the challenge for any theory of power. For 
as Wight again so succinctly puts it:
“[Ojur embodied nature as a ‘species being’ has direct implications fo r social science. Thus when 
talking o f what the human persom can do, we are also talking about the human animal since the 
characteristic capacities o fHcmco sapiens cannot be reduced to society, even if they can only be 
exercised within it. [ .. .]  Recognition of the notion of ‘species being’, although perhaps passe and 
unfashionable within the social sciences, is, I think, a necessary component fo r  any critically 
orientated social theory [...simce it] allows us to determine whether social conditions are
dehumanising are not. ”211
In this chapter, I will therefore begin by deconstructing the ‘state-centric’ theories 
that have thus far dominatedl IR, then account for other attempts that have been 
made to theorise ‘world scociety’ without focusing solely on ‘state’ actors, 
including those attempts thalt have been made to use structuration theory in the 
study of world relations. I will then account for some core definitions that I 
believe are fundamental to thie study of world society, in order to clear the ground 
for the theory of world powder relations that will be used in this thesis. It is the 
argument here that mainstream! IR theory must contend with the complex realities 
and thus inequalities of the world, which far transcend ‘state’-level analysis. They 
may be epistemological realities -  in that they are not timeless, ontological 
phenomena that have alwayrs existed, but rather have the potential to either be 
reproduced or transformed (dependent on human knowledge of them -  but that 
does not make them any lesss real to the humans who are experiencing them. On 
the contrary, and as this thesiis shall argue, social inequalities are frequently as real 
and limiting to social agency as death itself and may also lead to this very real, 
biological end to human agemcy.
277 (Emphasis in original) Wight, Coliin. (2006), p211.
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The ‘International ‘State9 System9 Revisited -  Deconstructing the ‘State9
“States as concrete political entities came into existence recently and in a historically specific 
context. Bom o f and in a complex social environment, there were numerous intra-, inter-, and 
extrastate influences that helped to constitute the European states system that eventually emerged 
and exported itself throughout the known world. ”278 
/
“In conventional international theory, states, like Hobbes's Individuals in the state of nature, 
appear to have sprung like mushrooms into maturity: States loo>k alike, differentiated only by their 
power and capacity to act on the international system. ”279
To call for a review of the ‘international ‘state’ system’ is certainly not news, as 
the above quotations, made almost a decade ago, make clear. The criticism has 
come both from within IR itself, as well as from o>ther disciplines in the social 
sciences, extending from gender and post-colonial studies to historical sociology 
and political science. The basic demand is the same across the board however. The 
two theorists quoted above, for example, may on further examination seem to have 
quite different agendas, but they are united in their charge that there needs to be a 
reformation of the ‘state’ concept. Sujata Chakrabarti Pasic, for example, 
concentrates on the importance of culture to IR, and sees the ‘state’ as a cognitive 
construct, that will “only survive if the historical arguments for unity within them 
continue to convince an audience”.280 J. Ann Tickner, on the other hand, 
concentrates on the impact of the concept of ‘state’ on issues of gender, stating 
that “the collective we, embedded in the historical construction of the state-as- 
unitary actor model of international theory, represents men’s rather than women’s 
voices.”281 She concludes, in common with many other feminists, that “[w]e 
should, therefore, be thinking about reconceptualizing state identities in ways that 
are not associated with an exclusionary, militaristic, gendered form of patriotism. 
This would depend on rethinking the identities of citizens also.”282
These are both fundamentally important criticisms butt it seems they have yet to be 
properly addressed by the main ‘theory-builders’ of world power -  i.e. by (neo-
278 Pasic, Sujata Chakrabarti. (1996), p97.
279 Tickner, J. Ann. (1996), pl51.
280 Pasic, Sujata Chakrabarti. (1996), p l02.
281 Tickner, J. Ann. (1996), pl52.
282 Ibid, pl59.
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)realists, (neo-)liberals, ‘globalisation’ and world-system theorists and even, as 
shall be seen below, by some constructivists, such as Alexander Wendt -  all of 
whom typically continue to settle with ‘state’-centric theories. This is a very 
serious problem, for until the ‘state’ is accepted for what it is -  a historical 
construct of human agency -  theories of world power will continue to give only a 
very fragmented and biased view of the world, where the unitary ‘state’ actor 
continues to dominate all epistemological thought on world relations. It is the 
contention in this thesis that it should not be the question of choosing between 
‘state’ and ‘non-state’ actors however, but rather a choice to refrain altogether 
from theorising solely around the concept of the ‘state’.
Historical sociologists, such as Mann, and political scientists, such as Ferguson 
and Mansbach, have illustrated this point in great historical detail, in their 
respective comparisons of the modem Westphalian ‘state’ with other forms of 
political organisation in world society. Although Mann retains the concept of 
‘state’, Ferguson and Mansbach choose to speak instead of ‘polities’ as 
constituting the main actors in world politics.283 For, as they so eloquently put it: 
“[t]he question is not whether the state exists and is observable, but to what extent 
it explains the things we need to understand.”284 I shall return to the arguments of 
these theorists in the next section, since they both offer helpful alternative ways to 
theorising world politics. For now, however, my focus is on deconstructing the 
‘state’.
The reason that the ‘state’ still dominates most theories of world power could 
reside in a methodological dispute that still seems to maintain its grasp on the 
discipline of IR. This dispute has its origins in the three so-called ‘Great Debates’
within the discipline: i) concerning realism and idealism; ii) concerning how to
conduct social scientific research; and iii) the role of naturalism. As Wight has 
pointed out, all of these debates shared a common concern -  “[i]n all of these 
‘great debates’ [...] the underlying logic concerning the issue of naturalism is 
similar and two traditions are typically represented. The first -  the naturalist 
tradition -  asserts that there is, or can be, an essential unity in method between the
283 Ferguson, Yale H. -  Mansbach, Richard W. (1996b).
284 Ferguson, Yale H. -  Mansbach, Richard W. (1996a), p34.
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natural and social sciences. The second -  the anti-naturalist hermeneutic tradition 
-  posits a radical distinction in method between the natural and social sciences.”285 
Typically, mainstream IR has fallen down heavily on the naturalist side of the 
debate, advocating such scientifically stringent methodologies -  whether this be 
the methodologies followed by neo-/realists or by neo-/liberals -  that the complex 
realities of world politics cannot possibly be encompassed within their theories. 
One of the most illuminating examples of this is the ‘levels-of-analysis’ debate, 
which seems to have spun itself, and possibly even the discipline, into an 
epistemological quagmire -  a mess that, as Wight points out in the below 
quotation, has to do with its close relation to the agent-structure dilemma.
“Although the language o f agents and structures was alien to IR until recently the discipline has 
nonetheless been forced to grapple with a version o f the problem in the guise of the 'levels o f
analysis’ problem. ”286
The ‘levels-of-analysis’ debate began with J. David Singer’s paper on the subject 
in 1960, where he stated that “the responsible [IR] scholar must be prepared to 
evaluate the relative utility -  conceptual and methodological -  of the various 
alternatives open to him, and to appraise the manifold implications of the level of 
analysis finally selected.”287 Singer and his followers deemed to have settled this 
matter by deciding that one could choose to theorise either about the ‘nation state’ 
or the ‘international system’, thus also implicitly accepting that, 
epistemologically, this is what IR was about. He did, however, concede that other 
actors might eventually replace the ‘nation state’:
“[I]t may well be that existing institutional forms will take on new characteristics or that new ones 
will appear to take their place. As a matter o f fact, if  incapacity to perform its functions leads to 
the transformation or decay o f an institution, we may expect a steady deterioration and even 
ultimate disappearance of the national state as a significant actor in the world political system. ”288
Since Singer, there has been a plethora of literature on the levels of analysis that 
are considered relevant to the study of world relations. The arguments that have
285 Wight, Colin. (2006), pl6.
286 Wight, Colin. (2006), p72.
287 Singer, J. David. (1961), p77.
288 Ibid, p90.
121
followed have revolved around the relationships between the ‘international 
system’, the ‘nation-state’, ‘bureaucracy’ and the ‘individual’, bringing the total to 
four levels of analysis in all: i) ‘international system’; ii) ‘nation state’; iii) 
‘bureaucracy’; andiv) ‘individual’289.
There has, however, been a great deal of confusion in IR over what should 
determine the level of analysis one chooses to focus on, as a very illuminating 
debate between Wendt and two other IR theorists, Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, 
has revealed. It all began with the publication of Hollis and Smith’s book 
Explaining and Understanding International Relations in 1990. In this they stated:
“Someone who inclines to a Structuralist view in International Relations will be best suited by 
some kind of realism in a unified philosophy o f science and hence by taking the main task to be one 
o f explaining international relations. Someone who inclines to a hermeneutic view in philosophy 
will be best suited by an International Relations theory which works from the inside and tries to 
understand international relations in terms of rules, actions, and their (often unforseen) results. 
[ . . .]  Singer’s level-of-analysis problem is classically one o f whether to explain top-down or bottom- 
up, whatever quite one identifies fo r  the purpose as ‘system’ and as ’unit’. ”290
Hollis and Smith then proceeded to argue that the ‘levels-of-analysis’ problem 
needed to be abstracted to instead comprise of two poles, the holistic and the 
individualistic. Crossed with the notions of explaining and understanding, they 
produced Figure 1 (see below). In their view, structuralists use external structures 
to explain the holistic level and rational choices to explain the individualistic level, 
whereas the hermeneutic view uses collective rules to understand the holistic level 
and reasoned choices to understand the individualistic level. It is important to note 
that Hollis and Smith were referring to structuralism as it has often been 
interpreted in IR, (originating in Waltz’ Theory o f International Politics, where he 
conceived of the structure or system as comprising of the sum of the rational units, 
namely states) not in the social sciences in general -  not many structuralists 
outside of IR would include rational choice on the individualistic level for 
example.
289 Hollis, Martin -  Smith, Steve. (1991), p395.
290 (Emphasis in original) Hollis, Martin -  Smith, Steve. (1990), p214-5.
122
Explaining Understanding
Holistic
Individualistic
Figure 1: ‘Mapping theoretical disputes’ (Hollis & Smith, 1990, p215.)
The circle in the middle -  comprising of individuals as role-players -  represented 
“the core” of Hollis and Smiths’ matrix and “should be thought of not as a position 
of four-way compromise but as a movable counter to be manoeuvred to whatever 
place on the chart the reader finds most satisfactory.”291 They could not agree 
where they would put the counter themselves, compromising instead to leave it in 
the centre, to let the reader decide,292 but in a later article they claimed that, 
wherever it was placed, it would always end up being like “a dance round the 
maypole [...] As the dance goes round and round [...] the ribbons grow shorter, 
the circle closes and the bemused theorist is drawn to a  centre where everything 
mediates everything and is mediated by everything.”293
As I shall argue below, it is very difficult to box society up in this way, be that on 
a global or a local scale. For there is no dualism between holism (structure) and 
individualism (agency), only duality, and so individuals do not so much move 
around from one box to the other as find themselves in the midst of it all -  both 
affecting and being affected by social structures. Using Bourdieu’s notion of the 
‘synoptic illusion’, Wight warns of the dangers of using diagrammatic theories 
such as Hollis and Smith’s matrix:
291 Ibid, p214-215.
292 Ibid, p216.
293 Hollis, Martin -  Smith, Steve. (1991), p409.
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“[TJhe deployment o f the matrix by Hollis and Smith produces an image o f rigid boundaries that 
may not hold when the issue is considered in other discursive and less dichotomous ways. [ ...]  
First, the relationships created between entities in the diagrams are often an artefact o f the 
exercise o f the production of the diagram: they do not exist in practice. Because these relationships 
never actually occur in interaction as depicted in the diagram, what appears to be logically 
incompatible ‘on paper’ may be compatible in practice. In effect, the entire diagrammatic creation 
is a kind o f fiction, which does not exist in reality. Second these diagrams always do violence to 
time and space. For, on the one hand, they represent in simplistic two-dimensional form what is, in 
fact, multi-dimensional, and on the other hand, all sense o f the playing out o f strategies in practice
over time is lost. ”294
To their credit, however, Hollis and Smith did bring to light the importance of 
agency and structure to the level of analysis problem in IR theory -  a point which 
many structurationists in the discipline surprisingly seem to have missed. In his 
critique of Hollis and Smith’s book, Wendt for example stated that the authors 
“conflate two distinct problems: the ‘level of analysis’ problem and the agent- 
structure problem.”295 He admitted that the two problems are related, since “at any 
given level of analysis (bureaucratic, nation-state, or systemic) there will typically 
be a problem of relating structure to agency -  but the point is that the relevant 
agents keep changing across different levels of analysis.” In their constant focus 
on holism and individualism, Wendt argued, Hollis and Smith were only in fact 
discussing issues of agency and structure and not levels of analysis.296 In his view, 
the latter “is a problem of explanation: of assessing the relative importance of 
causal factors at different levels of aggregation in explaining the behaviour of a 
given unit of analysis.”297
Wendt’s main ambition has been to open up the concept of ‘state’ to a 
‘structurated’ analysis of culture and identity, claiming that “states’ identities and 
interests are in important part constructed by the process of interaction”.298 This is 
a very important contribution to IR theory -  which has otherwise generally 
favoured an individualist approach, where ‘states’ are regarded as pre-determined, 
‘rational’ actors -  but there is a major problem with his approach, namely that he
294 Wight, Colin. (2006), p86-87.
295 Wendt, Alexander. (1991), p387.
296 Ibid, p388.
297 Ibid, p387.
298 Wendt, Alexander. (1992), pl83.
124
wishes to open up the ‘state’ without including other agents. For he continues to 
proclaim the existence of a ‘given unit of analysis’, namely the ‘state’. It is very 
odd that Wendt should do this, since he himself has criticised “deep-seated 
individualism about social relations [in which] agents with given powers and 
interests are the ontologically privileged starting point for theory.”299 Nonetheless, 
it seems that Wendt is determined to stick with the ‘state’ and his sentiments on 
the subject are most clearly stated in the following statement:
“The point is merely that states are still the primary medium through which the effects o f other 
actors on the regulation o f violence are channelled into the world system. It may be that non-state 
actors are becoming more important than states as initiators of change, but system change 
ultimately happens through states. In that sense states still are at the center o f the international 
system, and as such it makes no sense to criticize a theory o f international politics as ‘state- 
centric’ than it does to criticize a theory o f forests fo r  being ‘tree-centric’. ”300
It would appear however that it is Wendt himself who cannot see the wood of 
world society for the trees he is growing there. Pasic (who advocates the inclusion 
of culture into IR theory) certainly seems to think so, stating that “Wendt still 
begins at the statist departure point of both realism and rationalism” -  “the 
standard overemphasis on unitary state actors and their interaction is a real 
drawback.”301 Wight has also criticised Wendt for “employing] a conventionalist 
defence of his own acceptance of the analogy between states and individuals”, 
adding that “it is precisely this institutionalized assumption which any discourse
' I M  #
on the agent-structure problem should surely have addressed.” This is a highly 
problematic theoretical move says Wight, that reduces the ‘state’ to an individual, 
instead of accepting that “the state, as a constructed social form, can only act in 
and through individual action. State activity is always the activity of particular 
individuals acting within particular social forms.”303
Wendt’s rather contradictory approach raises some fundamental questions as to 
the validity of current thinking about the ‘level-of-analysis’ problem. For if
Wendt, Alexander. (1991), p389.
300 Wendt, Alexander. (1999), p9.
301 Pasic, Sujata Chakrabarti. (1996), p87-9.
302 Wight, Colin. (1999), pl27.
303 Ibid, pl27-8.
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‘states’ are created from and interact with something, where and more importantly 
what is that something in a ‘state’-centric theory? By maintaining the ‘state’ as 
the sole unit of analysis, one is left with only two areas of study -  inside and 
outside the ‘state’ -  with the focus on how ‘domestic’ and/or ‘international’ 
politics help to shape the ‘ state’ in question. But if ‘states’ are themselves created, 
maintained and changed through societal processes, their very identities differing 
from each other and subject to change as a result, how then can Wendt essentialise 
them into being the only entities relevant to world politics? There is no fluidity -  
read structuration -  in this notion of world society, only a static fixation with a 
reified concept of ‘states’ and their perceived interests and capacities.
Wight agrees with Wendt that the agent-structure problem is distinct from the 
‘levels of analysis’ problem, although he concedes that they are both “choices that 
all analysts must make.”304 Wight argues that “it is possible to defend a vertical 
yet non-hierarchical (in the sense of an a priori privileging of one level over 
another) account of levels; whilst accepting and expanding on Walker’s horizontal 
point.”305 (Walker’s point being that the relations between individuals, states and 
system might be better grasped as horizontal relationships.306) The problem as 
Wight sees it is that Hollis and Smith relegated individuals to a separate level, 
with bureaucracies as their only structure. “This treatment of the level-of-analysis 
problem takes the relocation of agency as unproblematic.”307
As already noted, Wight offers his own conception of agency as one that stretches 
across all ‘levels’ of society -  indeed, it is his account of different types of agency 
that shall be used in this tlhesis. He also criticises IR’s tendency to attribute human 
agency onto the state, staling that “[acceptance of the ‘personification theory’ of 
the state accords human agency no role, because the state now takes on the 
properties of human agency and the real human agents that act in the world are 
theoretically redundant.”308 Moreover, as already mentioned, Wight also advocates 
that, “under a structural relational account, we should think not of international
304 Wight, Colin. (2006), pl02.
305 Ibid, pi 06.
306 Walker, R.B.J. (1993), pl34.
307 Wight, Colin. (2006), p i07.
308 (Emphasis in original) Ibid, p i '98.
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relations, but of global social relations”309, although, coming as it does in the last 
pages of his most recent book, he has yet to set these out in any detail. He is 
however critical of IR’s focus on the ‘state’, arguing:
“The state system we currently exist within is, in many respects, a chimera. It is a powerful 
chimera, but it is nothing other than the result o f a particular configuration o f structural 
relationships that are constantly changing. The vision ofIR as a realm with the state (as actor) at 
its core existing in a structural environment that can be usefully analytically separated from all 
other realms only serves to feed the chimera. ”310
Although it is thus clear that Wendt and Wight have differing opinions as to the 
usefulness of current IR theory -  Wendt defending the continued focus on the 
‘state’ while Wight’s is a call to include other agents in any analysis of ‘global 
social relations’ -  it is very curious that, as structurationists, both claim that the 
‘levels-of-analysis’ problem is unrelated to that of agency and structure. It should 
be noted that both of their criticisms are directed towards Singer’s conflation of 
the two problems and that it is not my intention here to defend the arguments that 
either Singer or Hollis and Smith have made for different levels of analysis. On 
the contrary, it is the argument here that the agency-structure problem renders 
traditional IR concepts of ‘level-of-analysis’ more or less useless, except to 
distinguish between distinct forms of external and internal ‘state’ politics, either 
between each other or within their own borders. Thus, while I agree with both 
Wight and Wendt that the ‘levels-of-analysis’ problem does constitute a separate 
theoretical problem to that of structure and agency, it is the argument here that the 
two are inextricably related to one another and that a structurationist account of 
world relations necessarily and logically leads to a reconsideration of traditional 
IR frameworks. Wight may have recognised this in his call for the discipline to 
focus instead on ‘global social relations’ but as he has yet to define what these are, 
it is necessary to turn to other theorists to see how these might be conceptualised.
“The most important single fact about the evolution o f politics over the past three centuries or so is 
that virtually the entire world has been progressively carved up into political units o f a single 
broad type -  the nation-state -  to the exclusion o f others. [...W ]e still have little idea what the
309 Ibid, p299.
310 Ibid.
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world o f politics would look like if the nation-state were to be transcended by some other 
predominant structural pattern. ”311
The above quotation by Philip G. Cerny is taken from his publication on the 
implications of structurationism for theorising about the state, namely The 
Changing Architecture o f Politics: Structure, Agency, and the Future o f the State. 
He openly admits that while, in this publication, he focuses on the state as the 
“core structure of political life [...], the modem state -  as it has developed in post- 
feudal and capitalist society -  is viewed here not as a reified, determining, large- 
scale structure analogous to, e.g., race, but as a contingent phenomenon. It is the 
product of a certain amount of historical accident, of circumstantial choices made 
by political agents, and of pre-existing structures being in flux due to a wide range 
of interconnected changes along [...] structural dimensions”.312 Cemy maintains 
however that the nation-state is still “the central, active, structuring feature of a 
rapidly changing global environment” and regards it as “highly improbable that it 
will actually be replaced by any alternative structure.” Nonetheless, he argues that 
the twenty-first century will transform both the institutional structures and the 
dominant ideas of world politics -  e.g. through processes such as the rapidly 
integrating global financial marketplace and the growing issues of environmental 
resource management -  in ever more complex ways.313
Indeed, in a more recent publication, Cemy hints at what this future might look 
like. He claims that there is a “process of reconfiguring of political power going 
on -  indeed, of its effective disarticulation or bordering  in a more complex world 
-  integrally rooted in and arising from globalization, making traditional state- 
based notions of political power increasingly problematic and in some ways 
redundant.”314 He deems it unlikely that the nation-state will be able to respond to 
these changes with a system of global governance, but rather that such changes 
must in that case come from “within the newer, essentially transnational 
structures” of the world.315 He concludes his original analysis of the future of the
311 Cemy, Philip G. (1990), p3.
312 Ibid, p i 1.
313 Ibid, pxiv.
314 (Emphasis in original) Cemy, Philip G. (2000), pl71.
315 Ibid, pl85.
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state with the words “it will never be the same again.” This thus also has 
consequences for the theorising of world politics within IR, which he criticises for 
not keeping up with the empirical realities of these changes. He neatly sums up his 
call for theoretical reformation within IR with the statement: “What is needed is an 
analysis which looks at political structures such as states as processes of 
structuration -  as complex patterns of ongoing but uneven interactions between 
agents and structures, and as complex mixes of stasis and change.”317
Cemy is not alone in calling for a theoretical reformation within IR to keep up 
with the times, so to speak. Equally, and as already mentioned, identity theorists 
and feminists (such as Pasic and Tickner) and political scientists (such as 
Ferguson and Mansbach) have been calling for the discipline to move away from 
its traditional ‘state’-centric approach for some time now. And it seems at last to 
be resonating with some of the key ‘theory-builders’ within the discipline. In his 
recent book on ‘English School’ theory, for example, Barry Buzan states that 
“[m]anaging this expansion from interstate to world politics is important to IR as a 
discipline.”318 He distinguishes between ‘international system’, ‘international 
society’ and ‘world society’ and claims that it remains the discipline’s biggest 
challenge to incorporate all of these perspectives.319 He believes that the English 
School is the sub-discipline that is best suited to manage this expansion, given that 
it already includes all of these perspectives (albeit with varying degrees of 
success). This project is not without its difficulties however, for “[t]he concept of 
world society, and especially how world society and international society relate to 
each other”, he states, “is in my view both the biggest weakness in existing 
English school theory, and the place where the biggest gains are to be found.”320 
The only problem is that Buzan’s own proposed solution to this dilemma retains 
the great epistemological divide between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ actors, despite his 
wish to include the latter.321 For despite stating that IR “needs [...] to avoid 
ensnaring itself in the trap of unnecessary choices between state and non-state
316 Cemy, Philip G. (1990), p246.
317 Ibid, p22.
318 Buzan, Barry. (2004), p2-3.
319 Ibid, pl-7.
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alternatives” , he later in the book argues that it “is perfectly clear that a global- 
scale pluralist interstate society exists on the basis of effectively universal 
acceptance of Westphalian institutions such as sovereignty, territoriality, 
diplomacy and international law.”323
Although it is certainly not the intention of this thesis to deny that the world of 
‘states’ constitutes a very important part of contemporary world society, it is the 
argument here that the Westphalian ‘state’ is only one of many agents to exist in 
world relations. It should not therefore be granted exclusive focus of analysis 
when studying world events -  past, present or future. Although theorists such as 
Buzan may wish to incorporate these agents into already existing theories of IR -  
English School or otherwise -  it is not exactly clear how this will work, without 
fundamentally rewriting some of the main concepts of IR theory itself, including 
its continued focus on levels and systems. There are some theorists in the 
discipline however who have recognised the need for a fundamental 
epistemological makeover of the discipline and it is to these theorists that the next 
section now turns.
222 Ibid, p3.
123 Ibid, p208.
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I f  Not ‘States’ Then What? -  Alternative Concepts o f ‘World Society’ and 
Power in IR Theories
“ The study of world society is the study o f the total environment in which the behaviour of 
individuals, groups, nations and states occurs. The social and political behaviour o f others is the 
social and political environment o f each system. The behaviour o f one part o f a society affects the
behaviour o f others. ”324
Burton is the IR theorist who is perhaps most closely associated with the study of 
‘world society’ and whose ideas, as can be seen in the above quotation, are very 
similar to those of structurationism, since he claimed that behaviour (agency) 
creates the environment (structures) in which behaviour (agency) can take place. 
Indeed, as shall be seen below, Burton’s main interest was in understanding world 
relations, not just between states, but across both physical and epistemological 
boundaries. He criticised what he saw as the discipline’s “past preoccupation with 
relations between nations” and claimed that the term “[‘international relations’] is 
an unfortunate title for our present purposes. [...] The study of world society is a 
much wider study than the relations of units within it.”325 Indeed, Burton had wide 
ambitions for the study of ‘world society’, stating that it “needs to be built into 
educational systems, just as is mathematics, language, health and road safety.” 
Since the publication of his seminal work World Society in 1972 however, very 
little has changed in the conceptual study of ‘international relations’ within the 
discipline of IR itself.
Burton was fundamentally opposed to separating ‘world society’ into different 
levels -  “any artificial separation of politics from international politics, or any 
approach to an understanding of world society that implies one set of theories to 
explain behaviour at one social level, and another set at another level, must be 
misleading. [...W]e will understand behaviour of states, of groups within states, 
and of men if we place them in the broader framework of world society.”327 He 
was also acutely aware of the potential power of theories of ‘international 
relations’, stating that “the images and models held of reality contribute to the
324 Burton, John. (1987), p4.
325 Ibid, pl9.
326 Ibid, p3.
327 Ibid, pl64.
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creation of reality”. Specifically on neo-/realist assumptions about the ‘aggressive’ 
state, he wrote “[t]he assumption that states are potentially aggressive is one that 
leads states to adopt defensive measures, alliances and collective security. Other 
assumptions could lead to other behaviour.”328
Thus aware of the inherent difficulties in studying ‘world society’ and of the 
potential dangers of simplifying its realities into geographical relationships 
between states alone, Burton instead advocated studying ‘world society’ using a 
cobweb model, that mapped out world behaviour, such as population movements, 
links and transactions (both material and non-material) etc.:
“What we really need to have, either in map form or conceptually, is an image o f world society 
that shows behaviour by showing these linkages. I f  we could superimpose on successive sheets of 
transparent paper air-passenger movements per week, telegraphic flows, ethnic and language 
relations, movements o f scholars, technical advisers, migration, tourism, and all other 
transactions, we would begin to build up a picture of relationships which would help to explain 
behaviour in world society far better than traditional maps. ”329
Thirty years after Burton wrote this, one does of course not have to resort to 
superimposing these links onto successive sheets of transparent paper -  there are 
plenty of computer programmes available today that can and do do this for the 
social researcher. Many ‘globalisation’ theories (usually associated with political 
science, sociology and development studies) typically try to amalgamate these 
many patterns into the single claimed conceptual reality of a new emerging pattern 
of ‘globalisation’ -  a school of thought which has blossomed over the past two or 
three decades since Burton wrote World Society. Mainstream IR theory however 
has struggled to keep up with these new epistemological conceptions of world 
society, maintaining its old-fashioned state-centric theories. Indeed, as recently as 
1995, Burton was referred to as being regarded within the discipline as “a 
marginal figure at best, unreal at worst and idealistic”.330 This comment, however, 
came from David J. Dunn, in an article praising Burton’s contribution to IR 
theory. He concludes:
32y Ibid, p35-6.
330 Dunn, David J. (1995), p206.
132
“As far as international relations is concerned -  and it is as well to put in the caveat, fo r  Burton 
has gone well beyond the limits o f the discipline -  he has actually provided a framework within 
which international relations can be both located and reinvigorated. If it had discrete concerns 
once, it has problems now (for example, making old words work in a new world, setting a new 
agenda, addressing emergent novelties) and Burton, fo r all that he has been marginalized and 
dismissed, offers more than many others in terms o f pointers as to where we go from here. ”331
Mann is another theorist (notably a historical sociologist) who has offered 
definitions of world society and power that seem to rest on a structurationist 
methodology. In the first volume of The Sources o f Social Power, where he sets 
out the conceptual framework of the ensuing historical analysis, he claims that 
“societies are constituted of multiple overlapping and intersecting sociospatial 
networks of power. [...] They are not social systems (closed or open); they are not 
totalities”. Indeed, Mann argues that, if he could, he “would abolish the concept of 
‘society’ altogether”, since there “is no master concept or basic unit of 
‘society’”332. He is thus in agreement with Burton that to “conceive of societies as 
confederal, overlapping, intersecting networks rather than as simple totalities 
complicates theory”, but adds “we must introduce further complexity.” And it 
is not, he states, that the contemporary world is exceptional in this regard, thus 
undermining the argument, made by many ‘globalisation’ theorists, that 
contemporary global interdependency is a relatively new phenomenon. On the 
contrary, “[i]n prehistory, trading and cultural interaction was of enormously 
greater extent than could be controlled by any ‘state’ or other authoritative 
network” -  “the forms of overlap and intersection have varied considerably, but 
they have always been there.”334
“Human beings need to enter into social power relations, but they do not need social totalities.
They are social, but not societal, animals. ”335
331 Ibid, p208.
332 Mann, Michael. (1986), p i.
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As already mentioned in the previous chapter however, like Giddens, Mann offers 
only a four-faceted taxonomy of the sources of social power that he believes are 
‘primary’ or ‘determining’ in societies -  namely the ideological, economic, 
military and political (IEMP) relationships. According to Mann, these are: i) 
overlapping networks of social interaction (not dimensions, levels, or factors of a 
single social totality); and ii) organisations, institutional means of attaining human 
goals. The methodology that he adopts is distinctly structurational and is 
summarised best in his own words:
“I operate at a more concrete, sociospatial and organizational level o f analysis. The central 
problems concern organization, control, logistics, communication -  the capacity to organize and 
control people, materials, and territories, and the development o f this capacity throughout history.
The four sources o f social power offer alternative organizational means of social control. In 
various times and places each has offered enhanced capacity fo r organization that has enabled the 
form o f its organization to dictate fo r a time the form o f societies at large. My history o f power 
rests on measuring sociospatial capacity fo r organization and explaining its development. ”337
Mann’s concept of agency is made up of organisational power -  “in pursuit of 
their goals, humans enter into cooperative, collective power relations with one 
another.”338 By this he does not mean that the driving force of human society is 
institutionalisation -  it is rather that humans need to enter into various networks of 
extensive and intensive power relations in order to achieve their goals in life. And 
this can happen in direct conflict with existing institutions, or it may happen 
“unintentionally and ‘interstitially’ -  between their interstices and around their 
edges -  creating new relations and institutions that have unanticipated 
consequences for the old.”339 This also answers the question why the masses do 
not always revolt -  because “they lack collective organization to do otherwise [...] 
They are organizationally outflanked,34°. He does not mean that power relations 
themselves are always so very organised however, distinguishing between 
‘authoritative’ power (which is actually willed by groups and institutions) and
336 Ibid, p2.
337 (Emphasis in original) Ibid, p2-3.
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‘diffused’ power (which typically comprises an understanding that practices are 
natural or moral or result from self-evident common interest).341
Different relations or institutions may be relevant in each of the four sources of 
social power, says Mann. The simplest empirical proof to this, he claims, is the 
typical answer to the simple question ‘in which society do you live?’ Answers 
generally refer either to national states or to a broader ‘economic society’ (e.g. ‘the 
West’ or ‘industrial society’). Delve deeper however and it becomes more 
complex, as more and more identities are included. Mann explains this eloquently 
in the following statement:
“Human beings do not create unitary societies but a diversity o f intersecting networks o f social 
interaction. The most important of these networks form relatively stably around the four power 
sources in any given social space. But underneath, human beings are tunneling ahead to achieve 
their goals, forming new networks, extending old ones, and emerging most clearly into our view 
with rival configurations of one or more o f  the principal power networks. ”342
He does not leave it there however. Not only are societies confederal, overlapping 
and intersecting networks, as opposed to simple totalities -  they also “weave 
across each other in the historical process”.343 And, most importantly, we can 
never know in which direction they will go. The four sources of social power are 
therefore ‘tracklaying vehicles’ (here he amends Weber’s railway metaphor of 
‘switchmen’ to describe the power of religious ideas), which lay “different gauges 
of track across the social and historical terrain.” More importantly, “the tracks do 
not exist before the direction is chosen”.344
The problem with Mann’s IEMP model as it stands however is that it remains 
‘state’-centric. For, despite his wish to abolish the concept of ‘society’, Mann 
seems to be quite content with the concept of ‘state’. The reason for this is to be 
found in his definition of ‘political power’, which he “restrict[s] [...] to 
regulations and coercion centrally administered and territorially bounded -  that is,
341 Ibid, p8.
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to state power”.345 Such a narrow definition of political power not only excludes 
from analysis the political power of ‘non-state’ actors, but also that of structurated 
processes such as gender and culture. Despite his overemphasis of the autonomous 
power of the ‘state’ however, Mann is credited (by Ferguson and Mansbach) with 
having recognised “that there is a good deal more to the story than Westphalian 
polities.”346
“[Tjhere is no logical, historical, or empirical justification for universalizing the Westphalian 
polity, which is only one of many forms of political organization. A reality o f overlapping 
authorities, organizing citizens in different ways and attracting their resources fo r  limited 
purposes, is messier than the myth o f a system of states, but it is closer to what actually prevails in
the world. ”347
As the above quotation makes clear, Ferguson and Mansbach replace the concept 
of ‘state’ altogether with the concept of ‘polities’, in order to be able to include all 
of the ‘forms of political organisation [...that] prevail[] in the world’. Polities are 
defined by the authors as being “entities with a significant measure of 
institutionalization and hierarchy, identity and capacity to mobilize persons for 
value satisfaction (or relief from value deprivation).” A polity’s domain “includes 
the persons who identify with it, the resources (including ideological resources) it 
has, and the issue(s) it affects. No polity is omnipotent, controlling all persons and 
resources with regard to all issues.” And “[although all polities have a territory of 
sorts -  where the persons that identify with the polity are -  that territory need not 
be clearly demarcated. A polity need not have a ‘center’, although it is (in their 
view) a disadvantage for it not to have one -  or to have more than one, like the 
medieval papacy at one stage or the late Roman Empire.”348 They stress that “a 
polity in our conception is distinguishable from any unitary notion of society” 
(about which they agree “Mann rightly cautions”) and is also distinguishable from 
“social networks”. This is because “social networks, interactions, or transactions -  
for example, a market -  that produce value satisfaction may lack sufficient 
identity, institutionalization, and hierarchy to be a polity.” Instead, they will only
345 Ibid, p26.
346 Ferguson, Yale H. -  Mansbach, Richard W. (1996b), p32.
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348 (My emphasis) Ferguson, Yale H. -  Mansbach, Richard W. (1996a), p22.
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allow “organized social groups, from families to transnational firms” to be 
polities.349
This thesis will also use the term ‘polity’ rather than ‘state’ to describe the 
relevant entities that operate in world society, using a modified version of the 
definition offered by Ferguson and Mansbach above. Before embarking on a 
critique of their definition as it stands however, it is important to note that -  
however it is defined -  a polity is as much an epistemological concept as any 
other. Indeed, just as the concept of ‘state’, it cannot be said to have existed in 
exactly the same form across time and space and thus cannot be granted the status 
of an ontological concept. The problem with Ferguson and Mansbach’s definition 
as it stands however is that it leaves out of analysis many other forms of polity that 
have had an effect on the structures of world society through the power of agency.
A polity in this thesis takes Ferguson and Mansbach’s basic definition as read -  as 
an entity that has the capacity to mobilise persons for value satisfaction (or relief 
from value deprivation) that includes the persons who identify with it, the 
resources (including ideological resources) it has and the issue(s) it affects. It is 
thus an entity which has the ability to reproduce or transform structures of power 
for its (members) own purposes -  in other words, although it certainly includes 
‘states’, it is not restricted to ‘states’ alone, but rather includes all entities that are 
relevant in the politics of world society, whether they be political, economic, 
religious or other socio-political entities. It is on their final point however -  that 
only organised social groups (and not other, less organised social groups or social 
networks) constitute polities -  that I find I cannot agree with Ferguson and 
Mansbach, as it thus omits from analysis not only organised social networks but 
also more informal and diffuse networks and groups, such as those found within 
patriarchal structures. For while these networks of power may operate on 
widespread and sometimes even purely cognitive levels, without a centre of 
authority, they necessarily require agency to maintain them. They may be so 
diffuse that it is difficult to attribute individual agency or locate any organisational 
structure to them but agency is fundamental to their operation and this agency is
349 Ferguson, Yale H. -  Mansbach, Richard W. (1996b), p34.
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not limited to the individual man or woman alone. Instead, it is usually a question 
of collective agency (in the form of social networks or groups, however loosely 
defined or organised) that reproduces or transforms these structures.
The reason that Ferguson and Mansbach are epistemologically ‘forced’ to omit 
these social groups and networks from their concept of polity is due to their 
equally problematic claim that a polity must have a hierarchy. Indeed, they 
generally seem to be at a loss when it comes to these more diffuse forms of social 
power, since they state that, in some cases, “authorities are more difficult to locate 
in a precise way because of the diffuse manner in which an interest is organized -  
gender, class, race, ethnicity -  but role models or spokespersons can usually be 
identified.”350 They define authority as “the ability to exercise influence or control 
across space over persons, resources, and issue outcomes; in other words, it is the 
capacity to govern”351 and claim that “[virtually all polities have some means of 
disciplining or coercing persons within their domain.”352
Authority and the means to discipline and coerce are not seen in this thesis as 
being the sole property of certain, individual agents within a polity however, 
although such hierarchical structures do of course exist. Thus, authority here not 
only includes the capacity of certain specific individuals or groups to govern over 
others but also includes the capacity of all agents within a structure (the 
‘oppressed’ as well as the ‘oppressors’) to govern together by mutually creating, 
reproducing or transforming the structure in question. For structures do not have 
authority in and of themselves -  indeed, this would be to totally remove agency 
from the equation. Structures may provide certain agents within them with more 
authority than others, but it is not the structures themselves that hold this authority. 
No matter how vast or dispersed the group in question, as in the case of patriarchal 
structures, it is agency that always lies at the root of the structure, either working 
to reproduce or transform the structure in question.
350 Ibid, p26.
351 Ibid, p35.
352 Ibid, p35.
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Moreover, even if a spokesperson can be located that advocates social division 
along the lines of gender, class, race or ethnicity, they are usually not the 
authorities behind these divisions. This is not to deny the fact that such cases have 
certainly existed throughout history, in the form of socio-political preachers 
advocating social separation on the basis of their beliefs. It is the argument here 
however that these cases do not constitute the norm of most everyday social 
segregation. Indeed, although divisions of identity do build on human interaction 
and thus agency, this agency is usually so diffuse that it is difficult to attribute 
individual agency and thus responsibility. The limits of agency in such diffuse 
cases cannot therefore be attributed to a particular hierarchical authority but rather 
to all human interaction within that polity, which can operate on both individual 
and collective levels.
To continue with the example of patriarchal structures, these are not maintained 
because a group of men somewhere have the authority to discipline and coerce 
other men and women into submission, but are instead the result of more diffuse 
networks of human agency -  across time and space -  which ultimately need not 
include all men and can and usually also do include women. Wight’s three-faceted 
concept of agency can help here to maintain the distinction between patriarchy as 
a structure and patriarchy as agency. Patriarchy as a structure is the social 
organisation of men and women according to divisions of gender. Agencyi refers 
to the individual men and women within the structure. Agency2 -  as the socio­
cultural system into which persons are bom and develop -  is the level at which the 
patriarchal structure (and all other structures besides) either facilitate or constrain 
the men and women located at agencyi to either reproduce or transform the 
structure. Agency3 -  as the ‘positioned-practice’ places which agentsi may or may 
not inhabit -  refers to the hierarchical positions of authority that Ferguson and 
Mansbach claim are essential for a polity to maintain power over agency2 and 
agencyi. And it is on this final point that I disagree with them. Depending of 
course on agency2 and thus their positional placing within the patriarchal structure, 
the men and women in agencyi are perfectly capable of either reproducing or 
transforming the structure without agency3 -  Wight’s distinction between social 
groups (as either informally or formally structured) and organisations (as formally 
structured) is again useful here. For although it certainly helps a polity in its
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agentic capacities to have a formal organisation, it does not necessarily need to 
have one in order to have an impact on world society -  the power of consumers to 
boycott certain goods for being deemed socially unacceptable proving another 
case in point. For although these consumers may be steered in their opinions by 
advocacy or media groups and organisations, their ability as consumers to 
mobilise and change structures of power is not necessarily dependent on 
hierarchical organisation, but can sometimes operate in a quite arbitrary, almost 
spontaneous fashion.
It is important here to once again distinguish between agency and structure, at the 
same time as recognising their interdependency. Agency is never restricted solely 
to a ‘polity’ but rather operates across and between structures -  this is what 
Foucault meant when he said that power is everywhere, exercised by all agents 
except in cases of total domination. It is also the argument here however that a 
structure of power -  such as a patriarchal structure -  can, through its 
organisational capacities to place agents in different positions of power, also 
operate as a ‘polity’. For a patriarchal structure can also function as an entity in 
society that can be used to mobilise persons according to its values and will as 
such also comprise of persons who identify with it, the resources (including 
ideological resources) it has, and the issue(s) it affects. It does not however 
necessarily need to have an organised structure, with people in positions of 
authority dictating the rules and norms of that structure. This is not an attempt to 
reduce structure to agency -  as already mentioned, structures operate by 
constraining or facilitating all agency within them, depending on the positional 
placing of the agents in question -  but it is an attempt to ‘humanise’ structures. 
For as networks of power, structures operate solely through the agency of their 
members and as such cannot be reduced to somehow being inhuman structures 
that exist freely of human agency.
It is useful here to recall Wight’s distinction between social groups, organisations 
and institutions. Although Wight is against any attempts to ascribe agency (and 
thus responsibility) onto organisations and institutions (much less structures), 
stating that it is instead always the individuals who are at the centre of these who 
are the relevant agents, his distinction between the three does help to define
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collective agency more thoroughly than Ferguson and Mansbach manage in their 
definition of polities. While a social group, for example, may eventually grow into 
an organisation with a formalised hierarchical structure, it may equally comprise 
of a collective with no clear hierarchical structure -  the relative successes of local 
uprisings such as those organised by the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo in 
Argentina (a group of mothers who met once a week to protest against the 
disappearance of their children) to change existing political structures constituting 
a case in point. For although this particular group did eventually expand into a 
large, organised group that eventually branched off into two separate 
organisations, its initial successes were due solely to the collective efforts of 
fourteen mothers to find their missing children.353 So while Ferguson and 
Mansbach restrict their notion of collective agency to solely encompassing 
organisations, this thesis extends the definition to also include more informal 
social groups and networks, as well as institutional agency, such as that found in 
patriarchal structures.
It is highly probable however that Wight would be just as opposed to the term 
polity as he is to the term state, if it meant the ‘personification’ of that polity, by 
attributing agency and responsibility onto the organisation or institution per se. 
That is not the intention here however, for the agency and thus responsibility 
always belongs to the individuals or groups who have the capacity to act within 
the relevant polity in question. The argument here is that -  by including 
individuals, social groups and social networks as well as organisations -  the term 
polity, as it is defined here, not only avoids the personification of abstract 
institutions and structures but also and importantly allows for the study of other 
entities in world society than states alone.
“The fundamental form of domination in our society is based on the organizational capacity o f the 
dominant elite that goes hand in hand with its capacity to disorganize those groups in society 
which, while constituting a numerical majority, see their interests partially (if ever) represented 
only within the framework o f the fulfillment o f the dominant interests. Articulation o f the elites,
353 Bosco, Fernando J. (2001)
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segmentation and disorganization of the masses seem to be the twin mechanisms o f  social 
domination in our societies. In short: elites are cosmopolitan, people are local / . . J ”354
Another sociologist who has written about the power of networks is Manuel 
Castells. His theory of a network society is an interesting, if slightly ‘space-age’ 
notion of world order which, contrary to mainstream IR theories, can instead be 
criticised for attaching too little significance to the power of the ‘state’. According 
to Castells, the ‘nation-state’ today constitutes merely a node in the ‘network- 
state’, which is instead a complex make-up of various actors -  financial 
institutions, NGOs etc. Global power is to be found in these networks of 
organisations -  indeed, the network society is itself global, leaving outside 
everything that is not valued by the networks. It is the network that defines the 
power holder -  for example, the US is the power holder of state military power, 
while the financial markets are the power holders of global capitalism. This brings 
Castells to the rather radical conclusion that the question of power therefore 
hopelessly dissolves in the network society. This does not mean that power is non­
existent however -  on the contrary, it is held by many different networks.355
"From the pinnacles o f power and their cultural centers, a series o f symbolic socio-spatial 
hierarchies are organised, so that lower levels o f management can mirror the symbols of power 
and appropriate such symbols by constructing second-order spatial communities that will also 
tend to isolate themselves from the rest o f society, in a succession of hierarchical segregation 
processes that, together, are tantamount to socio-spatial fragmentation. ”356
Castells’ hypothesis of global power holders thus has two main categories: i) 
programmers -  power holders who have the capacity to programme a particular 
network to reach certain goals; and ii) switchers -  power holders who have the 
capacity to incorporate, or switch between the various networks. The actors in 
Castells’ theory are humans but they are not individuals -  they are instead 
networks of actors or elites. The process of programming a network is specific to 
each particular network and each programme is generated by ideas and culture. 
Thus, ideological hegemony precedes the ability to programme a network. Due to 
their ability to switch between the various networks, the switchers are more
354 Castells, Manuel. (1996), p415.
355 Castells, Manuel. (2004)
356 Castells, Manuel. (1996), p416-417.
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powerful than the programmers, as the connections make possible an even greater
o c  n
power. Indeed, each network left on its own is instead quite fragile.
The primary mechanism of domination is therefore through presence in the 
networks -  you are either in or out. The power of the media, for instance, is in its 
networks, not in its ownership, as otherwise stated by many other structural 
theorists. Similarly to Gramsci’s notion of counter-hegemony, Castells’ theory 
also allows for the concept of counter-power, as the resistance to power is also 
operated through the programming of power. Activists can both try to re­
programme individual networks, by campaigning to impose new regulations or 
values in the networks -  e.g. actions taken against the WTO and the global 
financial market -  or they can try to block the switches -  eg. through acts of
'1 Z Q
terrorism.
Castells’ theory of power is obviously very different to the traditional strands in IR 
of realist and structuralist theory. He allows almost no priority to state agency, nor 
does he allow structures to consume the agency of networks. The main problem 
with his theory can be summarised in the same way however. By totally 
disregarding the agency of states, he cannot even begin to problematise the 
concept of US hegemony since, in his view, it simply does not exist. This is 
clearly a view of society that does little to explain current trends in world 
relations. Completely disregarding the importance of US power does not seem 
credible, as does handing all power over to diffuse, nameless networks, which 
somehow operate outside of individual human agency. Castells seems to demand 
that we hit fast forward and transport ourselves to a dimension of world politics 
that quite simply does not yet exist. Old traditional ‘networks’ of power -  namely 
those between states -  still have too much importance in the structure of world 
order to be so totally disregarded.
“The social scientists, in politics and economics especially, cling to obsolete concepts and 
inappropriate theories. These theories belong to a more stable and orderly world than the one we
357 Castells, Manuel. (2004)
358 Ibid.
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live in. It was one in which the territorial borders o f states really meant something. But it has been 
swept away by a pace o f change more rapid than human society had ever before experienced. ”359
One IR theorist who already 20 years ago argued for the declining relevance of the 
‘state’ in world politics, but who was equally fundamentally opposed to what she 
called the “string of vague and woolly words” that have tried to fill the holes left 
in IR discourse, namely ‘globalisation’, ‘interdependence’ and ‘global 
governance’, is Susan Strange. Such terminology “often serves to dull or even 
conceal the reality of relationships, the crude facts of structural power over other 
governments and over other societies”, she stated.360 Claiming that “politics is 
larger than what politicians do, and what power can be exercised -  and is every 
day being exercised -  by non-state authorities as well as by governments”, Strange 
called for a ‘new realism’ that could “look seriously at the power exercised by 
authorities other than states”.361
"the realist school o f thought in international relations has held that in the last resort military 
power and the ability to use coercive force to compel the compliance o f others must always 
prevail. In the last resort, this is undeniably true. But in the real world, not every relationship is 
put under such pressure. Not every decision is pushed to such extremes. There are many times and 
places where decisions are taken in which coercive force, though it plays some part in the choices 
made, does not play the whole, and is not the only significant source of power. ”362
Strange conceded that her work was closely related to that of Giddens in 
sociology, although she called ‘structuration’ a “rather clumsy term”. Indeed, 
Strange was one of the first IR theorists to offer a relational definition of world 
power. Although she proclaimed herself to be a realist, as Robert Cox makes clear 
“she certainly cannot be classified with those theorists who posit an exclusively 
state-centered view of world political economy or with the oversimplifications of 
neorealism.”364 She did however focus heavily on economic power, stating that 
“the impersonal forces of world markets, integrated over the postwar period more 
by private enterprise in finance, industry and trade than by the cooperative
359 Strange, Susan. (1996), p3-4.
360 Ibid, pxii.
361 Ibid, pxiv-xv.
362 (Emphasis in original) Ibid, p31-32.
363 Ibid, px.
364 Cox, Robert W. (1981b), pl83.
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decisions of governments, are now more powerful than the states to whom
o r e
ultimate political authority over society and economy is supposed to belong.”
“[PJolitics is a common activity; it is not confined to politicians and their officials. [...PJower 
over outcomes is exercised impersonally by markets and often unintentionally by those who buy 
and sell and deal in markets. [...AJuthority in society and over economic transactions is 
legitimately exercised by agents other than states, and has come to be freely acknowledged by
those who are subject to it. ”366
Claiming not to have much patience with semantic discussions as to whether 
power should be broadly or narrowly defined, Strange “preferred] to stick with a 
larger, more all-inclusive definition of power. Power is simply the ability of a 
person or group of persons so to affect outcomes that their preferences take 
precedence over the preferences of others.” Hers was a relational approach, 
which she admitted made analysis more complicated -  “if, and when, you have to 
add will and skill to the kind of resources of men (and women) and material that 
can be counted, you have added two unquantifiable and often largely 
unpredictable factors to the equation.”368
Strange identified four primary structures of power in the international system: i) 
security; ii) finance; iii) production; and iv) knowledge, and four secondary power 
structures that are subordinate to and ruled by the primary structures, namely: i) 
trade; ii) communication; iii) energy; and iv) welfare. The four primary structures 
are held together in a four-faceted triangular pyramid or tetrahedron, where each 
plane touches the other three and is held in place by them.369 The possessor of any 
of these types of power is “able to change the range of choices open to others, 
without apparently putting pressure directly on them to take one decision or to 
make one choice rather than others.”370
Strange, Susan. (1996), p4.
365 Cox, Robert W. (1981b), pl83.
366 Strange, Susan, (1996), pl2-13.
367 Ibid, p l7.
368 Ibid, p l8.
369 Strange, Susan. (1994), p26 & 139-140.
370 Ibid, p31.
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Strange also spoke of a ‘hegemonic obsession’ within IR theory, that has “tended 
to exclude all other questions relating to the nature and use of power in the world 
system [..] Power is still seen primarily as capabilities, as a property of persons, or 
of nation-states as organised societies, not as a feature of relationships, nor as a 
social process affecting outcomes [...]”.371 Indeed, she used this claim to argue 
that, in the late 1980’s, the US was much more powerful than academics cared to 
admit, who instead spoke of a hegemonic decline.372
However, despite her claim to combine structural and behavioural definitions of 
power, she has been criticised for falling onto the behavioural side of the 
structurationist ‘fence’. Cox, amongst others, has criticised her for affording too 
much attention to behavioural power:
“Perhaps her structural power sometimes seems to retain too much of relational power, when she 
speaks of the United States determining the frameworks. Perhaps she appears to underestimate the 
autonomy of frameworks, their basis in intersubjective meanings, in acquired and deeply rooted 
habits of thought, sustained, to be sure by a hierarchy of real power, but not necessarily shaped
consciously by powerful states. ”373
It is, perhaps, not surprising that it is Cox who claims to have this “quibble”, given 
his own preference for theories of structural power. Indeed, by straddling the 
fence, Strange has attracted criticism from both sides of the theoretical divide. 
Other critics of her approach, such as Helge Hveem, have stated the opposite, 
meaning that she granted structural power too much weight in her theory of world 
power. He also criticises Strange for ignoring the links between different resources 
of power -  an actor that can collect together its various resources, he states, has 
much more power than one that cannot.374
The main problem with Strange’s theory is not that it tries to satisfy both sides, 
however. It is that it does so inadequately. Her definition of structural power 
remains centred on economic theory and as such does not delve as deeply into 
other power structures as the theories offered by, for example, Held. It is not just
371 Strange, Susan. (1996), p21-23.
372 Strange, Susan, (1988a).
373 Cox, Robert W. (1981b), pl84.
374 Hveem, Helge. (1997), p25-26 on Strange, Susan. (1988b).
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that she prioritises economic power however, but also that she speaks generally of 
primary and secondary structures of power, sub-setting trade, communication, 
energy and welfare under security, finance, production and knowledge. It is the 
argument here however that all structures of power — listed here under the twelve 
sites of power -  are of equal importance to world relations of power. For despite 
her acknowledgement that military power is only superior ‘in the last instance’, 
Strange makes a similar mistake to that of the traditional realists she criticised, 
namely by giving some forms of power sole priority. This means that many other 
structures of power, such as those found in patriarchal structures, remain 
unidentified. This is exemplified when she writes o f women’s empowerment -  
“[ejlectrical technology has liberated millions of women from the drudgery that 
imprisoned previous generations in the day-long labour of preparing food, keeping 
the family’s clothes clean and mended, and houses clean and warm.”375 It should 
be noted that this sentence constitutes one small reflection in a paragraph 
highlighting the overall importance of technology to empowerment, not just of 
women but in general. Nonetheless, her general view on the subject can be 
discerned -  economics and technology are the way to empowerment, not cultural 
or social change. Indeed, there is no reflection in her analysis that her sentence 
implies that it is women who are expected to perform these ‘duties’ -  power to her 
does not seem to include questions of social identity, leaving her structural 
account of power with gaping holes that cannot be filled by economic analyses 
alone.
Strange’s structural account of power is nonetheless; richer than her behavioural 
one. For, as Hveem rightly points out, her combined theory leans more toward 
structuralism than behaviouralism -  there is very little mention of behaviouralist 
power in her writings. As such it, it is a lopsided and unfinished theory. The 
importance of Strange’s contribution to the power debate in IR cannot be 
overestimated, however. Her demand to open up the concept of power for 
multidimensional analysis was much needed at the time of her writing and she left 
behind her an alternative to the traditional realist conception of power.
375 Strange, Susan. (1996), p8.
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“Power is the production, in and through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of 
actors to determine their circumstances and fate. ”376
Strange is not the only IR theorist to have attempted a combined theory of power, 
however. Accusing IR and ‘global governance’ theorists respectively for not
nnn
giving the concept of power “sustained consideration” , Michael Barnett and 
Raymond Duvall also offer a multidimensional approach to the concept. As the 
above quotation suggests, they advocate a dualist concept of power, (as a 
combination of both behavioural and structural qualities), and suggest an 
alternative to the typical realist approach. They warn IR theorists that “[t]he failure 
to develop alternative conceptualizatons of power limits the ability of international 
relations scholars to understand how global outcomes are produced and how actors 
are differentially enabled and constrained to determine their fates.”378 They thus 
argue that “scholars of international relations must work with multiple conceptions 
of power” and hope that their taxonomy “demonstrate[s] how a consideration of 
power’s polymorphous character will enhance and deepen theoretic understanding 
of international politics.”379
In order to reflect these multiple forms, Barnett and Duvall propose a taxonomy of 
four types of power: i) Compulsory; ii) Institutional; iii) Structural; and iv) 
Productive Power. Compulsory Power “is power as relations of interaction o f 
direct control by one actor over another”, while Institutional Power, is “the control 
actors exercise indirectly over others through diffuse relations o f interaction”. 
Structural Power is “the constitution of subjects’ capacities in direct structural 
relation to one another”, while Productive Power “is the socially diffuse 
production o f subjectivity in systems of meaning and signification”.380 It is not 
clear, however, exactly how Barnett and Duvall’s taxonomy differs from 
traditional behaviouralist/structuralist theory. Indeed, on closer examination, their 
taxonomy consists only of the usual two components, namely agency and 
structure, not four as they claim. For, as shall be revealed below, not only do the
376 Barnett, Michael -  Duvall, Raymond, (2005b), p3.
377 Barnett, Michael -  Duvall, Raymond, (2005b), p2. /  Barnett, Michael -  Duvall, Raymond. (2005a)
378 Barnett, Michael -  Duvall, Raymond, (2005a), p41.
379 Ibid, p40.
380(My emphasis) Ibid, p43.
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two categories of Institutional and Productive Power collapse into Compulsory 
(read behavioural) and Structural Power respectively, but Barnett and Duvall also 
seem to confuse structural and behavioural power in their description of 
institutional power.
To begin with the first two behavioural types of power -  Compulsory and 
Institutional Power -  rather than constituting separate forms of power as Barnett 
and Duvall claim, it is the argument here that both are related. Indeed, the only 
difference between them is the location of agency in each -  a distinction which the 
authors oversimplify since, as shall be seen below, the location of agency across 
time and space is much more complex than simply constituting direct action in the 
present and indirect, institutional action in another time or place. In Barnett and 
Duvall’s interpretation, however, compulsory power concerns direct control 
between actors in close spatial and temporal proximity to each other, while 
institutional power refers to indirect institutional control, across time and space.
The reason that Barnett and Duvall make a distinction between direct and indirect 
control is that they argue that it “becomes more difficult to observe power in 
operation the greater is the social distance”381. To support this, they quote Dahl’s 
claim that there is “no action at a distance”382. The problem with this claim 
however is not only that it reduces institutional power to structure but also that it 
implicitly reifies that structural power as somehow being beyond agency, instead 
of seeing it as being continuously reproduced or transformed by agency in the 
present. Nonetheless, Barnett and Duvall back up Dahl’s claim by maintaining that 
theorists such as Bhaskar and Giddens point to “specific relations [which] concern 
the direct causal/constitutive connection between actors that are in physical, 
historical, or social positional proximity.”383 This is to misinterpret Bhaskar and 
Giddens however. For, as already mentioned, both of these theorists include the 
notion of indirect control in their respective descriptions of the processes of 
transformation/structuration -  across time and space -  as well as direct control.
381 Ibid, p47.
382 Ibid, p47. /  Dahl, Robert. (1957), p204.
383 Barnett, Michael -  Duvall, Raymond. (2005a), p47.
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The main problem with Barnett and Duvall’s distinction between compulsory and 
institutional power is thus that it removes agency from the latter. This is 
exemplified when they write “A cannot necessarily be said to ‘possess’ the 
institution that constrains and shapes B.”384 For although they are correct in stating 
that “rare is the institution that is completely dominated by one actor”, this does 
not mean that “power is no longer a matter of A’s direct effect on B” 385 as they 
claim. Agency is always present in institutional power, however indirect or diffuse 
-  it cannot be removed from the equation. Indeed, according to the interpretation 
of Wight’s account of agency that is used in this thesis, institutional agency 
includes both the direct, individual agency of people in positions of power in 
agency3, as well as the more diffuse, indirect agency of people located in agencyi 
and agency2, since all actors involved in an institutional arrangement help to 
reproduce or transform its structures. The added concepts of the ‘ghosts’ and 
‘myths’ of agency that are offered in this thesis can also help to account for the 
indirect agency that Barnett and Duvall wish to include here -  namely that agency 
which occurs either across or completely outside of (in the sense of never having 
occurred at all) time and space but that remains relevant to institutional power in 
the present.
It is the argument here therefore that direct and indirect control are not so easily 
separated as Barnett and Duvall advocate -  agency at close temporal and spatial 
proximity can be just as complex and indirect as agency across time and space -  
indeed, this is not what separates the two. They argue that the ‘faces of power’ 
debate is imprecise and blurred -  but it is the argument here that the ‘faces’ 
debate, once refined as it has been in this thesis, distinguishes between direct and 
indirect control more precisely than Barnett and Duvall’s distinction between 
compulsory and institutional power -  namely through decision-making, agenda- 
setting, manipulation and self-governance. It is thus the argument here that the 
refined account of the four faces of power, along with the interpretation of 
Wight’s conception of agency that is offered in this thesis, more adequately
384 Barnett, Michael -  Duvall, Raymond. (2005b), p l5 .
385 Ibid, p l6.
386 Barnett, Michael -  Duvall, Raymond. (2005a), p43. / Barnett, Michael -  Duvall, Raymond. (2005b),
p8.
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describes the behavioural aspects of power than does Barnett and Duvall’s rather 
simplified distinction between compulsory and institutional power.
When it comes to Barnett and Duvall’s second two types of power -  Structural 
and Productive Power -  here the distinction is even more unclear. To begin with, 
Barnett and Duvall claim that institutional power “focuses on the constraints on 
interest-seeking action [whereas] structural power concerns the determination of
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social capacities and interests.” As already mentioned, their definition of 
institutional power as such collapses into structure, for what are the constraints on 
action if not structural constraints?
Furthermore, although they admit that “[productive power and structural power 
overlap in several important respects”, they distinguish between the two by stating 
that “whereas [structural power] works through direct structural relations, 
[productive power] entails more generalized and diffuse social processes.”388 
While it is clear that they are using productive power to account for systems of 
knowledge and diffuse social processes, it is again not clear that it is correct to 
separate these from structural relations on the basis that the latter are more direct. 
Indeed, this is not only to fall into the same trap as Strange’s theory of power, by 
differentiating between different structures of power, but also suffers from the 
same problem as their behavioural definition, in that it is not clear that structural 
relations are direct while productive relations are indirect. This is made even less 
clear when they claim that, in productive relations, “the move is away from 
structures, per se, to systems of signification and meaning (which are structured, 
but not themselves structures) and to networks of social forces perpetually shaping 
one another.”389 This distinction relies heavily on the unfortunate structurationist 
distinction between structures and systems which, as already mentioned, risks 
reifying systems as somehow reproducing or transforming themselves outside of 
agency.
387 Barnett, Michael -  Duvall, Raymond. (2005b), p i 8.
388 Barnett, Michael -  Duvall, Raymond. (2005b), p20.
389 Ibid.
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It is thus the argument here that productive power be granted the same status as 
structural power -  as non-material structures, that are reproduced or transformed 
through agency and nothing else. For structural power not only manifests itself 
through the global networks of economy, culture, welfare and the like, but also, in 
the more Foucaultian sense, shapes and determines the very discourse and 
understanding of such processes. These discourses are only ever maintained 
through agency however, and the idea that the processes that determine these are 
somehow less direct than those which maintain material structures simply does not 
hold. Capitalism, for example, is no more direct in its structural power than 
structures that are built around religion or knowledge. All of them are maintained 
through human agency, which is either direct or indirect, depending upon the 
particular instance under study.
Another problem with power as Barnett and Duvall define it, is that they 
distinguish between negative power (such as constraint) and positive power (such 
as persuasion and collective choice), arguing that theories of power should only be 
concerned with the former. Moreover, they distinguish between power and 
resistance, admitting that the two are related but again, only defining power as the 
submission or disadvantage of some under others.390 As already mentioned, 
structures are not only reproduced but can also be transformed by agency -  thus 
any concept of power must be able to take these, what Foucault termed the 
‘positive’ aspects of power’, into account. It is also very difficult to distinguish 
between ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ power conceptually since, as already mentioned, 
this involves making assumptions about the ‘best’ interests of the agents involved. 
This can only be done on the empirical level, by ascertaining the perceived 
interests of the agents themselves and even then, one cannot be sure that one has 
distinguished between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ power.
To summarise, although Barnett and Duvall are right to problematise IR’s current 
conceptualisation of power, their attempt to bridge the gap between structuralists 
and behaviouralists seems instead to create even more divides, further obstructing 
any chances of uniting, through structuration, structuralist and behaviouralist
390 Bamett, Michael -  Duvall, Raymond. (2005a), p42. /  Barnett, Michael -  Duvall, Raymond. (2005b),
p22-23.
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theory. For although their overall review of the differences between the various IR 
schools of thought remains both insightful and instructive, their attempt at a 
taxonomy fails due to collapsing structure and agency into each other. It is 
therefore high time to introduce the concept of power that will be used in this 
thesis, in the hope that this will rectify some of the issues raised here and open up 
for a debate on the more precise distinctions between structural and behavioural 
power in world relations.
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World Society -  A World of ‘Glocalised’ Polities
The reader may have noticed by this point that I have chosen to use the terms 
‘world society’ or ‘world relations’, (apart from when I refer to other IR theorists 
on the subject), instead of using the favoured term ‘international’ as advocated by 
the very name of the discipline itself. This is simply because a deconstruction of 
the term ‘state’ also entails a deconstruction of the term ‘international’. For 
although the terms ‘state’ and ‘nation’ should certainly not be conflated, as they 
denote very different forms of political organisation, they are very similar in that 
both are quite recent constructs. As such, they are not the only possible political 
arrangements imaginable in ‘world society’ and the term ‘international’ -  denoting 
relations solely between ‘nations’ {not states) -  should be left to reflect only as 
much (or as little). Indeed, as Burton makes clear: “[T]he recognized term 
‘international relations’ is really concerned with inter-state relations.”391
I do not take ‘world society’ to include all the relationships present in ‘global’, 
‘interhuman’ or ‘first-order society’ however. For, as Barry Buzan points out, 
there is “not much to be gained, and quite a lot to be lost analytically, from simply 
using world society as a label for the totality of human interaction in all forms and 
at all levels”392 However, while I agree with him that not all human interaction is 
politically relevant to the workings of ‘world society’, I do question whether it is 
really possible to define the concept without crossing all levels of human society 
and agency. For if ‘non-state’ actors are to be truly incorporated into IR theory 
(and not just added on as an afterthought), then the discipline has at least to be 
theoretically prepared to include both individuals and collective actors from all 
levels of world society, even if the prevalence of these actors can vary over time 
and space. Thus, in this paper, I take ‘world society’ to be that which is formed by 
the interaction of ‘polities’ on a global level -  a ‘world of polities’ in other words.
As already mentioned, a polity in this thesis denotes an entity with a significant 
measure of institutionalisation, identity and capacity to mobilise persons for value 
satisfaction (or relief from value deprivation) in world relations. This definition
391 (My emphasis) Burton, John W. (1972), p70.
392 (My emphasis) Buzan, Barry. (2004), p2.
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differs from Ferguson and Mansbach’s original definition in that it does not 
include the concept of hierarchy, thus enabling the analysis of more diffuse forms 
of human interaction, as well as more traditional, hierarchical forms of polity, 
such as the ‘state’. The definition here of the domain of a polity, however, remains 
much as Ferguson and Mansbach intended it, in that it includes the persons who 
identify with it, the resources (including ideological) it has, and the issue(s) it 
affects. Since processes or structures of power cannot exist freely of human 
agency, the domain of a polity is thus determined by the sum of its parts -  i.e. its 
human members -  and not on more exclusive notions such as physical space -  i.e. 
territory. Indeed, a polity’s territory in this paper is simply defined as the persons 
who make up that polity. Similarly, I agree with Ferguson and Mansbach that no 
polity is omnipotent, although as to whether it is a disadvantage for the polity not 
to have a centre394 -  here again I would tend to disagree. For, as already 
mentioned, in the cases of more diffuse social divisions, there does not necessarily 
need to be a centre of authority advocating that division.
The use of ‘world society’ and ‘polities’ (instead of ‘international relations’ and 
‘states’) thus eliminates the unhelpful distinction that is traditionally made in IR 
theory between ‘state’ and ‘non-state’ actors and also means that it is possible to 
include all political processes and thus agents and structures of power that are 
relevant on a global scale. These polities can comprise of individuals and/or 
collective actors from all levels of world society. For it is my argument that there 
is always at least a potential for individuals and collective actors from any part of 
world society to be a part of the larger picture and change its structures. And the 
fact that this potential exists means that these actors and processes must be 
allowed ‘access’ to any theory of world society. For while world society -  as a 
matter of fact -  is certainly not all-inclusive in its current state (in that it certainly 
does not include all members in their capacities to change its structures) these 
structures do change over time, and thus also the arrangements of actors within 
them. Those who have no capacity to change things today may very well have the 
capacity tomorrow and should not therefore be excluded from theoretical
393 Ferguson, Yale H. -  Mansbach, Richard W. (1996b).
394 Ferguson, Yale H. -  Mansbach, Richard W. (1996a), p22.
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frameworks simply in order to freeze a short and distinct moment in both time and 
space.
Having thus established the definition of world society that will be used in this 
thesis -  namely as a world of polities -  it is time to examine more closely how 
these polities relate to one another, more specifically in relations of power. And 
this is not only a question of interaction -  on individual as well as collective levels 
-  in the here and now, but also, importantly, a question of how these interactions 
change over time and space.
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Relations of Power -  The Interaction o f ‘Polities* Across Time and Space
It is thus the argument here that polities -  which all operate under varying 
structural constraints -  shape world society through processes of ‘glocalisation’ -  
a term I have adapted from Roland Robertson.395 As has already been mentioned, 
‘globalisation’ is a rather woolly and imprecise term that sets out to homogenise 
what are varied global and local relations across time and space. As Robertson put 
it, “[t]here is indeed a ‘mythology about globalisation’ [...] Much of the talk about 
globalisation, has almost causally, tended to assume that it is a process which 
overrides locality, including large-scale locality [...] This tendency neglects two 
things. First, it neglects the extent to which what is called local is in large degree 
constructed on a global, or least a pan- or super-local, basis. In other words, much 
of the promotion of locality is in fact done ‘from above’. [...] Second [...] there 
has been little attempt to connect the discussion of time-and-space to the thorny 
issue of universalism-and-particularism.”396
‘Glocalisation’ thus tries to rectify this falsely dichotomised polarity between the 
‘global’ and the ‘local’, by maintaining the contextual variance of global forces, 
not only according to place but also according to temporal and other structural 
forces that are relevant in each particular context. For, as Robertson points out, 
“we should become much more historically conscious of the various ways in 
which the deceptively modem, or postmodern, problem of the relationship 
between the global and the local, the universal and the particular and so on, is not 
by any means as unique to the second half of the twentieth century as many would 
have us believe.”397
395 Robertson, Roland. (1994) / Robertson, Roland. (1995)
396 Robertson, Roland. (1994), p34-35.
397 Ibid, p38.
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Figure 1:
Escher -  Smaller and Smaller 
(taken from the M. C. Escher Website)
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Figure 1 above, by the illusionist Escher, may help to illustrate this, my 
structurated/Foucaultian ‘glocalised’ concept of world power more fully. At first 
glance, it resembles the image of a mathematical fractal that appears to continue 
until infinity, replicating the same processes over and over again. And so it gives 
the illusion of a network of individuals that spirals in towards infinity, with an 
endless number of agents and structures. It is, however, just that -  an illusion -  
since it is clear that the finite point is the single body in the middle. And although 
this body, or individual, will probably comprise of multiple identities, and 
possibly even personalities, he/she is, all the same, only one agent, with only the 
capacity to do as much as one agent can possibly do on their own. Together with 
others, however, it is a completely different story, since structures/relationships 
will either constrain or facilitate this individual in his/her actions. And, as we pull 
out from the centre of the image towards the greater networks, we can see that the 
size and thus capacity of the agent becomes greater, the further out we go. At the 
furthest point, one individual is suddenly granted phenomenal capacities of human 
agency, that barely and frequently do not fit into one body alone -  hence the need 
to also study collective actors. This ‘individual’ agency is, however, also an 
illusion, since it depends on support from the structures/relationships of many 
other individuals besides. So while ‘individuals’ at this outer section of humanity 
certainly can and do perform individual acts that affect structures/relationships of 
enormous magnitude, their capacity to do so depends on the very survival of those 
structures/relationships. Without them, these bodies too are reduced to the 
insignificant figure in the centre.
The question is -  where does one place a world polity in this Escherian image of 
society? Do we try to section off the bodies some way down towards the centre -  a 
messy job in itself, since they are all entangled -  so that we only see the top levels 
of society? If so, what do we miss? Well, to begin with, we miss the mutually 
constitutive relationships that connect the ‘top’ layers to the ‘bottom’. But we also 
miss the most important dynamics of society and thus of power itself -  namely 
those which constrain certain individuals or networks to the ‘bottom’ of the social 
pile in the first place. And this is the whole point -  we cannot divide society up 
into levels or strata if we wish to see the full dynamics of what is going on there.
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The overlapping of different polities, across all levels of society, means that the IR 
theorist must be open to all forms of polity that have an effect on world society.
It is clear then that this is not a simple question of ‘levels-of analysis’, since there 
is always the possibility for change, and structures/relationships that seem 
‘natural’ or pre-determined one day, can have disappeared the next. A network at 
the top may collapse and the individuals within it find themselves lost and alone in 
the centre again, or individuals from the centre can equally climb their way to the 
surface and change the structures/relationships that preside there. This is social life 
at its very simplest -  as a set of spatial and temporal social relationships that either 
facilitate or constrain the individual in his/her life as a social agent. For time and 
space naturally also have a bearing on the range of relationships that is possible 
between polities. Unlike most structuration theory, however, which only includes 
time and space as the ‘third dimensions’ through which structures/relationships 
operate, I also take time and space themselves to constitute issues or resources 
over which humans can compete. I will expand on this later in the thesis, but the 
persistence of colonial or patriarchal structures/relationships, as well as the 
competition over their histories, are some examples of time and space as 
structurated resources and issues of social power.
The notion that there is an infinite number of resources or issues that unite or 
divide these Escherian individuals is also illusional, since there are only so many 
issues or resources over which humanity competes. These relate to fundamental 
human needs and desires -  which, although multiple, are certainly not infinite. We 
are all, after all, but one kind of species, living a particular way of life on a 
particular planet, and although our ways of life (or actions) may differ enormously 
across the world, they are not so diverse that they surpass conception. This 
argument however, (which, in augmented form, also constitutes a paper in itself) 
brings us dangerously close to the dividing fault-line between Foucaultianism and 
structuationism. For while Ferguson and Mansbach (in true (albeit unstated) 
Foucaultian spirit) rather unhelpfully claim that there are as many issues or
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resources as there are actors and structures , Giddens, Mann and Bourdieu all
398 Ferguson, Yale H. -  Mansbach, Richard W. (1996b), p30.
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restrict their respective ‘lists’ to only include four such issues, or as they call them 
‘sources’ or ’resources’ of power. They divide ‘resou rces’ into: i) political; ii) 
economic; iii) cultural/ideological/symbolic/discourse and; iv) social/legal/military 
‘power’ respectively.399 The vast difference in the actual content of each of these 
four definitions naturally goes without saying, as it is near to impossible to 
conceive of social and military ‘re-/sources’, for example, as denoting similar 
relationships of power. For although these ‘re-/sources’ may and frequently do 
overlap, they cannot be said to mean the same thing. Indeed, the very fact that 
theorists so fundamentally disagree on what constitutes these ‘re-/sources’/issues 
of power reveals that there must be much more to the story than each of the four- 
faceted approaches can possibly recognise on their own.
In an attempt to bridge the Foucaultian/structurationist divide in this matter, 
therefore, it is the argument here that a compromise must be sought. For at the 
same time as the structurationist definitions fail to sufficiently cover the vast scope 
of ‘resources’ over which humanity competes, Ferguson and Mansbach’s 
definition (where the possible number of issues totals the number of structures and 
agents) is useful only to a historian or an anthropologist, and not a social theorist 
wishing to more generally map the relationships of power that are possible in the 
human world. I have therefore chosen to use and augment an already much more 
extensive definition of ‘re-/sources’/ ’issues’ offered by Held in his account of 
‘nautonomic structures’. This augmented definition includes twelve sites of 
power: i) the site of space; ii) the site of time; iii) the site of knowledge and 
aesthetics; iv) the site of morality and emotion; v) the site of identities; vi) the site 
of the body; vii) the site of welfare; viii) the site of culture/cultural life; ix) the site 
of civic associations; x) the site of the economy; xi) the site of the organisation of 
violence and coercive relations; xii) the site of regulatory and legal organisation.
And although Held’s seven ‘sites of power’ certainly offer a more detailed view of 
the number of resources over which humanity competes than the previous four- 
faceted attempts, there are still in my view a few sites missing, namely: i) the site 
of space; ii) the site of time; iii) the site of knowledge and aesthetics; iv) the site of
399 Giddens, Anthony. (1984), p33. /M ann, Michael. (1986), p l7 . /  Parker, John (on Bourdieu, Pierre).
(2000), p48.
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morality and emotion; and v) the site of identities. As already mentioned, Held 
switches between the notion of ‘spheres’ and ‘sites’ of power, without any reason 
given for why he does so. I have opted for the word ‘site’ throughout, as it in my 
view better denotes the idea of a node of human interaction than the words 
‘structure’, ‘sphere’, ‘freedom’, ‘re-/source’ or ‘issue’, all of which sound much 
more diffuse and thus void of human action.
Structurationism makes clear that the concepts of time and space are fundamental 
to any analysis of society. And these are usually included as the necessary but 
relegated ‘third dimensions’ in most structurationist theories -  through which 
power and other relationships operate. It is one of the main arguments of this 
thesis however that they also themselves constitute structures and therefore 
resources of power over which humanity competes and that thus also differentially 
positionally place people in different capacities of agency. To begin with the 
concept of space for example, although Held, like Foucault, accounts for the 
human body as a site of power, both seem to forget about the planet Earth as a 
body -  i.e. the natural environment. In general, the spatial (geographical and 
environmental) organisation of social life -  as a competition over, for example, 
natural resources, demography and ‘urbanisation’ -  is fundamental to relationships 
of power across the world. And of course the site of space, as all the other sites, 
interplays with the site of time -  namely the historical organisation of social life. 
Relevant with regard to the site of time are, for example, the ongoing effects of 
colonialism and the continued prevalence of patriarchal structures around the 
world. For although the site of time may have its origins in the past, it is relevant 
today to the extent that certain relationships of power are still maintained in the 
present. I call this the ‘ghost of agency’ and will return to it later.
The next three sites denote non-material or cognitive structures of power, as 
highlighted by, for example Marx, Gramsci and Foucault, that are often left out of 
structurationist taxonomies of power. These are the sites of power that are 
internalised within each individual human being but which interact on an 
aggregate level through socialisation processes. They are thus just as dependent on 
processes of human interaction as other sites of power -  and, just like the other 
sites of power, may operate independently, or shape and delimit other sites. The
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first is the site of knowledge and aesthetics (linguistic, visual and sonic discourses) 
-  again, a central concept to Foucault and other ‘post-modernists’, as well as 
Gramscian concepts of hegemony. This site can be exemplified in world power 
relations by the dominance of modem ‘Western’ academic and political discourses 
on ’development’, ‘democracy’ and ‘Orientalism’/ ’Occidentalism’, as well as by 
the ongoing ‘battles’ between Hollywood/Bollywood and various other forms of 
popular art and music around the world.
The second of the cognitive sites to be included here is the site of morality and 
emotion -  argued here to be distinct from the former cognitive site in that this one 
denotes core psychological ethical and emotional codes, as opposed to the more 
‘rationalised’ or ‘intellectualised’ ones of knowledge and aesthetics. For although 
these two sites, like all of the others, affect each other, the distinction I am trying 
to make here is that between the rationalising of core beliefs and emotions (the site 
of knowledge and aesthetics), and the actual core beliefs or feelings themselves 
(the site of morality and emotion). Examples of the latter include the deep-rooted 
ethical struggles between religion and secularism (as emotional struggles, not 
intellectualised debates), or equally contested and core emotional dichotomies 
such as the belief in monogamy or polygamy respectively.
The third and final cognitive site of power to be included here is the site of 
identities. This is held to be separate and distinct from Held’s site of 
culture/cultural life, which denotes the public and local -  thus collective -  
organisation of identity. The cognitive site of identities that I have added here 
denotes instead the organisation of social life around the individual Self / Other, 
and as such is distinct from more organised Self / Other processes on a collective 
level. Examples of this include gender, race, ethnicity and class on the individual 
level -  all of which can lead to a struggle within the same individual and thus lead 
to diverse struggles of power within supposedly homogenous human collectives 
(as found in Held’s site) such as gender, race, ethnicity and class. Indeed, this site 
problematises the very concept of homogeneity, for, as Foucault so succinctly put 
it -  the individual or subject “is not a substance”.400
400 Foucault, Michel. (1996), p440.
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My own account of the -  now twelve -  sites of power is therefore as follows:
1) The Site o f Time: the temporal organisation o f social life (past, present and 
future), including the ‘ghosts' and ‘myths o f agency’, e.g. Westphalian polity, 
colonialism, patriarchal stmctures etc.
2) The Site o f Space: the geographical and environmental organisation o f social 
life, e.g. natural resources, demography, ‘urbanisation’ etc.
3) The Site o f Knowledge & Aesthetics: the organisation o f social life around 
knowledge and discourse, e.g. discourses such as ‘development’, ‘democracy’, 
‘Orientalism’/ ’Occidentalism’ etc.
4) The Site o f Morality & Emotion: the organisation o f social life around morality 
and emotion, e.g. religion versus secularism, monogamy versus polygamy etc.
5) The Site o f Identities: the organisation o f social life around the Self and the 
Other, e.g. gender, race, ethnicity, class etc.
6) The Site o f the Body: as Held’s definition in Chapter Two
7) The Site o f Welfare: as Held’s definition in Chapter Two
8) The Site o f Culture/Cultural Life: as Held’s definition in Chapter Two
9) The Site o f Civic Associations: as Held’s definition in Chapter Two
10) The Site o f the Economy: as Held’s definition in Chapter Two
11) The Site of the Organisation of Violence and Coercive Relations: as Held’s 
definition in Chapter Two
12) The Site o f Regulatory and Legal Institutions: as Held’s definition in Chapter 
Two
Unlike most other theories of power, I do not give any of these sites of power 
precedence over the others. That is to say, economic or military power (in sites 10 
and 11 respectively) are not considered to be more or less ‘powerful’ than any of 
the other sites. For while it is certainly possible that the site of the organisation of 
violence and coercive relations (military power) is more effective than all the 
other sites of power, this does not necessarily have to be the case, and therefore 
such potential empirical facts must be kept distinct from any such conceptual 
distinctions in the theory. Indeed, due to the interdependency of all of the sites, 
military power usually does not have precedence over other forms of power
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(except in the final, total act of war), as it requires all of the other sites to survive. 
This brings us to the concept of existential power which, it is argued here, can 
come in many different forms. For military power is not the only form of power 
that can take the ‘life’ of human agency through total domination -  this is also 
possible through economic, legal or other social means. And again, although 
social death is at least potentially reversible, until this is actually done, the effects 
of total domination on human agency remain the same -  leaving no possibilities 
for action and resistance. As Foucault made clear, such instances are rare, but the 
fact that they can and do occur means that a theory of power must take them into 
account.
These sites of power shall be presented and argued for in further detail in the rest 
of this thesis, (where I present my own proposed structurated account of world 
power) as it is my view that world power cannot and should not be analysed 
without also taking these five sites of power into account. Accounting for the sites 
of power alone will not suffice for a study of the relations of power that operate 
within and across them however -  indeed, to do so would amount to little more 
than a singularly structural account of power. For, as I have tried to make clear, 
these sites, or structures, cannot exist -  or, in the case of the physical ones such as 
the body, have no social meaning -  without human agency. It is thus the task of 
the rest of the thesis to account for how these relationships of power are conceived 
here to operate, through both structure and agency.
Accounting for the sites of power alone will not suffice for a study of the relations 
of power that operate within and across them however -  indeed, to do so would 
amount to little more than a singularly structural account of power. For, as I have 
tried to make clear, these sites, or structures, cannot exist -  or, in the case of the 
physical ones such as the body, have no social meaning -  without human 
relationships. And these relationships cannot exist at all without human agency. 
How then does the agency of power operate? Here, I turn to Wight’s definition of 
three levels of agency, as well as more traditional notions of political power -  
namely those describing the political decision-making process -  most famously 
summarised in the by now classical ‘faces of power’ debate. This may seem to be 
a most odd turn for a supposedly relational theory of power, in that the ‘faces of
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power’ debate typically saw power as “transparent, expressed in an unambiguous 
and empirically demonstrable way in the decision-making process.”401 The point 
is, however, that including the concepts of decisions, non-decisions, manipulation 
and self-governance does not necessarily need to result in a definition of power as 
transparent and observable. Indeed, it is certainly not my intention to define power 
as such, or as a zero-sum game for that matter -  another criticism made of more 
traditional ‘faces of power’ definitions 402 I maintain instead that power exists 
within and across all of the aforementioned sites of power, not as an observable 
entity in itself, but rather as a potentially endless number of both observable and 
unobservable reciprocal relationships. However, these relationships, by their very 
definition, need human agency, and thus the exercise or practice of power, to 
survive. This human agency can be unconscious and without motive, but it still 
needs to include the vital ingredient, namely action itself. And action, 
fundamentally, is about making decisions -  however unconscious or concealed 
these may be. Indeed, action cannot exist at all without the decision-making 
process and vice versa. Not all -  indeed, probably very few -  of these decisions 
will ever be observable or even conscious, but they nonetheless exist.
This can again be exemplified with the more traditional and favoured example of 
military power. As already mentioned, holding a gun to someone’s head is only 
one of the many forms of existential power available to humanity. And it also 
needs to be viewed as something more than a simple ‘do I?/don’t I?’ decision of 
taking someone else’s life. For behind that decision lie a multitude of other -  
individual and collective -  decisions that have already been made. These are the 
more cognitive ones, denoted in my additional sites of power. To take someone’s 
life for example -  except in the rare cases of psychotic illnesses or accidents -  is 
never a random act, but involves cognitive evaluations and thus decisions over 
different types of action that are deemed to be required at different times -  social 
and ethical conditioning in other words. A culture that endorses violence, for 
example, is more likely to ‘pull the trigger’ than a culture that endorses pacifist 
actions. Thus, the decision of whether or not to pull the trigger has already, to 
some extent, been made before the actual decision itself. This is not to say that it
401 Hay, Colin. (2002), pl71.
402 Ibid, pl73.
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cannot be reversed -  i.e. that another decision cannot be made -  but it does mean 
that it is not the case of one simple, observable decision-making process. 
Patriarchy is another example of this. The decision of whether or not to employ a 
woman in a work place may also in some cases be pre-made, depending on the 
gendered conditioning of the employer. If the employer has a more gender-neutral 
predisposition, the decision will depend more on the employee’s merits and the 
interview than in the case of an employer who has a gender-biased predisposition 
either for or against female employees.
This argument is not an attempt to null and void the notion of responsibility from 
human action, but it is an undertaking to problematise the notion of the decision­
making process as a simple case of singular decisions that are without precedence. 
Indeed, to make alternative decisions to the socialised ‘pre-made’ one may 
sometimes require decisions made on a larger, more collective scale than that of 
the individual -  i.e. by a culture that decides to change and adopt a more pacifist 
or gender-neutral approach to social life.
This said, a multitude of decisions remains, however, a multitude of decisions. 
They do not have to be conscious, or an organised chain of events -  indeed, it is 
rarely the case that decision Z has been preceded by decisions X and Y in a linear 
sequence. On the contrary, there can be many decisions occurring separately or 
simultaneously, both within and between individuals. It is rather like the question 
of structure and agency, in that it resembles the chicken and egg scenario -  and, 
just as in the case of structuration, it is not really that important which did come 
first. The important thing is that decisions are being made -  consciously or 
unconsciously -  that favour one type of action, or outcome, over another.
The inclusion of outcomes to this concept of power may seem to signal that it is, 
after all, a question of a zero-sum game. For as Colin Hay points out, the problem 
with such approaches is the notion that “[i]f Anna has power [and] Ben does not, 
the extent of Anna’s power is the extent of Ben’s lack of power.”403 Thus, if Anna 
affects the outcome, Ben does not and power as such is a zero-sum game of win or
403 Ibid, p!73.
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lose. This is not, however, the approach I am advocating. Like Foucault, I argue 
that Ben can have as much power as Anna to affect the outcome -  and this 
requires action on both parts, and therefore necessarily decisions and outcomes. 
Thus, if Anna makes a decision that will somehow affect Ben, Ben can -  unless 
there is a state of total domination -  counter that decision with another that either 
changes their relationship of power or maintains it as it is. Either way, both agents 
have the power to make a decision and thus take an action -  why it is necessary to 
include this most fundamental aspect of human relationships in a concept of 
power. These decisions and outcomes need not be conscious, intended or co­
ordinated by the relevant actors, or observable to the social scientist. The 
important thing is that they -  as forms of human interaction -  take place.
I have two more concepts relevant to the agency of power that should be 
introduced before I conclude, and they are the ghosts and the myths of agency 
respectively. These are not to be confused with one another, however similar they 
may sound. I use the former -  the ghosts o f agency -  to denote actions that 
occurred a long time ago but that are still having an effect on current power 
relations. As already noted, these actions are here ‘listed’ under the site of time, 
but obviously the ghosts of agency -  and thus also the site of time -  can affect all 
of the other sites of power -  e.g. the birth of capitalism for example, or the 
creation of the Westphalian polity. The second concept -  the myths o f agency -  
refers instead to actions that have never taken place at all. Stories of these 
mythical actions can be kept alive by human agents that wish to preserve current 
power relations. Thus, a powerful polity may find that he/she/it benefits from 
these myths of agency being kept alive, even if they are untrue. This mythical 
discourse is included here under the site of the knowledge and aesthetics of power, 
but also, and naturally affects all of the other sites. Examples include conflicting 
stories of who first discovered the Americas, or who came first, Adam or Eve.
Finally, it is in my view fundamentally wrong to ‘deface’ the concept of power 
altogether -  as has suggested -  even if one chooses a Foucaultian approach. 
Indeed, this is one of the central arguments of this thesis -  namely that if power, as 
Foucault would have it, comprises of reciprocal relationships, then these 
relationships need both the concepts of structure and agency in order to exist. One
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thus has no choice but to include the concept of agency -  for power cannot exist 
independently of the ‘faces’ of human society. Hayward and other critics (such as 
Archer) are right to point out that this agency cannot be defined as a simple 
equation or universe comprising of only two actors -  A and B -  but this does not 
mean that these actors can be excluded from the analysis altogether. For each actor 
affects the relationships in which they are a part. Here, again, it is useful to return 
to Foucault and the reciprocal nature of power. In this conception, it is not only A 
who makes a decision over B, but also B who makes a decision whether to comply 
or to resist. Thus, the three ‘faces of power’ definitions can equally be written that 
B makes A do something he or she would not otherwise have done, or neglects to 
make a decision etc. As already mentioned, most of these are not single, 
observable decisions -  although such processes certainly do exist. The point of 
structuration theory is that action cannot exist freely from social conditioning, and 
so decisions can also be unconscious and/or collective ones, such as cultural 
practices. However, the exercise or practice of power in these relationships 
remains the same -  culture/group A (and conversely B) can make culture/group B 
(and conversely A) do something that they would not otherwise have done, or 
neglect to make a decision etc. In line with David West and others, I do not think 
it is wise for the social analyst to try to work out what A or B would otherwise 
have done -  i.e. to ascribe interests, ‘real’, ‘objective’ or otherwise -  but in the 
case of manipulation (the third ‘face’ of power), it is not impossible to find the 
actual processes that would cause such a change of interests to occur -  
advertising, as West argues, being a case in point.404
There are, in the end, only so many ways that agents can exercise power over each 
other. So far, the ‘faces of power’ debate, and I myself, have only been able to 
come up with four such ways -  namely decisions to overtly/covertly change / 
overtly/covertly neglect / covertly manipulate or consciously/unconsciously self- 
govem relations of power. In the spirit of a structurated/Foucaultian analysis, the 
argument here is that all of these three ways can be exercised by individuals or 
groups, (A, B, C ... x), as either initial instances of power or as reactions or 
resistance to such initiatives. At this point, it may seem that the ‘faces of power’
404 West, David. (1987), pl41-142.
169
debate thus has little to offer an analysis of power, being so disarmed of its 
original conceptions and language. I disagree however, since it is vital to maintain 
the notion of human agency in relationships of power. These relationships -  as 
processes -  cannot exist freely of decision-making to change, neglect or maintain 
them as they are. And while it may not always be the simple case of one actor 
exercising power over another, sometimes it is indeed that simple. Indeed, for all 
the social conditioning of an action -  and thus multitude of individual and 
collective decisions that came before it -  power can sometimes be the simple case 
of one action changing the nature of a certain power relationship for good. At the 
end of the day, the reasons behind that action will never truly be known to anyone 
other than the relevant actor. The effects of the action, however, can usually be 
traced -  either through individual actions or through more diffuse social processes. 
For actions do indeed speak louder than words.
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Conclusion
Power, as reciprocal relationships that are socially, spatially and temporally 
determined, is ultimately about the freedoms of human agency. A 
structurated/relational approach to this question can help to see these connections 
between agency and society -  how these relationships are constrained by society 
but also change through agency. In my own definition of these freedoms, I have 
listed what I regard to be the twelve sites of power most prevalent to human 
society and shall use them in the second half of this thesis to analyse world 
relations of power, as exemplified by HIV/AIDS. It is important to note that the 
twelve sites of power alone do not explain the nature of power however. For they 
are not static, unchanging sites of power but are rather interdependent and are 
changed or maintained through human agency -  in other words, through the 
exercise of power. And there are only so many ways agency can do this -  namely 
through redaction, neglect, manipulation or self-governance.
How then can this conception of world power aid an analysis of ‘hegemony’ or 
‘empire’? Namely by looking at the key actors -  polities -  in each site of power 
and reviewing their exercise of power, as well as the constraints they face, both 
from other actors, as well as regarding access to other sites. For these sites of 
power are not mutually exclusive, but rather intertwine with each other -  thus, 
polities in one site will naturally interact with polities in others. It is not then 
simply the case of reviewing each site as a separate entity, but rather a matter or 
seeing which key polities and which other sites have a bearing on the relationships 
in that particular site of power. This opens up the concepts of ‘hegemony’ and 
‘empire’ to more multi-faceted and thus realistic accounts of world power and 
domination -  the latter of which is very rarely total, however ‘hegemonic’ or 
‘imperial’ its description. For there is otherwise always the possibility for re­
action, transformation and resistance, and thus also for the formation of other 
counter-hegemonies and/or -empires in any or all of the twelve sites of power.
One must raise the question however, whether an IR theorist who chooses to use 
the theory of structuration needs to reduce the level of analysis to such an extent 
that focus is put solely on those individuals who most stand to influence the
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international agenda, such as for example George W. Bush and his closest peers? I 
would argue that such a simplification is not necessary however. Units such as 
states or non-governmental organisations can also be said to be capable of making, 
and more importantly choosing to make a difference to a pre-existing state of 
affairs, or course of events. For although, as Wight has pointed out, they are all 
reducible to individual human agents and regarded as a product of structuration 
processes, they do ultimately participate in decision-making processes on an 
aggregate level and should thus be studied as agents in their own right. They too 
can be regarded as ‘conscious, intentional beings’, without having to split the 
responsibility or choice that this entails between the individuals that comprise the 
aggregate. Such a philosophical reduction disables rather than enables social 
analysis, since it removes the agency (and thus responsibility/choice) from state 
and non-governmental actors that highly influence and indeed decide over other 
human aggregates, and individuals, on a daily and global basis. The question of 
who comprises an agent, therefore, should not make it impossible to use Giddens’ 
theory of structuration in IR theory. Indeed, Giddens himself has increasingly 
acknowledged the need for a framework that takes into account the international 
setting of the agency/structure dilemma and the interaction between the structures 
of the state and the international system.405
The overlapping of many different polities means that the domain of a polity is 
also determined by the other attributes found within the actual individuals who 
comprise it -  e.g. cultural or economic. The domain of polity is also very much 
determined by its resources, which in the case of gender are mainly (although 
certainly not exclusively) ideological -  in that the very foundation of patriarchal 
structures builds on the cognitive assumption of socially constructed differences 
between men and women. And, finally, the domains of patriarchal structures are 
also obviously defined by the issues related to social divisions of gender -  
although again, due to the overlapping of polities, these issues can and often do 
span the full spectrum of social life. It is thus high time to turn to the second half 
of this thesis, where I shall use the example of HIV/AIDS to explain this 
conception of world relations more fully.
405 Buzan, Barry et al. (1993), p i 10.
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Chapter Five -  Why HIV/AIDS as an Example of ‘Glocal’ Power?
“Individuals can make a difference, but their institutions are almost as intractable as the epidemic 
itself. The iron laws of institutions routinely subvert the best intentions. ”406
/
“Freedom to choose must be accompanied by the possibility of having access to one’s choices. ”407 
Introduction
Power is thus seen in this thesis as ‘glocalised’, structurated relationships between 
agency in the decision-making process (be that conscious or unconscious, 
collective or individual) and the twelve sites of power. For, as argued in the first 
half of this thesis and as the above two quotations also make clear, agency and 
structure are inextricably intertwined -  one cannot exist without the other. As the 
capacity of all social agents to re-/act in all (or most) of these social relations, 
power is therefore everywhere and (potentially at least) everyone’s, affecting and 
being affected by every part of socio-political life. Seen this way, it becomes clear 
that global power is much more than a zero-sum military, economic or cultural 
behavioural relationship between a few state-actors, or a structural relationship 
between, for example, centre and periphery. There are many other forms of 
existential power besides military power that can disable human agency -  social 
death can be as debilitating as biological death, although the former is at least 
potentially reversible. To this end, this thesis offers its own definition of power, in 
the hope that this will open up a new debate on the contours of world power by 
intertwining aspects of behavioural, structural and post-modernist definitions of 
power. Using the case of HIV/AIDS to illustrate the intricate complexities of these 
‘glocal’ power relationships, the rest of this thesis sets out to reveal why previous 
attempts to map these relationships have ultimately failed in revealing these 
complexities.
Even when power is more generally defined as the capacity to act in society, it is 
clear that a deadly and debilitating disease such as HIV/AIDS has the full potential 
to affect this power negatively. Without treatment, the disease leads to a very early
406 De Waal, Alex. (2006), pl23.
407 Eisenstein, Zillah. (2004), p i95.
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and painful biological death, bringing to a permanent end human agency itself. It 
is not the biology of HIV/AIDS that is under focus in this thesis however, but 
rather its social causes and effects. For as the rest of this thesis will show, not only 
is the spread of the disease highly dependent on both material and cognitive 
structural realities such as poverty and gender, but the disease itself can also 
worsen such social inequalities and even result in the very real social death (in the 
form of total economic, cultural or other social exclusion) of those who suffer 
from it while they are still living. Conversely, the relative successes of HIV/AIDS 
activism and behavioural changes also reveal the positive and empowering aspects 
of political power, global as well as local, that exist in world relations.
HIV/AIDS is not unique in either of these regards however. Similar to all other 
human diseases, it both affects and is affected by structure and agency, since the 
extent of its spread both affects and is affected by structurated relations of power. 
According to Tony Barnett and Alan Whiteside -  two authors who have written 
extensively on the ‘glocal’ social processes that have contributed to the spread of 
HIV/AIDS -  “[all] epidemics have their deepest foundations in ‘normal’ social 
and economic life. [...] As we all share the same world, but unequally, so we are 
differentially exposed to disease organisms, and for that matter to many non- 
infectious illnesses. [...] In the poorest countries, it is the wealthier, better-fed, 
better-housed and more leisured who are most likely to escape infectious 
disease.”408 The only difference between HIV/AIDS and other diseases is that it 
primarily affects prime-age adults, is fatal and is also widespread -  as Barnett and 
Whiteside point out, “[i]t is unusual for this group (prime-age adults) to be the 
target of any disease.”409
HIV/AIDS has been singled out as a unique and very political disease however, 
partly because of the predicted and very dire consequences it has already started to 
bring to certain parts of the world such as Asia and sub-Saharan Africa and partly 
because of the way in which it is spread. As Barnett and Whiteside so succinctly 
put it: “HIV/AIDS mixes sex, death, fear and disease in ways that can be 
interpreted to suit the prejudices and agendas of those controlling particular
408 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p71.
409 Ibid, p50.
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historical narratives in any specific time or place.”410 It is for all of these reasons 
and just because it is so very politically contested that I have chosen HIV/AIDS as 
an example of ‘glocal’ relations of power, as it reveals not only the very real 
material and cognitive power of the body, but also because it highlights current 
‘glocal’, structurated relations of power.
As the next chapter will show, just as with most analyses of world politics, 
analyses of HIV/AIDS typically fall into three categories: behavioural, structural 
and post-modernist. Behavioural accounts typically focus on the individual’s role 
in spreading the disease, while structural accounts centre on societal phenomena 
such as capitalism or urbanisation to account for the stronghold that the disease 
has on some parts of the world over others. The latter will be analysed here using 
Held’s original seven sites of power, as these best encapsulate most traditional 
structural accounts of power in general and most mainstream structural analyses of 
HIV/AIDS in particular. Post-modernist accounts typically attribute the spread of 
the disease to a multitude of factors across societies and resist any attempts to 
generalise them. All of these three approaches will be examined and critiqued in 
the next chapter. The next chapter will then frame this discussion around my 
additional five sites of power, in order to reveal why an augmented, structurated 
and ‘glocalised’ analysis is needed. For it is argued here that power is not only 
relational between structure and agency, but that the definitions of agency and 
structure themselves also need to be expanded upon from most traditional 
behavioural and structural accounts, in order to account for the multiple levels of 
agency at work across the additional ‘three dimensional’ structures of time and 
space as well as the cognitive structures of knowledge and aesthetics, morality and 
emotion, and identities. As Burton has made clear, although it is questionable 
whether such an analysis could ever be adequately conducted, due to the sheer 
vastness of scale, the following two chapters will outline some of the main 
arguments for the inclusion of each structurated site of power, using the example 
of HIV/AIDS to reveal the role that each particular site has to play and thus its 
necessary inclusion in any analysis of world politics.
410 Ibid, p71.
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Before examining the politics of HIV/AIDS and how these affect and are affected 
by ‘glocal’ relations of power however, this chapter will first deal with the basic 
facts that are known about the disease. For although many of the ‘facts’ 
surrounding HIV/AIDS are disputed -  as shall be examined later in the site of 
knowledge and aesthetics -  there are some basic empirical facts about the disease 
which first need to be addressed in order to be able to discuss these other issues 
coherently. These include the basic biology of the disease, as well as some of the 
more general material and cognitive realities that can be discerned from current 
‘glocal’ trends -  those trends relating to specific sites of power will be dealt with 
in the final chapter. For although the underlying causes and effects of most, if not 
all, of these social realities are contested, most commentators agree that 
HIV/AIDS is a disease which is making a very real and devastating social impact 
on many parts of the world today -  killing the very lives that make up these 
societies.
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The Basic Facts o f HIV/AIDS
To begin with, it is necessary to distinguish between infection (HIV) and disease 
(AIDS) -  something which journalists and policy advisers have occasionally failed 
to do, thus leading to public confusion.411 HIV (the Human Immunodeficiency 
Virus) is a virus which, if left untreated, will within five to eight years lead to 
death from AIDS (Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome), which is not one 
disease, but rather a number of opportunistic infections, such as TB (tuberculosis) 
or Kaposi’s sarcoma, that come about as the immune system fails. Because HIV is 
a retrovirus -  hiding itself in the body’s immune system -  it is detected by 
measuring HIV antibodies in the blood. A person is described as being HIV- 
positive if these antibodies are detected. It is much more difficult to define AIDS 
however. Where the equipment is available, people are medically regarded as 
having AIDS when their CD4 cell count falls below 200. In most parts of the 
world however, such sophisticated tests do not exist and so AIDS is defined 
clinically by examining the patient and assessing his or her condition (some 
patients may not seek treatment until their counts are as low as 18412). To 
complicate the measurement of AIDS cases even further, it is possible for people 
who are very sick with AIDS to return to being HIV-positive and leading a fairly 
normal life when treated for the disease 413
HIV is not a robust virus and is hard to transmit. Unlike many other diseases, it 
can only be transmitted through contaminated body fluids. The virus has to enter 
the body in sufficient quantities in order to infect it and must pass through an entry 
point in the skin and/or mucous membranes into the bloodstream. The main modes 
of transmission (in hitherto order of importance) are: i) unsafe sex (anal, vaginal 
and occasionally oral); ii) transmission from infected mother to child; iii) use of 
infected blood or blood products; iv) intravenous drug use with contaminated 
needles; v) other modes of transmission involving blood; for example, bleeding 
wounds. 414 To date, two major strains of the HIV virus have been discovered.415
411 Ibid, p58.
412 The Independent. (1st December 2007), p4.
413 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p30-36.
414 Ibid, p41.
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However, HIV is similar to other viruses -  in that it survives through mutating and 
forming new sub-types of the virus -  and so it may be possible that it mutates into 
a form that is transmitted in other ways than those listed above, although I have 
not found any medical evidence to suggest that this has yet happened.
Despite over 20 years of research, there is still no cure or vaccine for HIV and 
scientists hold little hope of finding one, since the virus has evolved a way to 
protect itself from the human immune system.416 There have however been major 
advances in clinical treatment over the past two decades. There are three stages to 
the medically recommended treatment of HIV: i) ‘positive living’ -  staying 
healthy, eating the correct food etc, while CD4 cell counts are still high; ii) 
prophylactic treatment to prevent TB and other common infections when the CD4 
cell count begins to drop; and iii) the use of ARVs (anti-retroviral drugs) to fight 
HIV directly. There are three different types of ARV treatment: i) single therapies 
(only one drug) -  the earliest form of treatment that is no longer used much since 
it causes fairly swift mutation of the virus into drug resistant strains; ii) double 
therapies (a combination of two drugs) -  often preferred because it is cheaper than 
the third type, but slower to take effect and also of limited duration; iii) tripal 
therapy (usually involves two reverse transcriptase inhibitors and one protease 
inhibitor) -  also known as HAART (Highly Active Anti-Retroviral Therapy), so 
called since it is capable of suppressing HIV for many years in a significant 
number of individuals.417
Access to medication is still very restricted in many parts of the world however. In 
many Western countries for example, patients have over twenty different drugs to 
choose between, while patients in most parts of Africa are so far limited to a 
choice of six, despite all the funding for treatment programmes currently 
available.418 Furthermore, all of these forms of treatment require long-term 
economic investment to implement, as well as basic social infrastructure such as
415 i) HIV-1, which has three sub-divisions -  Group M, (which is divided into 11 subtypes or clades (A
to K) and causes 99% of the world’s HIV/AIDS infections), and Groups O and the newly discovered
Group N; and ii) HTV-2, which is a less virulent form than HIV-1 (Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan.
(2006), p39.)
416 BBC News, Friday 15th Feb 2008.
417 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p46-7.
418 Epstein, Helen. (2007), p266.
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medical facilities, personnel and transport etc.419 -  requirements which are lacking 
in many parts of the world where treatment is most needed. It is not surprising 
therefore that it is currently estimated that antiretroviral drugs will add, on 
average, only an extra four or five years to the life of a patient living in Africa420, 
since his or her chances of survival depend not only on a lifetime’s supply of 
medication, but also on access to the basic infrastructure and facilities needed to 
administer those drugs, as well as other basic needs such as food, housing and 
clothing -  needs which even a healthy person may struggle to meet and which 
become even more difficult to satisfy when sick.
“HIV is a disaster on many levels. [...] Disasters, man-made and ‘natural’, disrupt basic services, 
exacerbate other drivers of the epidemic, and can increase people’s vulnerability to HIV infection. 
People living with HIV are among the groups most vulnerable in disaster and crisis situations. But, 
at the same time, they have much to offer and their fuller participation is crucial to tackling the
epidemic. ”421
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies recently 
issued a report listing the HIV/AIDS pandemic as one of the great disasters of 
modem times. Measuring the number of people currently living with HIV and the 
number of people who have died from AIDS is very difficult in current ‘glocal’ 
circumstances however, since these figures remain contested by global as well as 
by local actors (outlined in more detail below and discussed in relation to power in 
the site of knowledge and aesthetics in Chapter 7). Nonetheless, although it may 
be difficult to measure the exact number of people in the world who are suffering 
or have already died from the disease, it is widely acknowledged that HIV/AIDS 
has already claimed many millions of lives worldwide. UNAIDS estimated in 
2005 that it had already then killed more than 25 million people since it was first 
recognized in 1981, “making it one of the most destructive epidemics in recorded 
history”422 and totalling more than most of the wars of the 20th Century put
419 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p368-369.
420 Epstein, Helen. (2007), p266.
421 International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, Press Release (26 June 2008)
422 UN AIDS/05.19E, 2005, p2.
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together.423 It is also a disease which has been reported from every inhabited place 
in the world 424
HIV (infection) and AIDS (mortality) figures are obviously and inextricably 
linked. Unlike most other epidemics however, HIV/AIDS has two epidemic 
curves -  the HIV infection curve precedes the AIDS mortality curve by between 
five and eight years -  further complicating accurate analysis of global statistics. 
This is also what makes HIV/AIDS such a lethal epidemic in comparison to other 
epidemics such as Ebola fever, for example, since the spread of the former is 
much more difficult to detect than the spread of the latter. According to Barnett 
and Whiteside:
“In the [ ...]  case [o f Ebola], victims o f the disease quickly and visibly fa ll ill, putting the general 
population and public health professionals on their guard. [ ...]  HIV infection moves through a 
population giving little sign o f its presence. It is only later, when substantial numbers are infected, 
that AIDS deaths begin to rise. People do not leave the infected pool by getting better because 
there is no cure. They leave by dying (of AIDS and other causes). The effects o f life-prolonging 
ARTs is, ironically, to increase the pool o f infected people. [...T]he reality is that without 
affordable and effective treatment, AIDS case numbers and deaths will continue to increase after
the HTV tide has been turned. ”425
It is highly possible, for example, that HIV prevalence figures may decrease due to 
an increase in deaths from AIDS, conflict or other forms of violence and illness, 
thus reducing the number of those infected. Similarly, since death from AIDS is 
never from AIDS itself but from one of the many opportunistic infections caused 
by the syndrome, many deaths from AIDS may go undetected, if they are recorded 
instead as deaths from TB, for example. Indeed, since most countries in the world 
report only the immediate cause of death on patients’ death certificates, it is 
certainly possible that many deaths from AIDS go unnoticed. According to 
Barnett and Whiteside, “[i]n most countries AIDS is not a notifiable disease, 
which means that medical staff are not legally required to report cases. Even if 
they do, there are serious constraints to this process: reporting may be very slow 
[...], data may be inaccurate because of unwillingness to report cases [...] the
423 The Independent, (Penketh, Anne), 16th May 2006.
424 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p8.
425 Ibid, p52-3.
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condition from which a person dies may not be recognised as being AIDS related 
[.. .and] doctors may feel that it is pointless to report cases as there is no incentive, 
they are too busy or they get no feedback.”426 And, in areas where HIV/AIDS is 
highly stigmatised, many cases may be deliberately mis-recorded, in order to spare 
shame to the family of the deceased 427
“Diseases are not only ephemeral biological and social constructions, but 
they also often acquire moral dimensions which make them susceptible to 
discriminatory policies, religious sanctions, and administrative action.
Conversely, subjected to the vagaries o f disease causality and the changing 
contexts o f collection and validation, death records were never employed 
in a societal vacuum. All collected causes of death continue to be 
conveniently packaged within socially and bureaucratically acceptable 
categories that vary in time and place. Before interpreting the historical 
data, we must always ask not only who did the reporting and collecting, 
but who was ultimately in control o f the data registration and 
dissemination process: church, governments, hospitals, insurance companies, 
or the medical profession?,,m
As Giinter B Risse makes clear in the above quotation, the deliberate manipulation 
of death records is not uncommon across the world or throughout history -  there 
are many potential parties who may share an interest in manipulating death 
records, across both time and space. It is therefore not only the immediate actors 
involved -  the medical official, patient and his/her family -  who might have an 
interest in manipulating the death record, but also other actors who have an 
interest in the data thus collected, such as governmental and non-governmental 
organisations. In the same way, the number of reported HIV infections may be 
increased or decreased according to the interests of the particular actor concerned 
-  they may be exaggerated in order to increase funding for treatment, for example, 
or be underestimated in order to reduce any perceived stigma. Indeed, a very 
important fact to note in the particular case of measuring the ‘glocal’ prevalence of 
HIV/AIDS is that all global data produced by all agencies originate from the 
actual countries themselves429 and so are not only subject to what data is
426 Ibid, p58.
427 Avert, 2007.
428 Risse, Gunter B. (1997), pl83.
429 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p56.
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accessible and thus available in each country but may also be subject to 
manipulation.
The pros and cons of HIV testing have come under close scrutiny since the 
discovery of the disease. Cuba, for example, tested its entire population when 
news of the virus broke in the 1980s and consequently isolated all of those who 
were infected in ‘sanatoria’ -  an action which caused much controversy at the time 
but that has also undoubtedly contributed to the low level of HIV infection in the 
country.430 As Barnett and Whiteside point out, the nationwide testing of a 
population not only raises many practical problems -  Cuba only has a population 
of 11.1 million, other countries would struggle both logistically and economically 
to test their entire population -  but also raises many ethical issues -  “do you 
compel people to take part? If people are identified then what do you do with 
them?”431 The 2004 UN AIDS/WHO Policy Statement on HIV Testing advocates 
that countries adopt the ‘3 Cs’ approach, namely that tests be “confidential, be 
accompanied by counselling [and] only be conducted with informed consent, 
meaning that it is both informed and voluntary”. It also states however that “[t]he 
current reach of HIV testing services remains poor: in low and middle income 
countries only 10 per cent of those who need voluntary counselling and testing, 
because they may have been exposed to HIV infection, have access to it.”432
Problems with data collection are not of course isolated to the case of HIV/AIDS. 
For even though not all diseases have the same degree of stigma attached to them 
(although many diseases do incite a similar fear of contamination and thus 
stigmatisation of those infected), the analyses of many other diseases suffer from 
similar ethical, practical and logistical problems in obtaining accurate and reliable 
data. This also relates to the much contested and political nature of census taking -  
as a recent article in The Economist stated, “[n]umbers mean power, which is why 
counting people is so controversial”. The article goes on to recount numerous 
examples throughout history when governments have either used a census against 
their citizens or hidden results that are not in their own or their citizens’ perceived
430 Ibid, p45.
431 Ibid, p61.
432 UNAIDS/WHO, 2004, p i.
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interests, as well as cases where a census would benefit the recognition of 
minority groups. Indeed, although history is rife with incidents of census taking -  
the first known record of a census was by the Babylonians, which dates as far back 
as 3800BC -  the practice was long resisted and feared in many parts of the world, 
being referred to as ‘the sin of David’, referring to an account in the Book of 
Numbers in the Bible, where a count by King David was said to have subsequently 
been punished by God.433 Numbers have therefore always bom the utmost 
political importance to policy makers and citizens alike and will probably always 
continue to do so. Access to these numbers, as well as the interpretation of them 
will thus also always be political, as there is, as already noted, an inextricable link 
between knowledge and power -  something which will be discussed in more detail 
in the site of knowledge and aesthetics.
“Epidemiologists and statisticians may make assumptions and extrapolate, but they are dependent 
on the information they are given. [ .. .]  The question was and still is: ‘Do we have a clear picture 
o f the number of AIDS cases or deaths?' The answer is ‘N o’, and indeed we never did. [ .. .]  AIDS 
case data have always been ‘political’. In the early years of the epidemic, countries were reluctant 
to admit to the existence o f the disease because o f what they felt its presence might suggest or 
imply about the morals and behaviour o f their citizens, or what it might do to the tourist
industry. ”434
Data thus reflect what is available in countries and what they choose to report. 
Epidemiologists and statisticians are dependent on the information provided to 
them and thus far it is difficult to fully grasp the extent of the spread of the 
disease. However, although it is impossible to know for certain the numbers of 
people infected with HIV/AIDS, AIDS case data still have a value: “First, if they 
are collected consistently and in sufficient quantities, trends will be apparent. 
Second, they can give an indication of the scale of the problem. Finally, they can 
show where the epidemic is located by age, gender, mode of transmission and 
geographical area.”435
Data collection is not the only problem facing the analysis of HIV/AIDS however. 
The very organisations that track and ‘manage’ the disease themselves constitute a
433 The Economist, 22nd December 2007, p66.
434 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p56-9.
435 Ibid, p59.
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vast and complex ‘glocal’ network that is itself near to impossible to account for 
fully and accurately:
“The AIDS pandemic is tracked and ‘managed’ by an enormous, world-spanning collection of 
organizations [ ...]  Even a brief look at what the ‘structure’ of such an organizational universe 
might look like illustrates the complexity o f this system. Just to map this universe is an enormous 
challenge. [ ...]  This universe is organized partly as a hierarchy, with the big funders and the 
regulatory organizations like the Global Fund, WHO, the World Bank and UNAIDS at the top; but 
it is also organized as a network of ‘partnerships’ and projects, often with specialized focuses or 
target groups. And then in many respects it is unorganized, with entrepreneurial actors at all levels 
inventing (or reinventing) themselves as actors in the AIDS drama. [...O jur usual ways o f thinking 
about boundaries, or even about nested hierarchies o f social processes (local, regional, national, 
international, global, for example), do not work very well. ” 436
As Ann Swidler makes clear in the above quotation, it is difficult to set boundaries 
for the ‘glocal’ organisation of HIV/AIDS. There are many multiple levels to this 
‘universe’, which is partly an organized hierarchy and partly unorganized, with 
actors at all levels ‘inventing [...] themselves as actors in the ADDS drama.’ This 
complexity of the ‘world of ADDS’ again echoes Burton’s claim that it is near to 
impossible to fully comprehend the whole of world relations. At best, all we can 
hope to do is map the entire ‘glocal’ organisation of HIV/ADDS (something which 
is beyond both the scope and remit of this thesis), but even then we would be 
limited in our knowledge of how this ‘glocal’ network operates since even the 
organisations themselves will probably operate in partial darkness with regard to 
knowledge of each other’s existence and operations.
Suffice to say here therefore that there are two main polities which collect and 
compile global data on the disease and on whom most other organisations are 
dependent in order to be able to discern ‘glocal’ patterns -  UNADDS/WHO and the 
United States Bureau of the Census (which in turn is a primary source of data for 
UNADDS).437 The accuracy of this data is highly debated. Some have criticised 
UNADDS for overestimating the prevalence of HIV in certain regions of the world 
-  criticism which lead the organisation to change its methods of measuring the 
disease in 2007. Others have praised the organisation precisely for this capacity to
436 Swidler, Ann. (2006), p270-l.
437 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p57.
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change its methods however. Barnett and Whiteside, for example, state that, “[a]s 
the epidemic has progressed, so UNAIDS and WHO have improved their 
surveillance and modelling methods and the demands of advocacy for simple, high 
and shocking figures have been trimmed in response to criticism.”438 In order to be 
able to conduct the ensuing analysis however, it is necessary here to first account 
for current global estimates, since these are the basis for any discussion on 
competing analyses of the disease.
In its latest report, UNAIDS estimated that 33.2 million people [30.6-36.1 million 
-  “the ranges around the estimate define the boundaries within which the actual 
numbers lie, based on the best available information”] were living with HIV in 
2007, 2.5 million [1.8-4.1 million] of whom were newly infected that year. It also 
estimated that 2.1 million [1.9-2.4 million] people died from AIDS in 2007439. 
The regional distribution of the 33.2 million people living with the disease in 2007 
is as follows, in declining order of prevalence (the figures for 2006 have been 
included, to show decreases that are most likely to have resulted from changes in 
UN AIDS’ measurement of the disease):
* 22.5 million [20.9-24.3 million] in sub-Saharan Africa (down from 24.7 million 
(21.8-27.7 million) in 2006)
* 4.0 million [3.3-5.1 million] in South and South-East Asia (down from 7.8 
million (5.2-12.0 million) in 2006)
*1.6 million [1.2-2.1 million] in Eastern Europe and Central Asia (down from 1.7 
million (1.2-2.6 million) in 2006)
*1.6 million [1.4-1.9 million] in Latin America (down from 1.7 million (1.3-2.5 
million) in 2006)
*1.3 million [480 000-1.9 million] in North America (down from 1.4 million 
(880 000-2.2 million) in 2006)
UNAIDS. (2007), pi.
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* 800 000 [620 000-960 000] in East Asia (up from 750 000 (460 000-1.2 
million) in 2006)
* 380 000 [270 000-500 000] in the Middle East and North Africa (down from 
460 000 (270 000-760 000) in 2006)
* 230 000 [210 000-270 000] in the Caribbean (down from 250 000 (190 000-320 
000) in 2006)
* 75 000 [53 000-120 000] in Oceania (down from 81 000 (50 000-170 000) in 
2006).440
It is clear therefore that sub-Saharan Africa is currently the region in the world 
that is the worst affected by the disease -  accounting for approximately 67.7% of 
all HIV cases. What is more, UNAIDS states that AIDS is the leading cause of 
death there.441 It is also for this reason that most attention has been on this region, 
resulting in many different explanations as to why it has been so severely hit, as 
well as a bias of research that has prioritised the study of HIV/AIDS in Africa over 
other regions, as shall be examined in more detail in the ensuing analysis.
Those who write about HIV/AIDS are also split as to whether to call its spread a 
global pandemic, or one or more endemics or epidemics. According to Barnett and 
Whiteside, an epidemic “is a rate of disease that reaches unexpectedly high levels, 
affecting a large number of people in a relatively short time”, while an endemic “is 
continuously present in a population [...] at low or moderate levels” and a 
pandemic “describes epidemics of worldwide proportions”. They argue that 
HIV/AIDS is a pandemic,442 while the same Barnett, this time writing together 
with Gwyn Prins states in a footnote: “We use the word ‘endemic’ because in 
many world regions the term ‘epidemic’ no longer suffices to describe what is
440 Ibid, p39.
441 Ibid, p4.
442 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p28.
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happening”443 -  thus not refuting the notion of a pandemic, but seeming to suggest 
that this consists of many endemics rather than that of many epidemics. Others, 
such as Nana K. Poku use the term epidemic to describe its global spread: “From 
an initial prevailing view that HIV/AIDS was not an important development issue, 
the world has now come to a consensus that the epidemic is a terrible development 
disaster of perhaps biblical proportions. [...] Where the epidemic has hit hardest, it 
has slashed life expectancy in half, doubling or even trebling adult mortality.”444 
This thesis will follow Barnett and Whiteside’s definition to argue that, rather than 
one homogenous pandemic, there are many different HIV/AIDS endemics that are 
present concurrently in different parts of the world that both affect and are affected 
by different ‘glocal’ realities, both material and cognitive.
“[A] national [HIV] epidemic is made up o f many sub-epidemics, with different gradients and 
peaks. These sub-epidemics vary geographically and in terms o f their distribution among social or 
economic groups. In many countries in the poor world, HIV spread first among drug users and 
commercial sex workers (CSWs). From there it moved into other groups: mobile populations, men 
who visited sex workers, and eventually into the broader population. One common feature in both 
the rich and poor worlds is that HIV spreads among people at the margins o f society, the poor and
dispossessed.,,44S
As shall be examined in more detail in the next two chapters, aggregate data (the 
collection and interpretation of which constitutes a serious methodological 
problem in itself) has typically been based on misinformed assumptions about who 
is behaviourally at risk and has pigeon-holed countries and people as being either 
more or less at risk of infection, (thus stigmatising some and leaving others still at 
risk), without examining the more complex structural causes and effects of the 
many, varied HIV/AIDS epidemics around the world. A truly epidemiological 
account -  according to the basic definition of epidemiology as ‘the study of the 
spread and control of diseases’446 -  would include the many different local, 
national and global socio-economic contexts governing the spread of the disease 
but up until now, this has not typically been the case.
443 Barnett, Tony -  Prins, Gwyn. (2006), p359.
444 Poku, Nana K., 2006, p345.
445 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p53.
446 Oxford Paperback Dictionary Thesaurus & Wordpower Guide (2001)
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There are also ethical problems with using aggregate data. Since HIV/ADDS is 
primarily transmitted through sexual relations, infected needles or direct contact 
with blood, it raises issues of stigmatisation. Those who are commonly branded as 
carriers of the disease are groups who are already often stigmatised -  such as 
‘women’, ‘Africans’, ‘drug users’ or ‘commercial sex workers’ -  identities which 
are in reality much more complex and diverse than they are homogenous. As the 
next chapter will show however, analyses of HIV/AIDS risk not only missing 
these complexities if they build on simplified, aggregate data but they also stand to 
stigmatise such groups even further, especially if they follow a behavioural 
hypothesis that puts all the power and responsibility to turn the pandemic around 
on the individual.
It will be argued here therefore that unprotected sex and drug use are not 
behaviours that are restricted to certain parts of the world, or to certain 
homogenous ‘out’-groups, but are rather instead widespread, global phenomenon 
-  albeit in varying ‘glocal’ degrees -  and that the reasons why HIV/AIDS has hit 
sub-Saharan Africa particularly hard are much more complex than simplified 
behavioural or structural analyses can make out on their own. Sub-Saharan Africa 
is not one homogenous social region for example, but rather a large and richly 
diverse region that has many different forms of social organisation, be these 
political, gendered, cultural, economic etc. And while it is certainly true that the 
region as a whole is suffering more from the disease than anywhere else in the 
world at this present time, UNAIDS cites many different patterns of infection rates 
across the region, with the southern part being the most severely affected.447 As I 
will demonstrate, there are many varying causes and effects of ‘glocal’ political 
phenomena such as HIV/AIDS, which ultimately depend on the particular 
combination of ‘glocal’, structurated conditions in a particular area. As Barnett 
and Whiteside make clear, “[w]hether a person contracts HIV depends on his or 
her social and economic position. Social class, gender, ethnicity, market position 
all combine to create particular ways of making a living. [...] some of us inhabit a
447 UNAIDS. (2007), p!5-20.
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world where we can be spatially -  if not sexually -  polygamous; others are stuck 
in their locality, but the world comes to them”448.
These are conditions that affect both the individual’s power to protect him-/herself 
from the disease, as well as a society’s power to protect its members. Even the 
best efforts to do so on either side may be futile if there are structural relationships 
which constrain positive action against the disease. Due to the ‘glocal’, 
structurated nature of such power relationships however, it is also clear that there 
may very well be behaviours that (consciously or unconsciously) contribute to the 
spread of the disease. These behaviours will never be free from structural 
influences however -  whether these be material or cognitive -  and so any analysis 
that looks solely at behavioural explanations are as insufficient as any that looks 
solely for structural explanations. The next chapter will highlight both of these 
types of analysis, as well as the growing popularity of post-modernist approaches 
which advocate doing away with traditional analyses altogether. The final two 
chapters will then look at a way to combine all three approaches by outlining a 
‘glocalised’, structurated analysis of the power relations that have contributed to 
the spread of HIV/AIDS in certain parts of the world over others.
448 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p388.
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Conclusion
The only empirical facts that can be certainly known about HIV/AIDS concern its 
biological make-up as a virus -  and even these have been contested by some 
actors who deny its existence. Everything else that is ‘known’ about the disease, 
from where the disease originated from to more specifically accounting for where 
and who it affects most today, remains contested and is still up for dispute, despite 
over three decades of global research. Indeed, the case of HIV/AIDS highlights 
more general problems regarding the validity and reliability of global statistics, 
since both the methods of data collection and the consequent interpretations of this 
data are hotly contested, highlighting the political power of different views or 
‘knowledge’ in world politics. For although certain global patterns can already 
now be discerned, it is still far too early to know exactly how this disease will 
affect the world as a whole, since this is dependent both on past, present and future 
structures of agency.
What is certain is that adequate data collection on a global scale remains beyond 
the grasp of even the largest organisations (as a result of local, national and global 
obstacles) and that there are many different theories about the underlying causes 
and effects of the disease which, not surprisingly and in common with most other 
global issues, generally favour either structural or behavioural accounts -  
something which will be explored further in the next two chapters. It is also clear 
that -  although it is certainly a fact that the virus is spread by human-to-human 
contact through body fluids and thus by human behaviour -  behavioural accounts 
for the spread of the disease will not suffice alone.
This thesis therefore argues that it is analytically more useful to speak of a current 
‘glocalisation’ of the HTV/AIDS virus to sub-Saharan Africa. It will thus be 
argued that Africa’s particular vulnerability to the disease has not only to do with 
global factors, both past and present, but also to do with varying local cultural, 
social, economic and political contexts that heighten the vulnerability of some 
parts of the continent and lessen that of others, as well as, of course, individual 
behaviour. This is not to say that there are not unifying factors that link one part of 
sub-Saharan Africa with another and that make the region as a whole currently
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more susceptible to the HIV/AIDS virus. However, the fact that there has also 
been an increase in infection in other parts of the world, such as India, which in 
2006 took over from South Africa as the country with the largest number of 
people infected by HIV,449 (although these figures are now disputed) reveals that 
sub-Saharan Africa is not alone in facing the challenges of HIV/AIDS.
It is the aim here therefore, just as with every other global political issue, to argue 
for an empirical, structurated and ‘glocalised’ approach to the issue that takes into 
account ‘glocal’ behaviour across the twelve sites of power. For it is only thus that 
‘glocal’ realities can be more accurately discerned and dealt with, both on a global 
and a local level. For, as shall be shown, current differences in vulnerability to the 
HIV virus depend on ‘glocal’ structural inequalities as well as behavioural actions 
on the part of both individuals and policy makers alike.
449 Financial Times, Friday July 21 2006, p5.
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Chapter Six -  Behavioural, Structural and Post-Modernist 
Analyses of HIV/AIDS
Introduction
Just as with most global phenomena, analyses of HIV/AIDS typically fall into one 
of the following three categories: i) behavioural studies, which put all of the focus 
on the behaviour of actors (most commonly, the individual) involved in the social 
process (in this case the spread of HIV); ii) structural studies, which focus on the 
structures that affect the process; iii) and post-modernist studies, which advocate 
empirical, deconstructed discourses that shy away from generalising or 
compartmentalising any one part of the process. There are some further 
methodological fault lines specifically with regard to HIV/AIDS which can be 
useful in separating these three approaches: i) those that prioritise a behavioural 
analysis of HlV-transmission (the focus of much mainstream epidemiological 
analysis) typically see the global spread of HIV/AIDS as being dependent on the 
movement of the virus through certain groups of people, (so-called ‘core­
transmitters’, e.g. prostitutes, migrant workers, gays etc.); ii) those that prioritise a 
structural analysis see the global spread of the virus as being dependent on the 
history of ‘globalisation’ and the resultant unequal socio-economic distribution of 
resources (e.g. poverty, gender etc.); and iii) the more post-modernist approaches, 
that advocate moving beyond epidemiological and structural analyses altogether, 
usually claim that the global spread of HIV/AIDS is dependent on such a high 
complexity of socio-economic factors that these cannot be generalised into one 
global theory of the virus.
Traditionally, many policy makers have favoured behavioural analyses with 
regard to HIV/AIDS, with ensuing policy prescriptions that sanction to change 
social behaviour by educating (or at worst isolating) the individual in order to 
prevent the spread of the virus. As shall be seen below however, such analyses 
risk concentrating all of the responsibility (and thus also potential blame) for the 
spread of the virus on the actions of individuals, rather than on the complex social 
processes that lie behind these actions. Those analyses which focus instead solely
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on structural factors equally risk losing sight of the importance of agency, without 
which, on all levels, none of these structures can be maintained. Policy 
prescriptions in these cases often advocate changing entire social structures, which 
is nigh on impossible if human agency is left out of the equation -  ‘faceless’ 
structures are abstract and, it is argued here, ontologically impossible (i.e. do not 
exist), but they risk becoming analytically reified as somehow existing outside of 
human interaction if agency is not taken into account. Post-modernist analyses are 
equally analytically flawed, as they risk leaving the social scientist unable to 
discern trends which, in the case of HIV/AIDS, could lead to equally flawed and 
potentially lethal policy prescriptions, as very little can be done about something 
which is denied existence in the first place.
There is an important distinction which should be made from the outset however 
between social analytical explanation and consequent policy prescriptions. An 
analysis which states that it is solely behavioural, for example, while 
acknowledging that there are other structural aspects of the research matter in 
question, cannot be blamed if ensuing policy prescriptions are thus also 
behavioural. There is nothing wrong with social scientists deciding to focus 
exclusively on one aspect of a phenomenon, if they are conscious and make clear 
that they are limiting their analysis to looking at that particular aspect. Indeed, it is 
not the intention of this thesis to advocate doing away with specialist research -  
that would be potentially fatal to the social sciences as a discipline.
What follows therefore is not meant to be a damning critique of individual 
research on various aspects of HIV/AIDS -  on the contrary, all of this research is 
extremely useful in tying together the various strands of the structurated puzzle, so 
to speak. What is revealed below however is how limited a solely behavioural or 
structural analysis is in revealing the structurated complexities of any social 
phenomenon, in this case, HIV/AIDS. Conversely, post-modernist analyses reveal 
just how little can be said about anything if everything is left wide open to 
interpretation, without revealing any of the material or cognitive realities that 
actually exist independently of any research about them.
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However, it is also clear that, if the original analysis in any piece of research fails 
to capture the complexities of a social problem, ensuing policy prescriptions that 
follow on from this research equally cannot be entirely blamed if they too then are 
limited in their scope and understanding of that problem. Of course, no social 
science is ever neutral and there will always be research that follows a pre­
determined outcome -  throughout human history, policy makers have been known 
to look for ‘made-to-order’ research that can back them up in their proposed 
policies. This is a very important aspect of political power that is taken into 
consideration in this thesis -  under the site of knowledge and aesthetics. However 
it cannot be presumed a priori that all social research is conducted under these 
conditions or has the power to influence all policy makers alike. As the next two 
chapters will show, the case of HIV/AIDS reveals the magnitude of social research 
that exists independently of existing policy -  demonstrating that the relations 
between power and knowledge are as structurated and reciprocal as in any other 
site.
A purely Foucaultian analysis, for example, might state that knowledge is the key 
site of power in any social phenomenon, but the case of HIV/AIDS reveals that 
knowledge does not always equal power -  social actors can have all of the 
necessary information they need to act on something but still not have the power 
to change their situation. Other sites of power also come into play, which is why 
knowledge here is assigned only as much importance as the other eleven sites. 
This chapter will thus examine all of the three aforementioned types of analysis of 
HIV/AIDS -  behavioural, structural and post-modernist -  in order to make the 
continued case for a ‘glocalised’, structurated analysis that takes into account all 
three approaches but does not favour one above the other. Since behavioural 
approaches represent the mainstream response to HIV/AIDS, both in world 
politics as well as in IR theory, more attention has been afforded to giving a 
critical summary of these, in order to set the scene for the structurated analysis that 
will follow in the next two chapters.
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Behavioural Analyses of HIV/AIDS
“[ T]he behavioural change hypothesis, which remains the dominant policy response to the 
[African] continent’s AIDS crisis, has been less than effective. A t the crux o f this failure is the 
inability -  or unwillingness -  to acknowledge the complex but real relationship between the 
continent’s traditional problems and the entrenchment of the HIV/AIDS pandemic. ”450
Behavioural interventions were the initial and necessary response to the unfolding 
crisis of HIV/AIDS. Upon discovery, little was known about the disease except 
that it was spread through contact with bodily fluids and so any behaviour that 
increased the risk of such contact was advocated against -  with the so-called 
‘behavioural change hypothesis’ -  whilst researchers struggled to come to grips 
with both the biology and epidemiology of the disease. The ‘behavioural change 
hypothesis’ has consequently been a predominant feature of both much ‘glocal’ 
research and policy on HIV/AIDS, partly because it is commonly argued that 
“prevention of HIV through behavioural change is now, and will be for the 
foreseeable future, the only way to prevent its spread.”451 Indeed, although thirteen 
years have now passed since this comment was made in the preface of a WHO 
publication entitled Sexual Behaviour and AIDS in the Developing World, very 
little has changed. There is still no vaccine against the disease and thus, apart from 
more radical alternatives, (such as the mandatory isolation of infected individuals, 
as exercised by Cuba in the 1980s), behavioural change is still one of only two 
known methods of prevention. The second set of preventative interventions is 
known as ‘biomedical’, including: i) the use of condoms: ii) the immediate 
treatment of other sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), (since these are known to 
increase the risk of HIV infection); and iii) trying to discourage or make safer 
sexual and other practices that increase risk 452 It is clear however that this second 
set of interventions also requires behavioural action. The use of condoms, for 
example, requires not only that individuals use them, but also requires the 
manufacture and provision of these condoms (social action on a grander scale) and 
all of these behaviours depend of course on structural resources, both material and 
cognitive.
450 Poku, Nana. (2002), p537.
451 Cleland, John -  Ferry, Benoit. (1995), pxvii.
452 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p45-46.
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The behavioural change hypothesis is based on an assumption of individual, 
rational behaviour, which is problematic in itself since, like most other behaviour, 
sexual behaviour is not always, if ever rational and cannot be reduced to the 
individual alone, since many societal factors influence individual behaviour. Like 
all human behaviour, sexuality is “a complex of actions, emotions and 
relationships” that cannot be easily understood by quantitative analysis alone.453 
Despite the inherent complexities involved in conducting a behavioural analysis 
however, many behavioural analyses of HIV/AIDS continue to reduce behaviour 
to a series of isolated and quantifiable variables (i.e. whether or not people use 
condoms or how many sexual partners a person has per unit of time).
There are two well-known acronyms associated with behavioural change and 
HIV/AIDS: namely ABC and KAPB. The classic ABC message refers to A -  
abstain; B -  be faithful; and C -  condom if necessary. The underlying moral 
message here is clear -  sex is something that is perceived as best avoided until 
marriage, at which point monogamy is advocated and condoms should only be 
used if extra-marital sex is unavoidable. Leaving aside the question of whether or 
not this or any other moral code about sex is preferable, it is clear that such a 
message aims to change individual behaviour and that -  if it is advocated strongly 
enough and adhered to -  it could also have the power to do so en masse. The 
danger is that it thus also stigmatises deviant behaviour -  such as pre-, extra- or 
non-marital sex -  so that anyone who does not follow this advice risks not only 
social ostracism but is also in greater danger of infection than if condoms are 
advocated as always being preferable and thus also, perhaps, made more widely 
available.
Uganda, for example, has long been championed as the (perhaps only) ‘success 
story’ in using behavioural change in the form of the ABC message to reduce HIV 
prevalence rates. This behavioural change is not only accredited to the general 
Ugandan population however, but also to the country’s leader, President Museveni 
who, at a time when many politicians around the world refused to talk about
453 Ibid, p80.
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HIV/AIDS (perhaps due to squeamishness, ignorance, or embarrassment, although 
many other reasons could be suggested), acknowledged the epidemic already in its 
early stages in the 1980s and strongly and widely advocated the ABC approach as 
a means to combat the disease.
Some argue however that Uganda’s success in reducing its HIV/AIDS endemic 
over the ensuing two decades “has been more celebrated than analysed” and that 
the Ugandan government has manipulated its prevalence figures to show a 
decline.454 Whatever the case, it is clear that the Ugandan government behaved 
differently to many of its neighbouring governments. Peter Gill -  a journalist who 
has written a personal account of his many meetings around the world with 
various HIV/AIDS policy makers over the years, blaming many of them for the 
current extent of the worldwide pandemic -  while by no means remaining 
uncritical of some of the Ugandan government’s policies, writes that “Museveni 
was one of the very few leaders in Africa to do his duty [...shaping] Uganda’s 
response to Aids with persistence and imagination. Hundred of thousands owe 
their lives to him.”455 He goes on however to claim that it is unclear whether or not 
Uganda’s success in reducing prevalence rates was due to the ABC approach 
alone or to the country’s concurrent supply and promotion of the use of condoms, 
concluding that the current lack of condoms in the country risks reversing the 
trend to one of higher infection rates. Interesting in this regard is the simultaneous 
recent change in US policy regarding HIV prevention, which has moved from one 
of condom promotion to one of abstinence promotion in that The White House 
explicitly advocates using the ABC model456, thus favouring the behavioural 
interventions of abstinence and monogamy over the use of condoms. Many critics 
of this policy worry that this too could reduce the efficacy of HIV prevention 
strategies and actually worsen the epidemic457. Regardless of whether or not this is 
the case however, it is certainly the case that the ABC strategy runs certain risks if 
it reduces the use of condoms.
454 De Waal, Alex. (2006), p95.
455 Gill, Peter. (2006), p37.
456 The White House (2008)
457 Gill, Peter. (2006), p i87.
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The second acronym associated with behavioural change is KAPB: these are the 
Knowledge, Attitude, Practices and Behaviour interventions. This hypothesis 
assumes that, for behavioural change to be effective, people first need to have 
knowledge, then they need to change their attitudes and finally alter their practices 
and behaviour. Although this message is less moralistic than the ABC one, it is 
clear that it too suffers from oversimplification of the problem. Barnett and 
Whiteside neatly summarise the difficulties of using the KAPB model, stating that 
“even if people have the knowledge, they may not have the incentive or the power 
to change their behaviour. If prevention is to move beyond knowledge to action, 
we must look at the socio-economic causes of the epidemic and intervene there 
too.”458 This is clearly advocating a structurated approach to the problem.
Despite much criticism of the approach however, there are still both analysts and 
policy makers who focus exclusively on behavioural explanations for the spread of 
the virus.
“Most journalists and reporters who cover the AIDS pandemic are more socially and politically 
correct than epidemiologically accurate. Furthermore, most uncritically accept and use 
information distributed by UN AIDS, an organization that doesn ’t deny it is primarily an AIDS 
advocacy agency -  not a scientific or technical agency. ”459
This bold statement is made by James Chin, (an infectious disease epidemiologist 
with a background in the Global Programme on AIDS (GPA)), who very recently 
came out with a book entitled The AIDS Pandemic: The collision o f epidemiology 
with political correctness, where he claims that UNAIDS has overstated the global 
risk of the epidemic. The reasons that Chin gives for the concentration of the 
disease on the African continent are solely behavioural -  “[h]eterosexual risk 
behaviours in most populations outside of SSA [sub-Saharan Africa] are 
insufficient to sustain significant epidemic HIV transmission.”460 His argument is 
based on the epidemiological fact that “[e]pidemic heterosexual HIV transmission 
requires a high prevalence and frequency of sex partner exchange (i.e. having 
multiple sex partners on a concurrent basis)”. However, Chin bases his conclusion
458 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p46.
459 Chin, James. (2007), pvii.
460 Ibid, p3.
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that “the pattern and prevalence of these heterosexual risk behaviours in most SSA 
populations are sufficient to sustain epidemic HIV transmission whereas the 
patterns and prevalence of these risk behaviours in most other populations are not 
sufficient to fuel epidemic heterosexual HIV transmission”461 on some very 
dubious evidence.
The only global comparison of sexual behaviour that Chin makes is between 3 
African and 3 Asian countries, (based on only one data set -  a GPA/WHO KABP 
survey Sexual Behaviour and AIDS in the Developing World from 1995462 - 
twelve years prior to the publication of Chin’s book), leading him to the highly 
questionable conclusion that sexual behaviour is much riskier in sub-Saharan 
Africa than anywhere else in the world 463 He dismisses outright (with very little 
evidence, bar a couple of local case studies) UN AIDS’ claims that poverty, gender 
inequity, discrimination and stigma and lack of access to healthcare are the major 
determinants of high prevalence in SSA populations 464 The limitations of this 
research notwithstanding lead Chin to the highly questionable (and implicitly 
racist) argument that ‘Africans’ (as a supposed homogenous group of individuals 
perceived to be the most susceptible to carrying the virus) are ‘over-sexualised’ 
and must therefore be educated to change their behaviour.
Another recent study of sexual behaviour, published in the medical journal The 
Lancet and comparing sexual behaviour surveys between 1996-2006465, indirectly 
counters Chins claims. It found that, while monogamy is the dominant pattern in 
most regions of the world, the reporting of multiple partnerships (the only 
condition Chin claims is necessary to increase the risk of HIV transmission) is 
higher in developed countries than in developing countries, as well as more 
common in men than in women. Nonetheless, the study made reservations about 
the reliability of data from some parts of the world and thus the ability to make 
global comparisons at all, stating that “obstacles to sexual-behaviour research 
remain” “especially in Asia and the middle east” and that “African countries [...]
461 Ibid, p54.
462 Ibid, P71.
463 Ibid, p71-76.
464 Ibid, p80.
465 Wellings, Kaye et al. (2006), p!707.
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have received hugely disproportionate attention from researchers compared with 
Asian countries, and so the evidence base is partial.” They also note that sexual 
behaviour studies might be more susceptible to error than other surveys, “since 
they are especially prone to a social desirability bias -  the tendency for 
participants to respond according to social expectations of what is right.”466
And so, while the Lancet study does try to pinpoint some regional trends in sexual 
behaviour, it does so hesitantly. Its importance as a social scientific study lies in 
what it admits that it cannot tell us and it makes this point clearly throughout. For 
what is made clear is that sexual behaviour is not only a very complex 
phenomenon but is also beyond simplified generalisations made either about 
individual behaviour or about regions in a global context. This is reflected in their 
warning against a ‘one-size-fits-all’ policy against HIV/AIDS -  the authors argue 
that behavioural intervention programmes need to be tailored not only to suit 
national and local contexts, but also individual needs 467 Theirs is implicitly a 
structurated approach, for while they do not deny the importance of changes in 
behaviour and thus agency to advancing sexual health, they review this behaviour 
in the context of prevailing social norms. In their own words: “Although 
individual behaviour change is central to improving sexual health, efforts are also 
needed to address the broader determinants of sexual behaviour, particularly those 
that relate to the social context. The evidence from behavioural interventions is 
that no general approach to sexual-health promotion will work everywhere and no 
single-component intervention will work anywhere.”468
How behavioural change can be brought about remains therefore a matter of 
enormous contention. Indeed, condom usage is highly illustrative of the problems 
facing a purely behavioural analysis. In its simplest terms, it requires that 
individuals x and y use a condom in the act of having sex -  each and every time 
they do so. Individuals x and y cannot be assumed a priori to be in an equal power 
relationship however -  indeed, much research has been done on the gendered 
aspects of condom usage and the difficulties many women across the world have
466 Ibid, p i 706-8.
467 Ibid, p 1718-21.
468 Ibid, pl706.
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in negotiating with their male partners to use a condom. This depends not only on 
individual conflicts of power however, (although shame and blame is often 
associated with asking a partner to use a condom, since it can be perceived to 
imply that one of the two has had sex outside the partnership) but also on broader 
cognitive mechanisms, such as gendered institutions or cultural practices. Even if 
all concerned favour the use of condoms however, there is no guarantee that there 
will be any condoms readily available. As already mentioned, this in turn relies on 
other social actors behaving in a way to ensure the supply of condoms -  behaviour 
that in turn is also highly dependent on the behaviour of other actors as well as 
structural constraints. A behavioural analysis that puts focus solely on individual 
behaviour thus risks losing these equally important aspects of analysis.
Following Wight’s augmented definition of agency, therefore, it is clear that 
behavioural theories cannot focus on the individual alone. Indeed, as already 
mentioned in the case of Uganda, it is clear that the actions of polities can and do 
also play a major role in fighting the disease. As Chapter 5 has shown however, 
uncovering which polities play a part in this is difficult if not impossible to 
discern. There are many actors involved in the ‘glocal’ world of HIV/AIDS and it 
is far beyond the scope of this thesis to account for each and every one of them. 
Major global actors, such as UN AIDS, are easily accounted for -  however, their 
power to influence ‘glocal’ trends is not clear. For although they may (or may not) 
have the power to implement policies on a global level, how this then filters down 
to the local level, through the multitude of social actors that also play a role, will 
always be unique to the particular local context. These actors are situated across 
the twelve sites of power -  from political and economic actors to religious and 
cultural leaders, as well as at the level of the household -  and so any analysis that 
tries to simplify any of these relations will always miss out other important aspects 
of these relations.
“Despite the international scope o f the AIDS pandemic, and the growing involvement o f a number 
o f prominent international organizations in its management, the discipline of international
relations still lags notably behind many of these related fields in studying these effects. Only very 
recently has the AIDS pandemic begun to make inroads into the core o f the field  through the efforts
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o f a small group o f scholars exploring the implications of the pandemic fo r  international
security. ”469
Despite the increasing importance of HIV/AIDS as in issue in world politics, it is a 
subject that has only recently emerged in IR literature. Where it does appear, it is 
primarily limited to the sub-discipline of security studies and is again primarily 
behavioural in analytical scope. If one browses the mainstream IR journals, one 
can admittedly find a few special issues on the subject (e.g. International Affairs, 
March 2006, International Relations, Vol 19(4) 2005 and Vol 15(6) 2001 and 
Third World Quarterly, 2002), but the IR theorists contained therein write solely 
on the security aspects of the epidemic, focusing on the implications of the disease 
for foreign policy and thus state behaviour. Those that write on the global political 
and socio-economic causes and effects of the disease mainly originate from other 
disciplines, (such as political science, sociology etc.). A more general perusal of 
mainstream IR literature provides little evidence of the subject having penetrated 
the deeper debates on the content and contours of IR theory itself.
This is not very surprising however. The majority of HIV/AIDS cases are still 
predominantly to be found in so-called ‘developing’ or ‘Third World’ countries, as 
well as among women, all of whom are generally underrepresented in mainstream 
IR theory. The absence of HIV/AIDS from mainstream IR literature (except as an 
issue of securitisation) is therefore likely to be the result of a continued bias within 
the discipline as to what constitute relevant issues for analysis. And it is clear that 
-  with perhaps the exception of economy and culture -  other forms of structural 
violence and inequalities still do not count for much:
"The problem is that the discipline o f International Relations has defined its core concerns in such 
a way as to exclude the most marked forms o f violence in world politics, in favor o f a relatively 
small subset which ultimately relies on the prior moves o f separating the outside from the inside of  
a state, separating economics and politics, separating the public from the private, separating the 
‘natural’ from the ‘social’ worlds, separating the female from the male, separating the moral from  
the practical, and separating causes and effects. One can add that the discipline’s definition of
469 Elbe, Stefan. (2006), p i20.
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violence looks very closely linked to the concerns o f the white, rich, male world o f the power
elite.”410
/
“The Third World (and those scholars who have chosen to focus their efforts on understanding it) 
has long been o f secondary importance in Anglo-American International Relations literature. 
[...T]he Third World continues to figure largely on the margins of the International Relations 
discipline in the US and UK. What lies behind this silence is the failure o f the dominant theories of 
International Relations to engage with the global human condition on the basis o f anything other
than its impact on the G-8. ”471
Those IR theorists who do write about HIV/AIDS, within the sub-discipline of 
security studies, are in some disagreement as to whether the disease constitutes a 
matter of national, international or human security (as shall be examined in more 
detail below), but they are all united in pinpointing the epidemic as a matter of 
utmost urgency both for international policy makers and the theorists themselves:
“The HIV/AIDS epidemic is perhaps the greatest security threat from disease since the bubonic 
plague ravaged Europe between 1346 and 1351. [ .. .]  The short- and long-run impacts vary 
considerably. While ultimately population decline (in terms of deaths associated with the 
HTV/AIDS virus) is a humanitarian crisis in its own right, the indirect or short-run consequences 
o f the epidemic are what makes this an immediate security concern to African countries. ”472
There are striking parallels between the security literature in IR and the 
behavioural change literature within HIV/AIDS discourse in general. To begin 
with, both sets of literature have tended to follow on from initial policy -  for, as 
shall be examined in more detail below and as was the case with the behavioural 
change hypothesis, it is highly probable that the disease only became securitised in 
theory after certain states and international organisations securitised it in practice. 
Secondly, both sets of literature are predominantly behavioural in their analytical 
approach -  securitisation literature also focuses primarily on behavioural 
responses to the disease, this time in relation to the world of states and thus 
polities instead of the world of individuals. The securitisation literature is much 
more recent than the behavioural change hypothesis however -  until only about 
eight years ago (almost twenty years after the discovery of the disease) both IR
470 Smith, Steve. (2004), p510.
471 (Emphasis in original) Thomas, Caroline and Wilkin, Peter. (2004), p241.
472 Ostergard, Robert L. (2002), p346-7.
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literature and the international community of policy makers maintained their 
silence on HIV/AIDS:
“In the first two decades since the discovery of HIV/AIDS in the mid-1980s, the disease was 
conceptualized primarily as a public health and development issue. Although the links between 
HIV/AIDS and security were sporadically explored in the 1990s by a small number o f analysts in 
the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency and in some security think tanks, the major international 
turning point in terms o f conceptualizing HIV/AIDS as a security issue did not occur until
2000. ”473
HIV/AIDS was initially considered -  if not by IR theorists then at least by 
practitioners of international relations -  to be a matter for economic and 
development policy, (albeit not one of the utmost urgency). It was not until 
pressure from the Clinton administration in 2000 that HIV/AIDS in Africa became 
designated as a threat to international peace and security by the United Nations 
Security Council. This decision was accompanied by the declassification of a U.S. 
policy document -  the National Intelligence Estimate entitled The Global 
Infectious Disease Threat and Its Implications for the United States474 -  which 
was also used as the underlying reason for the official ‘securitisation’ of 
HIV/AIDS in the U.S. that same year. It was not long, therefore, before HIV/AIDS 
also became ‘securitised’ in IR literature. In the few years that have followed since 
its practical ‘securitisation’, HIV/AIDS has been the subject of “a plethora of 
reports and scholarly studies mapping out the implications of HIV/AIDS for 
security in greater detail.” These studies can be divided into three categories, 
depending on whether they consider HIV/AIDS to be a threat to: i) human 
security; ii) national security; or iii) international security.475
The basic definition of the concept of security is that an issue requires the 
adoption of emergency measures, either by the nation-states themselves, the 
international community of states, or the international community at large. 
Common to all three theoretical approaches therefore has been the thorny question 
of whether it is possible or indeed desirable to securitise HIV/AIDS in the first
473 Elbe, Stefan. (2006), pl21.
474 National Intelligence Estimate. (2000)
475 Elbe, Stefan. (2006), pl21.
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place. Indeed, it is necessary here to distinguish between ‘security’ and 
‘securitisation’ -  the former encompasses a more traditional notion of security and 
is more policy oriented, while the latter is an analytical concept used by 
‘securitisation’ theorists to debate the implications of certain issues becoming 
securitised in practice. Thus, not all ‘securitisation’ theorists are for the practical 
securitisation of these issues -  indeed, many of them write about the problems 
involved when issues such as HIV/AIDS are securitised in practice.
One of the most influential commentaries on the normative process of 
securitisation is the work of Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, entitled 
Security: A New Framework for Analysis from 1998. According to one 
securitisation theorist, Stefan Elbe, it “remains the only systematic scholarly study 
of the ethical implications of widening the security agenda to include an array of 
non-military issues -  making it a natural starting point for a more sustained debate 
about the securitization of HIV/AIDS.”476 Although there is not room here to enter 
into the finer points of Buzan et al’s analysis, suffice to say that the main point of 
their securitisation theory is to follow the reality of global politics and broaden the 
theoretical concept of security from the more traditional military concept to also 
include political, economic, environmental and societal security. They define 
security as “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game 
and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. 
Securitization can thus be seen as a more extreme version of politicization.”477 
Their aim is thus not only to expand traditional theoretical concepts of security 
beyond that of purely military issues but also to make possible the distinction 
between security issues and political ones, in order to avoid “the danger [...] that 
all things seen as problems will unthinkingly be classified as security issues.”478 
For “[t]here are intellectual and political dangers in simply tacking the word 
security onto an ever wider range of issues”479. In sum, their aim is:
“[to make it] possible to evaluate whether one finds it good or bad to securitize a certain issue.
One rarely manages to counter a securitizing attempt by saying as an analyst, ‘You are not really
477 Buzan, Barry -  Waever, Ole -  de Wilde, Jaap. (1998), p23.
478 Ibid, pl95.
479 Ibid, p i.
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threatened, you only think so. ’ But it is possible to ask with some force whether it is a good idea to 
make this issue a security issue -  to transfer it to the agenda of panic politics -  or whether it is 
better handled within normal politics. ”480
Robert Ostergard is one of the prominent voices within the realm of security 
studies who has made the case for the securitisation of HIV/AIDS, although he
4 0 1
recognises the difficulties involved. He is also critical of more inclusive security 
concepts such as those adopted by so-called ‘human security’ approaches, as 
advocated, for example, by the UNDP:
“issues such as unemployment, crime, pollution, drugs, and human rights violations are issues that 
all nations must contend with in some form. Changing their status from problems o f good  
governance to a security threat diminishes their distinct importance. [...T]o bring these issues to 
the level o f a security problem is almost meaningless -  governments have no greater sense of  
urgency about them. The concept of human security thus becomes insignificant. The HTV/AIDS 
pandemic is an extraordinary threat to individuals, but by grouping it with a series o f social 
maladies, we lessen the seriousness o f the problem. ”482
Instead, Ostergard advocates adopting a more traditional concept of security to the 
spread of HIV/AIDS. His primary empirical focus is on the threat of HIV/AIDS to 
the political, economic and military establishments of the African continent. As 
examples, Ostergard cites: i) the risk that illness and death from the virus empties 
key bureaucratic institutions of their personnel; ii) the risk that accusations of 
infection are used as a political weapon in, for example, elections; iii) the already 
high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in African militaries, which not only affects 
personnel and their families, but also military performance and security; and, 
finally, iv) the long-run domestic economic impact, such as lost productivity, 
decreased investment, worker illness, increased government expenditures, higher 
insurance costs and the loss of trained personnel.483 As shall be examined below 
however, while all of these examples certainly constitute some of the acute and 
very real problems currently facing many African countries in their battle against 
HIV/AIDS, they are by no means the only threats to the continent’s future stability 
-  far from it.
480 Ibid, p34.
481 Ostergard, Robert L. (2002), p338.
482 Ibid, p336.
483 Ibid, p341-346.
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In his article ‘Should HIV/AIDS Be Securitized?...’, Stefan Elbe makes 
convincing cases both for and against the securitisation of the disease, ultimately 
coming to the conclusion that, due to the urgency of the epidemic, it is better that 
it becomes securitised than that it remains completely outside the international 
political arena.484 However, the question of whether or not to securitise HIV/AIDS 
is, as Elbe warns, a highly sensitive one:
“framing the issue as a security issue pushes responses to the disease away from civil society 
toward the much less transparent workings of military and intelligence organizations, which also 
possess the power to override human rights and civil liberties -  including those of persons living
with HIV/AIDS. ”485
Elbe points to several examples where the securitisation of HIV/AIDS has already 
had detrimental effects on civil liberties. Specific cases include the discrimination 
against Haitians in the U.S. when the virus was first discovered, as well as against 
Africans in Europe and Russia. “Portraying HIV/AIDS as a national and 
international security threat risks fuelling such exclusionary and dehumanizing 
responses” says Elbe, “and could serve as an implicit legitimization of any harsh 
or unjust ‘emergency’ policies that states may adopt in relation to persons living 
with the virus.”486 Securitising the HIV/AIDS virus also risks securing preferential 
treatment for the armed forces and state elites in severely affected countries, thus 
also discriminating against the civilian population.487 However, as already stated, 
Elbe is not against the securitisation of HIV/AIDS, he merely wants to point to the 
potential dangers if it is done without consideration for the above difficulties.
One of the primary reasons that Elbe is for the securitisation of HIV/AIDS is that 
he believes that it will ensure that the issue is brought onto the international 
political agenda, thus securing high-level political leadership and increased 
funding.488 He also argues that it is essential in terms of potentially overriding the 
provisions made in the World Trade Ogranization’s Agreement on Trade-Related
484 Elbe, Stefan. (2006), p i32.
485 Ibid, p i28.
486 Ibid.
487 Ibid, p l30.
488 Ibid, pl32-133.
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Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), which namely contains an important set 
of ‘security exceptions’, including Article 73(b). The patents on many AIDS 
medicines are currently protected by the TRIPS agreement, so the securitisation of 
the disease could potentially override these protections and ensure poorer 
countries access to cheaper versions of HIV/AIDS drugs.489
Elbe also argues that the state-centric and self-interested nature of security need 
not necessarily be a drawback -  on the contrary, it can act as an important 
motivation and mobilise both domestic and global responses to HIV/AIDS. 
Indeed, he goes as far as to claim that “the appeal to the naked self-interest of 
states is the only strategy left in light of the pressing daily humanitarian 
implications of the pandemic.” 490 Finally, Elbe argues that the risk that the 
securitisation of the HIV/AIDS virus results in the stigmatisation, not of the virus, 
but of the people who carry it, can also be minimised:
“There is a crucial difference between arguing that ‘people with HIV/AIDS are a security threat' 
and arguing that ‘AIDS is a security threat': while the former aims to be politically exclusionary, 
and would bring into play a host o f normative concerns [ ...]  the latter can be understood as a 
more inclusive gesture arguing that those living with HIV/AIDS should receive assistance if  they so 
desire. It is also the latter claim that predominates among those linking HIV/AIDS with
security. ”491
Indeed, although he points to many of the dangers involved in securitising 
HIV/AIDS, Elbe remains in favour of the move, providing it is done sensitively. 
He suggests three ways in which those advocating the links between HIV/AIDS 
and security can minimise some of the aforementioned dangers:
i) “to insist that it is not exclusively a security issue, but rather a security issue in addition
to also being a health issue, a development issue, an economic issue, a social issue, a political 
issue, a gender issue, etc. [ . . .]  The security dimension of HIV/AIDS could then complement, rather 
than supersede, existing frameworks’’492
489 Ibid, p i 33-134.
490 Ibid, p i 34.
491 Ibid, p i 37.
492 Ibid, pl38.
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ii) "by framing the illness as a security issue, or as an issue with an important security 
dimension, rather than as a dangerous and overwhelming security threat. ”
iii) “that the problem lies not with the people living with the virus, but with the virus
itself. ”493
It is very difficult in practice however to avoid the stigmatisation of people 
carrying a virus that is deemed a threat to security. Susan Sontag was one of the 
first Western social scientists to point to the racial and sexist undertones in 
HIV/AIDS discourses in general. In the context of securitisation, it is interesting to 
note that Sontag also criticised the use of military metaphors to describe 
HIV/AIDS, long before the disease became securitised either in practice or in 
theory. In her own words, “[military metaphors contribute to the stigmatizing of 
certain illnesses and, by extension, of those who are ill.”494 HIV/AIDS sufferers on 
the African continent thus risk a case of ‘double-stigmatisation’ -  not only through 
racism but also through the use of military metaphors to describe the disease. 
Securitising HIV/AIDS therefore not only directly contributes to the latter case, by 
‘militarising’ perceptions of the disease, but it also risks the former, by solely 
focusing on security issues and ignoring structural aspects of the disease, such as 
gender, culture and racism.
Another problem with the assumptions made by securitisation theorists who link 
HIV/AIDS with security is their overwhelming focus on the health and well-being 
of the military and political elites. There are plenty of other groups in society who 
could be considered to be essential for security, such as grand-/parents, teachers 
and health care workers, not to mention the future generation of AIDS orphans, 
many of whom not only lack access to health care but also to basic resources such 
as food and shelter. Similarly, only focusing on the risk of HIV infection in 
conflict (to the military, rape victims etc.) ignores those who could very well be 
said to contract HIV/AIDS as a result of the structural violence of poverty. Sex is 
a very common commodity on the black market in many ‘developing’ countries 
and can be traded for schooling, jobs, money, or sometimes just a bit of food.
493 Ibid, pi 38.
494 Sontag, Susan. (1989), p i 1.
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“Hardly surprising, then, that young people think o f short-term survival before long-term well­
being. Short-term survival strategies often include exchanging sex fo r  schooling, a job, money or a 
roof over one’s head. On a continent where so much o f the population is already infected with 
HIV, such strategies are a recipe not fo r survival but for premature death. ”495
Human security theorists (including the UNDP) could argue that their definition of 
security takes these other socio-economic factors into account. Ironically, 
however, the human security definition of HIV/AIDS -  to focus on the threat of 
the disease to Africans themselves -  reveals the paradoxes of using a security 
approach. For how do you secure yourself against a disease when you have little 
or no other security? People living under conditions of extreme poverty are hard 
pushed to choose an issue to become securitised, since there are so many potential 
issues to choose from. HIV/AIDS is by no means the only or worst threat facing 
the African continent -  other diseases such as malaria and malnutrition continue to 
claim many millions of lives. The lack of response by ‘glocal’ actors to these and 
all of the continent’s other problems -  such as conflict and overall political 
turmoil, growing international debt and unjust conditions of trade -  provide an 
almost textbook example of Bachrach and Baratz’s ‘second face of power’, where 
matters of socio-political importance are kept off the global political agenda. What 
responses there have been -  such as the pledge by G8 leaders at the Gleneagles 
Summit in 2005 to double aid to the African continent by 2010 -  have not only 
been few and far between, but can in a dark light appear to have been little more 
than a play for the galleries or cognitive manipulation of the political agenda -  
playing for time, if you will, perhaps to avoid just such criticisms of neglecting the 
problem. Indeed, according to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD), the G8 pledge has yet to materialise since African aid from 
rich countries was static in 2006, excluding a one-off debt relief to Nigeria496. 
Similarly, despite recent amendments to the WTO Agreement on Trade Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), which was hailed by Northern 
governments as a huge step forward for access to HIV/AIDS medicines, in the 
three years since these procedures were agreed, no country has yet used them to 
import generic versions of essential medicines. According to The Stop AIDS 
Campaign -  a registered charity and campaigning initiative of the UK Consortium
495 Poku, Nana K. (2001), p l98.
496 Financial Times, April 3 2007.
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on AIDS and International Development, a group of more than 80 UK based 
organisations -  “the new flexibilities contained in TRIPS are unnecessarily 
complex and [.. .o]f additional concern is the fact that many countries are being, or 
have already been, encouraged to sign regional and bilateral free trade agreements 
which ensure a higher level of patent protection or other forms of de-facto 
monopolies - such as protection of pharmaceutical test data and prohibition of 
parallel importation - than even TRIPS requires. These so-called ‘TRIPS-plus’ 
policies, favoured by the US, remove any possibility of placing public health 
above commercial interests such as patent rights.”497 Indeed, the WHO admits 
itself that access to generic drugs is being restricted due to ‘red tape and political
> 498pressure .
Also, and more importantly, the everyday struggle for existence overshadows 
more long-term decisions, such as whether one dies of old age or a sexually 
transmitted disease. It is sometimes the simple case of a harsh but devastating 
choice between ‘death now or later?’ Without also taking all of these structurated 
behaviours and inequalities into account, the full impact of HIV/AIDS cannot be 
fully understood. Securitising HIV/AIDS seems to be a panic response, (initiated 
by policy makers and followed up by IR theorists, with little consideration for the 
theoretical inconsistencies) to ‘push the stop button’, without realising that there 
are many other factors in play that will override the circuit.
It is also important to note that securitisation does not mean the same as 
government action -  the latter encompasses the former, but securitisation is only 
one of the many policy options available to a government and is not always 
necessarily the most effective or normatively appropriate choice. Treating 
HIV/AIDS as a security threat for example is very different to treating it as a state 
of emergency. Within the security literature on HIV/AIDS, it is also clear that 
there is a great difference between writing about the disease as a threat to nations, 
states or the international community and writing about the disease as a threat to 
humanity.
497 The Stop AIDS Campaign, May 2006, p2.
498 World Health Organisation, May 2006.
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Following the main point of this thesis, it is argued here that, aside from the very 
real risk that securitising HIV/AIDS in practice may add to the fear and thus social 
stigma that is itself a major contributing factor to the continued prevalence of the 
epidemic, securitising the theoretical debate on HIV/AIDS in IR literature also 
risks restricting it in two ways: i) to merely encompassing matters of security and 
behavioural responses to the disease, thereby ignoring the multitude of other 
global socioeconomic concerns that are relevant both to understanding and 
curbing the spread of the disease; ii) to simply discussing how to protect those not 
yet infected, thus ignoring the plight of the millions of people who already live 
with the disease. This in turn could have dire policy implications -  for if HIV is 
thought of only as a matter of security and other causes and effects are ignored, 
the pandemic risks worsening rather than improving.
“The danger [ ...]  is that health becomes 'securitised’: that the international agenda focuses 
narrowly on the harder security concerns rather than on broader issues involved in global public 
health, [ ...]  that, in public debate, health issues become secondary to national security, and, not 
least, that resources and attention are focused disproportionately on hard security issues rather 
than on issues of global public health. Compare, for example, the newspaper column space and 
resources devoted to the 'war on terror ’ with those on the global HIV/AIDS epidemic. ”499
One final but prominent figure in the discourse on HIV/AIDS in security studies 
who should be mentioned is Colin Mclnnes. Most of his work is on current 
international policy and he is very keen for the disease to be both recognised and 
raised on the international political agenda, although, as the above quotation 
makes clear, he is wary of the implications of securitisation as a means of 
achieving this. He cites Ilona Kickbusch, who uses Nye’s definition of soft power 
to claim that health can (and in her view should) be seen as a ‘soft-power tool’ -  
stating that the recent lack of leadership by the U.S. in global health has led to a 
global public health crisis500. As discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis, Nye’s is a 
solely behavioural definition of power and so, while it encapsulates the agency of 
power, it fails to take into consideration any of the relevant structures of power 
that structurate this behavioural power. Thus, although Kickbusch may be correct 
in stating that health can be used as a ‘soft-power tool’ by leading polities, it may
499 Mclnnes, Colin. (2004), p2.
500 Kickbusch, Ilona. (2002)
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not be the case that leadership by the U.S. or any other polity would make any 
difference to the spread of the epidemic, without also concurrent broader structural 
changes occurring.
Mclnnes does not question this limitation in Nye’s (and thus Kickbusch’s) 
definition of power however -  instead he criticises Kickbusch’s optimism that 
viewing health as soft power will allow the U.S. “to move beyond the narrow 
confines of promoting the national interest towards more global communitarian 
values”501. He questions the belief that international political institutions are 
securitising HIV/AIDS for reasons that are in the interests of global public health. 
And it is in this regard that the Mclnnes/Kickbusch debate does highlight a very 
interesting aspect of the securitisation discourse on HIV -  namely the ways in 
which health can be used by governments and other polities as ‘a means towards 
an end’. For while I share Mclnnes’ concern over the normative implications of 
securitising the issue, as well as his scepticism about using Nye’s definition of 
‘soft-power’, Kickbusch’s paper (especially since it is more policy prescriptive 
than theoretical), does reveal that health and thus the site of the body is indeed a 
contested site of power in world politics -  a site that current polities may either 
use to further their interests or ignore if it is not in their self-interest to pursue the 
issue. It also reveals the interdependent nature of the sites of power, as health can 
affect foreign policy and vice versa. For although I share Mclnnes’ normative 
concerns about this, Kickbusch is guilty only of revealing the importance of health 
issues to the security discourse.
The behavioural side of the equation is thus very important in highlighting the 
ways in which actors may use certain issues in order to gain power over others -  
hence the argument in this thesis for a structurated approach rather than a purely 
structural one. The fact that health is even debated as a securitisation issue reveals 
that it is an issue that is of importance to world polities, although the reasons for 
this may be many and varied. It is conceivable for example that some policy 
makers do indeed regard the disease as an emergency that needs to be securitised, 
perhaps in order to shut national borders to prevent HIV infected people from
501 Mclnnes, Colin. (2004), p3.
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entering the country (many countries today impose mandatory HIV testing on 
immigrants for example) -  others however could equally be using the 
securitisation of HIV as an excuse to implement other security objectives, while 
others may be more interested in maintaining HIV as a global health issue.
It is argued here however that the case of HIV/AIDS in turn neatly reveals the 
problems associated with using restricted definitions of power. By confining the 
definition of world politics to only encompassing state matters of a military (or at 
best, economic and cultural) nature, mainstream IR forces itself to squeeze in 
anything and everything else into this poorly fitting framework, usually with the 
same results as here. For although policy makers may be interested in securitising 
health issues, it is clear that a securitised analysis of HIV does little to reveal the 
complexities of the pandemic, nor does it particularly enrich existing theory. But 
this is once again what makes HIV/AIDS such a good example of the treatment of 
power within mainstream IR theory -  the fact that it has so far only been analysed 
in securitisation literature reveals the bias (whether intentional or not) within the 
discipline towards more traditional state- or economic-centric power analyses.
The African continent is often treated externally -  by the media, as well as by 
many academics and policy makers -  as one homogenous society. It may seem an 
obvious statement to make, but it must be remembered that Africa is not one 
country -  it is a culturally, socially and politically rich and diverse continent. 
There have admittedly been attempts since the 1960’s to unite the foreign policies 
of the African states, and the newly reformed Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU) is gaining some credibility as an international actor. But, as with other 
regional organisations, such as the European Union, the OAU certainly does not 
represent a homogenous, unified state, much less people. And yet, most sub- 
Saharan African states all have one thing in common -  HIV/AIDS. Why is this? 
What else does the region have in common? What separates Africa from the rest 
of the world, where infection rates arejiot so high? Well, to begin with, they all 
share a history of colonialism, Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) and 
poverty. Indeed -  if one wishes to securitise the issue of HIV/AIDS -  it could 
equally be argued that the African continent’s security has been under threat ever
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since the first European explorers paved the way for slavery, colonialism and, 
later, SAPs in the 19th and 20th centuries.
It is the main argument of this thesis that structurated relationships (involving 
international, national and local policy makers, as well as individuals) across 
twelve sites of power are severely constraining sub-Saharan Africa from 
successfully dealing with HIV/AIDS. As shall be examined in more detail below, 
the reasons for the continued spread of the disease on the continent are many and 
varied and it is impossible to find one that alone can explain the many varied 
endemics that have taken hold there and elsewhere in the world. What is certain 
however is that behavioural theories by themselves cannot explain these causes 
and effects. For while they may be useful in revealing the implications that the 
disease may have on individual behaviour or on foreign policy, they reveal little 
else besides. To repeat the main contention of this thesis -  global power is about 
much more than simply the relationships between states and, as an example of 
‘glocal’ power, HIV/AIDS has both been caused by and created many more 
structurated relationships of power than simply those between individuals.
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‘Globalised’ and Post-Modernist Approaches to HIV/AIDS
“AIDS fits the common understanding of ‘globalization’ in a number o f ways, including its 
epidemiology, the mobilization against its spread, and the dominance o f certain discourses in the
understandings of the epidemic. ”502
Outside the discipline of IR, the volume of academic writing on the ‘glocal’ 
causes and effects of HIV/AIDS is not only vast, but also extremely rich and 
diverse in content. Many theorists agree however on the basic premise that the 
spread of HIV/AIDS has been greatly fuelled by ‘globalisation’, although there is 
less agreement about the spatial and temporal boundaries of this global pandemic, 
as well as whether it is defined by structural or behavioural characteristics. 
Furthermore, as shall be shown below, post-modernist critics of ‘globalisation’ 
theories contest the idea of temporally or spatially determining the spread of 
HIV/AIDS altogether, arguing that this only reifies racist institutional attitudes 
that HIV/AIDS is solely the ‘developing world’s’ problem. Post-modernists argue 
instead for the recognition that HIV/AIDS does not constitute one global 
‘pandemic’, but is rather comprised of many smaller epidemics, with different 
strains of the virus prevalent in different parts of the world. They further argue that 
the socio-economic contexts of these epidemics vary according to locality, both 
between and within nation-states, and so a global analysis of the spread of the 
disease is not only useless, but also essentialist and at risk of misinforming 
policies directed towards the prevention and treatment of the disease.
“AIDS is the first epidemic o f globalisation. It has spread rapidly because of the massive 
acceleration o f communication, the rapidity with which desire is reconstructed and marketed 
globally, and the flagrant inequality that exists within and between societies. ”503
The main defining aspect that all ‘globalisation' theorists of HTV/AIDS share is 
that ‘globalisation’, in whichever way it is defined, has in some way had an effect 
on the global spread of HIV/AIDS. They focus on the global causes and effects of 
the spread of the disease, as well as the especially devastating effect it has had and 
threatens to continue to have on the ‘developing’ world, particularly sub-Saharan
502 Altman, Dennis. (2001), p69.
503 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p4.
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Africa. Many are united in the view that ‘globalisation’ has not only facilitated the 
rapid spread of the disease, but could also, if managed appropriately, provide the 
means with which to contain it. What also distinguishes these ‘globalisation’ 
theories of HIV/AIDS from the IR theories considered above is that here there is 
little focus on the concepts of human or inter-/national security (although some 
authors do include security as one of the many problems related to the disease) -  
rather, the primary concern is with the global cultural, social, economic and 
political causes and effects of the virus.
Another point on which most ‘globalisation’ theorists of HIV/AIDS are agreed 
upon is that, regardless of whether they see globalisation as an age-old or a 
modern-day phenomenon, the movement of people -  be that through war, 
colonialism, slavery, tourism, urbanisation or migration -  caused by this 
‘globalisation’ has greatly contributed to the spread of the disease, both across 
continents as well as within nation-states themselves. On the contemporary effects 
of ‘globalisation’, Dennis Altman writes:
“HIV followed the huge population movements of the contemporary world, whether these are 
truckers moving across Zaire and India, women taking up sex work as a means of survival as old 
communities and social order crumbled, men seeking work on the minefields of South Africa and 
Zimbabwe, or tourists (for example American in Haiti), refugees (Haitians fleeing to the United 
States), and soldiers (Cubans serving in Angola; UN troops in Cambodia or the former 
Yugoslavia) moving across national boundaries. ”504
This basic claim -  that the virus is spread through the movement of people -  could 
be used to support the previous arguments made by those IR theorists and policy 
makers who wish to securitise the disease, so that it can be contained within 
nation-state boundaries. According to most ‘globalisation’ theories (old and new) 
however, this is a completely impractical policy to implement, since people 
constantly move across and within nation-state borders (be this as colonialists, 
slaves, tourists, migrant workers, soldiers or refugees) and, even in the unlikely 
event that they are ever successfully and completely prevented from doing so, the 
damage can already be said to have been done since, as already stated, various
504 Altman, Dennis. (2001), p70.
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strains of the HIV virus are already prevalent in every nation-state in the world. 
Indeed, for many ‘globalisation’ theorists, the causes and effects of HIV/AIDS 
cannot simply be attributed to the movement of people alone.
For although ‘globalisation’ theorists of HIV/AIDS may disagree on the effects 
that this movement of people has had on the spread of the disease -  some focusing 
on the behaviours that people engage in on the move, whilst others have focused 
on the gendered, cultural and socio-economic inequalities that make people move 
in the first place or that they encounter whilst on their travels -  they are at least 
united in the view that the movement of people in itself does not adequately 
explain the spread of the disease -  it is the contexts in which they find themselves 
that is important. Indeed, as Nana Poku and Alan Whiteside so succinctly put it, 
“being mobile in and of itself is not a risk factor for HIV/AIDS; it is the situations 
they encounter and the behaviours in which they may engage while they are 
travelling and living away from home that lead to an increased vulnerability to 
HIV/AIDS.”505
The problem with many ‘globalisation’ accounts of HIV/AIDS as they stand 
however is that they tend to ignore the agency of both ‘glocal’ polities and 
individuals, reifying instead global structures as somehow operating independently 
of human behaviour. Economic explanations for the spread of HIV/AIDS, for 
example, tend to focus solely on the economic structures of capitalism and nothing 
else. While there is nothing wrong with conducting a partial analysis per se, a 
more comprehensive understanding of ‘glocal’ power relations must take into 
account all relevant aspects. And it is here that the case of HIV/AIDS once more 
can reveal why this must necessarily be so. To continue with the example of 
economic structures -  it is certainly not the case that it is economic inequalities 
alone that have contributed to the stronghold of the disease in poorer parts of the 
world. To make this argument is simply to play into the hands of behaviouralist 
arguments, which are typically highly critical of such approaches. Indeed, this has 
as severe implications for policy as a purely behaviouralist or securitised account, 
as a purely structural policy can constrain action on the ground. Hakan
505 Poku, Nana K. -  Whiteside, Alan. (2004), pxx.
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Seckinelgin, for example, argues that global politics have left local HIV/AIDS 
organisations with little room for manoeuvre. He claims that not only are NGOs 
constrained in their potential agency by ‘glocal’ institutionalism and are thus “by 
and large still under the mandate of the state actors and governed by their foreign 
policy interests”506, but that their link to people on the ground is thus also 
questioned, claiming that “there is a pattern which appears to falsify the assumed
S07relationship between people and NGOs as people’s organisations.” Of course, it 
is difficult to blame such ‘glocal’ institutionalism on the theoretical flaws of 
structural accounts of world politics -  rather it is the combined persistence of 
structural inequalities, fuelled by agency that causes such rigidity -  but it is clear 
that such accounts do not help to analyse these dynamics. A nuanced account of 
economic inequalities would recognise instead the inherently complex relationship 
between structure and agency, both globally and locally, that have combined 
across time and space to produce the stark contrasts in global susceptibility to the 
disease. The ensuing structurated analysis in the next two chapters, based around 
the twelve sites of power, will attempt to at least sketch the outer parameters of 
such an account.
Post-modernist theorists contest the idea of temporally and spatially defining the 
epidemic altogether. In Globalizing AIDS, Cindy Patton argues that attempts to 
geographically map the epidemic have been rooted in institutional racism. Since 
hers is more a personal narrative (based on her own experiences as an AIDS 
activist) than a structured analysis, I have included some longer excerpts from her 
book below in order to illustrate some of her main arguments:
“Although the simple scheme of [ .. .]  world patterns may originally have had broad scientific and 
heuristic value in preparing for a pandemic, it quickly took on a narrative life of its own, offering 
supranational policy makers and news reporters a veneer o f scientific objectivity fo r what were 
essentially racist and class-disadvantaging representations o f local epidemics. Almost 
immediately, the pseudoscientific label ‘African AIDS’ circulated with more resonance, and 
perhaps more credibility, than did the official WHO term, ‘Pattern Two ’, to describe the spread of 
the disease in places where cases related to heterosexual intercourse seemed to predominate. This 
recycling o f very old racist ideas that alleged unchecked sexuality in Africa, or among black
506 Seckinelgin, Hakan. (2008), p63.
507 Ibid, p66.
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people generally, was devastating fo r local activism in both Africa and North America. In many 
African nations, the Global Programme on AIDS (GPA), national health ministries, 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and local activists promoted a ‘return to monogamy’ 
instead o f exploring the complex class, migration, and cultural patterns that concretely fram ed the
epidemic. ”508
Patton focuses on the global discourse of HIV/AIDS, arguing that it was framed 
by epidemiology, which had already stigmatised certain groups or countries before 
the discovery of the disease. She begins her discourse analysis by tracing the early 
years of HIV/AIDS, before it was officially recognised by medical practitioners 
and given ‘The Name’, as she calls it:
“Without having a diagnostic label [ .. .]  early affected persons had already been marked as 
different and were deemed troublesome by the medical systems they attended. Paradoxically, as 
people matching existing stereotypes appeared within the administrative systems that use medical 
care fo r  policing, the collision between individual physical need and social desire to control 
allowed those original cases to become visible to the world medical community. Because 
surveillance systems were already on the alert fo r sexual ‘deviants’ and unwanted immigrants, 
officials noticed and quickly told their colleagues o f their mysteriously ill or inexplicably dead 
patients. Inaccurate as these initial, discriminatory understandings were, they form ed the 
prerequisite o f modem epidemiology: They connected illness with a population whose shared 
location, traits, or practices promised to yield clues to the origin and dynamics of a disease. ”509
Patton also levels criticism at structural accounts of the disease, especially those 
that try to find singularly ‘globalised’ reasons for its spread, arguing that the 
divide between behavioural and structural accounts leaves little room in between 
for a more detailed and nuanced analysis:
“In developing countries, colonialism and modernization were commonly blamed fo r  local 
epidemics. But although the social and economic relations that undergird the epidemic did in 
general develop alongside colonial and postcolonial or modem political regimes, from  the 
standpoint o f local action, broad political critiques are insufficient bases on which to develop a 
public health response. The heated battle between those who cloak racism in scientific language 
and those who attack the colonialist legacy still present within science and global health 
management quickly resulted in a political and scientific gap between the two sides; both lacked a
508 Patton, Cindy. (2002), pxi-xii.
509 Ibid, pxvii-xviii.
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detailed analysis o f local health delivery practices and ignored the political and sociosexual 
economy o f decolonizing or democratizing places. ”510
The main problem that Patton’s argument faces however is exactly that it is more 
of a personal narrative of her own experiences working in the field, rather than a 
detailed discourse analysis of the epidemiological and structural accounts that she 
criticises. There is, for example, very little referencing in the book and so the 
reader is reliant on her interpretation of events. This is a problem that is faced by 
many post-modernist analyses -  they either focus on deconstructing a detail or 
narrate a personal experience as a critique of mainstream behavioural or structural 
analyses. This is understandable however since, as already mentioned in the first 
half of this thesis, a thorough post-modernist analysis of world politics is difficult 
if not impossible to achieve -  indeed, although it is the aim here to offer an 
alternative, ‘glocalised’ account of HIV/AIDS, there is certainly not room within 
the confines of this thesis to more than sketch the proposed outlines of such an 
analysis. It is namely very difficult to fill in the gaps between behavioural and 
structural accounts, since this not only involves conducting an analysis of vast 
magnitude but also involves deconstructing ‘silent’ discourses -  a problem that 
any analysis of power faces when trying to reveal its more covert second, third and 
(especially) fourth faces. This is also the problem that Patton is confronted with. 
For although it is questionable whether it is actually possible to find documents or 
policies referring to HIV/AIDS before it was given ‘The Name’ -  the early period 
of the epidemic was, as Patton makes clear, one of confusion, as both sufferers and 
medical practitioners alike struggled to find the reasons for the disease -  her 
account is more of a critique than an attempt to offer an alternative analysis to the 
behavioural and structural accounts she criticises.
As an activist directly involved in this period however, Patton’s own voice must 
be given some credence. Her thesis that the terminologies used by both 
epidemiological and structural accounts are heavily influenced by the power of 
discourse is certainly one worth making, as shall be seen in the site of knowledge 
and aesthetics. Moreover, Patton’s argument that ‘global’ epidemiological and 
structural theories of HIV/AIDS distort an understanding of the locality of the
5,0 Ibid, pxii.
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disease is an important one, as it highlights many of the problems with attempts to 
find a ‘globalised’ reality.
A recent publication -  entitled HIV & AIDS in Africa: Beyond Epidemiology, 
compiled by a collection of authors ranging from numerous social scientific 
disciplines -  echoes Patton’s calls for HIV/AIDS to be de-‘globalised’. In the 
introduction to the book, one of the editors, Susan Craddock writes:
“Problematic gender and racialized representations of sexual practices, social behaviours, and 
government actions generated within and outside o f Africa are proving detrimental to the lives of 
millions currently affected by HIV/AIDS. Women are ‘reservoirs o f infection, ’ Africans are 
promiscuous, AIDS victims are depraved, African governments are incompetent [...]. The 
aggregate effects o f such interpretations are insidious fo r the stigmatization, misguided 
interventions, and indifference they help to produce as well as the lives that continue to be lost. 
[ ...]  An example within an African context is problematic postcolonial discourses associating 
AIDS with Western immorality and locating subsequent interventions in ‘traditional’ patriarchal
heterosexual praxis. ”5U
The aim of the book is “to uncover the various ways AIDS is embedded within 
social, economic, cultural, political, and ideological contexts.” The contributors to 
the book “largely disagree with the representation of AIDS as multiple instances 
of individual risk resulting from lack of information or poor decisions.” Craddock 
writes that “[w]e understand it rather as deeply rooted in historical antecedents, 
geopolitical relations, global financial configurations, government policies, local 
institutions, and cultural politics.” Most of the contributors “employ for the most 
part variations of a cultural political economy of vulnerability framework that 
reflects their understanding of AIDS as resulting from material, symbolic, and 
discursive forces effectively constraining the opportunities and choices available 
to individuals and potentially creating conditions of vulnerability for large sectors 
of regional populations.”512
There are many illuminating articles contained within the volume, discussing a 
wide range of issues: struggles over the meaning of AIDS; perceptions and
511 Craddock, Susan. (2004), p4-5.
512 Ibid, p5-6.
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misperceptions of AIDS in Africa; critiques of attempts to map the disease; 
gendered vulnerabilities; sexualities; poverty; migration and war; the roles of the 
IMF and the WB; research methods, agendas and ethics; as well as personal 
accounts of the disease (to mention but a few). There is not space here to account 
for each author in turn, although many of their findings will be referred to in the 
structurated analysis that follows later in this thesis. Suffice to say at this stage that 
the authors thus draw on a wide-range of disciplines and, put all together, 
comprise a comprehensive critique of more generalised overviews of HIV/AIDS. 
Although some of the authors do fall back on more behavioural or stmctural 
accounts of the spread of the disease, it is clear that the main aim of the book is to 
force the parameters of discussion about HIV/AIDS wide open. As such, the 
volume as a whole presents a post-modernist approach to the question of 
HIV/AIDS in Africa, that focuses on ‘glocalised’ realities, rather than ‘globalised’ 
generalisations.
As with Patton’s analysis however, the problem with such works is that they do 
leave the door wide open, leaving both theorists and policy makers scrambling in 
the dark as how best to approach the issue of HIV/AIDS in a broader global 
context. Not only that, but there is also a real danger that post-modernist theories 
that focus solely on the discourses and experiences of individuals and localities 
lose sight of very real ‘glocal’ material and cognitive inequalities that influence 
these discourses. This can have as dire consequences for policy as a purely 
stmctural or behavioural account, since it leaves the analyst fundamentally unable 
to say very much about anything, except that HIV/AIDS is a disease that kills 
people. This fundamental opposition to acknowledging any material or cognitive 
realities not only means that ‘glocal’ policy becomes an impossibility, but also that 
practitioners on the ground are left with very little to go on except other people’s 
narratives and hearsay. A similar point is made by Altman in his critique of the 
postmodernist turn in sexual theory:
“There are two major problems in the postmodern turn in sexual theory, as well as a minor one, 
namely a belief that the more impenetrable the language the deeper the thought. The first objection 
is that the emphasis on discourse, performance, and play too often means a disinterest in material
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realities and inequalities. [ ...]  Second, the emphasis on discourse tends to deny the role o f social
movements and political work[...]. ”513
513 Altman, Dennis. (2001), pl59.
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Conclusion
As argued throughout this thesis, I thus propose a theoretical approach to 
understanding ‘glocal’ phenomena such as the spread of HIV/AIDS that tries to 
combine all three aforementioned methodological approaches -  behavioural, 
structural and post-modernist -  based on the ‘glocalised’ and structurated 
understanding of power that is the basis of this thesis. For although the 
mainstream epidemiological approach, with its primary focus on the behavioural 
aspects of HIV/AIDS, has been strongly and correctly criticised for seeing all 
behaviour as ‘rational’ and ignoring structural influences, while structural 
approaches typically ignore behaviour altogether, it is clear that ‘glocal’ power 
analyses must take both structure and agency into account. A structurated 
approach must necessarily therefore combine a behavioural approach with a 
structural one, but can only do so, it is argued here, by also taking into account the 
post-modernist critiques against making essentialist generalisations about these 
behaviours and structures -  the primary focus here thus being on ‘glocalisation’ 
rather than ‘globalisation’. I propose to do this by analysing structurated behaviour 
across the twelve sites of power proposed in this thesis.
In the next chapter, I will conduct a brief structurated analysis of Held’s more 
traditional seven sites of power, since these are already well accounted for both in 
traditional analyses of world power, as well as in much of the literature on 
HIV/AIDS. Since the site of the body is the lens through which all of the other 
sites will be examined (as HIV/AIDS is obviously located within the site of 
physical and emotional well-being), this site has been given a bit more attention. 
This is also because it is also one of the main points of this thesis that the site of 
the body is underrepresented in mainstream IR theory and so the definition of the 
site has been expanded upon, in order to more fully explain why it is absolutely 
necessary to include the site of the body in an analysis of ‘glocal’ power 
structures. In Chapter 8, I will then account in greater detail for the five sites of 
power that I have added to Held’s original seven sites since these, along with the 
contention that world power must be analysed using a ‘glocalised’ structurated 
approach, are the main contributions of the thesis.
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Chapter Seven -  A Structurated Analysis of HIV/AIDS in Held’s 
Seven Sites of Power
Introduction
“HIV/AIDS marks exclusions that can be found not only across the gross geography o f continents, 
but also in the more subtle geography of social networks and city blocks. It is marked in the ebb 
and flow  of global and local labour markets, where the quest fo r  work and livelihoods may take on
a sexual complexion. ”514
There are a handful of analysts who promote a ‘glocalised’ view of HIV/AIDS in 
southern Africa rather than a ‘globalised’ one. Barnett and Whiteside, for 
example, stress that the inequalities marked out by HIV/AIDS are not just global, 
but also national and local: “[n]owhere are the long chain relationships between 
the microscopic and the macroscopic worlds more evident than in the origins of 
the HIV/AIDS epidemic and its social and economic consequences”515. Implicitly 
throughout their analysis AIDS in the Twenty-First Century, the authors emphasise 
the multi-faceted dimensions of power that create these inequalities. The book is 
rich with examples of many different types of socio-economic inequalities that 
affect the spread of HIV/AIDS, in different ways in different parts of the world, 
many of which will be referred to in the ensuing analysis. They also question a lot 
of the epidemiological research that has so far been conducted by international 
organisations, criticising its behavioural focus. The main problem with the book as 
it stands however, is that it is not itself structured in such a way that it highlights 
the importance of each of these inequalities, perhaps because it is not meant to 
provide a definition of social inequalities but rather offer a detailed overview of 
global HIV/AIDS. Part m  of the book, on ‘Vulnerability and Impact’, has separate 
chapters on: ‘Individuals, Households and Communities’; ‘Dependents: Orphans 
and the Elderly’; ‘Rural Livelihoods and Agriculture’; ‘Private Sector Impact’; 
‘Development and Economic Growth’; ‘Government and Governance’; and there 
is also a separate chapter on Africa in Part II on ‘Susceptibility’. Of greatest 
concern here however is that there are no separate discussions or chapters on
514 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p6.
515 Ibid, p74-5.
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gender, culture or identity -  indeed, although there are several examples of these 
dimensions of HIV/AIDS offered throughout the book, none of the concepts are 
even warranted a mention in the subject-index. This is very unfortunate for a book 
that sets out to offer a comprehensive view of global HIV/AIDS.
In the ensuing analysis, therefore, all of these inequalities will be grouped instead 
under the twelve sites of power proposed in this thesis -  starting with Held’s 
original seven sites of power in the remainder of this chapter, to then argue for the 
inclusion of my additional five sites in the next chapter. This separation of the 
twelve sites of power should not be taken as giving any of the sites precedence 
over the others however -  it is merely an analytical separation to pinpoint what is 
missing if one limits an analysis to Held’s original seven sites. Indeed, it is argued 
here that all of the twelve sites of power are equally relevant in the study of any 
social phenomenon, not as static structures, but as structurated sites that are 
created and maintained or changed by the behaviour of both ‘glocal’ polities and 
individuals alike. As already mentioned however, Held’s definitions of the seven 
sites focus mainly on the negative aspects of power (as nautonomic structures) and 
have a tendency towards falling on the structural side of the fence. All of the sites 
analysed here will instead be analysed as structurated sites of power that 
necessarily include agency as well as structure and will also include any positive 
aspects of power currently discernible with regards in particular to HIV/AIDS. 
The analysis that follows will therefore examine: i) how each site operates as a 
structure of power; ii) how it functions as a resource for agency; iii) how it forms 
agency; and iv) who the main actors are in each site with the potential to change 
its structure (usually a difficult question to answer, since a ‘glocalised’ 
structurated approach opens up the world stage to a multitude of actors spanning 
all twelve sites of power).
In order to maintain the union between a structurationist and a Foucaultian 
approach, the analysis will also make a distinction between the social construction 
of i) material realities (structurationist) and ii) cognitive ‘realities’ (Foucaultian) in 
each site. For, as has already been discussed and shall become apparent in the 
analysis below, while there are some material realities that are hard to dispute, 
sometimes the distinction between these and the more cognitive ‘realities’ can be
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so fine that it surpasses even the most careful analyst’s perception. The rest of this 
chapter will thus analyse Held’s original seven sites of power, as these are the sites 
that are most typically approached in most mainstream analysis, leaving the next 
chapter to argue for the additional inclusion of my extra five sites of power, as it is 
argued here that power cannot be fully comprehended without also including these 
sites.
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The Site of the Body
“The body is not just skin and bones, an assemblage of parts, a medical marvel [ .. .]  The body is 
also, and primarily, the self We are all embodied. [ ...]  Controversies rage about the ownership of 
the body, the boundaries, its meaning, its value, the criteria of life and death, and how it should be 
lived, and loved. [...T]he body and the senses are socially constructed, in various ways by different 
populations, as are the various organs, processes and attributes of the body. The problem is to 
demonstrate how the body is constructed, and why, and also why these constructions vary and 
change. The body is not a ‘given ’, but a social category with different meanings imposed and 
developed by every age, and by different sectors o f the population. As such it is therefore sponge­
like in its ability to absorb meanings, but also highly political. ”516
Held defines the site of the body as ‘how physical and emotional wellbeing are 
organised’. This section aims to expand on this definition, using the particular case 
of HIV/AIDS, to show how physical and emotional wellbeing structurate agency 
both within the site of the body, as well as across all of the other sites. For it is the 
argument here that the body constitutes as fundamental a resource as any other, 
both on an individual level, as well as en masse, across all levels of agency. Since 
agency either reproduces or transforms societal structures and vice versa, a fluid 
and never-ending creation and recreation of the social definition of the body takes 
place -  it is treated and defined as one thing or another depending on its context in 
time and space. The body fares more or less well according to power in all of the 
other sites -  it is not served well, for example, by poverty or discrimination 
against it, but may prosper if allowed access to health, education and other 
material and ideational sites of power.
It is thus not just a question of addressing material issues such as physical and 
emotional health or disease as Held would have it, or the more cognitive structures 
that determine Whether or not political power in the site of the body is racialised or 
gendered as ‘male’ or ‘female’, but rather a question of studying the interplay of 
all of the social factors that results in the many different embodied realities of this 
world. It is obviously beyond both the scope and the remit of this thesis to conduct 
an analysis of all of these ‘glocal’ realities -  since, as Burton has made clear, this 
would require mapping all of the relevant relationships of power that interplay
516 Synnott, Anthony. (1993), pi.
229
within the site of the body, which is nigh on impossible. What follows below 
therefore (as in the rest of the sites in this and the following chapter) are a few 
examples both of the multiple levels of agency that operate in the site, as well as 
how it both affects and is affected by these structurated relations of power across 
all of the twelve sites.
In some ways, the human body, in both its biological and its social constitution, is 
the very essence of politics, for without it there can be no human agency or 
structures and thus no relationships of power. For what is power without life to 
sustain it? The body is thus not merely the vessel through which politics happens, 
but is in itself a very important part of the reciprocal relationship between agency 
and structure. It is, as the above quotation so eloquently puts it, a ‘highly political’ 
‘social category’ that is ‘sponge-like in its ability to absorb meanings’. It is 
probably no coincidence therefore that, as one of the main theorists of power, 
Foucault dedicated a great deal of his life’s work to the subject of tracing the 
social and thus political roots of the definition of the human body and subject. In 
his History o f Sexuality, he wrote that “power is situated and exercised at the level 
of life, the species, the race, and the large-scale phenomena of population. [...] 
The disciplines of the body and the regulations of the population constituted the 
two poles around which the organization of power over life was deployed. ”517 
For, as Foucault and Held, as well as many feminists and post-colonialists have 
made clear, how the body is defined and consequently organised socially is of the 
utmost importance for political power. Thus, in the site of the body, it is the 
embodiment of the structurated interplay of all of the other sites of power that is 
under the spotlight. It is a case of, as physician and anthropologist Paul Farmer 
puts it, asking the question “[b]y what mechanisms, precisely, do social forces 
ranging from poverty to racism become embodied as individual experience?”518
With regards to the site of identities, for example, but also in relation to other sites 
such as that of knowledge and aesthetics, space and time, the frequent 
stigmatisation of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA) highlights the central 
focus that is, or has historically been put on the body in many of the other sites.
517 Foucault, Michel. (1998), p i37-139.
5,8 Farmer, Paul. (2005), p30.
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The study of tropical disease, for example, highlights the distinctions that can be 
made between different bodies, as some are considered to be ‘exotic’, ‘tropical’ or 
‘diseased’ while others are not. Cindy Patton calls this ‘tropical thinking’, which 
originates from the study of diseases in the Western colonial era and was in its 
conception concerned with the protection of colonialists whilst they were in the 
colonies. Typically, ‘tropical thinking’ is based on the premise that: “Where there 
are tropical diseases, there must be a lack of civilization (tropics), and where there 
is civilization there must be lack of (tropical) disease.” 519
In relation to the site of the organisation of violence and coercive relations for 
example, as Sontag has made clear, a ‘war’ against HIV/AIDS-the-virus risks 
becoming a ‘war’ against HIV/AIDS-the-body, i.e. a ‘war’ against its victims 
rather than against the disease. The infected body itself can thus easily become the 
target of other sites of power, instead of the issue in question, namely the disease. 
The mandatory isolation of HIV-positive people in ‘sanatoria’ in Cuba in the 
1980s is one such example, while the blame and stigmatisation of Haitians in the 
early years of the outbreak of the disease is another.520 The belief that sex with a 
virgin will cure the disease521 is another example where a potent mix of the other 
sites of power can combine to create an abuse of power against the bodies of 
others. Furthermore, although it is estimated that the ratio of women to men 
infected with the disease “remain[s] stable globally”, the fact that the proportion of 
infected women to infected men is increasing in some parts of the world522 
highlights the importance of other sites of power on the site of the body. 
According to UN AIDS:
"Globally, and in every region, more adult women (15 years or older) than ever before are now 
living with HIV. The 17.7 million [15.1 million-20.9 millionl women living with HTV in 2006 
represented an increase of over one million compared with 2004 [ ...]  Across all age groups, 59%  
of people living with HTV in sub-Saharan Africa in 2006 were women. In the Caribbean, the 
Middle East and North Africa, and Oceania, close to one in every two adults with HIV is female.
519 Patton, Cindy. (2002), p34-50.
520 Farmer, Paul. (1992).
521 Akeroyd, Anne V. (2004), p96.
522 UNAIDS. (2007), p8.
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Meanwhile, in many countries of Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, the proportions of 
women living with HIV continue to grow. ”523
The predicted impact of HIV/AIDS on life expectancy in those countries worst 
affected by the disease is, in Barnett and Whiteside’s words, “devastating”. The 
average life-expectancy in many of these countries now lies between 30-40 years 
-  half a lifetime in more ‘developed’ countries.524 Thus the site of the body also 
highlights the fact that not only does power in all of the other sites limit power in 
the site of the body but that this site in turn limits power in all of the other sites. 
As a structurated reality that is formed by both agency and structure, the power of 
the body is thus determined both by the actual physical and emotional power of 
the body itself, as well as how it is affected by all of the other sites. With regards 
to the site of time, for example, it is clear that, with only half a lifetime in which to 
exercise power, the power of the body is reduced. As Barnett and Whiteside point 
out, “[tjime is not neutral, ticking away in the background, measuring out each life 
in equal amounts. Time is relative. [...] Time, indeed, is gendered and so is the 
risk of infection.”525
The bodies that are infected with the disease are thus often limited in their power 
of agency in all of the other sites, risking social exclusion or worse social death 
(i.e. a total loss of agency) before the biological death that is caused by the disease 
itself. Even if they do continue to operate in other sites of power, there is a myth 
of agency here -  known as ‘coping’ -  as Barnett and Whiteside make clear:
“The constant struggles to survive that characterise the livelihoods of so many do not leave room 
fo r  coping in the ‘extraordinary’ (in fact, for them, all too ordinary) circumstances in which many 
poor people live. That is what they do every day o f every year. That is the nature o f poverty. And 
when the big crisis hits them they do not cope. Thus, to talk of such poor people ‘coping ’ is to cross 
the line between technical appreciation o f what is possible and barely disguised cynicism and clear 
acceptance that different groups of human beings can only be offered second-, third- (or worse) 
best options. [ ...]  A term such as ‘coping’ may be a way of escaping from the challenge o f
523 UNAIDS/06.29E. (2006), p3-5.
524 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), pl87 & 192-193.
525 Ibid, p22-3.
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confronting how people’s capabilities are stunted, how their entitlements are blocked and their 
abilities to function as full human beings with choices and self-definitions are frustrated. ”526
Of course, there have always been individuals who are either physically and/or 
mentally incapacitated but who are still able to and/or relied upon to make 
decisions of social import, whether this be in economic, political or spiritual 
matters at household or indeed at global level (spiritual or regal leaders who rule 
until their death for example). Individuals may also become martyred after their 
death, revealing again that the power of the body is interrelated with all of the 
other sites, since its actual physical existence is not necessary for the power of that 
particular individual to continue after his or her death -  this phenomena is closely 
related to the ghosts of agency, since it is the actions of people past that is relevant 
here. Even fictitious and thus non-existent bodies have power in other sites, as in 
the case of folklore and superstition. Such sites of power have also granted many 
physically existing bodies perceived power, as in the cases of witchcraft or 
religious worship. All of these are examples of myths of agency, although the term 
‘myth’ could be and usually is disputed, only going to show that the body is a site 
of political contestation as much as any other.
It is also clear that there are multiple levels of agency operating within the site. 
With regards to the first face of power, for example, it is clear that being infected 
with HIV/AIDS has the full potential to restrict access to the decision-making 
process, not only because of the material realities that the disease brings with it, 
such as poverty, but also because of cognitive realities such as stigmatisation and 
discrimination. However, even if PLWHA were fully capable to participate 
equally in all of the other sites of power, their actual ability to do so depends on 
their structural location in these other sites. As already mentioned, HIV has so far 
mainly affected people living in poorer areas of the world and so their ability to 
participate in decision-making processes can already be expected to be limited. 
Polities on the other hand have been very active in trying to change the course of 
HIV/AIDS infection, as the prevalence of behavioural change remedies and the 
securitisation of the pandemic illustrate.
526 Ibid, p351-352.
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The second face of power (that of no-decisions) is also relevant in the site of the 
body, since HIV/AIDS was long neglected on the international political agenda, 
highlighting the fact that the interests of PLWHA were not recognised politically 
until only very recently -  although, as already mentioned, it is questionable 
whether it was brought up on the international political agenda with their interests 
in mind, since it was first and foremost brought up as a matter of security. Indeed, 
this conflict of interests reveals once more the multiple levels of agency that 
operate within each site, for it is not always clear who brings what issue on to a 
political agenda. With regards to the body in particular, some illnesses or disorders 
may be considered to be so undesirable that they often disappear from sight, as no- 
one wishes to claim them. Indeed, the body reveals the politics of non-ownership 
and denial of the second face of power -  for where material resources such as 
economic wealth and prosperity usually result in a contest for  ownership, more 
subjective and cognitive resources such as identities can just as easily result in a 
contest for non-ownership and denial, with no-one wanting to claim them. When 
such negative identities or problems are discovered, they may very well be denied 
in the ‘self and projected onto ‘others’, as ‘their’ problem to deal with on their 
own.'This can certainly be argued to be the case with diseases such as HIV/AIDS, 
where fear and denial have led some actors to disclaim the disease as either non­
existent or as somebody else’s problem. Thus, while some bodies are defined in a 
positive light, with desirable attributes, others may be defined negatively, as 
undesirable.
The third face of power (that of the manipulation of interests) can also be found in 
this site, for example with regard to discourses on the body -  that determine what 
it is and what it should be. For while it is clear that most people are agreed that it 
is detrimental to the power of the body to be infected with HIV/AIDS, there are, as 
already mentioned, many different judgements about those bodies that are infected 
with the disease, as well as what should be done both to these bodies and to curb 
the spread of the disease. The fourth face of power can also be located in the 
aforementioned prevalence of behavioural models in many responses to the 
disease, which strongly advocate the individual’s responsibility to self-police the 
body and take responsibility for its own health, regardless of the structural 
constraints that may be placed upon it.
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All of these are examples of the negative constraints that HIV/AIDS can put on 
the power of the body. However, HIV/AIDS also highlights the positive 
Foucaultian aspects of power. With regard to the fourth face of power for 
example, it is clear that a certain degree of self-policing (e.g. not undertaking 
high-risk behaviours) can empower an agent as much as constrain him/her. 
However, the point that the example of HIV/AIDS hammers home is that not all 
agents have the luxury of self-policing their behaviour when faced with the harsh 
everyday realities of structural inequalities.
The disease has also raised ‘glocal’ awareness of the importance of global health, 
as well as awareness of many of the structural conditions that have made some 
parts of the world more vulnerable than others to the disease -  such as economic 
and gendered inequalities. PLWHA and other AIDS activists have had many 
successes in bringing the issue up on to the ‘glocal’ political agenda, even 
managing to change some of the structures of the other sites -  as shall be 
discussed below in the site of civic associations. According to Alex de Waal:
“People living with HIV and AIDS are among the most marginalized people in the most powerless 
continent, but a string o f successes have been scored by them or on their behalf. One success is 
making it legally unacceptable to discriminate against people living with HIV and AIDS. De facto 
discrimination is widespread, but whenever it is challenged the law is clear. Another victory was 
establishing the Global Fund to fight AIDS, TB and Malaria in 2001, alongside a huge increase in 
funding for AIDS through existing mechanisms. [ ...]  Perhaps most dramatic was the precipitous 
fall in the price o f antiretroviral drugs between 2001 and 2003, so that they became an affordable
option in poor countries. ”527
Before leaving the site, it is important to discuss one of the most fundamental 
aspects of the body that the case of HIV/AIDS highlights, but that is relevant in all 
of ‘glocal’ politics, namely that of gender and sexuality. For, like most human 
behaviour, sex and sexuality are not ‘rational’ behaviours (as Chin would have it) 
but are rather heavily structurated behaviours that depend on structural realities, 
material as well as cognitive. Some analysts argue however that these behaviours 
are becoming increasingly homogenised due to processes of ‘globalisation’.
527 (Emphasis in original) de Waal, Alex. (2006), p60.
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In his book Global Sex, Dennis Altman argues that “changes in our understandings 
of and attitudes to sexuality are both affected by and reflect the larger changes of 
globalization. Moreover, as with globalization itself, the changes are 
simultaneously leading to greater homogeneity and greater inequality. [...] 
Increasingly sexuality becomes a terrain on which are fought our bitter disputes
M O
around the impact of global capital and ideas.” Altman claims that the spread of 
the HIV virus has “made a mockery of national sovereignty”, claiming that it is 
the “growing internationalization of trade in both sex and drugs [that] has played a 
major role in the diffusion of HIV, and its rapid spread into almost every comer of 
the world.”529 He also argues that “[e]qually the international response [to the 
disease] has implications for the globalization of certain biomedical and 
sociobehavioral paradigms [...]. Global mobilization around the demands of a 
biomedical emergency has inevitably meant the further entrenchment of western 
concepts of disease, treatments, and the body.”530
“Most significant”, writes Altman, “is the impact of the epidemic on regimes of 
sex and gender. Different cultural understandings of the meanings humans give to 
their bodies are constantly being challenged and remade by the impact of 
particular western notions, via economic, cultural, and professional influences; the 
AIDS epidemic has created ‘experts’ who in turn influence perceptions of sex and 
gender through HIV education and prevention programs. Such programs further 
the diffusion of a particular language around sexuality and sexual identities which 
depend upon particular, largely western, assumptions.”531
Altman allows that “[t]here is no one AIDS epidemic, but rather a patchwork 
which has very different epidemiological patterns and consequences, depending 
on the economic and political resources available”532. He also concedes that 
“bodily pleasure is often shaped by political and economic conditions; a sex 
worker in a Calcutta brothel is unlikely to experience her body in ways similar to
528 Altman, Dennis. (2001), p i.
529 Ibid, p71.
530 Ibid, p73.
531 Ibid, p73-4.
532 Ibid, p81.
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that of her customers (or indeed to that of a high-class “escort” in Manhattan)”533, 
as well as “recognizing the diversity of sexualities, and the fact that for most 
people behaviour does not necessarily match neat categories”534. It is clear 
however that he sees a tendency towards a global conformity of sexualities.
Others agree that there are trends towards global similarities in sexual behaviour. 
Catherine Campbell has studied a local project in a mining community in 
Summertown, South Africa. The project was initiated by a grassroots group of 
black African residents in the mid-1990s and worked with local, national and 
international organisations. It aimed to limit HIV transmission through three 
activities: the control of sexually transmitted diseases (STIs) (given that other STIs 
increase the likelihood of HIV-transmission); community-led peer education; and 
condom distribution.535
Campbell’s study pays particular attention to the embodiment of power, namely 
“to the social construction of sexuality by migrant mineworkers, commercial sex 
workers and young people”536. She contends that the reluctance to use condoms 
that she found amongst her respondents (explained by most of them as a need for 
intimacy due to prolonged periods of up to a couple of years spent away from their 
families) is not unique to the area, citing research in both Europe and America that 
has found a significant correlation between level of social support and safe sex. 
“People are less likely to engage in unprotected sexual intercourse if they live in a 
supportive social environment. In conditions where they felt lonely or isolated, 
flesh-to-flesh sexual contact may often come to symbolize a form of emotional 
intimacy that is lacking in other areas of their lives.”537
Campbell’s research suggests that knowledge of the existence of the disease is not 
the only issue affecting behavioural decisions regarding sexuality. Indeed, 
Campbell’s work not only highlights the global and local socio-economic factors 
influencing such behaviour, but also the more psychological effects that socio­
533 Ibid, p2.
534 Ibid 2001, p75.
535 Campbell, Catherine. (2003), p i2.
536 Ibid, p i.
537 Ibid, p33.
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economic deprivation can have -  thus challenging more traditional ‘rational 
choice’ behavioural models:
“the research has illustrated the way in which sexual behaviour, and the possibility o f sexual 
behaviour change, are determined by an interlocking series o f multi-level processes, which are 
often not under the control o f an individual person’s rational conscious choice. Sexualities are 
constructed and reconstructed at the intersection o f a kaleidoscope array of interlocking multi­
level processes, ranging from the intra-psychological to the macro-social. [ . . .]  Thus, fo r  example, 
one’s innermost needs fo r trust and intimacy are often symbolized by the closeness offlesh-to-flesh 
sex. This may become a particularly compelling option in life situations that offer scant 
opportunities fo r the development of secure and stable relationships. ”538
Campbell’s underlying methodology is obviously structurated -  indeed, she refers 
directly to Bourdieu in her theoretical presentation in the book539 and, in another 
article, also cites Social Identity Theory/Self-Categorization Theory (SIT-SCT) as 
a theoretical starting point for her research. SIT-SCT focuses on “the way in 
which [...] cognitive and motivational processes are structured within dynamically 
changing social contexts”540 -  a concept in critical social psychology which 
focuses on the relationships between agency and structure. As she says herself, she 
“seeks to take account of the social determinants of behaviour in addition to the 
individual psychological determinants.”541
In finding similarities between the responses of her interviewees and other groups 
around the world, Campbell’s research suggests a global socio-psychological 
human condition that may have existed across time and space, rather than a global 
structure of power that is currently shaping and changing agency, as Altman seems 
to suggest in his account of a globalised sexuality. Indeed, there are many 
embodied similarities between humans which are often denied by polities in their 
attempt to shape human behaviour, not least sexual behaviour. This links back to 
the distinction made in the beginning of this thesis between public, private and 
intimate realms of power since, as VeneKlasen and Miller have also made clear, 
power in the first two realms does not necessarily mean power in the third. This
538 Ibid, p i 85.
539 Ibid, p53-4&  190-1.
540 Campbell, Catherine. (2004), p l45.
541 Campbell, Catherine. (2003), plO.
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may be due to a lack of power in the site of the body (e.g. emotional wellbeing) 
but is also likely to be affected by structurated relations of power across all of the 
twelve sites. For as already mentioned, sex (and thus the intimate realm of power) 
is one of the most heavily regulated of human behaviours, shaped by material as 
well as cognitive structures. And so, while global similarities may exist, they must 
also be contextualised locally, according to prevailing structurated conditions.
It is not the intention here to deny that there are global mechanisms that may be 
homogenising sexualities however. Indeed, Altman highlights some very 
interesting and oft-ignored connections between HIV/AIDS and these global 
forces, such as Hollywood’s portrayal of HIV/AIDS (which I will return to in the 
site of knowledge and aesthetics), as well as the effects of global polities’ efforts 
to curb the spread of the disease. As he makes clear himself, however, many 
different concepts of sexuality abound worldwide, that are dependent on a variety 
of socio-economic factors. And so, although it is certainly important to highlight 
global trends towards homogenisation, HIV/AIDS also and once again reveals the 
need for a ‘glocalised’ approach to world politics.
“If the body is a site fo r knowing more, then the global must be interrogated from this local site. 
No two bodies are identical and all bodies share basic needs or they die. This sharedness is too 
subversive, so political discourses distance us from this knowing and become a tool fo r obeying 
rather than seeing. [ ...]  When I  denaturalize a body - a s  a site o f power, as a place o f political 
conflict, and as an attempt at control -  it requires an unpacking o f hierarchical individuals. ”542
In her book Against Empire... for example, Zillah Eisenstein focuses on the 
‘female slave’s body’, claiming that “if these women had been set free, they would 
have used their creative power to make a different world.”543 Whether or not this 
would have been or could be the case is not the question here however -  the point 
here is that Eisenstein also recognises the power of the body in both local and 
global relations, as the above quotation (also by her) makes clear. She speaks of 
the body in polyversally inclusive terms, stating that “[t]he female body desires 
freedom from war, rape, unwanted pregnancy. It desires control over the self. One
542 Eisenstein, Zillah, (2004), p36.
543 Ibid.
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does not need to learn this from someone other than oneself.”544 And, similar to 
Eisenstein, it is the argument here that the body needs to be ‘unpacked’ in order to 
be understood and ‘denaturalized’ as a site of power in ‘glocal’ relations.
“Relations o f authority, wealth, and signification are imprinted on the bodies and minds o f the 
rulers and the ruled. We may observe without being deterministic that these relations take the form  
o f  structural violence whose consequences may be measured in terms o f mortality rates and seen in 
the distribution o f suffering. We may observe without being functionalist that these relations are 
also expressed in denunciations o f the Western world, in subaltern and nationalist discourses, and 
in the moral discourses of prophetic churches and fundamentalist ideologies. The politics o f  
inequality as it may be read in the lives o f the South African adults who are dying so young and the 
politics of defiance against power and science that has manifested itself in South Africa have
become global issues. ”545
In much racist and sexist rhetoric at least, the body is often confused with agency, 
since the particular embodiment of social actors -  as ‘women’, ‘Africans’, or 
‘homosexuals’ -  is often used as a reason or explanation for particular patterns of 
agency or behaviour. As Didier Fassin so succinctly puts it in the above quotation, 
‘relations of authority, wealth, and signification are imprinted on the bodies and 
minds of the rulers and the ruled’. Equally important as material structures are the 
cognitive ones, as it is clear that how the body is defined -  in terms of gender, 
culture etc. -  affects the power of agents in all of the other sites of power. For it is 
often the agency of the (under-)represented body (the ‘woman’, the ‘homosexual’ 
or the ‘other’) which is contested in all of the other sites of power.
The example of HIV/AIDS reveals that, at present, agency is heavily structurated 
towards the political preferences of ‘glocal’ polities, excluding those who are 
constrained in their capacities to act in the site of the body due to these ‘glocal’ 
structural inequalities. Thus agency in the site of the body seems, at least in the 
case of HIV/AIDS, still to be in the hands of state actors and NGOs, as well as 
cultural, religious and other social polities and not in those actually affected by the 
disease. For despite their relative success in raising awareness of the disease, as de 
Waal points out, “[p]eople living with HIV and AIDS are rarely an organized
544 Ibid, p 176.
545 Didier, Fassin. (2007), pxx-xxi.
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constituency and not [...] a revolutionary one.”546 Furthermore, not only is 
HIV/AIDS currently most prevalent in populations where people have limited 
agency anyway -  due to their structurated realities in this and all of the other sites 
-  but they are also limited in their capacities to change their situation once 
infected with the disease, since it not only results in social death (in the form of 
unemployment, stigmatisation etc.) but also in the very real and premature 
biological death of many of those infected.
546 de Waal, Alex. (2006), pi 13.
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The Site of Welfare
“[I]n assessing the effect o f state intervention on the ‘welfare* of people, all 
outlays, all policies and all state activities are taken, at least hypothetically, to be
relevant. ”547
Held defines the site of welfare as the ‘organisation of the domain of goods and 
services that aids the transition of the citizen from private person to full 
membership of the community’. As such, it is not limited to state welfare, which is 
the more traditional definition of the concept. The debates that surround the 
definition of the concept of welfare demonstrate the political nature of the site, as 
it too is a much contested site of power and the extent to which the state should 
contribute to welfare has always been hotly debated.548 Other agents in the site of 
welfare include individuals, households, communities and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), and opinions vary as to the extent to which each agent 
should be responsible for the welfare of the individual citizen. Once again, 
HIV/AIDS can help to reveal the ‘glocal’ politics of this site of power, as the 
disease has raised many questions as to who should provide healthcare for those 
affected by the disease, as well as how to educate people about it.
Agency in the site of welfare, just as all of the other sites of power, is thus 
‘glocal’, extending from the individual up to global institutions. The first face of 
power highlights the decision-making process in the site, which determines how 
welfare is governed and by whom. The second face highlights the question of 
whether welfare is considered to be a question of political power at all -  indeed, 
the late appearance of matters of global health and welfare on the international 
political agenda highlight the fact that the second face of power has probably been 
operating for quite some time in world politics. The third face of power, that of 
manipulation, highlights the contested boundaries of welfare, determining how 
welfare should be defined and who is entitled to it. And the fourth face of power 
once again highlights the notion of self-policing -  those that are deemed to have
547(Emphasis in original) Bryson, Lois. (1992), p5.
548 Ibid.
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brought the disease upon themselves may be less likely to receive help and 
treatment than those who are not held to be responsible for their infection.
One of the biggest problems facing many communities in sub-Saharan Africa for 
example is the growing number of children who have been orphaned as a result of 
the disease. The simultaneous privatisation of many welfare systems in the region 
has left many communities unable to ‘cope’. As Barnett and Whiteside state, 
“[o]rphans and solitary old people will be among those social groups least able to 
make effective demands upon a system that is likely to become increasingly 
dependent upon private insurance provision.”549 The loss of the parents of these 
children bears a double strain on the remaining family members, since it not only 
means a loss of income (hence linking it to the site of the economy) but also the 
burden of fending for the orphaned children’s welfare and upbringing.550 Indeed, 
the once widespread belief among “people ranging from senior policy makers in 
international agencies to politicians in Africa and Asia and people in local 
communities” that “an entity called the ‘extended family’ [would] absorb the 
orphans and destitute created through AIDS-related mortality”, “is now heard less 
as the full effects of the epidemic are becoming more apparent, above all in sub- 
Saharan Africa.”551
These local crises also have global dimensions since the provision of state and 
NGO welfare are globally structurated through mechanisms such as the World 
Bank and the OECD Development Goals. These can determine who to help and 
how. According to Barnett and Whiteside, “[i]n contrast to children who are 
orphaned or otherwise at risk, older people are less appealing to donors.”552 This 
does not mean that orphans are necessarily appealing to donors either however -  
indeed, there have been many studies conducted on the potential risks to national 
and international security that the growing number of HIV/AIDS orphans may 
present: “[i]n a society which is already stressed and where government may offer 
very little, large numbers of ‘youth’ who have been orphaned from an early age 
can become armed youths, recruits for millenarian cults or prey to unscrupulous
549 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p233.
550 Ibid, p232.
551 Ibid, p201.
552 Ibid, p230.
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politicians.” This claim, which is cited by Barnett and Whiteside, is immediately 
remonstrated by the authors however, as they claim that “[m]ost orphans do not 
become child soldiers. Not all child soldiers are orphans -  some of them are 
abducted from their parents.”553 de Waal agrees with this last statement, 
demonstrating that myths of agency abound in this site of power also. While 
acknowledging that “[w]e should not be complacent and we must be truly alert to 
the places where orphan numbers and needs are truly overwhelming”, he writes 
that “there is no evidence for children living outside social norms. Some children 
are heading households and others are living on the streets, but their resilience and 
determination to live within social frameworks is much more striking than any 
obvious anomie.”554
Another aspect of the site of welfare is of course education. How to educate 
people about HIV/AIDS and who should provide this education is another much 
contested issue in the literature. As already mentioned, the ‘glocal’ HIV/AIDS 
universe is enormous and both hierarchically structured (by global institutions) as 
well as greatly disorganised. Thus, there are a vast number of actors competing 
over the provision of HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention, from local groups to 
global agents such as UNAIDS and USAID. Some of these agents, (such as the 
U.S. and many religious groups) promote abstinence over the use of condoms, 
while others advocate safe sex. There is also a global discrepancy in the provisions 
of welfare for HIV/AIDS, as Seckinelgin makes clear: “The high cost of [...] 
drugs created a situation in developed countries where treatment was incorporated 
into the medical system. In contrast in developing countries treatment has 
remained unavailable and interventions are kept to prevention and care. A case of 
drugs fo r  us, condoms fo r  yo u ” 5 5 5  This highlights two ways of looking at welfare 
provision -  either as a ‘natural’ communitarian right or as an individual duty or 
responsibility. It links to the question of agency and responsibility for the spread 
of the disease, since the advocacy of both abstinence and the use of condoms puts 
the responsibility firmly on the individual, while the provision of state healthcare
553 Ibid, p226-227.
554 de Waal, Alex. (2006), p84-85.
555 Seckinelgin, Hakan. (2008), p26.
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once infected implies a notion of shared agency, as a common problem that 
requires a common solution.
These aspects once again reveal how closely intertwined all of the sites of power 
are with each other, since both material and cognitive structures will not only 
determine who contracts the disease, but also how they are dealt with once 
infected. The sites of economy and culture, for example, are highly influential in 
determining who is educated about the disease or who receives treatment for it. 
The limitations on agency are thus determined by an agent’s contextual allocation 
within these structures, since those that find themselves in wealthy or culturally 
liberated societies may find it easier to get help to ‘cope’ with the disease than 
those who are constrained by economic or other social inequalities. The 
assumptions that are made about this agency, regarding the extent of the 
individual’s own responsibility for his/her own welfare, are also thus contextual, 
highly dependent on the social positioning of the agent in question.
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The Site of Culture/Cultural Life
Culture is another concept whose definition is heavily contested -  indeed, decades 
of social scientific debate have contested the issue, with many different definitions 
being offered. Once again however, this only goes to show the political power of 
the site, as it is one that is constantly under negotiation. Held defines the site as 
‘those realms of social activity where matters of public interest and identity can be 
discussed, where differences of opinion can be explored and where local custom 
and dogma can be examined’. What are to be regarded as cultural norms and 
practices and what are considered to be matters of morality however are often 
interlinked, revealing once more the link with other sites of power.
Economic power, for example, may increase an agent’s ability to reproduce or 
transform cultural structures -  the global influence of the Hollywood film industry 
serving as a case in point. As already mentioned however, cultural transformations 
can also occur regardless of power in other sites -  indeed, many customs and 
norms may originate from a grassroots level. Here, the impact that the ‘gay’ 
community had on HIV/AIDS discourse in the early years of the epidemic may 
serve as an example of a cultural ‘minority’ succeeding in changing a political 
discourse without holding hegemonic power in other sites. Without also having 
had a strong advocacy group within the global media and film industries however, 
it is doubtful whether this activism would have been as successful as it was in 
bringing HIV/AIDS on to the global political agenda.
HIV/AIDS is once again a highly illustrative example of the political nature of the 
site, as the site of culture is also one that is heavily contested. As already 
discussed, essentialist stereotypes of various cultures are not uncommon in 
literature on the disease, with the many countries that make up sub-Saharan Africa 
often bundled together to represent one homogenous culture. The importance of 
culture in structurating relations of power cannot be ignored however, for cultural 
norms do certainly affect people’s abilities to control their own lives -  indeed, it is 
the significance of this structure in shaping and being shaped by structurated 
relations of power which makes it so well studied in much IR literature already.
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Instead of limiting the study of culture to a state-centric analysis however, it is 
once again the argument here that, like all of the other sites, culture must be 
studied ‘glocally’, since there are many different actors who both shape and are 
shaped by the site. HIV/AIDS once again illustrates this, since sexual behaviour is 
not only influenced by global cultural norms and values but also and obviously by 
regional, national and local norms and values, as well as individual preferences or 
indeed social positioning.
Except for some studies on ‘gay’ culture however, most of the studies on the 
importance of culture to the spread of HIV/AIDS have concentrated on sub- 
Saharan Africa. These studies are not themselves culturally ‘neutral’ however -  as 
Susan Craddock points out, “[underlying many studies is the assumption that 
Western-centric norms of marital-based sexual conduct either do or should pertain 
in differing regions of sub-Saharan Africa.”556 She also criticises media 
representations in the U.S. for “couching the epidemic in terms that too often 
resonate with neocolonialist understandings of African culture”, claiming that they 
“tend toward unreflexive depictions of cultural practices as causal factors.”
Oliver Phillips also writes on the dangers of essentialising culture, arguing that it 
can lead to a misrepresentation of cultural realities on the ground. He is less 
critical of global cultural values than Craddock however, claiming that they can be 
incorporated with local values to create new identities if local people so wish. 
Writing about the cultural denial of homosexuality in Zimbabwe, Phillips claims:
“it is [ .. .]  simplistic to claim that ‘gay’ or 'lesbian’ identities are imposed through an imperialist 
cultural discourse or economic dominance, fo r  they are actively assumed and proclaimed from  
below, by those marginalized in local social formations that assume exclusively heterosexual 
relations. These ‘new ’ identities are merged into local histories and contexts, so that they include 
local social signifiers and practices while simultaneously providing a strategy o f access to some 
benefits o f globalization. Thus, they are often used as a means fo r  laying claim to the protection o f  
human rights as enshrined in international treaties, or enabling more effective AIDS/HTV
556 Craddock, Susan. (2004), p4.
557 Ibid, p3.
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prevention work, or simply buying into an expanding market o f Western signifiers o f 'modern ’ and
bourgeois status. ”558
This once again reveals the ‘glocal’ nature of culture, as it is actively reproduced 
or transformed both globally and locally. As already mentioned, Altman claims 
that sexuality is becoming increasingly globalised -  Phillips reminds us however 
that these global cultural tendencies are always locally defined. Culture is always 
contextually specific and cannot be reified as one static ‘thing’ or entity. Some 
critics argue that this is what has happened in the epidemiological study of the 
disease however. According to Brooke Grundfest Schoepf:
“Culture was designated as the culprit o f HIV spread. But while culture was the concept most 
bandied about, social scientists specialized in the study o f culture were left out o f the loop. African
and Africanist anthropologists were ignored by biomedical researchers and by major funding 
agencies. This [ ...]  was a political stance. Blaming cultural differences fo r situations clearly linked 
to economic and political inequality supports the status quo. ”559
In the case of gender, it is too often the case that each ‘gender’ is reified as being 
either the perpetrator (in the case of men) or the victim (in the case of women) of 
the disease. As Anne V. Akeroyd makes clear, “to create the necessary changes in 
behavior it is not enough to recognize only the problem of men; it is also necessary 
to understand the problems fo r  men, the structural, ideological, and other 
constraints and cultural entrapments which make men as well as their partners 
vulnerable to HIV. [...] Culture and behavior are not static -  they have long been, 
and are being, challenged and changed in Africa.”560 Ida Susser and Zena Stein 
agree with Akeroyd, stating “[c]ontrary to the view of African women as helpless 
victims, most of the women we spoke to saw themselves as active participants in 
the search for a way to protect themselves in sexual situations. Nevertheless, their 
methods of sexual negotiation are shaped by cultural and historical perceptions of 
the bounds of the human body.”561 This latter statement could also be accused of 
essentialising African women however, since it is impossible to hold that all
558 Phillips, Oliver. (2004), pl58.
559 Grundfest Schoepf, Brooke. (2004), p i9.
560 Akeroyd, Anne V. (2004), plO l.
561 Susser, Ida -  Stein, Zena. (2004), p i43.
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African women will see themselves as active participants, just as it is impossible 
to hold that they are all victims.
Agency in the site of culture is thus heavily dependent on the structurated 
interaction between global and local customs and norms. The first face of power 
determines which cultural norms and customs prevail, as advocated by cultural 
polities, while the second face determines whether they are considered to be 
politically relevant at all. The case of feminism highlights the second face well 
here, since it is only in the past century or so that issues relating to gender have 
been brought up onto the mainstream political agenda in most countries -  before 
this, the ‘private’ realm of domestic politics was considered to be just that, private, 
with little to do with ‘public’ political life. The third face of power reveals the 
ways in which cultural norms and customs are ‘advertised’, which is often as 
‘neutral’ ‘truths’ that cannot be questioned. Finally, the fourth face highlights the 
aspect of self-policing in the site of culture. Cultural norms are often, as already 
stated, difficult to question and those who do so may be considered to be 
‘outsiders’, facing social exclusion or at worst, persecution and death. The 
examples of discrimination and stigmatisation are particularly relevant here, as 
those who ‘come out’ as HIV/AIDS sufferers often face social exclusion. Self­
policing may therefore serve as a means to remaining within hegemonic cultural 
norms or customs, in order to remain socially empowered. Obviously however, the 
opposite can also hold tme -  indeed, it is difficult to imagine any cultural change 
occurring without people empowering themselves by stepping outside of 
mainstream cultural norms.
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The Site of Civic Associations
The site of civic associations is also a heavily contested site of power, not only 
since many definitions of civic associations abound but also because there are 
many different views on the role that they do and indeed should play in ‘glocal’ 
politics. Held defines them as ‘the array of institutions and organisations in and 
through which individuals or groups can pursue their own projects independently 
of the direct organisation of the state or of economic collectivities such as 
corporations or trade unions’. As already mentioned, HIV/AIDS activists have had 
many successes bringing the issue of the disease up on the ‘glocal’ agenda, even 
managing to change some structures, such as making it illegal to discriminate 
against PLWHA and putting pressure on pharmaceutical companies and 
governments to provide affordable treatment. However, the case of HIV/AIDS 
also reveals that ‘glocal’ civil society is not only vast but also very disorganised, 
making an analysis of its ‘glocal’ structures near to impossible. Certain ‘glocal’ 
relations of power can be traced however, partly through its hierarchical 
governance and partly through its impact at grassroots level, which obviously 
varies contextually across the globe.
As already mentioned, Campbell has conducted a study of the agency of a 
community project in the small South African mining community of 
Summertown. She found that ‘grassroots participation is by no means a ‘magic 
bullet” and summarises her findings as follows:
“A central theme that emerged repeatedly from the Summertown research was the extent to which 
the interlocking factors o f poverty and gender inequalities served to undermine the social fabric o f  
life in ways that facilitated the transmission o f disease and undermined prevention efforts. The 
research also suggested that grassroots participation is by no means a 'magic bullet’. The 
potential fo r local participation to have positive health benefits depends very heavily on the extent 
to which local attempts by marginalized groups are supported and enabled by the efforts o f more 
powerful constituencies, at the regional, national and international levels, and the development o f  
health systems and organizational infrastructure to co-ordinate joint efforts. ”562
562 Campbell, Catherine. (2003), pl95.
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Campbell’s study highlights the obstacles that local grassroots organisations face 
in combating the spread of HIV/AIDS. For despite the project’s prevention efforts, 
widespread condom use remained low and there was no evidence of any reduction 
in STI levels. As already mentioned, Campbell contends that there are multi­
layered reasons for this, not least socio-psychological. The interplay between all of 
the sites of power thus reveals the limited capacities of civic associations to deal 
with the disease alone -  something which they have increasingly been left to do. 
Towards the end of their study on the global politics of HIV/AIDS, Barnett and 
Whiteside call for stronger governmental responses to the disease, stating 
“[consistency and sustainability will be fundamental to these responses; neither of 
these qualities is characteristic of the NGO sector where fashion and donor 
inclination often determine policy.”564
The HIV/AIDS NGO sector is namely populated with many different actors, 
ranging from religious groups (who typically advocate abstinence and are not 
always keen to promote the use of condoms as a method of prevention) to those 
run by PLWHA. The Global Fund for AIDS, TB and Malaria has made some 
progress in co-ordinating all of these groups and has become a major actor in the 
politics of HIV/AIDS. It involves partnerships between the public sector, NGOs, 
development partners and the private sector of each country.565 Not all analysts are 
convinced that this ‘glocal’ co-ordination, or hierarchy, is beneficial to combating 
the spread of the disease however.
Seckinelgin, for example, is not so sure that NGOs have so much positive power. 
To begin with, it is important to note that he uses a structurated definition of 
agency in his analysis of HIV/AIDS.566 As an example of the hierarchical 
governance of NGOs, he cites “the processes following the US President’s 
Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) in 2004 [...which] soon realised that 
in many countries these organisations do not exist in the way the funding 
framework requires. Therefore, intermediary contractors are brought in to build 
capacity. [...] this need for capacity building is linked with PEPFAR’s focus on
563 Campbell, Catherine. (2003), p i85.
564 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p314.
565 Ibid, p48.
566 Seckinelgin, Hakan. (2008), p53-58.
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service-delivery based interventions as well as its strong emphasis on abstinence. 
[...] This [...] is a clear example of how the international policy perspective is 
shaping NGO activities.”567
It is clear therefore that the site of civic associations is as contested as any of the 
other sites of power. Agency in the site is heavily contested between ‘glocal’ 
polities. The first and second faces of power reflect the degree of decision-making 
that civic associations have over their affairs, or indeed whether or not there are 
any decisions that can be made in the allocation of funding etc. The third face of 
power reflects the manipulation processes by which polities may use this site to 
implement their own interests, whether this be global polities, such as PEPFAR, or 
smaller local groups. And the fourth face of power naturally highlights the degree 
to which these civic associations self-police themselves to conform to prevailing 
power structures. Once again, all of the other sites of power play a role here, since 
these associations will be differentially capable of agency depending on their 
power in other sites. Economy is obviously a major factor here, but all of the other 
sites, material as well as cognitive, will play a role in shaping the agency of a 
particular association.
567 Ibid, P67.
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The Site o f the Economy
Held defines the site of the economy as ‘the collective organisation of the 
production, distribution, exchange and consumption of goods and services’. As 
with all of the other sites, the exact definition of these goods and services and thus 
of this site is contested however, since throughout the history of economic 
philosophy, theorists have debated which issues are included in the economy. 
Many feminists, for example, have emphasised the role of the domestic sphere -  
childrearing, household maintenance etc -  in maintaining the organisation of 
production, while some economists have criticised mainstream economic theories 
for missing out informal markets (such as the ‘black market’) in economic 
measurements such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Again however, the 
contentions over the definition of the site only go to prove its political relevance 
and the power that the site has over social organisation.
One common point on which many theorists on HIV/AIDS agree upon is its link 
with poverty, stemming from the fact that the disease is still highly concentrated in 
certain parts of the world, notably those already suffering from other diseases and 
epidemics, typically known as the ‘developing world’. Nana Poku, citing United 
Nations (UN) and World Health Organisation (WHO) data, states “the glaring fact 
[...] is that 95 per cent of the global distribution of HIV infections and AIDS cases 
are located in the developing world.” He admits that the link between HIV and 
poverty is not a straightforward one, however. At the macro level, for example, the 
relationship between poverty and the HIV virus is weak, since a majority of the 
global poor, for the time being anyway, remain unaffected by the virus569 -  but 
Poku maintains that poverty is one of the major contributing factors to the African 
continent’s particular vulnerability to the disease:
“poverty is closely linked with high unemployment, hunger and malnutrition, lack o f basic
services, inability to pay fo r or access health care, disintegration o f families, vulnerability, 
homelessness and often hopelessness. Mainstream biomedical literature has long documented the
568 Poku, Nana K. (2005), p7.
569 Poku, Nana. (2000), p46.
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methods by which this combination o f factors can undermine the body’s specific and non-specific
immune response. ”570
Poku’s work focuses mainly on the political economy of HIV/AIDS, arguing that 
the WB’s Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) are largely to blame for the 
African continent’s particular vulnerability to the HIV/AIDS virus.571 He is 
concerned with the contemporary effects of globalisation, believing that it has 
made the African state irrelevant.572 He maintains however that his is a broad view 
of the many cultural and socio-economic causes of HIV/AIDS:
“The real impact o f HIV/AIDS can only be understood in the context o f the critical social and 
economic problems already experienced by countries on the African continent: poverty, famine 
and food shortage, inadequate sanitation and health care, the subordination o f women and fiscal 
policies that allocate insufficient resources to the social sectors. These factors create a particular 
vulnerability to the devastating consequences of the epidemic. Economic need and dependency 
lead to activities that magnify the risk o f HTV transmission and mean that many people, 
particularly women, are powerless to protect themselves against infection. Inequitable power 
structures, a lack o f legal protection and inadequate standards o f health and nutrition all further 
exacerbate the spread o f the virus, accelerate progression from HTV infection to AIDS, and 
aggravate the plight o f those affected by the epidemic. ”573
It is certainly not the intention here to, like Chin, discredit the link between 
poverty and the spread of HIV/AIDS -  for, again, it is one of the main aims of this 
thesis to reveal the very real material and cognitive structurated inequalities that 
affect the spread of the virus. Poverty is certainly one of those inequalities -  and 
an important and oft ignored one at that -  as it puts people at high risk of 
contracting HIV, both by leaving them exposed to high-risk social environments 
and behaviours, and by denying them adequate healthcare and welfare provisions. 
The main concern here is that, as well as lumping Africa together as one 
homogenous continent, Poku also seems to prioritise poverty above all other 
structural inequalities -  exemplified when he lists the subordination of women 
along with fiscal policies at the end of his ‘list’ of inequalities. He does admittedly 
acknowledge that the link between HIV/AIDS and poverty also has a clearly
570 Poku, Nana. (2002), p535.
571 Freedman, Jane -  Poku, Nana. (2005), p676.
572 Poku, Nana. (2000), p40-l.
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gendered dimension, claiming that many of the poorest people in Africa are 
women who often head the poorest of households. He points out that, inevitably, 
these women are particularly vulnerable to engaging in commercial sex 
transactions, either as a temporary or a permanent means of economic survival.574 
Again, however, he is looking purely through an economic lens, ignoring many of 
the other aspects of gendered inequalities that have little if anything to do with 
commercial transactions. Indeed, it is the argument here that gendered inequalities 
need to be lifted to an equal position to economic inequalities, as do other socially 
constructed inequalities, such as those based on sexuality, identity, culture, 
religion, nationality and so forth.
“Four phenomena that may result from SAPs have conspired to undermine the social fabric of  
many developing countries, potentially promoting behaviors that place their citizens at increased 
risk fo r HIV infection: (1) declining sustainability o f the rural subsistence economy; (2) 
development o f a transportation infrastructure; (3) migration and urbanization; and (4) reductions 
in spending on health and social services. ”575
Peter Lurie agrees with Poku that SAPs have undermined the social fabric of many 
‘developing’ countries. His list of maladies that have resulted from this are all 
macro phenomena -  he does not mention the economic impact on the individual, 
complaining instead that in mainstream epidemiological analysis, “social and 
economic forces [...] have been largely overlooked in favour of factors that 
operate at the individual level.”576 To rectify these social inequalities, Lurie argues 
that: i) “the satisfaction of basic human needs such as food, housing, and transport 
must become a primary goal”; ii) “emphasis should shift from the production of a 
small number of primary commodities for export to the diversification of 
agricultural production”; and iii) marginal producers and subsistence farmers must 
be supported”.577 It is clear therefore that Lurie’s is a more structural approach, 
although his list of remedies are all directed at helping the individual combat the 
spread of the disease.
574 Freedman, Jane -  Poku, Nana. (2005), p679.
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It is clear that economic factors alone cannot account for the spread of the disease 
however. Linking back to the site of civic associations, Barnett and Whiteside 
argue that there is a link between the level of social cohesion, economic equality 
and epidemic prevalence. Societies with high levels of social cohesion and high 
income can expect an epidemic curve with a low peak and slow decline followed 
by a slow growth with low endemic prevalence. Societies with high levels of 
social cohesion and low income can expect to see a slow growth in prevalence, as 
levels of infection are “kept in check by socially defined behaviour”. A society 
with low levels of social cohesion and low income can expect exponential 
epidemic curves, with persistent high levels of infection, while a society with low 
levels of social cohesion and high income can expect a sharp increase in 
prevalence followed, “hopefully”, by a sharp decline. This last curve shows the 
relationship between HIV/AIDS and the economy, for as they say themselves, 
“[although the society is susceptible to infection in the early stages, wealth means 
it has the capacity to respond.”578
As already mentioned, the accuracy of knowledge about HIV/AIDS has 
consistently been questioned, which in turn has delayed or even prevented 
economic responses to the disease, thus linking the site of the economy to other 
sites such as that of knowledge and aesthetics. It also links the site of the economy 
to the site of morality and emotion, since moral questions are frequently asked as 
to whose problem it is to begin with, whether money for treatment and aid should 
wait until estimates are more certain, or whether polities should act immediately. 
And in the case of HIV/AIDS, there has been a long history of waiting and denial:
"Politicians, policy makers, community leaders and academics all denied what was patently 
obvious -  that the epidemic ofHlTV/AlDS would affect not only the health o f individuals but also 
the welfare and well-being o f households, communities and, in the end, entire societies. [ ...]  It is 
hard to measure things -  quality o f life, quality o f relationships, pain of loss - f o r  which measures 
are partial or non-existent. I f  it is hard to see these things, it is all the easier to deny them. ”579
While knowledge about the disease remains uncertain however, it is a very real 
material reality that the region of sub-Saharan Africa has been the worst affected
578 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p98.
579 Ibid, p5-6.
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and that the same region as a whole suffers from economic deprivation -  linked, as 
already stated, to its long history of socio-political upheaval and unrest. Only five 
countries (South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, Morocco and Sudan) account for almost 
two-thirds of the continent's output.580 This material reality strongly affects not 
only people’s susceptibility to contract the disease (due to the socio-economic 
situations in which they find themselves), but also their abilities to recover from it. 
Many African governments are currently unable to provide treatment for their 
citizens and so have turned to the global community for help. UNAIDS recently 
estimated however that achieving universal access to anti-retroviral drugs will 
require spending up to four to five times current levels -  nearly 14 million people 
will need treatment by 2010, rising to 22 million in 2015.581 To date however, 
government responses to UNAIDS’ call for more money have been limited -  so 
limited in fact that other actors, such as Product RED (a business that donates up 
to 50 per cent of the profits of its branded goods to the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria) have stepped in instead. RED’s fundraising 
success -  in the first 20 months of its operation it contributed $50 million -  has 
made it the 13th largest contributor to the Global Fund, ahead of countries such as 
Australia, Belgium, China and Russia.582 It is important to note here that RED is 
not a charity but a business -  a new form of economic actor, that not only 
highlights a new, innovative way of raising funds for emergencies, but also the 
potential for new actors to enter a structure and change its parameters.
Economic growth and development are two concepts which are often confused 
with one another. As Barnett and Whiteside put it, “[ejconomic growth is the 
means; ‘development’, improved living standards, better quality of life -  all these 
are the ends. But what is development?” Development is namely a heavily 
contested term, that is used to distinguish between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ 
countries. It is a concept which is impossible to measure, but as Barnett and 
Whiteside again state:
“We don’t know how to describe development, but we know it when we see it. And, perhaps more 
importantly, people who want it know when they don’t have it! [...It] implies either tangible
580 BBC News, Monday 17th December 2007.
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improvement in individual or national circumstances, or belief in change fo r  the better. People 
need to be able to look to the future and have something to aim fo r -  some goal, some promise. 
[ ...]  Poverty and absence o f hope fo r  the future have paradoxical and apparently contradictory 
effects on attitudes to risk. [ ...]  The shorter the timeframe that people have, the more short-term 
risks they take with their health and the less willing they are to risk their limited assets which must 
be used fo r short-term survival. They are unwilling to invest fo r  the future. ” 583
According to Barnett and Whiteside, “HIV/AIDS means [...] development targets 
will not be achievable. Over the next few decades, gains will be slowed and some 
past achievements reversed.”584 There is namely a reciprocal relationship between 
HIV/AIDS and poverty -  each one exacerbates the other. Economic deprivation 
limits all regional and local agency -  from government to individual level -  to 
respond to the disease. Indeed, agency in the site of the economy is well 
exemplified by the case of HIV/AIDS. The first face of power reflects the basic 
ability to be able to make economic choices and decisions -  a government or 
organisation’s ability to provide education and treatment for example, or an 
individual’s ability to abstain from sex for money, to be able to afford condoms, 
hospital visits, treatment etc. Indeed, Campbell’s respondents in Summertown are 
also relevant here, since economic structures determine whether or not mining 
communities and the brothels that build up around them exist in the first place. 
The second face of power reflects the assumptions that medical treatment should 
cost money, for example. Economic political issues can -  as the case of 
HIV/AIDS shows -  be kept off political agendas, treated instead as ‘neutral’ 
material realities that cannot be changed. Indeed, here the difference between a 
reified structure and a structurated one becomes clear, for as the relative successes 
of HIV/AIDS activists to increase access to pharmaceutical drugs makes clear, 
economic structures can be changed by agency, sometimes overnight. The third 
face of power relates to the second, in that it reflects the manipulation mechanisms 
that are inherent in most economic structures to persuade people to consume and 
produce goods and services. Finally, the notion of self-policing reflects the 
tendency of people within economic structures to either reproduce these structures, 
or indeed transform them by curbing their own participation within them -  the 
wealth of studies on consumer behaviour and the relative successes of socially
583 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p290.
584 Ibid, p291.
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‘responsible’ goods (such as Product Red) to break into mainstream consumer 
markets proving a case in point.
259
The Site o f the Organisation of Violence and Coercive Relations
Held defines the site of the organisation of violence and coercive relations as 
‘concentrated physical force for or against the community’. As already mentioned 
earlier in the thesis, Galtung’s definition of structural violence would expand this 
to include the harm caused by all structural inequalities -  which in this case would 
include all of the other sites of power. The case of HIV/AIDS highlights the 
importance of both material and cognitive structures of violence, as well as actual 
physical force. According to Grundfest Schoepf:
“ [b]y fostering social isolation, [stigma] add[s] to the suffering endured by sick people and their 
families. In several countries, “free women, ” living without male protection, were made 
scapegoats, rounded up and deported to rural areas where they were unable to make a living; 
others were imprisoned and raped. Women whose HIV/AIDS was known or suspected were evicted 
from their homes and deprived o f livelihoods and children. Some were accused as witches. While 
witchcraft may be an ‘imagined violence, ’ accusations often have social and material effects. ”585
There are, in other words, many different forms of violence. According to 
Akeroyd, “[a]t one extreme are war-rape and other forms of violence; at the other 
is the refusal of an HIV-infected man to use a condom to protect his uninfected 
partner, a finding not uncommon in studies of discordant couples.”586 In southern 
Africa, rapes of young girls and even babies have occurred “in the belief that sex 
with a virgin will cure AIDS”587. AIDS orphans in particular are vulnerable to 
sexual molestation.588 Indeed, rape and gang rape have become “potent methods of 
spreading HIV” in South Africa in particular.589 55 000 South African women 
were estimated to have been raped in 1997, which translates into 134 women 
raped per 100 000 of the total population.590 Rape also has higher odds of HIV 
transmission because of physical trauma.591 If other violence is also factored into 
the equation -  e.g. state violence such as war -  the risk of the spread of the disease
585 Grundfest Schoepf, Brooke. (2004), p23.
586 Akeroyd, Anne V. (2004), p97.
587 Ibid, p96.
588 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p359.
589 Ibid, p i 66.
590 Statistics South Africa. (2000), p i.
591 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p l66.
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is even higher. HIV/AIDS can be spread both during and in the aftermath of war592 
- in general, it is well known that war is one of the worst risk milieux for sexually 
transmitted diseases (STDs)593, the prevalence of which also affect HIV 
transmission.
The site of violence and coercive relations has also revealed positive power 
relations with regard to HIV/AIDS however. Violence against women has 
consequently “become a major concern for women’s groups, and has been taken 
up by newspapers, international agencies, the courts, the medical profession, and 
governments in a number of countries.”594 Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) is 
now outlawed in some African states and there is a worldwide campaign on non- 
consensual sex in marriage organized by a London-based NGO called CHANGE. 
The UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration against Violence against 
Women in 1993, UNIFEM has a Trust Fund in Support of Actions to Eliminate 
Violence against Women, and violence against women has also been discussed in 
other United Nations and international organisations such as the WHO and the 
Commonwealth Secretariat.595
The site of violence and coercive relations is obviously linked with both the 
material and the cognitive sites of power. Violence against women in particular is, 
according to Akeroyd, “linked to the subordinate legal, social, and economic 
position of women, and to cultural assumptions about relations between men and 
women: but it also reflects the general level of violence in the wider society. The 
tide is now running strongly against male violence -  but to change its acceptability 
strikes at conceptions of masculinity and the structure of gender relations.”596
Whether or not Akeroyd is correct in her prediction that the tide will turn away 
from male violence remains to be seen -  it is the argument here that violence is no 
less prevalent today than it has ever been and that there are still plenty of ‘glocal’ 
‘wars’ to be getting on with, from household level to global. Indeed, HIV/AIDS
592 Craddock, Susan. (2004), p5.
593 Lyons, Maryinez. (2004) p i85.
594 Akeroyd, Anne V. (2004), p96.
595 Ibid, p97.
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reveals just how deeply engrained violence remains in many societies today, from 
a material and cognitive structural level to a behavioural one. For, as should be 
apparent by now, the disease is not just spread by single actions, but is rather the 
result of many interconnecting structurated inequalities.
Agency in the site of violence is not very difficult to ascertain when it comes to 
physical violence, but more so when it comes to other structural violence in the 
other sites of power -  although here, too, polities can usually be found, as this 
thesis aims to demonstrate. With regards to physical violence in particular 
however, the first face of power obviously relates to the direct violent act -  
although, as already stated, this can be an act that may be considered by some to 
be ‘harmless’, such as having sex without a condom. The second face reveals the 
denial of many violent structures and actions from political agendas around the 
world. Domestic violence is a relatively new issue to have entered ‘glocal’ 
political discourse for example -  it was previously kept out of ‘public’ politics. 
The third face of power refers to the manipulation that occurs both in defining 
violence (by individuals as well as polities), as well as the act of using violence to 
secure certain ends. The fourth face of power -  that of self-policing -  reveals how 
the structural limits and constraints that are placed on violence within society 
manifest themselves within the individual. It is obviously related to the cognitive 
sites of power, as definitions of what acts are to be considered violent and when 
they are acceptable are all structurally determined.
262
The Site o f Regulatory and Legal Organisation
Held limits his definition of the site of regulatory and legal organisation to “the 
state as an independent corporation, made up of an ensemble of organisations”. It 
is argued here however that this site also constitutes many other regulatory and 
legal structures, global as well as local, that may also include more informal 
regulatory and legal organisations, such as customary law. However, since much 
of state involvement in HIV/AIDS has already been covered earlier in this thesis, 
the discussion here will be kept to a minimum.
Barnett and Whiteside state that “[w]here the epidemic has been controlled at the 
national level there has been consistent and high-level leadership. [...] A 
necessary, but not sufficient, criterion for preventing spread of HIV or turning the 
epidemic round is political leadership. This must begin at the highest levels if 
there is to be national success.”597 As already mentioned, some governments, such 
as the Cuban government in the 1980s, also used coercion and segregation in order 
to try to control the epidemic. For the dilemma facing any government is how to 
regulate private behaviour, if indeed it should do so at all. Other options include 
trying instead to find a cure for the disease -  i.e. treating it as any other disease, 
rather than focusing on the way in which it is spread -  or trying to use 
manipulative measures, such as health insurance premiums etc, to try to make 
people be more careful. All of these are options that are open to states around the 
world and while very few use coercive measures, it is necessary to account for the 
fact that they are possible measures that states might take. Indeed, the introductory 
section in this chapter on the practical securitisation of the disease reveals that 
many governments already treat it as a matter of security. As also mentioned 
however, treating it as a matter of security helps to bypass other regulatory 
systems, such as the TRIPS agreement. This is an example of agency reproducing 
a structure (TRIPS) -  it would be transformative if focus was instead put on trying 
to change the system.
597 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p359-361.
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Land ownership is one of the most fundamentally contested political rights 
throughout history and it is also relevant here. It also reveals the conflicts that can 
occur between constitutional, state laws and customary law. As Barnett and 
Whiteside make clear, “Land is ‘owned’ in many different ways. [...] we can 
speak of ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ forms of property. [...] Women and orphans may 
find themselves thrown off the family’s land and on occasions forced to migrate to 
town to seek a living. This is also an impact of HIV/AIDS and such events have
C Q O
been reported from many parts of east and central Africa.” Thus ownership of 
land can both affect and be affected by the spread of virus, once again revealing 
the interdependency of this site with all of the others.
Agency in the site of regulatory and legal organisation is thus also varied, from the 
individual level up to the international. The first face of power signifies all the 
legal and regulatory decisions that are made about HIV/AIDS on all of these 
levels, while the second face of power signifies those decisions that are not made, 
as issues related to the disease may be kept off the political agenda. The third face 
of power reveals the importance of manipulation in these processes, as citizens or 
indeed states may be pushed towards accepting one dominant view of the disease 
over another -  for example, if a state wishes to quarantine all of those infected 
with the disease. And finally the fourth face of power reveals the idea of self­
policing into the site, which once again can also be either positive or negative -  
indeed, without self-policing, laws (whether constitutional or customary) would be 
broken or transformed on a daily basis.
598 Ibid, p250-251.
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Conclusion
All human behaviour is socially contextual, highly dependent on the relative 
distributional allocation of resources for agency, both within the immediate 
locality, as well as in broader, global social surroundings. Focusing solely on 
structural constraints however, does away with the usefulness of behavioural 
analyses -  structures cannot exist independently of human agency. A structurated, 
‘glocal’ analysis requires studying the structurated behaviour of all relevant agents 
-  global and local -  as well as the material and cognitive resources that structure 
this behaviour. In the case of HIV/AIDS, it is these ‘glocal’ power relations that 
have in turn affected where and how quickly the disease has spread, affecting 
some parts of the world much more quickly and devastatingly than others. Having 
conducted a brief overview of these processes in Held’s original seven sites of 
power, the next chapter will argue for the inclusion of my additional five sites, as 
it is the argument here that a fully nuanced analysis of any social relations of 
power must also include these sites.
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Chapter Eight -  A Structurated Analysis of HIV/AIDS in the 
Additional Five Sites of Power
The Site o f Time: The Temporal Structuration of Agency
“Stories are mines o f information, rich in memories and history. Couched in a story, lessons touch 
their audience at many levels: while the narrative explicitly relays the plot and sways the emotions, 
it also reaches into the unconscious. Stories raise and answer questions about meanings and 
values. /Scenarios are rigorously constructed, imaginative stories about the future. The scenario 
stories and the process of creating them are intended to help people think more freely about 
complex, poorly defined, or intractable problems. ”599
The site of time is defined here as ‘the historical organisation of social life (past, 
present and future), including the ‘ghosts’ and ‘myths of agency’. It is important 
not to confuse the site of time with history however. History is rather the disputed 
discourse of time, which will be examined further in the site of knowledge and 
aesthetics. Time is depicted here as a resource of power in its own right -  as a site 
of both material and cognitive struggles over past, present and future socio­
political histories and potential developments. Indeed, the very fact that the 
discourse of time is so heavily disputed in competing world histories of events 
reveals the true power of time. The above quotation -  taken from a recent 
UNAIDS report entitled AIDS in Africa: Three scenarios to 2025 -  perhaps best 
summarises the importance of the site of time to an analysis of power. For 
although the site of knowledge and aesthetics is about the actual construction of 
these hi-stories, the site of time represents the site where the many different 
historical, present and future realities -  both material and cognitive -  that people 
either do or believe themselves to inhabit, are structurated.
Time is thus a heavily contested resource of power, not least because it 
encapsulates one of the most abstract concepts known to humankind -  namely 
how and where we both materially find and cognitively perceive ourselves to be in 
past, present and future contexts. Although, as already mentioned, many 
structurationists prefer to leave time to one side, as one of the third dimensions
599 UNAIDS. (2005), p24.
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through which power operates, it is one of the main aims of this thesis to prove 
that time itself also constitutes a resource of power over which humanity competes 
-  cognitively as well as materially -  the outcome of which determines the extent 
of possible social agency at any one given moment in time.
As such, the site of time serves as a useful analytical concept that can show why 
some social actors have a greater capacity to act than others. One’s position ‘in 
time’ can quite simply determine whether or not one has the potential to change a 
current power relationship. It can be abstract and relative as well as real and 
material, and does not necessarily need to rest on a Western notion of calendar 
time running from the Dark Ages to the Present Day. It is also not necessarily 
historical or chronological -  indeed, many people today have no more access to 
modern-day medicines, technologies or socio-political opportunities than their 
ancestors did. Equally, there may be little difference between past, present and 
future cognitive perceptions of time -  religious beliefs, for example, prove that 
some perceptions of time can last for centuries, if not millennia. Indeed, the 
relevant polities need not necessarily be ‘in’ the particular timeframe of analysis -  
some polities may be long gone in actual social existence or action but be just as 
relevant in contemporary politics (here entitled ghosts of agency), while the 
potential existence of future polities may cause current polities to change their 
actions in the here and now.
For time operates as a structure of power by both materially and cognitively 
situating agents in their respective positions of power. Materially in the sense that 
some actors have access to more resources simply through their material temporal 
positioning in the world. Put simply, the passing of time allows some actors to 
accumulate more resources than others -  be they states, corporations or 
individuals. At the same time, however, time also serves as a structure that 
cognitively puts people in their place, if you will. A negative perception of one’s 
own potential for past, present and future agency is much more likely to constrain 
that agency than a positive one, for example. Indeed, material struggles over time 
can result from cognitive ones, as well as vice versa. Cognitive struggles over 
nationalist narratives, for example, can result in very real material struggles over 
these contested histories and potential futures -  the recent wars in the Balkans
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proving a very bloody and real case in point. In sum, the structure of time allows 
some actors to establish themselves -  materially or cognitively -  as the leading 
polities in any of the other eleven sites of power. It also -  in the future sense -  
allows some actors the potential to become leading polities in ways that would 
have been inconceivable in previous times, as exemplified by the recent socio­
political advances of women in many countries around the world.
Some historical structures are deeply embedded however, and so are not so easily 
changed by agency -  the colonial structures that led the Western world to be so far 
economically advanced of the ‘developing’ world could be argued to constitute 
just such an example of slow-moving structures. Indeed, as already discussed in 
the beginning of this thesis, many structural accounts of global politics adopt this 
view of unchangeable and cemented structures. Other examples, however, reveal 
how quickly agency can change the parameters of historical structures -  again, the 
relative successes of feminist struggles in many parts of the world over long- 
rooted patriarchal structures in the mere space of a century or two proving a case 
in point.
Some theorists argue that time has become globalised in the modern-day age, with 
the birth of technologies such as the internet, mobile phones and other scientific 
discoveries, such as medicines. Giddens has argued that modernity has led to the 
separation of time from space. “In pre-modem settings [...] time and space were 
connected through the situatedness of place. [...] The widespread use of 
mechanical timing devices facilitated, but also presumed, deeply structured 
changes in the tissue of everyday life -  changes which could not only be local, but 
were inevitable universalising. A world that has a universal dating system, and 
globally standardised time zones, as ours does today, is socially and experientially 
different from all pre-modem eras. The global map, in which there is no 
privileging of place (a universal projection), is the correlate symbol to the clock in 
the ‘emptying’ of space.”600 It is the argument here however that, although it is 
analytically useful to distinguish between time and space as constituting separate 
resources of power, this cognitive change in the perception of time and space is
600 Giddens, Anthony. (1991), pl6-17.
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‘glocalised’, as it is still far from universal -  many people around the world still 
do not live according to a universal worldview of time, or limit the extent to which 
they do so solely to matters of global business or politics. For even if there is 
universal agreement to label a year 2008, for example, this does not mean that this 
label bears a universal meaning. Nor is this purely a cognitive disparity, since the 
actual material access to this universalised and standardised high speed world is, 
currently at least, limited to a few privileged polities around the globe.
Indeed, the current ‘glocalisation’ of HIV/AIDS to the African continent reveals 
the continued interdependence between the sites of time and space, as well as all 
of the other sites. Far from revealing a universally temporally identical world that 
provides equal access to modern-day structures and innovations, it reveals a world 
that is still very much spatially divided by the structure of time. For it is a material 
fact that HIV/AIDS has affected some people and parts of the world much more 
severely than others -  which, at this time, is predominantly women in Africa and 
India. Historian John Iliffe argues that “the fundamental reason why Africa had 
the worst Aids epidemic was because it had the first Aids epidemic.”601 As already 
examined earlier in the thesis however , others argue that, far from being a matter 
of biological chance, it is the continent’s history of colonialism, as well as existing 
‘glocal’ socio-economic structures of poverty and migration that have made it 
particularly vulnerable to the spread of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS. 
Barnett and Whiteside also trace the high prevalence of HIV/AIDS in Africa to its 
history of slavery and colonialism claiming that, for the last five centuries, Africa
f%CY)has experienced an ‘abnormal normality’.
“Africans who detect racist stereotypes in much of the speculation about the geographical origin 
of AIDS are not wrong. [ ...]  The subliminal connection made to notions about a primitive past and 
the many hypotheses that have been fielded about possible transmission from animals [ ...]  cannot 
help but activate a familiar set o f stereotypes about animality, sexual license, and blacks. ’,603
The site of time perhaps reveals itself most potently in speculations about the 
geographical origin of the disease, a question that, contrary to popular belief,
601 Iliffe, John. (2006), p58.
602 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), pl43-145.
603 Sontag, Susan. (1989), p52.
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remains unresolved to this day604. If one looks up the history of the disease on 
popular websites for example, such as those of the BBC and UN AIDS, one finds a 
25-26 year timeline, claiming that the first incidents of HIV infection were 
discovered in 1981.605 According to John Iliffe however, “[t]he earliest convincing 
evidence of [...HIV] that causes [AIDS] was gathered in 1959 [ ...in  Leopoldville, 
the capital of the Belgian Congo, where] an American researcher studying malaria 
took blood specimens from patients in the city. When testing procedures for HIV 
became available during the mid 1980s, 672 of his frozen specimens from 
different parts of equatorial Africa were tested. Only one proved positive. It came 
from an unnamed African man in Leopoldville, now renamed Kinshasa. [...] 
Although nothing of this kind can be absolutely certain, there are strong grounds 
to believe that HIV existed at Kinshasa in 1959 and that it was rare.”606 Iliffe is 
careful to point out however that this case, attributing the source of the disease to 
one lone unnamed man in Kinshasa, “does not imply that the Aids epidemic began 
in western equatorial Africa. If that unnamed African had been the first person 
ever infected with HIV, it would have been an incredible coincidence.” He points 
to other cases earlier than this -  one identified by the scientist Luc Montagnier, 
whose laboratory first identified HIV, of an American man who died in 1952 of 
what could have been AIDS-related causes, however no blood was stored for later 
testing and so this could not be proven. Other cases involve a Japanese Canadian 
who died in 1958 and a Haitian American in 1959.607
Indeed, the history of the geographical origin of the HIV virus is a highly 
politically contested issue. In a famous speech in 1998, the South African 
president, Thabo Mbeki, attributed Africa’s particular vulnerability to the virus to 
poverty and Western exploitation.608 The idea that the virus was brought to the 
continent by the West was strongly adhered to by many people on the African 
continent at the beginning of the pandemic609, with some politicians and religious 
leaders advocating against the use of condoms610, since these too were believed to
604 Iliffe, John. (2006), p3.
605 BBC, 4 June 2006 / UNAIDS (2006).
606 Iliffe, John. (2006), p3.
607 Ibid.
608 Mbeki, Thabo (2000), cited in Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p318.
609 Farmer, Paul. (1992), p228.
610 Iliffe, John. (2006), p96.
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be infected. One Western historian, Edward Hooper, supports the suggestion that 
the virus was brought to the continent, tracing its origins back to trials for a polio 
vaccine in the 1950s.611 Other historians however, such as John Iliffe, maintain 
that current biological evidence on the genetic evolution of the disease has 
“effectively ruled out [Hooper’s] theory [...] a theory also contradicted by 
negative tests on surviving vaccine samples.” Instead, he traces the origins of the 
virus back to the transmission to human beings of the ancient and related simian 
immunodeficiency virus (SIV), an infection of monkeys in western equatorial 
Africa, that also spread to chimpanzees.612 Barnett and Whiteside agree with this 
view, stating:
"HTV derives from a virus that crossed the species barrier into humans. It is closely related to a 
number of Simian (monkey) Immunodeficiency Viruses (SIVs) found in Africa. [ .. .]  The question o f  
when and how HTV entered human populations has been a source o f great debate. We know that at 
some point the virus entered the blood of humans and then spread through sexual contact from  
person to person. In west Africa the less virulent HTV-2 spread from macaque monkeys. HIV-1 
spread from chimpanzees into humans in central Africa. Four lines o f evidence have been used to 
substantiate the zoonotic (transmission o f a disease from one species to another) origin of AIDS: 1. 
similarities in organisation o f the viral genome; 2. phylogenic relatedness of a particular HIV 
strain to that o f STV in the natural host; 3. geographical coincidence between the SIV and 
particular HTV strains; 4. plausible routes of transmission”613
Barnett and Whiteside also offer a number of hypotheses as to how the virus may 
have crossed the species barrier: i) through hunting bush meat; ii) contaminated 
vaccines (e.g. Hooper’s theory above); iii) contaminated needles in vaccine 
campaigns; iv) ritual behaviour such as the use of monkey blood.614 None of these 
hypotheses have yet been proven and it is questionable whether they ever will. 
What remains certain however is that the search for scapegoats to blame for 
spreading the deadly virus will most likely continue as long as the disease remains 
such a threat to humanity.
611 Hooper, Edward. (2000).
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The gendered dimension of the disease provides another point of contention, for 
while it is clear that gendered inequalities facilitate the spread of the virus, it is not 
clear why the many varied cultures on the African continent have proven to be 
more susceptible than others around the world. One possible link between them all 
is, once again, colonialism. Elizabeth Schmidt is a historian who has studied the 
relevance of British colonialism to modern-day patriarchal structures in 
Zimbabwe. She argues that, while women were certainly not equal to men before 
colonial rule, their situation worsened during and afterwards. The British are 
recorded by Schmidt as having made deals with local community leaders to keep 
their women in check, so that British servicemen could bring their families to the 
then-called Rhodesia without the risk of intercultural relationships.615 Other so- 
called ‘third world feminist’ analyses have revealed similar patterns of female 
oppression and restraint around the world as a result of conflict and colonial 
rule.616 What perhaps differentiates the African continent from these other 
countries then could be a synchronisation in time of the many different socio­
political contexts which have worked all together to promote the spread of 
HIV/AIDS on the African continent.617
The International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs), which were applied to many African and other ‘developing’ countries in 
the 1980s and ‘90s, have also hindered ‘glocal’ agency and can also be seen as a 
manipulation of the site of time -  forcing many countries to remain in a state of 
stunted economic and socio-political development. The exact nature of the effects 
of these SAPs on the current HIV/AIDS crisis facing the African continent is 
unclear -  however, it is not difficult to imagine that countries that were stripped 
bare of their health and welfare systems as a result of the programmes could not be 
expected to cope with an epidemic of such scope.
As already mentioned, the site of time is not only about the past however. It is also 
about interpretations and plans for the future, even if these are usually based on 
past models and projected present-day expectations. Future projections are
615 Schmidt, Elizabeth. (1996)
616 e.g. Alexander, M. Jacqui et al. (1997)
617 Iliffe, John. (2006), p58-64.
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problematic however, if not impossible. And again, HIV/AIDS proves an 
illustrative example of the role of future time for present global action or inaction. 
UN AIDS’ aforementioned report AIDS in Africa: Three scenarios to 2025, in 
which it outlines three different potential outcomes: i) ‘traps and legacies’, which 
extrapolates current trends until 2025; ii) ‘tough choices’, which applies the 
trajectory of the most successful response to date (Uganda); and iii) ‘times of
transition’, which illustrates what might occur if a comprehensive prevention and
£ 1 0
treatment response were rolled out across Africa as quickly as possible. There is 
no need to go into the finer details of these three scenarios here -  suffice to say 
that it is clear that dominant visions of the future are important for socio-political 
action in the present.
Agency in the site of time thus operates across many ‘glocalised’ levels, as with 
all of the other sites. The first face of power reveals itself in the access that people 
have to the decision-making process according to their structurated positions 
within the site -  it is clear, for example, that many (but not all) women in 
developing countries do not have the same agentic power to combat HIV/AIDS as 
their male counterparts, due to the structurated material and cognitive realities that 
have resulted both from patriarchal structures and colonialism. The second face of 
power can be found in the access that agents have to setting the agenda of time -  
again, individuals and polities in many developing countries are constrained in 
their agentic power here, as time has situated them outside of mainstream ‘glocal’ 
agenda-setting. Manipulation, as the third face of power, reveals itself in the 
narratives that depict the site of time -  as revealed above, there are many polities 
who have tried to influence the stories of time with regard to HIV/AIDS. Finally, 
the fourth face of power, that of self-policing, can be found in the more cognitive 
dimensions of the site, as time constrains not only people’s material social 
positioning in the world, but also their belief that they can do anything to change 
this. All of these faces can also be interpreted positively however -  many people 
and polities in developing countries, for example, have managed to surpass any 
temporal structural constraints on their agency to reform the site of time -  the
618 UNAIDS, (2005), p!2.
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many relative successes of NGO’s and women’s organisations to raise ‘glocal’ 
awareness of the disease proving a case in point.
Although there are probably as many different hi-stories of the world as there are 
people to tell them, all depending on the relevant ‘glocalised’ context, the site of 
time does disclose some key players. It not only reveals past ‘glocal’ polities and 
ghosts of agency that are still politically relevant today (such as the establishment 
of Western colonialism and ‘glocal’ patriarchal structures), but also exposes those 
‘glocal’ polities that currently influence the politics of HIV/AIDS (such as the 
United States (US), the United Nations (UN), the World Health Organisation 
(WHO), the World Bank (WB), the IMF, the World Trade Organisation (WTO), 
major pharmaceutical companies, religious leaders (from Evangelical Christians to 
traditional healers), ‘glocal’ media, as well as individual men and women across 
the world), as well as those actors that could (potentially at least) affect the future 
of the epidemic (such as the Global Fund, generic drug manufacturers and those 
activists fighting to change the socio-political background of the epidemic).
What is also apparent is that there are common threads that unite many of these hi­
stories -  such as the experiences of colonialism and patriarchy -  which make the 
global relevance of time all the more important. For it is a material reality that the 
African continent remains deeply scarred by its turbulent past and looks set to 
remain one of the world’s poorest areas, unless ‘glocal’ polities take action. As it 
stands however, the agency of many people and polities on the African continent 
remain disabled by the structure of time -  handicapped in their global agency to 
reverse the clock and win time in the battle to fight HIV/AIDS. For time really is a 
resource over which people compete and, in the case of HIV/AIDS, for many 
people in the world that time is running out.
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The Site of Space: The Spatial Structuration of Agency
Just as the human body is socially embodied, so is the planet on which we live. 
The earth and its neighbouring planets and stars have always had social material 
and cognitive meaning for human beings -  from the rising and setting of the sun to 
the distribution of land and its resources. And with social meaning comes 
competition, both over the material resource itself as well as over its cognitive 
meaning. The site of space is defined here as ‘the geographical and environmental 
organisation of social life’, recognising that space is both a material and a 
cognitive resource of power over which humanity competes. It is the argument 
here that, similarly to the site of time, the site of space is more than just a third 
dimension through which power operates, as argued by many structurationists. 
Like time, space also operates as a structure of power itself, by both materially and 
cognitively spatially situating agents in their respective positions of power. 
Materially in the sense that some actors have access to more resources simply 
through their material spatial positioning in the world. And, like time, space also 
serves as a structure that cognitively puts people in their place, if you will. The 
most obvious example of this is nationalism but overall it includes anything from 
the positive values attached to areas perceived to be of natural or cultural beauty, 
to the negative images conjured up by areas that have been the places of human 
suffering or natural devastation.
Together, the material and cognitive aspects of the site of space both structurate 
and are structurated by agency. If one is bom in a small, rural village, for example, 
one might not just lack material access to resources but may also not believe that 
one’s chances of entering the global political stage are as great as if one were bom 
in an urban centre. Most traditional concepts of space (in both traditional IR and 
globalisation theories in general, as well as those studying, for example, the 
urbanisation of HIV/AIDS in particular) have tended to focus on material 
relationships however, restricting from view the more cognitive aspects of the site. 
For although it can certainly be argued to be the case that a majority of people find 
themselves materially constrained from entering spaces of global political 
importance, space can also serve as a cognitive spatial barrier that constrains 
agency simply through the belief that this ought to be the case. History is rife
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however with examples of people managing to secure themselves positions of 
power despite coming from relatively obscure spatial origins, although this usually 
involves traversing the spatial divide by actually physically moving into the spatial 
hub of power. Today, this move may be as virtual and as simple as gaining access 
to the internet, although this is a space that is still not available to a majority of the 
world’s population.
The theory of power proposed in this thesis thus disagrees with some current 
‘globalised’ analyses that argue that the site of space is no longer as important as it 
once was. Instead, it is the argument here that space is just as materially and 
cognitively contested as it ever was, as exemplified by the continuation of age-old 
disputes over physical boundaries, current trends of urbanisation that are creating 
divides between rural and urban areas, as well as the continued segregation within 
many urban areas themselves.
The site of space is not just about competition over the natural environment 
through contested territories and the modern-day state-system however, as 
portrayed in the traditional disciplines of IR and Geopolitics, although these 
aspects are certainly also included here. Demography is also included here as a 
material resource to the site of space, since human populations can also be said to 
constitute material geographical resources, as illustrated by the politicisation of 
trends such as migration, urbanisation and slavery. Although there is some overlap 
here with the site of the body, the distinction I am trying to make here is that, in 
the site of space, human populations can constitute as valuable a spatial material 
and cognitive resource to polities as any other natural resource. The focus here is 
thus not on the individual body, or on the social embodiment of these bodies, but 
rather on their function as a resource of power simply in and of themselves.
Many countries heavily affected by HIV/AIDS face demographic changes of 
dramatic and devastating proportions never witnessed before in human history. 
Some countries risk losing a substantial proportion of entire generations and, 
given higher infection rates amongst women, some countries could be left with 
more men than women. Also left behind are a rapidly growing number of AIDS 
orphans -  sub-Saharan Africa alone had just over 10 million AIDS orphans by
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2005619 -  the burden of care for whom often falls upon the elderly. This is a 
serious problem, as Barnett and Whiteside point out:
"Under normal circumstances the young are cared fo r by their parents, and later provide support 
fo r  those parents. Some social scientists describe this as the 'intergenerational bargain’ [...]. In 
Greek tradition this has been likened to a vine, where the young adults stand straight and firm as 
the new shoots climb up and the old ones make their way down to the earth. If you take out the 
middle support the children can ’t climb and the old collapse. ”620
The case of HIV/AIDS reveals the devastating socio-political consequences that 
mass-death can have on societies, as one of their fundamental resources -  human 
beings themselves -  is depleted. Worldwide, many countries have had to face up 
to a massive depletion of this most fundamental of resources -  the human body 
itself. The disease risks draining the ‘developing’ world of human capital to a 
much greater extent than the ‘brain drain’ it has faced for many decades already, 
as whole societies and thus economies risk being wiped out. In some parts of the 
world, HIV/AIDS thus is creating new, almost apocalyptic-like socio-political 
spaces. Spaces where disease has wiped out a generation and where orphans and 
the elderly live together in impoverished communities. Spaces where socio­
political and economic activity are severely limited by illness and death. These 
spaces are not natural however but are rather highly structurated, dependent on the 
actions and inactions of ‘glocal’ polities, as well as the available resources in the 
other eleven sites of power.
Contrary to the case of natural resources however, where accumulation typically 
means greater material and cognitive power, it is not necessarily the case that a 
greater number of people amounts to a greater socio-political or economic value 
being attributed to a particular site of space. The so-called ‘developing’ world, for 
example, is typically materially very heavily populated with people but these 
populations are generally not materially able or cognitively considered (in 
traditional analyses of power at least, both behavioural and structural) to carry 
very much weight in global politics or economics. The ‘developing’ world has 
historically been under-represented in, for example, the United Nations’ Security
619 UN AIDS. (2006).
620 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p210.
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Council, for example, and finds it difficult to compete with Western and Asian 
economies. The ‘developing’ world’s power in global political and economic 
institutions thus remains limited, constraining for example global action towards 
HIV/AIDS).
The site of space also reveals positive power in a Foucaultian sense however. 
Many behavioural and structural accounts of global power refuse to acknowledge 
the ‘developing’ world’s agency, even as a potential. Although the ‘developing’ 
world, if it can be generalised as such, is still very much restricted in its access to 
global political and economic institutions, it does still have some agency both 
within and without these institutions. Any analysis of the UN for example, must 
also take into account the power of those member states representing the 
‘developing world’ who are periodically granted a seat on the Security Council, 
for although they may be few in number and can hardly be said to be 
representative, they do yield some positive power in the global decision-making 
process. This is not to say that the Security Council is by any means globally 
democratic, allowing equal access to all, but a thorough examination of global 
power must take into account all relevant polities and not just focus on one or two 
actors, as hegemonic analyses do.
HIV/AIDS provides an example of such positive power. Those ‘developing’ states 
that are heavily affected by the disease, for example, have not only managed to 
collectively put pressure on the international community to take action against the 
disease but have also managed to establish their own production of generic anti­
retroviral (ARV) drugs in varying degrees of success across the world. Also 
important to note is that these actions have not been solely state-centric -  indeed, 
some of the first, groundbreaking attempts to get HIV/AIDS on the global political 
agenda were carried out by grassroot organisations based in the ‘developing’ 
world. The distinction between top-down and bottom-up approaches is already a 
classical discussion within geopolitics -  the point that I am trying to make here is 
that both hold true to varying degrees, as both states and non-governmental 
organisations wield power on the global stage. Their agency will vary in degree 
according to the respective power of each in the other eleven sites and depending 
on the issue at stake, but both approaches must be taken into account in a
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theoretical account of global politics. For although it is certainly true that the 
current global political and economic climate currently does not structurally 
favour the agency of the ‘developing’ world -  either at state or grassroots level -  
what agency it does have has still managed to transform some of these structures 
and could potentially transform them even further if more action follows. Having 
said all of this, it is still the case that this agency has been spurred on by the very 
dire and desperate situation facing many ‘developing’ countries affected by 
HIV/AIDS.
Agency in the site of space is thus highly determined by one’s structurated spatial 
positioning. The first face of power can be discerned in the structurated potential 
for agency in the site of space -  as already discussed, many PLWHA, as well as 
‘developing’ countries are structurally constrained in their access to this decision­
making process. The second face of power reveals itself in the more cognitive 
aspects of the site -  as already discussed, HIV/AIDS only recently became a 
global issue of importance. It is unclear whether this was due to the securitisation 
move by global polities or whether it was the result of intense campaigning by 
activists and ‘developing’ countries, but it is almost certain that spatial positioning 
(both material and cognitive) was a contributing factor in the ability of the latter to 
influence the global political agenda. It is also clear that both the material and the 
cognitive boundaries of space can be politically manipulated -  as already 
discussed, contentions abound as to the material and cognitive spatial locations of 
the disease. The fourth face of power reveals itself in the cognitive aspects of the 
site -  agency in the site of space can quite simply be determined by a social 
actor’s perception of his/her/its spatial positioning in the world of politics.
The site of space thus reveals the role that the socially structurated geography of 
the planet has on current prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS. Access to treatment and 
thus AIDS mortality rates, for example, are highly dependent on spatial location. 
As Anne-Christine D’Adesky so concisely puts it -  “For rural residents, Brazil’s 
vast size can be fatal.” She cites one local AIDS activist who claimed that some 
patients had to travel for ten days in order to get treatment.621 Globally, one can
621 D’Adesky, Anne-Christine. (2004), p40.
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compare this to the example of a leading HIV/AIDS sufferer and campaigner who 
had to leave Malawi in order to be able to receive treatment in the United 
States.622
What is important to note here however is that it is the socio-political contexts of 
these geographical areas that are relevant, not the actual physical areas themselves. 
Both of these examples emphasise the importance of the medical and economic 
infrastructure of an area, which in turn depend heavily on the particular 
‘glocalised’ political environment. Also highly important are other socio-political 
aspects such as gender and ethnicity -  some groups of people are, from their very 
birth, more able to make use of geographical resources than others. It is also 
perfectly possible that remote areas manage to either contain an epidemic within 
their locality or shelter themselves from one, just as it is feasible that heavily 
populated areas do the same -  low prevalence rates in parts of the Western world 
being a case in point. HIV/AIDS prevalence and treatment is thus not dependent 
on physical geography more than as a socially conditioned geography. It is thus 
the interaction with all of the other sites of power that makes the ‘site of space’ 
relevant to a study global power, thus emphasising again the interdependency of 
all of the sites.
622 Ibid, p6-7.
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The Site o f Knowledge & Aesthetics -  The Discursive, Visual and Sonic 
Structuration o f Agency
A Foucaultian analysis necessarily includes cognitive aspects of power. The 
remaining three sites all reveal different aspects of this cognitive power, not as 
diffuse mechanisms that somehow occur freely of human agency, but rather as 
structurated cognitive and material processes. The site of knowledge and 
aesthetics -  defined here as ‘the organisation of social life around knowledge and 
discourse’ -  is the one that is perhaps the most closely related to Foucault’s own 
work, as the power of knowledge was one of his main subjects of study. The 
inclusion of aesthetics here is simply in order to broaden the idea of knowledge 
from being solely discursive -  in the form of written and spoken language -  to 
also include vocal and visual discourses, such as the media, film, television, music 
and art.
Just like all the other sites, the site of knowledge and aesthetics operates as a 
structure of power by both materially and cognitively structurating agency. 
Materially in the sense that some actors have more power than others to form 
discourses, whether that be in the role of a scientist, theorist, politician, economist, 
priest or Hollywood producer. The cognitive side to the site of knowledge and 
aesthetics is the more subconscious side of the equation, which situates people 
according to unspoken understandings about their power of knowledge.
Again, and just as with all the other sites of power, there is scope for agency 
across all levels of society -  actors frequently appear from all walks of life to 
suddenly have an influence on the socio-political stage. It is a common current 
argument that the more traditional, rigid routes of access to the site of knowledge 
and aesthetics are being opened up and ‘democratised’ for example, especially 
with the birth of the internet. Internet chatrooms, Wikipedia, Youtube and 
Myspace, to name but a few, have all opened up spaces to create new 
‘democratised’ discourses that, theoretically at least, are open access to anyone 
who wishes to participate. Aside from the previous notation that global internet 
access is currently far from becoming a material reality however, it is also 
questionable whether any of these spaces of knowledge have created discourses of
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any actual cognitive weight. For although there are certainly signs that the opening 
up of communication has connected people in ways previously unheard of, it is 
also possible that the hegemonic cognitive power of more traditional discourses 
will remain. Folklore and folk music have always existed, for example, and it is 
possible that these newer forms of discourse will also fall into this category and 
thus not be able to structurate power in the site of knowledge and aesthetics.
Once again, the case of HIV/AIDS highlights the relevance of the site of 
knowledge and aesthetics to a theory of power. As already mentioned, many 
different stories have been written about both the history and epidemiology of 
HIV/AIDS, and although neither discipline is a natural science, many historical 
and epidemiological accounts of HIV/AIDS present themselves as indisputable 
empirical fact -  and by doing so, emphasise the importance of this site as a 
resource of political power.
As already mentioned, the epidemiological study of HIV/AIDS has its roots in 
what Patton calls ‘tropical thinking’. This methodology remains a powerful 
hegemonic player in the discourse on HIV/AIDS and thus in the site of knowledge 
and aesthetics, as it still underlies much current thinking about the spread of the 
disease -  be that in the field of tropical medicine, international policy or indeed, 
common perceptions about the spread of the disease that are fuelled by media, 
religious or political groups.
One example of ‘tropical thinking’, for example, is Susan Hunter’s Who Cares? 
AIDS In Africa which, at first glance appears rich in empirical and historical 
content. There is little to no referencing to her sources in the main body of the text 
however, and the reader can only take Hunter at her own word. This is 
unfortunate, since she claims that the aim of the book is “to widen our focus from 
the relatively narrow fields of science and medicine to look at the epidemic’s 
social, political, and historical antecedents.” One of Hunter’s aims is namely to 
point out that the slave trade, colonialism, labour exploitation and the Cold War 
affected the health of Africans for many generations to come:
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“As we analyze the [AIDS] epidemic in Africa and develop strategies to mitigate its effects, it is 
critical to understand clearly the forces that set the stage therefor the epidemic’s horrible impact. 
When we take a moment to brush aside the mantle of racism inherited from colonial days -  shared, 
tragically enough, even by some Africans themselves -  to get a better idea of what Africa is really 
like and what has happened there over the past 200 years, it becomes very clear why AIDS took off 
so quickly and why it is worse in Africa than anywhere else in the world. ”623
The main problem with Hunter’s thesis however is that, underneath the ‘historical’ 
narrative is a narrative of Africa’s HIV/AIDS epidemic which is -  despite her 
aforementioned desire to ‘brush aside the mantle of racism’ -  both narrow and 
highly subjective. For although she highlights the importance of colonialism in 
contributing to Africa’s particular vulnerability to the virus, she does so from the 
viewpoint of evolutionary medicine. This leads her to make some dangerous and 
sweeping statements based on alleged (and unreferenced) biological differences 
between different human ‘races’ and between men and women that are not only 
highly questionable, but that also fail to take into account socially constructed 
diversities. Africa, for example, is generally presented as one culturally 
homogenous continent (although at one point she does at least make reference to 
the continent’s genetic diversity624), exemplified in statements such as “[i]n 
African societies, the male-female marriage bond is especially weak”625 or “[i]n 
Africa many women believe they deserve a beating”626. On differences between 
men and women, she again falls on the side of (again unreferenced) biological 
distinctions, to make such sweeping statements of ‘truth’ such as “[h]uman 
females are universally attracted to older, more stable men who can support them 
while they are pregnant and vulnerable.” This claim thus supposes that men and 
women comprise two neatly homogenous and distinct categories that are universal 
throughout the world, regardless of cultural or gendered differences. Indeed, it is 
questionable whether Hunter’s definition of ‘gender’ is the same as the usual 
social scientific definition of the term (as socially constructed differences between 
men and women) when she writes:
623 Hunter, Susan S. (2003), p54.
624 Ibid, p220.
625 Ibid, p i 97.
626 Ibid, p41.
627 Ibid, pl97.
283
"If gender relations were taken seriously in HIV/AIDS prevention programs and all other 
development programs, women could gain control o f their sexuality and exert more control over 
HIV transmission. In all known human and nonhuman societies, females are much more 
conservative and careful about choosing their mates than males. [ . . .]  It probably also explains 
why gender equity is so hard to achieve. Why would a male, driven by entirely different interests, 
voluntarily cede his control over fem ales?”628
It is obvious that Hunter means to draw attention to the very real pain and 
suffering that HIV/AIDS is causing in Africa -  as well as to find reasons for it -  
but her methodology is so flawed that her argument ultimately comes undone. The 
only two reasons it reveals for the continent’s particular susceptibility to the virus 
are: firstly, that ‘Africa’ (as a homogenous whole) suffered at the hands of (a 
presumably equally homogenous group of) colonialists; and secondly, that 
‘Africans’ constitute a distinct and separate group of people to the rest of the 
world. With regard to her first argument, it is not the point here to discredit the 
idea that the history of colonialism still has a very real and heavy impact on the 
spread of HIV/AIDS in much of the African continent -  indeed, this is also one of 
the main arguments of this thesis. Rather, it is that by lumping all Africans and 
colonialists together into two distinct homogenous groups, Hunter misses many of 
the aforementioned differences between colonial experiences on the African 
continent, as well as the varied impacts that these continue to have on the spread 
of HIV/AIDS.
"Is it ‘genocide by neglect’, as some have called the world’s failure to respond to HIV/AIDS? [ ...]  
If the rest o f the human species is more related to one another than they are related to Africans, is 
it simply a case that human genetics determines that we suffer less guilt in leaving Africa to fa ll 
into ruins? Is this intraspecies rivalry, which, as we learned from Darwin, is the most ruthless of  
all nature’s competitions? If we help Africa, are we helping the "less f i t” to survive?”629
In the end, Hunter can only appeal to the reader (who, as the statements of support 
on the back cover of the book make clear, could very well be an international 
policy maker) to find within themselves the compassion to ‘help Africa’, as the 
racist and sexist essentialism, however unintentional, that is implicit in her 
methodology makes itself all too apparent. This is perhaps why she interweaves
628 Ibid, p217.
629 Ibid, p219.
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two compassionate narratives with the ‘historical’ and ‘biological’ analysis 
throughout the book -  one based on Darwin’s personal life and one based on the 
lives of three fictitious Ugandan women (that the events and dialogues of both of 
these stories have been invented is only revealed in a footnote, leaving the more 
careless reader to believe perhaps that this is a piece of historical and/or 
anthropological fieldwork).630
It is very difficult to measure the impact that a certain discourse, much less a 
certain book, has on global policy. There has been much speculation, for example, 
about the role that the academic Samuel Huntington’s book The Clash o f 
Civilisations has played in inspiring U.S. foreign policy towards the Middle East. 
Despite the fact that Huntington was once a key advisor to the White House and 
that one might expect that his voice carried a certain weight in policy circles, it is 
almost impossible to prove that one book has altered the course of history. This 
does not mean that they cannot do so however. Religious books, for example, such 
as the Bible and the Koran, have certainly maintained an ongoing and steady 
impact on socio-political discourse for many centuries.
The point here therefore is not to single out Hunter’s book as a prime suspect of 
shaping current global discourse on HIV/AIDS. Rather, it is to point out the 
potential power that such a discourse could have on global policy. For if one were 
to hypothesise that Hunter’s book is compulsory reading for any global policy 
maker about to make a decision related to HIV/AIDS -  not an impossibility, given 
the endorsements on the back cover -  one can also imagine that their subsequent 
views on the causes and potential solutions to the epidemic might emulate her 
own. There are however a vast number of books written about HIV/AIDS and one 
might hope that an interested and competent policy maker would set about reading 
as many different views on the pandemic as possible.
Regarding the disputed origins of HIV/AIDS, for example, rather than revealing 
one dominant discourse, one is overwhelmed by the sheer magnitude of competing 
histories of the disease. For, as already mentioned earlier in this chapter, the
630 Ibid, p227.
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history of HIV/AIDS is a discourse that nobody wants to claim. Another relevant 
aspect of the site of knowledge and aesthetics is data bias. As already mentioned, 
some of the most influential academics in the study of HIV/AIDS, such as Barnett 
and Whiteside, admit that finding the correct and relevant data is in itself a major 
obstacle to any study of the subject. One popular theory about the spread of 
HIV/AIDS, for example, is that it follows migration patterns from rural to urban 
areas -  so-called urbanisation -  as discussed in the site of space above. This is a 
problematic hypothesis, however, since data collection in rural areas is 
problematic at best and impossible at worst.631 It is difficult therefore to make any 
general global comparisons in HIV/AIDS rates between rural and urban areas, 
although case specific evidence does suggest that urbanisation may be playing a 
part in the spread of HIV/AIDS in many parts of the world.
With regard to sonic and visual discourses, the case of HIV/AIDS highlights the 
importance of these too. It can easily be argued that without major Hollywood 
films (such as The Constant Gardener and Philadelphia, for example), global 
knowledge of HIV/AIDS would be limited. Knowledge comes in many forms, and 
the inclusion of sonic and visual discourses is meant here to broaden the concept 
from more traditional definitions that limit the study of knowledge to academic 
discourses and the like. HIV/AIDS reveals that knowledge can be acquired 
through many different mediums, as a structurated site of power that both enables 
and delimits agency.
For, just as with all of the other sites, agency in the site of knowledge and 
aesthetics is determined by the structurated positioning of social actors within the 
site. The first face of power determines who has the potential to shape and delimit 
discursive, visual and sonic discourses -  again, as with all of the other sites, 
multiple levels of agency are possible here. The second face of power shapes 
which discourses are brought on to the agenda in the first place -  the wealth of 
discourses on HIV/AIDS reveals that power here is, potentially at least, wide 
open, although the dominance of behavioural theories mentioned earlier in the 
thesis highlights that only certain discourses make it onto the global political
631 Barnett, Tony -  Whiteside, Alan. (2006), p58.
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arena. The third face of power, that of manipulation, is also highly relevant to the 
site of knowledge and aesthetics. As discussed above, discourses can be 
manipulated to suit certain political agendas and although it may not be possible to 
see which interests are being served (or denied), processes of manipulation 
themselves can be discerned if knowledge claims later turn out to be falsified. The 
fourth face of power is equally relevant to the site, as it reveals the unconscious 
discourses that underpin most discourses -  for subjectivity underpins all 
discourses by default.
This raises the ultimate question -  of what use then is social scientific 
‘knowledge’ if it can never be free from bias and thus reliable? Perhaps this is the 
most poignant aspect of the power of knowledge and aesthetics -  the fact that 
discourses have such great power to shape agency despite their inherent flaws. 
Indeed, agency requires some form of knowledge in order to happen at all, 
otherwise all action would be unconscious and spontaneous. The significance of 
knowledge and aesthetics as a resource of power therefore is its ability to justify 
and legitimise those actions, whatever the outcome. In the case of HIV/AIDS, it is 
clear that different discourses of knowledge have been used by each of the 
relevant polities -  from those that choose the uncertainties surrounding the disease 
to justify inaction, to those that use the magnitude of its spread to justify anything 
from enforced national screening and subsequent quarantine, to those that 
advocate abstinence from sex or traditional healing as a means of protection 
against the disease.
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The Site o f Morality & Emotion -  The Moral and Emotional Structuration of 
Agency
It is clear then that certain socio-political issues carry more material and/or 
cognitive value than others. Whereas the ownership of tales of conquest and 
victory is often desired and thus fought over, tales such as that of HIV/AIDS are 
often thrown aside and dropped like hot potatoes. For the case of HIV/AIDS 
reveals another important aspect of power -  namely that of the site of morality and 
emotion. This is defined here as ‘the organisation of social life around morality 
and emotion’ and is one of the deeper cognitive structures of power. Again, it is a 
site that involves overt material as well as covert cognitive struggle. The material 
aspects of this site consist of the more overt conflicts over moral and emotional 
issues, such as open socio-political struggles between various religious and/or 
secular polities on how to organise moral and emotional life, e.g. through 
conflicting views on polygamous versus monogamous lifestyles. The more covert 
cognitive aspects refer, once again, to the subconscious side of this site. Indeed, 
agency in these issues can be so deeply cognitively structurated that it barely 
appears to be agency at all. For this is a site where agency is often argued to be 
‘natural’, preordained or even commanded by some higher power. Morality and 
emotion cut to the very core of what it means to be a human being, thus making it 
a highly contested site of power.
As such, the site of morality and emotion also serves as a useful analytical concept 
that can show why some social actors have a greater capacity to act than others. 
One’s moral or emotional positioning can quite simply determine whether or not 
one has the potential to change a current power relationship. For, just as with all 
the other sites, morality and emotion operates as a structure of power by both 
materially and cognitively situating agents in their respective positions of power. 
The relevant polities may be the same as in the other sites, since morality and 
emotion is controlled through the discourse of religious leaders, politicians, 
academics and other social polities. However, it also includes the often unspoken 
moral and emotional discourses of the masses -  the everyday moral and emotional 
coding that structurates what agency is deemed possible. For the distinction I am 
trying to make here is between the previous more intellectualised and rationalised
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discourses in the site of knowledge and aesthetics, for example, and these more 
hidden discourses that are rarely questioned and thus justified.
A classic example would be that between a priest and a thief, or an emperor and a 
pirate. Even though the moral power of both sides is structurated and thus not 
natural or preordained, the former group is much more likely to have access to the 
resource of morality and emotion than the latter group, which is more likely to be 
shunned from society. Exceptions to this include the ‘Robin Hoods’ of society, 
who turn morality on its head and go against the hegemonic moral grain. These 
instances are exceptional however in their very visibility and may thus serve as an 
indicator of the often unspoken moral codes of a society. With regard to emotion, 
there may also be a great deal of difference, for example, between the socio­
political power of an actor who is outwardly perceived to be cold and rational and 
an actor who is perceived to be emotional and vulnerable. For although these are 
all culturally relative values, it could be argued that, in some prevalent hegemonic 
socio-political discourses at least, the emotions of mutual love and 
communication, for example, are often not as highly valued as the emotions of 
self-preservation and self-improvement. After all, a militarised and capitalist 
culture needs a different fuel than one which promotes peace and solidarity.
The case of HIV/AIDS once more proves the usefulness of such an analytical 
concept. As already mentioned, there is a stigma attached to the disease that not 
only reduces the agency of those carrying the disease but can even result in 
premature death, by stoning by the community etc. This stigma proves the 
irrational side to agency -  one that is governed by core values and emotions, rather 
than rationalised ‘knowledge’ and debate. Indeed, the site of morality and emotion 
refers to issues that are rarely brought up to debate at all -  the truly hidden aspects 
of power. The stigma attached to the disease is only one of these -  also relevant is 
the often unquestioned social positioning of the actor in the first place. This is the 
site where social conditioning has its deepest roots, where struggles over what it 
means to be a man or a woman, an African or a Westerner, are both materially and 
cognitively fought over. The whole Self and Other discourse may be 
intellectualised and rationalised in the site of knowledge and aesthetics, but it is 
fuelled by the heated core values contested over in the site of morality and
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emotion. The resulting conflicts within individuals themselves is the final subject 
of study in the next site of power, that of identities. The focus here is on the 
broader moral and emotional contexts that lead to these conflicts in the first place.
Regarding the origin of the virus, for example -  does one blame an unknown 
person for being the first ever to contract the disease, the institutions that turned a 
blind eye to the disease in the initial stages of the various epidemics, or the socio­
political structural constraints that facilitated the spread of the disease in the first 
place? Can one really blame anyone at all for the successful mutation of a 
biological organism into a killer virus? Or is it the fact that it is spread by human 
behaviour -  through unprotected sex or needle use -  that makes HIV/AIDS such a 
controversial disease? In his book Body Count: How they turned Aids into a 
catastrophe, Peter Gill writes:
“Of the 25 million who have died since 1981, many could have been saved. They 
died because governments, in the rich world and the poor world, and institutions 
with global responsibility like the churches failed in their humanitarian duty. [...] 
Governments in the poor world must make an earnest priority o f health and 
education, and the rich world must never again put demands for fiscal discipline 
ahead o f people's lives. [...] Most o f the people newly infected with HIV in Africa 
are women. They have little or no control over their sexual and reproductive lives.
632They are often coerced into sex and cannot insist on protection. ”
As should be clear by now, agency and thus responsibility in a structurated world 
is notoriously difficult to attribute. Agency in this site is similar to that in the 
others therefore, in that it too operates across multiple levels, through the four 
faces of power. The first face of power denotes those overt conflicts of power, 
where moral and emotional codes are openly contested. The second face of power 
denotes which moral and emotional issues are brought to the political agenda at all 
-  the case of HIV/AIDS reveals the reluctance with which ‘glocal’ polities, 
traditionally at least, have dealt with issues such as sex and death. The third face 
of power can be found in processes of manipulation in the site -  moral and
632 Gill, Peter. (2006), pl96.
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emotional codes (however covert) can be used to structurate agency in any of the 
other sites. The fourth face of power lies at the very root of the site -  for what is 
moral and emotional conditioning if not self-policing? This again reveals the 
positive aspects of power however, for agency without any moral or emotional 
self-policing at all risks not only disempowering the social actor in question, but 
also all of those affected by his/her/its agency.
It is clear then that the stigma attached to the vims depends on the moral and 
emotional coding of the issue. Certain socio-political issues simply have greater 
moral and emotional value than others. Sex and death are two issues that are 
highly contested socio-political issues, for example. Although again culturally 
relative, these are often private affairs but also heavily regulated ones. To return to 
Foucault once more, the issues of sex and death, as well as madness, reveal the 
most hidden regulatory mechanisms of a society. And these are ultimately 
conditioned in the site of morality and emotion. In the case of HIV/AIDS 
therefore, it is clear that social and ultimately biological death is heavily 
determined and regulated by the moral and emotional values attached to sex and 
drug use in the first place, and death in the final instance. For as long as these 
issues are hidden and kept out of socio-political discourse, the moral and 
emotional structures affecting them too remain hidden and out of sight. Brought 
into the open however and these core values and beliefs reveal themselves as 
constituting powerful discourses of either social acceptance or stigma. The 
resulting agency depends on the hegemonic moral and emotional discourses in the 
society in question.
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The Site of Identities -  The Multiple Structuration of Agency
“[W]hy should we assume that an individual or a collectivity has a particular set of interests 
simply because one aspect of their identity fits into one social category? [...N]arratives are not 
incorporated into the self in any direct way; rather they are mediated through the enormous 
spectrum of social and political relations that constitute our social world. ”633
The final site of power is defined as ‘the organisation of social life around the Self 
and the Other’ (as advocated by much social identity theory) and refers to the 
multiple structuration of identities and thus agency. For, as already mentioned, a 
Foucaultian analysis recognises that identities are never static and homogenous 
but are rather always fluid and heterogenous. It is close to impossible, for 
example, to answer the questions ‘what is a woman?’ or ‘who is African?’ 
‘Women’ and ‘Africans’ have many different identities, both within themselves 
and between each other.
Like all of the other sites, the site of identities is both structurated by and 
structurates agency and operates both materially and cognitively. Materially in the 
sense that many groups overtly exercise their power over individual identities, 
advocating a Self to belong to as opposed to an Other. The more cognitive and 
covert processes involved here however are within the groups and indeed within 
the individuals themselves. There is nothing essential about being a woman in a 
rural setting for example -  indeed, even if one were somehow able to 
anthropologically pin down the exact socio-political conditioning of an individual, 
noting everything from a person’s religious and cultural background to their 
personal upbringing and environment, one would not be sure that one would have 
fully grasped their identity. One ‘woman’ is not another ‘woman’ alike -  there are 
multiple identities at work within each individual that either constrain or enable 
the potential for agency.
The difference between the site of identities and Held’s site of culture is thus that 
the focus here is on individual identity as a resource of power, rather than on the 
cultured norms and practices that homogenise group identity. Both sites of power
633 Somers, Margaret R. -  Gibson, Gloria D., 1994, p66-67.
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are deemed here to be equally relevant -  Held’s site of culture denotes the broader 
mechanisms at play in structurated relations of power. What I want to explore here 
is the socio-psychological and cognitive make-up of the individual him/-herself. 
For how one defines oneself internally determines how one re-/acts in all other 
social situations, not only within cultural settings but also within all of the other 
sites of power.
It is thus argued here that the site of identities constitutes a resource of power that 
is as heavily contested as all of the others. A successful polity is one that manages 
to structurate their identity as being the dominant one. The most extreme and 
recent examples of this are perhaps the attempts in the 20th Century to create 
holistic Fascist and Communist identities respectively, as identities that overrode 
all other conflicting identities such as religious or cultural ones. However, it is a 
site of power that is as relevant today as it has ever been. And HIV/AIDS once 
again provides an illustrative example of this conflict of interests within the Self.
The example of HIV/AIDS reveals how one of the most complex human identities 
-  namely sexuality -  can suddenly enter the global political arena, both affecting 
and being affected by the other sites of power. Indeed, it is possible that one of the 
reasons that global policies on the issue have so far been inefficient at curbing the 
disease could be because it is so difficult not only to account for, but also to 
explain and understand individual sexual identity. Equally, it is also possible that 
much of the outward projection of stigma towards the Others carrying the virus is 
the result of a denial of the Selfs own sexual desires and thus also potential 
vulnerability to the disease. As already mentioned, there have been numerous 
studies which show that there are many unifying trends in sexual behaviour across 
the world, (albeit ‘glocally’ specific ones), thus directly countering, for example, 
age-old institutionally racist ideas about the over-sexualised, polygamous 
‘African’. The fact that these behaviours are universal however, could thus also 
signify an example of the projection of attributes that one fears in one’s Self onto 
the Other. Protection against the virus is also deeply rooted in the site of identities. 
As already mentioned, many educated and empowered people in various parts of 
the world fail to protect themselves, thus signifying deeper cognitive structures at
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play. For at the heart of the intimate realm of power lie the deepest human socio- 
psychological mechanisms that govern why certain agency occurs.
Identities thus play an important part in shaping agency in all of the other sites. 
And just as with all of the other sites, agency in the site of identities occurs at 
multiple levels of society, both shaping and being shaped by structurated relations 
of power. The first face of power is revealed in overt conflicts of interest in the 
site -  the struggle over identities is one that polities in most sites engage in, 
demanding allegiance to their particular cause or identity. The second face of 
power reveals, for example, the denial of underlying Self identities that may be the 
cause of social stigma or hatred of the Other. The third face allows room for the 
covert processes of manipulation that shape these Self and Other identities, while 
the fourth face reveals how the individual can self-police him-/herself into being 
either the Self or the Other, or indeed both at once! For identities are never easily 
understood, even on an individual level, and so trying to grasp them on a global 
level is difficult if not impossible to achieve, without running the risk of thus 
essentialising them. This does not mean that the site of identities has no place in a 
theory of global power however -  on the contrary, exploring the many possible 
conflicts of identity that exist both between and within individuals themselves 
highlights many of the ways in which ‘glocal’ power both structurates and is 
structurated by this site.
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Conclusion -  The Relevance o f the Additional Five Sites of Power to HIV/AIDS 
as an Example o f ‘Glocalised’ Power
Including the site of time in an analysis of HIV/AIDS highlights the importance of 
prevailing colonial and patriarchal structures in determining who in the world is 
currently most vulnerable to the HIV virus -  which, at this time, is predominantly 
women in the so-called ‘developing’ world. Including the site of space highlights 
the importance of the geographical and demographic aspects of the disease, as it is 
primarily thought to be spread through the mechanisms of urbanisation and 
globalisation, and is causing dramatic demographic changes to the societies thus 
affected. The site of knowledge and aesthetics adds the Foucaultian twist to the 
tale if you will. In general, not having access to knowledge handicaps your 
capacities as a social actor which, in the case of HIV/AIDS, can be a matter of life 
or death. The site of morality and emotion, in its turn, highlights the extreme 
sensitivity at the core of the issue -  namely that of the action of having sex. Sex is 
one of the most private of human actions and yet is also one of the most heavily 
regulated, across both time and space. Frequently, these regulations cut to the very 
core of the human condition, namely that of morality and emotion, governing what 
individuals both think and feel about HIV and sex. This site also highlights the 
stigma that is often attached to ‘coming out’ as an HIV sufferer -  which can itself 
be highly constraining to social agency and can, in extreme cases, even lead to 
death (by stoning by the community etc.). The site of identities is also at the very 
heart of the HIV issue, highlighting the variance in attitudes towards the disease 
between individuals within otherwise seemingly ‘homogenous-looking’ groups.
All of these five sites, together with Held’s original seven, are structurated through 
agency -  both shaping and being shaped by social action. It is the argument here 
that any analysis of ‘glocal’ relations of power must include all of these twelve 
sites, in order to fully comprehend the relations of power that operate in a specific 
empirical context. For none of the sites operates without the other, so to speak -  
the relations of power in one affect relations of power in another, in a continuous 
process of structuration.
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Chapter Nine -  Conclusion: The Implications of A Structurated 
Analysis of ‘Glocal’ Power for the Study of World Politics
This thesis has argued that traditional theories of world power typically fall into 
one of three categories: i) behaviouralist, which typically focus on the power of 
social actors to change or maintain relations of power; ii) structuralist, which 
typically view power as a social structure that constrains or facilitates all actors in 
their capacities to change these power relations; and iii) post-modernist, which 
reject the notion of theorising about power altogether, maintaining that the very 
discourse of power itself constitutes a relation of power that benefits some actors 
at the cost of others. Each of these approaches highlights important aspects of 
power, but none of them alone fully reveals the complexities of power. Instead, all 
three approaches need to be combined, using theories of structuration and 
Foucaultian relational power. For power is a multifaceted concept that has many 
different ‘faces’ of agency as well as structures, dependent on the empirical 
context that is under study.
One of the main points of the thesis is that one cannot equate agency and structure 
as denoting the same thing -  they necessarily require the existence of each other 
and are interdependent, but must be kept ontologically separate. Power has also 
been defined here as an ontological concept in its own right, as the glue which 
connects structure and agency. It has been argued that the definition of any of 
these concepts will always be up for debate however, as they may be ontological -  
in that they exist -  but any definition of them will always be epistemological. This 
thesis has also found that there are still many issues which remain unresolved 
within the structurationist literature, namely: i) the degree of autonomy (and/or 
knowledgeability) granted to the actor; ii) the degree of autonomy granted to 
structure; iii) the distinction between structure and system; iv) the number of 
structuration processes involved (duality or ‘tripality’); v) the role of time and 
space in these processes; vi) the different resources of power available to 
individuals; and vii) the potential for social change/power of resistance.
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I have consequently offered my own epistemological account of power, in an 
attempt to account for how it connects agency and structure through processes of 
structurationism. Agency here has been defined using Wight’s extended definition 
of social action, where agencyi refers to the ‘freedom of subjectivity’, agency2 
refers to the way in which agencyi becomes an agent of something and agency3 
refers to those ‘positioned-practice places’ which agentsi inhabit. This agency has 
been further defined using the four faces of power: i) decision-making; ii) agenda- 
setting; iii) processes of manipulation; iv) self-policing, to which I have also added 
the concepts of ‘ghosts’ and ‘myths of agency’. It has been argued that the 
structural side of the structurationist equation of power must include both material 
and cognitive structural realities, in order to bridge the structurationist/Foucaultian 
divide. To this end, structural power has been defined using Held’s seven sites of 
power, to which I have added an additional five sites, namely: i) the site of space; 
ii) the site of time; iii) the site of knowledge and aesthetics; iv) the site of morality 
and emotion; v) the site of identities; vi) the site of the body; vii) the site of 
welfare; viii) the site of culture/cultural life; ix) the site of civic associations; x) 
the site of the economy; xi) the site of the organisation of violence and coercive 
relations; xii) the site of regulatory and legal organisation.
I have argued for the empirical analysis of the structurated action of polities in 
each site of power, both with regard to their exercise of power, as well as the 
constraints they face from other actors, as well as regarding access to other sites. 
For these sites of power are not mutually exclusive, but rather intertwine with each 
other -  thus, polities in one site will naturally interact with polities in others. It is 
not then simply the case of reviewing each site as a separate entity, but rather a 
matter of seeing which key polities and which other sites have a bearing on the 
relationships in that particular site of power.
In the second half of the thesis, I have then used the particular case of HIV/AIDS 
to illustrate this epistemological account of power. The resulting analysis has 
shown that most mainstream approaches to HIV/AIDS can also be divided into the 
three categories: i) behavioualist; ii) structuralist; and iii) post-modernist. Arguing 
once more for the integration of all three approaches, I have argued that it is 
analytically more useful to speak of a current ‘glocalisation’ of the HIV/AIDS
297
virus to sub-Saharan Africa, since that region’s particular vulnerability to the 
disease has not only to do with global factors, both past, present and future, but 
also to do with varying local cultural, social, economic and political contexts that 
heighten the vulnerability of some parts of the continent and lessen that of others, 
as well as, of course, individual behaviour. Current differences in vulnerability to 
the HIV virus thus depend on ‘glocal’ structural inequalities as well as behavioural 
actions on the part of both individuals and policy makers alike. These structurated 
inequalities have then been exemplified in each of the twelve sites of power, in 
order to reveal not only the importance of each site on its own, but also the 
interdependence of the sites, since relations of power not only extend across all of 
the sites, but also across multiple levels of agency. Indeed, the overall contribution 
of the thesis is to argue for an empirical, structurated and ‘glocalised’ approach to 
the issue of world power relationships that accounts for the structurated agency of 
polities across the twelve sites of power. For it is only thus that ‘glocal’ realities 
can be more accurately discerned.
There are of course many limitations to any theory of power and this thesis is no 
exception. To begin with, it contains a broad and complicated set of arguments -  
indeed, each chapter (as well as each face and site of power) could probably fill an 
entire thesis in its own right. The illustration of HIV/AIDS has necessarily had to 
be brief, but then as Burton has made clear, it is close to impossible to fully 
account for all of the relevant relations of world power with regard to a particular 
issue. There are also epistemological limitations to the theory offered in this thesis 
however -  for as has been maintained throughout, any definition of power is 
necessarily epistemological and will thus always be up for dispute. Those theories 
which hold up best are those on which most theorists can agree -  it has merely 
been the aim here to offer a new way of looking at power, so that its definition 
might be further debated and refined. Indeed, there are many aspects of the theory 
that could be explored in future research -  the ghosts and myths of agency, for 
example, the structurated relationships between the twelve sites of power, as well 
as the processes of ‘glocalisation’ across the twelve sites all inspire further 
enquiry. It would also be equally rewarding to conduct a more extended 
structurated analysis of HIV/AIDS across the twelve sites of power than has been 
possible here.
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The main inspiration behind this project has always been the theoretical 
underpinnings of the concept of power and its implications for theories of world 
power however. For what power is and how it affects world relations is a debate 
which is still in its infancy within the discipline of IR. It is thus the hope here that 
this thesis may at least prise open the debate a little further, so that power in world 
relations can be more fully understood and better explained than has been the case 
thus far. For if critical theories, such as post-modernism and feminism, are to be 
fully integrated into mainstream IR theory, the discipline needs to expand its 
toolbox of theoretical concepts, in order to be able to account for relations of 
power that cannot be analysed in the world of states and states alone.
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